McLaughlin et al v. Forty Fort Borough et al
Filing
83
MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 73 Motion to Strike. The defendants response to this motion is construed as a nunc pro tunc request to file this dispositive motion out of time and is GRANTED. The plaintiffs shall file a response to the defendants summary judgment motion within 21 days, and the defendants may file a reply brief within 14 days of the filing of the plaintiffs response in opposition to this motion. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on May 1, 2015. (kjn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JEFFERY MCLAUGHLIN, et al., :
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
v.
:
:
FORTY FORT BOROUGH,
:
et al,
:
:
Defendants.
:
Civil No. 3:13-CV-16
(Judge Mariani)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
I.
Statement of Facts and of the Case
This case, which has been referred to us for resolution of a number of pretrial
motions, is a civil rights action brought by several residents of the Borough of Forty
Fort against the borough and a number of private parties. The gravamen of this
complaint is a longstanding, and acrimonious, dispute between the plaintiffs and
borough officials over a zoning decision by the borough to permit the operation of a
Dunkin Donuts restaurant at a location nearby the plaintiffs’ home, coupled with what
are alleged to have discriminatory failures by local authorities to effectively enforce
noise abatement ordinances against this Dunkin Donuts and its patrons.
Currently, the operative pleading in this lawsuit is the plaintiffs’ second
amended complaint. (Doc. 27.) Following a ruling by the district court on a motion
to dismiss, (Doc. 52.), a single claim remains against the borough defendants in this
second amended complaint, a “class of one” equal protection constitutional tort claim.
The defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment on this sole remaining
claim. (Doc. 65.) The plaintiffs, in turn, have moved to strike this summary
judgment motion, arguing that it is untimely since it was filed more than 30 days
after the initial discovery deadline passed in this case. (Doc. 73.) This motion is fully
briefed by the parties, (Docs. 74 and 77.), and is, therefore, ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion to strike will be denied, and the
defendants’ response, which we construe to include a nunc pro tunc request to file a
summary judgment motion, will be granted.
II.
Discussion
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions to strike
pleadings and provides, in part, that:
(f) Motion to Strike. The court may strike from a pleading an
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter.
F. R.Civ. P., Rule 12(f).
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While rulings on motions to strike rest in the sound discretion of the court,
Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 657 F.Supp. 1134, 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), that discretion
is guided by certain basic principles. Because striking a pleading is viewed as a
drastic remedy, such motions are “generally disfavored.” Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1057 (C.A.La.,
1982). As one court has aptly observed: “striking a party's pleadings is an extreme
measure, and, as a result, . . . ‘[m]otions to strike under Fed .R.Civ.P. 12(f) are
viewed with disfavor and are infrequently granted.’ Lunsford v. United States, 570
F.2d 221, 229 (8th Cir.1977) (citing 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure. Civil § 1380 at 783 (1969)). See also, Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gibson,
829 F.Supp. 1103, 1106 (W.D.Mo.1993); 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal
Practice § 12.37[1] (3d ed. 2000).” Stanbury Law Firm v. I.R.S., 221 F.3d 1059,
1063 (8th Cir. 2000). In practice, courts should exercise this discretion and strike
pleadings only when those pleadings are both “redundant, immaterial, impertinent,
or scandalous” and prejudicial to the opposing party. Ruby v. Davis Foods, Inc., 269
F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2001).
This stated reluctance to strike pleadings is entirely consistent with one of the
great animating principles behind the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the idea that
it is “entirely contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
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decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of . . . mere technicalities.” Foman
v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1962). See e.g.,
Caldwell v. Folino, 394 F. App'x 912, 914 (3d Cir. 2010); Lundy v. Adamar of New
Jersey, Inc., 34 F.3d 1173, 1186 n. (3d Cir. 1994). Judged by these guideposts, we
conclude that the defendants’ summary judgment motion should not be stricken
simply because it was not filed within the deadlines initially set by the district court,
or within 30 days after the close of discovery, as called for by Rule 56(b). While we
acknowledge that the plaintiffs are correct when they note that the court’s initial case
management order, which was never amended, set an October 2013 discovery
deadline, and a December 2013 dispositive motion deadline in this case, (Doc. 17.),
a strict adherence to these initial deadlines at this stage of the proceedings would
ignore the realities of this litigation. In fact, it would have been virtually impossible
for the defendants to adhere to this schedule since the plaintiffs’ operative pleading
in this case, their second amended complaint, was only filed in September 2013,
(Doc. 27.), the initial motion to dismiss that complaint was resolved in November
2014, (Doc. 52.), and the defendants’ answer to the second amended complaint was
not filed until December 23, 2014. (Doc. 59.) Given the actual timetable of this
litigation, it would be unrealistic to hold the defendants to the initial case
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management schedule since events which transpired after that scheduling order was
entered have fundamentally altered the pace of this litigation.
Further, we note that, in their response to this motion to strike the defendants
have offered to file a request leave to file this summary judgment motion. (Doc. 77,
p. 9.) Mindful of the goal that cases should be resolved on their merits whenever
possible, we will treat this response as a motion for extension of time to file a
summary judgment motion and grant this request, setting the stage for a resolution of
these issues on their merits.
An appropriate order follows.1
III.
Order
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs’ motion to strike (Doc. 73.), is
DENIED. The defendants’ response to this motion is construed as a nunc pro tunc
request to file this dispositive motion out of time and is GRANTED. The plaintiffs
shall file a response to the defendants’ summary judgment motion within 21 days, and
We note that a ruling denying a motion to strike rests within the authority
of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. §636. Singh v. Superintending Sch. Comm.
of City of Portland, 593 F. Supp. 1315, 1318 (D. Me. 1984)
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the defendants may file a reply brief within 14 days of the filing of the plaintiffs’
response in opposition to this motion.
So ordered this 1st day of May, 2015.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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