Abdullah v. Seba et al

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable Malachy E Mannion on 9/29/14. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 3 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 4 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 5 Unpublished Opinion(s))(bs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MUTTAQIN FATIR ABDULLAH,

:

Plaintiff

:

v.

:

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-1227
(JUDGE MANNION)
LT. SEBA, et al.,
Defendants

:
:
MEMORANDUM

I.

Background
Plaintiff, Muttaqin Fatir Abdullah, an inmate confined in the United

States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, (“USP-Lewisburg”), Pennsylvania, filed the
above captioned Bivens1 action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331. (See Doc. 1,
complaint). He names as Defendants the following USP-Lewisburg
employees: Jason Seeba2, Lieutenant; Gregory George, Emergency Medical
Technician, and Beverly Prince, National CPR Coordinator. Id. Plaintiff alleges
that on April 17, 2011, he and his cell mate were “placed in 24 hrs restraints
with belly chains pulled around our chest so tight that [Plaintiff] could barely
breath, or eat [his] meals” and “the restraints were so tight that is cause both

1

Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
2

The correct spelling of this Defendant’s name is “Seeba”. (See Doc. 352 at 89, Declaration of Jason Seeba).

of [Plaintiff’s] hands to swell up so bad that they look like [he] had on boxing
gloves”, resulting in “ulner nerve damage in [Plaintiff’s] left hand.” Id. at 2.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant, Nurse George “did tell Lt. Seba to loose the
chains from around [Plaintiff’s] chest, but Lt. Seba refuse to loose the
restraints from around [Plaintiff’s] wrists where [he] has ulner nerve damage
in [his] left hand from the restraints.” Id. at 3.
Plaintiff further claims that on April 19, 2011, Nurse Prince came to
Plaintiff’s cell and “observe the swelling in [his] hands, and refuse to tell the
Lt. to loose the restraints from around [his] writs.” Id.
On May 6, 2013, Plaintiff filed the instant action in which he seeks ten
million dollars in damages. Id. at 4. On June 7, 2013, Plaintiff filed a document
entitled “Medical Complaint” (Doc. 10).
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion
for summary judgment. (Doc. 28). Defendants’ motion is directed at both the
original complaint, (Doc. 1) and the Plaintiff’s “Medical Complaint”. 3 (Doc. 10).

3

Because this document was filed within twenty-one (21) days of service
of the original complaint, Defendants have construed such filing as an
amendment, in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). Subsequent to the
filing of this document, Plaintiff has filed numerous documents entitled
“Complaint” or “Amended Complaint”. (See Docs. 11, 16, 20, 22, 24, 29, 30).
However, Plaintiff has never properly sought leave to file an amendment
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Moreover, these subsequent “amended
(continued...)
2

The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. For the reasons
that follow, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be granted.

II.

Standards of Review
A. Bivens Standard
Plaintiff’s claims are filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331, in accordance

with Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, (1971). Under Bivens, the District Court has federal question
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 to entertain an action brought to
redress alleged federal constitutional or statutory violations by a federal actor.
Bivens, supra. Pursuant to Bivens, “a citizen suffering a compensable injury
to a constitutionally protected interest could invoke the general federal
question jurisdiction of the district court to obtain an award of monetary
damages against the responsible federal official.” Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 504 (1978). A Bivens-style civil rights claim is the federal equivalent
of an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the same legal
principles have been held to apply. See, Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 871

3

(...continued)
complaints” raise claims that do not relate back to the original complaint, nor
are they complete to stand on their own.
3

(3d Cir. 1975); Veteto v. Miller, 829 F.Supp. 1486, 1492 (M.D.Pa. 1992);
Young v. Keohane, 809 F.Supp. 1185, 1200 n. 16 (M.D.Pa. 1992). In order
to state an actionable Bivens claim, a plaintiff must allege that a person has
deprived him of a federal right, and that the person who caused the
deprivation acted under color of federal law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
48 (1988); Young v. Keohane, 809 F.Supp. 1185, 1199 (M.D.Pa. 1992);
Sharpe v. Costello, 2007 WL 1098964, *3 (M.D.Pa., 2007).
B. Motion to Dismiss
Defendants’ pending dispositive motion is supported by evidentiary
materials outside the pleadings. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d)
provides in part as follows:
If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule
56. All parties must be given reasonable opportunity to present all
the material that is pertinent to the motion.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(d).
This Court will not exclude the evidentiary materials accompanying the
Defendants’ motion. Thus, their motion will be treated as solely seeking
summary judgment. See Latham v. United States, 306 Fed. Appx. 716, 718
(3d Cir. 2009) (when a motion to dismiss has been framed alternatively as a

