Gula v. Advanced Cargo Transportation, Inc. et al
Filing
22
MEMORANDUM re 5 MOTION to Strike Plaintiff's Allegations of Reckless Conduct and Any Claim For Punitive Damages Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Advanced Cargo Transportation, Inc., Washington Munozarevalo Signed by Honorable Malachy E Mannion on 5/7/13. (bs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN GULA
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civil No. 3:13-CV-226
v.
:
ADVANCED CARGO
TRANSPORTATION, INC., AND
WASHINGTON MUNOZAREVALO
Defendants.
:
(JUDGE MANNION)
:
:
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is defendant Advanced Cargo Transportation’s motion
to dismiss, (Doc. No. 5), those portions of the complaint containing requests
for punitive damages and allegations of reckless conduct. (Doc. No. 1.) In his
brief in opposition, plaintiff argues that he has stated sufficient facts at this
stage of litigation and that a reasonable jury could find that defendants acted
recklessly, thereby entitling him to punitive damages. (Doc. No. 8, at 9.) After
reviewing the complaint and the parties’ briefs, the court has determined that
defendants’ motion to dismiss will be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On October 10, 2011, defendant Washington Munozarevalo was driving
his tractor-trailer truck in the eastbound lane of Interstate 80 in Monroe
County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 1, at 2-3.) The truck was owned by
defendant Munozarevalo but was “operated with the permission and consent
of his employer, Advanced Cargo Transportation . . . under an owner-operator
arrangement.” (Doc. No. 1, at 3.) At the time, plaintiff John Gula was a
passenger in a vehicle being driven in the westbound lane of Interstate 80.
(Doc. No. 1, at 3.) Although the precise chain of events are unclear from the
complaint, defendant Munozarevalo appears to have struck the rear of two
cars in the eastbound lane, crossed the highway median into the westbound
lane, and collided with the vehicle in which plaintiff was a passenger. (Doc.
No. 1, at 4.) As a result, plaintiff claims that he has sustained the following
injuries: a jejunal perforation, a mesenteric hematoma, a splenic flexure,
colonic ischemia, multiple acute left rib fractures, pleural effusion, numbness
and coldness of both feet, occasional numbness of bilateral fingers,
intermittent headaches, sensitivity to loud noises and light, fatigue, recurrent
nightmares, and a left L5 radiculopathy, post-traumatic stress disorder and
depressive disorder, slight bilateral tremor in the arms and mild psychomotor
retardation, and intermittent left leg weakness. (Doc. No. 1, at 11,17-18.)
Investigation after the accident showed that defendant’s truck had a
defective brake and relay valve on axle one and defective brakes on axle
three. (Doc. No. 1, at 7-8, 15.) Plaintiff claims that defendant was driving over
the speed limit while fatigued from operating his truck over the maximum legal
operation time. (Doc. No. 1, at 7.) Plaintiff further claims that defendant
Advanced Cargo failed to instruct defendant Munozarevalo how to safely
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operate the truck and did not provide Munozarevalo with proper training and
supervision. (Doc. No. 1, at 6-7.) Finally, both Advanced and Munozarevalo
failed to “maintain, inspect, and repair” the vehicle throughout its life of
service. (Doc. No. 1, at 6, 14.)
Plaintiff filed suit against Munozarevalo for operating his truck in a
“negligent, reckless and careless” manner. (Doc. No. 1, at 4.) He also sued
Advanced Cargo under the alternative theories of direct liability and
respondeat superior. (Doc. No. 1.) On February 25, 2013, defendants filed a
consolidated motion to strike and motion to dismiss, arguing that the
complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to support an award of punitive
damages and that allegations of recklessness should therefore be stricken.
(Doc. No. 6, at 2.) Defendants subsequently filed a third-party complaint
against Trac Intermodal, the manufacturer of the truck, seeking indemnity or,
in the alternative, contribution. (Doc. No. 13.) Plaintiff responded by filing an
unopposed motion1 for leave to amend the complaint in order to add Trac
Intermodal as a defendant to the case, (Doc. No. 15), which the court granted
on April 30, 2013, (Doc. No. 20). The defendants Munozarevalo and
Advanced Cargo withdrew their third party complaint on April 29, 2013. (Doc.
No. 18.)
1
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1, a party filing a unopposed motion must
attach a certificate of concurrence. While plaintiff does not attach a certificate,
the court will nonetheless rule on the motion.
