Williams v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections at SCI Camp Hill et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: it is ORDERED that: 1.Mr. Williams Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 7) is construed as a motion to proceed without full prepayment of fees and costs, and is GRANTED.2.Mr. Williams claims against the Departme nt of Corrections, SCI-Camp Hill, Secretary Wetzel, Superintendent Ditty, CHCA Law and Prison Health Services, Inc. are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.3.Within twe nty-one (21) days from the date of this order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint in this action in accordance with the foregoing Memorandum.4.The Clerk of Court shall forward to Plaintiff two (2) copies of this Courts prisoner civil-rights com plaint form which Plaintiff shall use in preparing any amended complaint he may file. 5.Failure to file an amended complaint as directed within the required time will result in this action being dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/24/13. (jam)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DARYL WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff
v.
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS at SCI CAMP HILL,
et al.,
Defendants
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
CIVIL NO. 3:CV-12-2440
(Judge Caputo)
MEMORANDUM
I.
Introduction
Daryl Williams, a state inmate formerly housed at SCI-Camp Hill, in Camp
Hill, Pennsylvania,1 files this pro se civil rights action alleging that prison officials and
medical staff violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they failed to perform
recommended imaging studies of his injured neck. (Doc. 1, Compl.) Mr. Williams
names the following as defendants: the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
(DOC); John Wetzel, DOC’s Secretary; Jeffrey Ditty, SCI-Camp Hill’s
Superintendent; Teresa Law, Corrections Health Care Administrator (CHCA); Prison
Health Services (PHS), SCI-Camp Hill’s contract medical care provider; and Dr.
John Doe, PHS’s chief medical officer at SCI-Camp Hill. Mr. Williams has also filed
an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 7.)
1
Mr. Williams is presently housed at Alle Kiski Pavillion in Arnold, Pennsylvania.
(Doc. 6, Notice of Change of Address.)
The Complaint is before the court for preliminary screening pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Upon screening the Complaint, the
court will grant Mr. Williams’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 7), but
dismiss the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) due to Mr. Williams’
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted against the named
defendants. Mr. Williams, however, will be granted leave to file an amended
complaint to identify those SCI-Camp Hill prison and/or medical professionals who
allegedly violated his Eighth Amendment rights by denying him prompt and
adequate medical treatment for his neck injury.
II.
Background
In May 2011, while housed at SCI-Camp Hill, Mr. Williams fell down a flight of
stairs fracturing his head, neck, shoulders and arm. (Doc. 1, Compl. at ¶¶ 8-9.) In
August 2011, he was seen by a “bone specialist” who recommended he receive a
“CAT scan and MRI for surgery.” (Id., ¶ 10.) Mr. Williams remained at SCI-Camp
Hill for four months after seeing the “bone specialist,” yet he never received the
recommended “MRI, CAT scan, or surgery” despite his deteriorating neurological
status. (Id., ¶ 11.) Mr. Williams claims PHS maintains a practice of utilizing the
least expensive treatment whenever possible to address prisoner medical issues in
order to save money. (Id., ¶¶ 13-14.) Mr. Williams seeks compensatory and punitive
damages from the defendants.
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III.
Standard of Review
When a litigant seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, without the prepayment
of fees, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, requires the court to screen a compliant. Likewise, when
a prisoner seeks redress from a government defendant in a civil action, whether
proceeding in forma pauperis or not, the court is mandated to screen the complaint.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915(A) give the
court the authority to dismiss a complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1)-(2).
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact. See
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003)(citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 327-28, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1832-33, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989)). In deciding
whether the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, the court
employs the standard used to analyze motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). Under Rule
12(b)(6), we must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). The court may also rely on exhibits
attached to the complaint and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502
F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
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Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), a complaint need only “include a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to
give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” “[T]he factual allegations of a complaint ‘must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level’ and the complaining party must offer ‘more than
labels and conclusions’ or ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’”
W. Run Student Hous. Assocs., LLC. v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 169
(3d Cir. 2013)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct.
1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Legal conclusions are “not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012)(citing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
Finally, we note that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard
than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys and are to be liberally construed. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081
(2007); Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009). Pro se litigants are to
be granted leave to file a curative amended complaint even when a plaintiff does not
seek leave to amend, unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.
See Philips, 515 F.3d at 245-46 (citing Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir.