4

motion for summary judgment such as in the present case, the alternative
filing “is sufficient to place the parties on notice that summary judgment might
be entered.”)
C. Summary Judgment
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) “[t]he court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). “[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no
genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
A disputed fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence
would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070,
1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Brotherhood of

5

Carpenters and Joiners of America, 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).
When determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the
court must view the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v.
Consolidated Rail Corporation, 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v.
Westinghouse Electric Company, 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). In order to
avoid summary judgment, however, parties may not rely on unsubstantiated
allegations. Parties seeking to establish that a fact is or is not genuinely
disputed must support such an assertion by “citing to particular parts of
materials in the record,” by showing that an adverse party’s factual assertion
lacks support from cited materials, or demonstrating that a factual assertion
is unsupportable by admissible evidence. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); see Celotex,
477 U.S. at 324 (requiring evidentiary support for factual assertions made in
response to summary judgment). The party opposing the motion “must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). Parties must produce evidence to show the existence of every
element essential to its case that they bear the burden of proving at trial, for
“a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving

6

party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U .S.
at 323; see Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir.1992). Failure
to properly support or contest an assertion of fact may result in the fact being
considered undisputed for the purpose of the motion, although a court may
also give parties an opportunity to properly provide support or opposition.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

III.

Statement of Facts4
On April 17, 2011, a calculated use of force was approved by the

Warden of USP-Lewisburg in order to place Abdullah in ambulatory restraints
after he refused to give staff his food tray and displayed signs of imminent

4

Middle District of Pennsylvania Local Rules of Court provide that in
addition to filing a brief in response to the moving party’s brief in support,
“[t]he papers opposing a motion for summary judgment shall included a
separate, short and concise statement of material facts responding to the
numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement [of material facts filed by the
moving party] ..., as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue
to be tried.” See M.D. Pa. LR 56. 1. The rule further states that the statement
of material facts required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to
be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by
the opposing party. See id. Because Plaintiff has failed to file a separate
statement of material facts controverting the statement filed by Defendants,
all material facts set forth in Defendants’ statement (Doc. 35) will be deemed
admitted.

7

violence by threatening to assault staff. (Doc. 35-2 at 87, Declaration of Jason
Seeba, USP-Lewisburg Lieutenant). Upon arrival of the team, Abdullah
submitted to restraints and was removed from his cell. (Doc. 35-1 at 4,
Declaration of Dr. Kevin Pigos, USP-Lewisburg Clinical Director). Abdullah
was removed from his cell, and escorted to the shower, where he was visually
searched. Id. The Plaintiff was placed in ambulatory restraints at
approximately 8:48 a.m., and was escorted to D-block without further incident.
(Doc. 35-2 at 87, Declaration of Jason Seeba, USP-Lewisburg Lieutenant).
On April 17, 2011 at 8:42 a.m., EMT Bryan Walls completed a Bureau
of Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounter on Plaintiff, which reflects the
following:
I/M was subject of a Calculated Use of Force. On arrival of the
team, he submitted to restraints and was removed from cell J313. He was taken to the shower area, stripped, and visually
searched. He was then re-dressed and ambulatory restraints
were applied. Circulation and motor function were intact distal to
the restraints after application. He was escorted to cell D-126
where he remained in ambulatory restraints. I/M offered no
medical complaints and did not sustain any injuries during this
Calculated Use of Force. I/M stated he was on Coumadin due to
circulation problems in his L leg.
(Doc. 35-1 at 16, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounter).
Beginning at 10:00 a.m., restraint checks were conducted by a
lieutenant every two hours. (Doc. 35-2 at 88, Declaration of Lieutenant Jason
8

