Smith v. Wilson

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 20 MOTION to Compel Discovery filed by I-Kiem Smith. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on December 20, 2013. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
I-KIEM SMITH,
Plaintiff
v.
MICK WILSON,
Defendant.

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Civil No. 3:13-CV-771

(Judge Kosik)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM ORDER
I.

Introduction

This case is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner, I-Kiem Smith,
alleging that the defendant Nick Wilson, a correctional officer, retaliated against
Smith by denying him meals and filing false misconduct reports against Smith. This
matter now comes before the Court for consideration of a motion to compel discovery
filed by Smith. (Docs. 20 and 21) This motion seeks disclosure of various prison
policies and investigative reports, and alleges that these discovery requests have been
ignored.
The defendants have responded to this motion, denying that they have ignored
the plaintiff’s discovery requests. Instead, the defendants have shown that they have
responded to some requests, while objecting to other requests on the grounds that the

requests either seek sensitive investigative records or seek to compel the defendants
to produce items which do not presently exist. (Doc. 25)
For the reasons set forth below, this motion will be denied without prejudice
to the renewal of a more narrowly targeted discovery motion, with a greater
supporting showing of relevance.
II.

Discussion

Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant discovery
dispute. At the outset, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
motions for sanctions, and provides that:
(c) Failure to Disclose, to Supplement an Earlier Response, or to
Admit.
(1) Failure to Disclose or Supplement. If a party fails to provide
information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the
party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply
evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was
substantially justified or is harmless. In addition to or instead of this
sanction, the court, on motion and after giving an opportunity to be
heard:
(A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees, caused by the failure;
(B) may inform the jury of the party's failure; and
(C) may impose other appropriate sanctions . . . .

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c).

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The scope of what type of discovery may be compelled under Rule 37, and give
rise to sanctions, is defined, in turn, by Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides as follows:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope
of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense –
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good
cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the
subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)( C ).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
“committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” DiGregorio v. First
Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the
scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the
Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus,
a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to compel
disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse
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of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983).
This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on
discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and
Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. Thus, at the
outset, it is clear that Rule 26's broad definition of that which can be obtained through
discovery reaches only “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense.” Therefore, valid claims of relevance and privilege still cabin and restrict
the court’s discretion in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the scope of

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discovery permitted by Rule 26 embraces all “relevant information” a concept which
is defined in the following terms: “Relevant information need not be admissible at
trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.”
A party moving under Rule 37 to compel discovery, or for sanctions, bears the
initial burden of proving the relevance of the requested information. Morrison v.
Philadelphia Housing Auth., 203 F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D.Pa. 2001). Once that initial
burden is met, “the party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack
of relevance by demonstrating that the requested discovery (1) does not come within
the broad scope of relevance as defined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such
marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh
the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure.” In re Urethane Antitrust
Litigation, 261 F.R.D. 570, 573 (D.Kan. 2009).
Furthermore, in a prison setting, inmate requests for information relating to
security procedures can raise security concerns, and implicate a legitimate
governmental privilege, a governmental privilege which acknowledges a
governmental needs to confidentiality of certain data but recognizes that courts must
balance the confidentiality of governmental files against the rights of a civil rights
litigant by considering:
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(1) the extent to which disclosure will thwart governmental processes by
discouraging citizens from giving the government information; (2) the
impact upon persons who have given information of having their
identities disclosed; (3) the degree to which governmental selfevaluation and consequent program improvement will be chilled by
disclosure; (4) whether the information sought is factual data or
evaluative summary; (5) whether the party seeking the discovery is an
actual or potential defendant in any criminal proceeding either pending
or reasonably likely to follow from the incident in question; (6) whether
the police investigation has been completed; (7) whether any intradepartmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or may arise from the
investigation; (8) whether the plaintiff’s suit is non-frivolous and
brought in good faith; (9) whether the information sought is available
through other discovery or from other sources; and (10) the importance
of the information sought to the plaintiffs case.
Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Finally, one other immutable rule defines the court’s discretion when ruling on
motions to compel discovery. It is clear that the court cannot compel the production
of things that do not exist. Nor can the court compel the creation of evidence by
parties who attest that they do not possess the materials sought by an adversary in
litigation. See, e.g., AFSCME District Council 47 Health and Welfare Fund v. OrthoMcNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 08-5904, 2010 WL 5186088 (E.D.Pa.
Dec. 21, 2010); Knauss v. Shannon, No. 08-1698, 2009 WL 975251 (M.D.Pa. April
9, 2009).
With these legal guideposts in mind, we turn to consideration of Smith’s
various discovery requests.
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First, we will deny these requests to the extent that Smith seeks records which
the defendants have already represented do not exist. This response, denying the
existence of certain requested materials, is sufficient, and Smith’s motion to compel
further responses relating to things that do not exist will be denied. See, e.g.,
AFSCME District Council 47 Health and Welfare Fund v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 08-5904, 2010 WL 5186088 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 21, 2010);
Knauss v. Shannon, No. 08-1698, 2009 WL 975251 (M.D.Pa. April 9, 2009).
As for Smith’s request for prison investigative documents, we note that Smith
has not explained the relevance of these materials and the defendants have objected
to the request citing the substantial security concerns, and staff safety issues, which
may arise in this setting if these records were to be released. We find this response
persuasive, in part, and, therefore, will decline to authorize wholesale disclosure of
these documents on the grounds that such disclosure may gravely impair institutional
security. See e.g., Banks v. Beard, 3:CV-10-1480, 2013 WL 3773837 (M.D. Pa. July
17, 2013); Mearin v. Folino, CIV.A. 11-571, 2012 WL 4378184 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24,
2012). However, we enter this order without prejudice to Smith filing a supplemental
motion, providing a more detailed proffer regarding the relevance of these materials
to the issues in this case, something which the plaintiff has not yet done.

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III.

Order

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons the plaintiff’s motion to compel (Doc.
20), is DENIED without prejudice.
So ordered this 20th day of December, 2013.

S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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