2004)). However, a complaint that sets forth facts which affirmatively demonstrate
that the plaintiff has no right to recover is properly dismissed without leave to
amend. Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 2002).
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IV.
Discussion
A.
The Department of Corrections and SCI-Camp Hill are
not “persons” for the purposes of a § 1983 action.
To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead two essential elements: (1) the
conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law;
and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d
Cir. 2009).
Mr. Williams claims against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
(DOC) and SCI-Camp Hill are subject to dismissal as they are not “persons”
amendable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); Pettaway v. SCI
Albion, 487 F. App’x 766, 768 (3d Cir. 2012). Furthermore, Mr. Williams will not be
granted leave to amend his claims against these defendants as doing so would be
futile.
B.
Mr. Williams’ Eighth Amendment Claim of Deliberate
Indifference to his Serious Medical Needs.
1.
Eighth Amendment Standard
To establish an Eighth Amendment medical claim, a plaintiff must show "(i) a
serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate
deliberate indifference to that need." Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318
F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir.
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1999). A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that a layperson would recognize the
need for a doctor's attention. Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834
F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). In addition, “if ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain’ results as a consequence of denial or delay in the provision of adequate
medical care, the medical need is of the serious nature contemplated by the eighth
amendment.” Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290,
50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)). Therefore, deliberate indifference may be manifested by
an intentional refusal to provide medical care, delayed medical treatment for
non-medical reasons, a denial of prescribed medical treatment, or a denial of
reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury. Durmer v.
O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218,
235 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting White v. Napolean, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990)
(finding “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” standard is met when
pain is intentionally inflicted on a prisoner, where the denial of reasonable requests
for medical treatment exposes an inmate to undue suffering or the threat of tangible
residual injury, or when, despite a clear need for medical care, there is an intentional
refusal to provide that care)).
A finding of deliberate indifference must be based on what an official actually
knew, rather than what a reasonable person should have known. See
Beers–Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 131 (3d Cir. 2001). A prison official acts
with deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs when he "knows of
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and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). “If a prisoner is
under the care of medical experts . . . a non-medical prison official will generally be
justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236.
Accordingly, absent a belief or actual knowledge that medical personnel mistreated
or failed to treat a prisoner, the non-medical defendants cannot be charged with the
Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference. Id. Deliberate
indifference, however, can be established by a prison official’s “intentionally denying
or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment
once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05, 97 S.Ct. at 291.
An inmate’s mere disagreement with medical professionals “as to the proper
medical treatment” of his medical complaint does not support an Eighth Amendment
violation. See Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346. Likewise, a
claim that a doctor or medical department was negligent does not rise to the level of
an Eighth Amendment violation simply because the patient is a prisoner. Estelle,
429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292. Accordingly, a "medical decision not to order an
X-ray, or like measures, does not represent cruel and unusual punishment. At most
it is medical malpractice." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107, 97 S.Ct. at 293. Also, a
doctor's disagreement with another doctor’s professional judgment is not actionable
under the Eighth Amendment. See White, 897 F.2d at 110. In sum, negligence,
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unsuccessful medical treatment, or medical malpractice do not give rise to a § 1983
cause of action, and an inmate's disagreement with medical treatment is insufficient
to establish deliberate indifference. See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235; see also Durmer,
991 F.2d at 69.
Additionally, a section 1983 claim cannot be premised on a theory of
respondeat superior. In order to establish liability for the deprivation of a
constitutional right, a party must show the personal involvement of each defendant.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, 129 S.Ct. at 1948; Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d
121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). “It is uncontested that a government official is liable only
for his or her own conduct and accordingly must have had some sort of personal
involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct.” Argueta v. U.S. I.C.E., 643
F.3d 60, 71-72 (3d Cir. 2011). This personal involvement can be shown where a
defendant personally directs the wrongs, or has actual knowledge of the wrongs and
acquiesces in them. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988);
A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir.
2004)(noting that “a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she
participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as
the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates'
violations”). A defendant “cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation
which he or she neither participated in nor approved.” C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226
F.3d 198, 201-202 (3d Cir. 2000).
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2.
Mr. Williams Fails to State Eighth Amendment Claim
against Secretary Wetzel, Superintendent Ditty, and
CHCA Teresa Law.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that Superintendents and CHCAs
are “undisputably administrators, [and] not doctors.” Thomas v. Dragovich, 142 F.