Seeba). On April 17, 2011, Lt. Seeba conducted restraint checks on Abdullah
at 4:00 p.m., 6:00 p.m., and 10:00 p.m. Id. Also, restraint reviews were
conducted by health services twice during each eight-hour shift. (See Doc.
35-1 at 18-27, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounters). During
the approximate 24 hour period that Plaintiff was in ambulatory restraints, he
continued to be disruptive, defiant and verbalized he would not be compliant
if he was removed from restraints. (Doc. 35-2 at 88, Declaration of Lieutenant
Jason Seeba).
At the 12:00 p.m. check EMT Walls noted the following:
I/M offered no medical complaints. He stated: “This is
unconstitutional.” He refused to move his extremities and stated
staff “should loosen this shit up or get out”. Refusal form
generated.
(Doc. 35-1 at 18, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounter).5
Paramedic George conducted restraint review checks at 4:00 p.m., 6:00
p.m. on April 17, 2011, and at 12:00 a.m. on April 18, 2011. (See Doc. 35-1
at 18-30). At his 12:00 a.m. check, Paramedic George noted swelling in

5

EMT Walls counseled Plaintiff on the possible consequences of failing
to comply with accepting medical treatment and the medical advice of moving
his extremities. Id. Plaintiff refused both and then refused to sign the Medical
Treatment Refusal form, reflecting same. (See Doc. 35-1 at 21, Medical
Treatment Refusal).
9

Plaintiff’s hands, stating “[t]he inmate continues to manipulate the restraints
which is causing the swelling.” Id. Abdullah was educated that continued
manipulation of the restraints was causing the swelling. Id. At no time did
Paramedic George recommend adjustment of Abdullah’s ambulatory
restraints because of circulation or other medical concerns. Id.
On April 18, 2011, Nurse Hartzel conducted a restraint review check at
6:00 a.m, and EMT Beverly Prince conducted a restraint review check at 8:00
a.m. (Doc. 35-1 at 31-36, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical
Encounter). At no time did Plaintiff offer any medical complaints, nor was
there any sign of apparent distress. Id. Both Nurse Hartzel and EMT Prince
found his restraints to be adequate with regard to circulation. Id. No injuries
were noted. Id.
Abdullah was maintained in ambulatory restraints for approximately
24 hours because he continued to be disruptive, defiant, and verbalized that
he would not be compliant if he was removed from restraints. (Doc. 35-2 at
88, Declaration of Lieutenant Jason Seeba). Id. ¶ 9.
On April 19, 2011, Abdullah was seen during sick call with complaints
that his hands are numb and he does not have any circulation in them. (Doc.
35-1 at 37, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounter). He also

10

stated at that he was “in restraints over the weekend” and “that was
unconstitutional.” Id. It was noted that Abdullah refused to move his
extremities during one restraint check and that he had strong bilateral pulses
and was able to move his fingers and toes during the other restraint checks.
Id. He was advised that the symptoms should improve within 7-10 days, and
to return to clinic if symptoms persist or worsen. Id.
On April 27, 2011, Abdullah was again seen during sick call. (Doc. 35-1
at 40, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounter). He again
complains that his recent episode of being in restraints was unconstitutional,
asking “Isn’t there anything you can do so that this doesn’t happen again?”.
Plaintiff relayed that his hands have improved somewhat, but that his left hand
is still numb. Id. He requested to see another doctor, stating that “it could be
my circulation.” Id. He denied any pain. Id.
On May 1, 2011, EMT Bryan Walls completed the following Bureau of
Health Services Encounter:
I/M stopped this provider during AM pill line/sick call. He c/o his
hands being numb since he was placed in restraints on 04/17. He
placed blame with this provider for not having Lt. loosen the
restraints when he was first placed in them stating that they cut
off the circulation and he now has permanent damage because
of it. When asked if he spoke with his PA about the issue, he
stated “The PA said it would be better in 7-10 days. Then he said
it might be a few weeks. It’s been a week and it’s not back yet. I
11