3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant’s motion to dismiss is brought pursuant to the provisions of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This rule provides for the dismissal of a complaint,
in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has
been stated, (Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir.2005)), and
dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting all of the facts alleged in the
complaint as true, the plaintiff has failed to plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (abrogating “no set of facts” language
found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The facts alleged must
be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. This requirement “calls for enough fact[s]
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of”
necessary elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Id.) Furthermore, in
order to satisfy federal pleading requirements, the plaintiff must “provide the
grounds of his entitlement to relief,” which “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir.2008)
(brackets and quotations marks omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
4
127 S. Ct. at 1964-65).
DISCUSSION
In his complaint, plaintiff requests punitive damages from defendants
Washington and Advanced Cargo Transportation, Inc. for “acts [which]
constitute a reckless indifference to the risk of injury to Plaintiff.” (Doc. No. 1,
at 11, 17.) Defendant subsequently filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
but asking for relief under either 12(b)(6) or 12(f). (Doc. No. 5, at 3.) In that
motion, defendants argue, “[p]laintiff’s Complaint in this matter has done
nothing more than make conclusory allegations of a reckless state of mind
without alleging facts sufficient to support such a finding, even if taken as
true.” (Doc. No. 5, at 3.)
In analyzing defendant’s motion, the court is cognizant that Rule 12(f)
and 12(b)(6) serve different purposes and provide different relief. Rule 12(f)
has “no application to a request for punitive damages, in that it does not
constitute redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” North
Side Foods Corp. v. Bag-Pack, Inc., 06-CV-1612, 2007 WL 954106, *3
(W.D.Pa. 2007); see also Jordan v. Wilkes-Barre General Hosp., 07-CV-390,
2008 WL 3981460, *4 (M.D.Pa. 2008) (court should not use 12(f) to eliminate
request for punitive damages). Rather, rule 12(b)(6) provides the appropriate
remedy when challenging a request for punitive damages. K.E.K. ex rel.
5
Kauffman v. The Grier School, 05-CV-386, 2005 WL 2028700, *2 (M.D.Pa.
2005) (analyzing punitive damages under Rule 12(b)(6)). On the other hand,
“[t]o the extent plaintiffs wish to excise individual allegations, Rule 12(f)
provides the appropriate vehicle for doing so.” North Side Foods Corp., v.
Bag-Pack, 06-CV-1612, 2007 WL 954106, *3 (W.D.Pa. 2007); Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(f). Because defendants ask the court to strike particular allegations and
dismiss the request for punitive damages, the court will analyze defendants
motion under both rules. Jordan v. Wilkes-Barre General Hosp., 07-CV-390,
2008 WL 3981460, *5 (M.D.Pa. 2008) (recognizing court’s authority to
interpret a motion and construe it according to the substance of the motion
itself).
As an initial matter, an award of punitive damages in a diversity case is
governed by state law. Bridges v. Ashland Borough, 10-CV-1065, 2011 WL
5826676 (M.D.Pa. 2011). Under Pennsylvania law, a party may recover
punitive damages if “(1) a defendant had a subjective appreciation of the risk
of harm to which the plaintiff was exposed and that (2) he acted, or failed to
act, as the case may be, in conscious disregard of that risk.” Hutchison ex rel.
Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 124 (2005). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has said:
The standard governing the award of punitive damages in
Pennsylvania is settled. Punitive damages may be awarded for
conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil
motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others. As the
name suggests, punitive damages are penal in nature and are
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proper only in cases where the defendant’s actions are so
outrageous as to demonstrate willful, wanton or reckless conduct.
Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 770 (2005).
The complaint contains numerous allegations indicating that defendant
Munozarevalo acted negligently and violated several Pennsylvania and
federal regulations. (Doc. No. 1, at 13-17.) Allegations of negligence,
however, are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss a request for punitive
damages under Pennsylvania law because punitive damages may not be
awarded for simple negligence. Kempson v. American Honda Motor Co., 09CV-0118, 2009 WL 744115, *5 (M.D.Pa. 2009). Furthermore, allegations that
a party violated state or federal law are legal conclusions to which the court
need not give a presumption of truth. For the purpose of defendants’ Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the court will only consider factual allegations from which the
court can draw an inference of a plausible claim for reckless conduct and,
therefore, punitive damages.