App’x 33, 39 (3d Cir. 2005). Thus, it is clear that Secretary Wetzel, Superintendent
Ditty and CHCA Law are non-medical prison personnel in the sense that they are
not responsible for directly rendering medical care to Mr. Williams. Thus, in order to
state an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference against them, Mr.
Williams must show that they possessed actual knowledge or a reason to believe
that “prison doctors or their assistants [were] mistreating (or not treating)” him.
Spruill, 372 F.3d at 326.
Mr. Williams’ only mention of Secretary Wetzel, Superintendent Ditty and
CHCA Law is in conjunction with the conclusory statement that they were
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs because they knew of PHS’s practice of
withholding necessary medical care from prisoners so they could maximize their
profits. (Doc. 1, ¶¶14-16.) However, Mr. Williams does not allege that any of these
defendants knew or should have known that his treating physicians were mistreating
him, or withholding medical care from him, for such nefarious reasons. Mr. Williams’
statement that hundreds of SCI-Camp Hill inmates have filed grievances and
lawsuits against PHS does not suggest how or why Secretary Wetzel,
Superintendent Ditty, or CHCA Law knew, or should have known, that PHS was
withholding medically necessary diagnostic tests or procedures from him for non-
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medical reasons, or that his medical needs were not being properly addressed.
Likewise, Mr. Williams cannot assert an Eighth Amendment claim against
these defendants based on their administrative titles, or supervisory roles, within
SCI-Camp Hill’s chain-of-command. As noted above, prison officials may not be
held responsible for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a
theory of respondeat superior. Argueta, 643 F.3d at 72.
Clearly, Mr. Williams’ claims against these defendants are based on their
supervisory positions within the prison and unsupported allegations of imputed and
assumed knowledge, and speculative tolerance of past misbehavior by PHS’s
practice of withholding medically necessary care for purely financial reasons. These
allegations are insufficient to set forth an Eighth Amendment claim against
Secretary Wetzel, Superintendent Ditty, or CHCA Law. Mr. Williams claims against
these defendants, as set forth in the Complaint, are subject to dismissal pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
3.
Mr. Williams Fails to State a Claim against PHS.
According to the Complaint, PHS holds a contract with SCI-Camp Hill to
provide medical care for inmates incarcerated there. (Doc. 1, ¶14.) Mr. Williams
alleges that Dr. John Doe,2 an employee of PHS, and PHS denied him medically
necessary imaging studies and treatment for his fractured neck for purely economic
reasons. (Id., ¶¶14-16.) Specifically, he alleges Dr. Doe and PHS have a practice
2
Mr. Williams has yet to identify who his treating physician(s) was while he was
housed at SCI-Camp Hill.
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and policy of “choosing the least costly medical treatment of prisoners in order to
make the highest profit at the detriment of inmate health”. (Id., ¶ 14.) This is Mr.
Williams’ sole explanation of why the “bone specialist[’s]” recommendations that he
receive a CAT scan and MRI were not followed during the four month period he
remained at SCI-Camp Hill.
A private corporation, such as PHS, may be sued under § 1983 for actions
taken under color of state law that deprive a prisoner of adequate medical care.
Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003).
However, PHS cannot be held responsible for the acts of its employees under a
theory of respondeat superior. See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Serv.,
436 U.S. 658, 691-94, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); see also
Afdahl v. Cancellierie, 463 F. App’x 104, 109 (3d Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential).
Instead, to establish liability against PHS, Mr. Williams must demonstrate that he
suffered a violation of his federal rights because of a PHS policy, practice, or
custom.3 See Natale, 318 F.3d at 583-84; see also C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.,
430 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 2005). After establishing that a policy or custom exists, a
3
For purposes of meeting this standard, a policy exists when a
municipal decision-maker with final authority issues an official
proclamation. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 263
(3d Cir. 2010). A custom exists when “practices of state
officials [are] so permanent and well settled as to virtually
constitute law.” Id. (internal citations omitted). To prove policy
or custom, a plaintiff must show “that a [decision-maker] is
responsible either for the policy or, through acquiescence, for
the custom.” Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ.,
587 F.3d 176, 193 (3d Cir. 2009).
Kean v. Henry, No. 12-1756, 2013 WL 1802632, *2 (3d Cir. Apr. 30, 2013).