can’t even pick up a pencil to put in paperwork. What are you
gonna do about it?”. While he was explaining this, he bent his
fingers slightly to demonstrate that he was having difficulty
moving them. I/M was referred back to his PA for continuation of
care. He was belligerent, “I see how this is gonna go.” He then
demonstrated fine motor function by opening his med envelope.
He squeezes the sides with one hand while pinching the top of
the envelope and sliding the 2 sides of the opening in opposition
directions with his other hand to open the end of the envelope.
(Doc. 35-1 at 43, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounter).
On May 3, 2011, Abdullah was seen for a follow-up encounter. (Doc.
35-1 at 37, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Encounter). Abdullah relayed
that at the time he was placed in restraints, he felt they were too tight. Id.
Specifically, he stated that the swelling and pressure from the restraints
caused a loss of adequate blood flow to his wrist/hand, particularly his left
hand. Id. After the restraints were removed, he stated that his left hand was
numb and did not work properly, and that he has difficulty holding a pencil or
grip objects with his left hand because he is unable to extend his fingers. Id.
He also complained of tissue tension and continued swelling in his palmar
region. Id. Following examination, a circumferential scab was noted around
the left wrist and less pronounced around the right wrist; and Plaintiff was
noted as having a weakness of his left hand muscles, loss of strength, and
loss of adduction of fingers and flexion of the EPL (positive Froment’s sign).

12

Id. Abdullah was prescribed medication for pain and consultations for an EMG
and an orthopedic consultation were submitted on an expedited basis for
peripheral nerve injury. Id.
On May 4, 2011, referrals were approved by the Utilization Review
Committee (“URC”), permitting Abdullah to be evaluated by an orthopedist
and specialist for a “lower ulnar nerve injury (L).” (Doc. 35-1 at 54-55,
Utilization Review Committee Referral).
On or about May 24, 2011, Abdullah was seen by consulting
orthopedist, David J. Ball, D.O. (Doc. 35-1 at 58-61). Dr. Ball noted that
Abdullah complained of an inability to extend his fingers, a decrease in
sensation in all digits and decreased grip strength in his left hand. Id. He also
complained of a decrease in sensation in 2-3 fingers on his right hand. Id.
Following his examination, Dr. Ball sought to rule out neuropathy and
recommended the following: (1) conduct electromyography (“EMG”) of the
upper extremities; (2) Medrol dose pack as an anti-inflammatory; and (3)
reevaluate Abdullah after the electromyography. Id.
On May 25, 2011, a consultation request was approved by the URC and
Abdullah was referred to an orthopedist to rule out neuropathy. (Doc. 35-1 at
62, Utilization Review Committee Referral).

13

On May 25, 2011, an EMG was conducted by John Rice, M.D., of
Evangelical Medical Services Organization. (Doc. 35-1 at 63-66). Dr. Rice
prepared a report and noted that the nerve conduction testing of the upper
extremities is abnormal, demonstrating:
1.

Left ulnar neuropathy of significant degree. There
does appear to be ulnar neuropathy at elbow level;
however, motor response is with depression of
amplitude distal to elbow field consistent with ulnar
dysfunction in forearm.

2.

Left median mononeuropathy proximal to wrist with
substantial reduction of response amplitude indicating
axonal injury pattern. There is evidence for left carpal
tunnel syndrome, though median nerve dysfunction at
the wrist does appear of mild degree.

3.

Left radial sensory neuropathy.

4.

The above constellation of electrophysiologic
abnormalities suggests left forearm lesion affecting
multiple peripheral nerves. Clinical and imagining
correlation is warranted.

Id.
On June 3, 2011, Dr. Kevin Pigos, USP-Lewisburg Clinical Director,
discussed the recent EEMG findings with the neurologist. (Doc. 35-1 at 67,
Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounter - Administrative Note).
The neurologist indicated that the injury is not consistent with an injury
involving restraint application, given that the location is far above the restraint
14

sites. Id. The neurologist recommended a follow up MRI of the entire left arm,
brachial plexus, cervical and thoracic spine and head, with and without
contrast. Id.
On June 20, 2011, Dr. Pigos spoke with an outside radiologist, and it
was determined that “given the technical difficulties of the MRIs ordered, they
will need to be done on separate and successive trips–Will first get brachial
plexus with and without contrast. Next will get entire arm MRI with and without
contrast. Third trip will be for brain/cervical/thoracic spine with and without
contrast.” (Doc. 35-1 at 68, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical
Encounter - Administrative Note).
On June 22, 2011, Abdullah was approved for referrals to radiology for
MRIs of his entire left arm, brain, cervical and thoracic spine, with and without
gadolinium contrast, due to loss of signal transmission throughout entire arm
on the recent EMG of his left arm. (Doc. 35-1 at 69-70, Utilization Review
Committee Referral).
On June 28, 2011, consulting orthopedist, Dr. Ball, examined Abdullah
for complaints of tingling in his left hand and reviewed the EMG report
compiled by Dr. Rice. (Doc. 35-1 at 71-75). Dr. Ball noted tingling and a good
range of motion in all digits. Id. At this time, Dr. Ball recommended ulnar