Plaintiff first states that defendant Munozarevalo “[operated] his vehicle
when he was so fatigued as to make it unsafe for him to operate the tractor
trailer” and also “[operated] his vehicle in excess of the applicable Hours of
Service.” (Doc. No. 1, at 14.) The complaint indicates that defendant failed to
“maintain, inspect and repair his vehicle” and “[operated] the tractor on public
highways with inoperative or defective brakes and a relay valve on axle 1
[and] inoperative or defective brakes on axle 3.” (Doc. No. 1, at 14-15.) While
these allegations may not conclusively establish recklessness, the court’s
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obligation is merely to determine whether they create a plausible inference of
recklessness, one which discovery will further substantiate. Williams v. Beard,
10-CV-979, 2012 WL 463441, *2 (M.D.Pa. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The court has determined that, in the
aggregate, these allegations allow an inference that defendant Munozarevalo
had a “subjective appreciation of the risk” he posed to other drivers.
Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 770 (2005).The fact that
he nonetheless operated his truck under these conditions indicates that he
acted with “conscious disregard of that risk.” Id. Therefore, plaintiff’s
allegations suffice to survive a motion to dismiss with regard to defendant
Munozarevalo.
As to defendant Advanced Cargo Transportation, plaintiff raises two
theories of liability – vicarious and direct. (Doc. No. 1, 4-8.) Looking at
vicarious liability under respondeat superior, the court has already determined
that plaintiff may go forward with his claim for punitive damages against
Munozarevalo. Plaintiff claims that Munozarevalo was acting within the scope
of employment at the time of the accident, and neither defendant disputes this
in the motion. Brezenski v. World Truck Transfer, Inc. 755 A.2d 36, 39
(Pa.Super.Ct. 2000) (“An employer is vicariously liable for the wrongful acts
of an employee if that act was committed during the course of and within the
scope of employment.”) Therefore, plaintiff has averred sufficient facts to
survive a motion to dismiss against Advanced Cargo under a theory of
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respondeat superior. The question remains, however, as to whether plaintiff
has alleged sufficient facts to support a claim of direct liability.
Plaintiff alleges that Advanced Cargo allowed Munozarevalo to operate
his truck with “inoperative or defective brakes and a relay valve on axle 1,”
“inoperative or defective brakes on axle 3,” and “a missing registration lamp
lens [sic] cover.” (Doc. No. 1, at 7-8.) Furthermore, the complaint indicates
that Advanced Cargo permitted Munozarevalo to operate the truck when he
was fatigued, in excess of the permissible time limit, and without proper
training or supervision. (Doc. No. 1, at 6-7.) Finally, Advanced Cargo failed to
“maintain, inspect, and repair” the vehicle. (Doc. No. 1, at 6.) Like the
allegations against Munozarevalo, these allegations, while not conclusive as
to recklessness, are sufficient to survive defendants’ motion to dismiss
because they allow the court to make an inference of reckless conduct.
Having disposed of the first part of the motion, the court must now look
at the motion to strike. Under Rule 12(f), “the court may strike from a pleading
an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). While this rule gives the court
significant discretion, “striking a pleading is a drastic remedy and should be
sparingly used by the courts.” Conklin v. Anthou, 10-CV-2501, 2011 WL
1303299, *1 (M.D.Pa. 2011); see also Zaloga v. Provident & Acc. Ins. Co. of
America, 671 F.Supp.2d 623, 633 (M.D.Pa. 2009) (acknowledging court’s
discretion to strike). In this case, defendants ask the court to strike the words
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“outrageous, careless, willfully, wantonly, reckless, and reckless indifference.”
(Doc. No. 6, at 2.) This language precisely mirrors the standard for punitive
damages enunciated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Hutchison ex rel.
Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 770 (2005). Because the court will deny
the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s request for punitive damages, this language
is not immaterial nor impertinent. Furthermore, the court does not perceive the
allegations to be scandalous. Allegations are scandalous if they “improperly
cast[] a derogatory light on someone, most typically on a party to the action.”
Zaloga v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. of America, 671 F.Supp.2d 623, 633
(M.D.Pa. 2009). Furthermore, “[s]candalous pleading must reflect cruelly upon
the defendant’s moral character, use repulsive language or detract fro the
dignity of the court. Id. The court is not prepared to find the terms
“outrageous, careless, willfully, wantonly, reckless, and reckless indifference”
scandalous, especially considering they are the terms used by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in the standard governing punitive damages. Finally,
defendants make no claim that the language is redundant, instead requesting
to have it totally stricken. (Doc. No. 6, at 3-4.) Therefore, the motion to strike
will be DENIED.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
Dated: May 7, 2013
O:\Mannion\shared\MEMORANDA - DJ\2013 MEMORANDA\13-226-01.wpd
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