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plaintiff must satisfy the causation requirement by demonstrating that the policy or
custom was the moving force behind the injury alleged. Watson v. Abington Twp.,
336 F. App’x 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2009).
Here, Mr. Williams asserts that PHS has a policy, custom, and practice of
putting profits ahead of the medical needs of prisoners for whom they are contracted
to provide medical care. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a mere
claim that cost was taken into account when denying a prisoner’s medical procedure
does not per se establish the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim.
In Winslow v. Prison Health Services, 406 F. App’x 671 (3d Cir. 2011), the court
held that “the naked assertion that Defendants considered cost in treating Winslow’s
hernia does not suffice to state a claim for deliberate indifference, as prisoners do
not have a constitutional right to limitless medical care, free of the cost constraints
under which law-abiding citizens receive treatment.” Winslow, 406 F. App’x at 674.
Here, even if the court assumes, as we must, that PHS considered costs when
determining Mr. Williams’ appropriate course of medical treatment while he was
housed at SCI-Camp Hill, he has not alleged that they wantonly or recklessly
disregarding a substantial risk to his health or safety. He does not suggest he did
not receive any medical care for his injuries. Rather, as set forth in the Complaint,
he avers that his treating PHS physician did not order imaging tests recommended
by another physician for four months for financial reasons. These allegations fail to
set forth an Eighth Amendment claim against PHS.
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C.
Leave to Amend.
“[I]f a complaint is vulnerable to [Rule] 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must
permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.”
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236. In this instance, the Court believes that any amendment
to Mr. Williams’ claim against the DOC or SCI-Camp Hill would be futile. However,
with respect to Mr. Williams’ Eighth Amendment medical claim against PHS and
other medical professionals who treated him, or failed to treat him, it is possible that
the deficiencies noted may be remedied by amendment. Thus, Mr. Williams will be
granted twenty-one days to file an amended complaint. If Mr. Williams decides to
file an amended complaint, he is advised that it must contain the same docket
number as the instant action and should be labeled “Amended Complaint.” In
addition, the "amended complaint must be complete in all respects. It must be a
new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to
the complaint already filed." Young v. Keohane, 809 F.Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa.
1992). Mr. Williams is advised that any amended complaint he may file supersedes
the original complaint and his amended complaint and must be “retyped or reprinted
so that it will be complete in itself including exhibits.” M.D. Pa. LR 15.1.
Consequently, all causes of action alleged in the amended complaint which are not
alleged in the amended complaint are waived.
Mr. Williams is also advised that his amended complaint must be concise and
direct. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d). Each allegation must be set forth in an individually
numbered paragraphs in short, concise and simple statements. Id. The allegations
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should be specific as to time and place, and should identify the specific person or
persons responsible for the deprivation of his constitutional rights and what each
individual did that led to deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, 129 S.Ct.
at 1948. He also shall specify the relief he seeks with regard to each claim. Mr.
Williams’s failure to file an appropriate amended complaint within the required time
will result in his claim being dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) due
to his failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
An appropriate Order follows.
/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. RICHARD CAPUTO
United States District Judge
Date: June 24 , 2013
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DARYL WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff
v.
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS at SCI CAMP HILL,
et al.,
Defendants
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
CIVIL NO. 3:CV-12-2440
(Judge Caputo)
ORDER
AND NOW, this
24th
day of JUNE, 2013, in accordance with the
accompanying memorandum, it is ORDERED that:
1.
Mr. Williams’ Motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (Doc. 7) is construed as a motion to proceed
without full prepayment of fees and costs, and is
GRANTED.
2.
Mr. Williams’ claims against the Department of
Corrections, SCI-Camp Hill, Secretary Wetzel,
Superintendent Ditty, CHCA Law and Prison Health
Services, Inc. are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim for which relief
can be granted.
3.
Within twenty-one (21) days from the date of this order,
Plaintiff may file an amended complaint in this action in
accordance with the foregoing Memorandum.
4.
The Clerk of Court shall forward to Plaintiff two (2)
copies of this Court’s prisoner civil-rights complaint form
which Plaintiff shall use in preparing any amended
complaint he may file.
5.
Failure to file an amended complaint as directed within
the required time will result in this action being dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for the reasons
set forth in the accompanying Memorandum.
/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. RICHARD CAPUTO
United States District Judge
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