Smiley et al v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Company et al

Filing 212

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 192 MOTION to Intervene filed by Greenblatt, Pierce, Funt & Flores LLC.Signed by Honorable Malachy E Mannion on 9/21/20. (bs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BOBBI-JO SMILEY, AMBER
BLOW, and KELSEY TURNER

:
:

Plaintiffs

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-2380
:

v.

(JUDGE MANNION)
:

E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS
AND COMPANY, and ADECCO
USA, INC.

:
:

Defendants
MEMORANDUM
I. INTRODUCTION
Presently before the court is a motion to intervene filed by Greenblatt,
Pierce, Funt & Flores LLC (hereinafter “GPFF”). (Doc. 192). Based on the
following, GPFF’s motion to intervene shall be DENIED without prejudice to
GPFF’s right to file an independent cause of action.

II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) provides in pertinent part that
“the court must permit anyone to intervene who . . . claims an interest relating
to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so
situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or

impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties
adequately represent that interest.” The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit has held
that a non-party is permitted to intervene under Fed.R.Civ.P.
24(a)(2) only if: “(1) the application for intervention is timely; (2)
the applicant has a sufficient interest in the litigation; (3) the
interest may be affected or impaired, as a practical matter by the
disposition of the action; and (4) the interest is not adequately
represented by an existing party in the litigation.
Mountain Top Condominium Ass’n v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72
F.3d 361, 365-66 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592,
596 (3d Cir. 1987).

III. DISCUSSION
In September of 2012, GPFF and another law firm entered an
engagement agreement to represent the plaintiffs in this matter. (Doc. 193,
at 2). Under this agreement, the two law firms agreed to evenly split forty
percent “of the total proceeds of any settlement or judgment and attorneys’
fees awarded for their services, together with all costs and expenses.” (Doc.
193, at 2-3). On August 8, 2018, GPFF filed a motion to withdraw as plaintiffs’
counsel (Doc. 159), which was granted on September 4, 2018 (Doc. 164).
Now, as this case is scheduled for a hearing on final settlement approval,

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GPFF filed the instant motion to intervene to protect its interest in its
contingency fee.
GPFF is unable to satisfy all the elements required to intervene herein.
With respect to the second prong of the requirements for intervention, the
Third Circuit has provided some guidance to the courts in determining
whether a sufficient interest has been provided.
While the precise nature of the interest required to intervene as
of right has eluded precise and authoritative definition, some
general guidelines have emerged…. An intervenor’s interest
must be one that is significantly protectable. This means that the
interest must be a legal interest as distinguished from interests
of general and indefinite character. The applicant must
demonstrate that there is a tangible threat to a legally cognizable
interest to have the right to intervene. This interest is recognized
as belonging to or one being owned by the proposed
intervenors…. In general, a mere economic interest in the
outcome of litigation is insufficient to support a motion to
intervene. Thus, the mere fact that a lawsuit may impede a third
party’s ability to recover in a separate suit ordinarily does not give
the third party a right to intervene….
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc., 419 F.3d 216, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2005)
(quoting Mountain Top Condominium Ass’n, 72 F.3d at 366) (internal
citations and brackets omitted).
Rule 24 states that an intervenor must claim “an interest relating to the
property or transaction that is the subject of the action . . . .” FED. R. CIV.
P. 24(a) (emphasis added). The subject of this case is the defendants’
alleged failure to pay all wages to their employees. GPFF does not claim to
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have any interest in the unpaid wage claims; they contend that they are
entitled to attorney’s fees and costs from the proposed settlement between
the parties. GPFF’s demand for attorney’s fees is a collateral dispute based
on a contractual relationship GPFF has with another law firm. Therefore, the
court finds that GPFF does not have a sufficient interest warranting
intervention.
Based on the foregoing, GPFF’s motion to intervene (Doc. 192) shall
be DENIED without prejudice to GPFF’s right to file an independent cause
of action. An appropriate order shall issue.

s/

Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
DATE: September 21, 2020
12-2380-01

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