15

nerve transposition at the left elbow and carpal tunnel release at the left wrist.
Id.
On June 29, 2011, a consultation request was submitted to the URC,
pending regional review. (Doc. 35-1 at 76, Utilization Review Committee
Referral). The request sought a referral to an orthopedist for cubital tunnel
syndrome (moderate) and carpal tunnel syndrome (mild). Id.
On June 30, 2011, Abdullah underwent an MRI of the brachial plexus.
(Doc. 35-1 at 77-81). The study found no masses, suspicious enhancement,
edema or other lesions involving the left brachial plexus or left cervical soft
tissues. Id. There were no left axillary masses or adenopathy identified. Id.
On July 13, 2011, an Administrative Note was entered into Plaintiff’s
medical records after an officer observed Abdullah doing numerous pushups
and pull-ups without difficulty while at recreation. (Doc. 35-1 at 82-83, Bureau
of Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounter - Administrative Note).
On August 9, 2011, Abdullah underwent an MRI of his left upper
extremity. (Doc. 35-1 at 85-87). The results found no focal abnormality of the
left upper extremity and no mass or abnormal enhancement within the bones,
muscles or along the neurovascular bundle. Id.
On August 10, 2011, Abdullah refused an MRI scan of his brain, cervical

16

and thoracic spine due to claustrophobia. (Doc. 35-1 at 88-89, Bureau of
Prisons Health Services Consultation Request).
On August 11, 2011, an Administrative Note was entered in his medical
file, noting the following:
Given inmate’s refusal of MRI on 8/10 which was the 3rd trip after
he had obtained 2 previous MRIs recently and requesting Ativan
before he has it done - his request to have the procedure done
with this medication is not clinically indicated and is suspicious for
a manipulation to obtain the medication for its side effect profile.
This will be discussed with him further at his next chronic care
encounter.
(Doc. 35-1 at 84).
On October 7, 2011, Abdullah received surgery for carpal tunnel
syndrome on his left wrist and ulnar nerve transposition in his left arm. (Doc.
35-1 at 90-94; Doc. 35-2 at 1-7). Upon return to the institution, Abdullah
stated that he did not have any pain at this time. Id. Abdullah was instructed
to alert medical for excessive bleeding through the dressing. Id.
On October 8, 2011, Abdullah’s dressing was checked. (Doc. 35-2 at 89, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounter - Administrative
Note). Upon arrival, it was noted that the dressing was covered in blood near
Abdullah’s elbow. Id. The dressing was removed and the suture site cleaned
and redressed. Id.

17

On October 11, 2011, Abdullah was evaluated for pain in his arm from
the surgery. (Doc. 35-2 at 10-12, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical
Encounter). Abdullah was prescribed ibuprofen for pain. Id.
On October 13, 2011, Abdullah was seen for a follow-up encounter.
(Doc. 35-2 at 13-16, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounter).
Following examination of the suture sites, a consultation for a followup
appointment with Dr. Ball was submitted. Id.
On October 14, 2011, Abdullah’s bandage was changed after he got it
wet while in the recreation yard. (Doc. 35-2 at 17-18, Bureau of Prisons
Health Services Clinical Encounter - Administrative Note). There was no sign
of infection and the staples were intact. Id.
On October 18, 2011, Abdullah’s bandage was changed. (Doc. 35-2 at
19-21). No signs of infection were noted but the left elbow was noted as tense
with hematoma in the upper arm, where the staples are placed. Id.
On October 20, 2011, the URC approved a referral to an orthopedist for
a status post on the left carpal tunnel tendon release and the left ulnar nerve
transposition. (Doc. 35-2 at 28, Utilization Review Committee Referral).
On October 20, 21 and 24, 2011, Abdullah’s bandage was changed.
(Doc. 35-2 at 22-27; 29-34, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical

18

Encounter - Administrative Note). The staples and sutures were noted as
intact. Id.
On October 25, 2011, Abdullah was seen for a follow-up encounter.
(Doc. 35-2 at 35-38, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounter).
Twenty-four staples and seven sutures were removed, and the sites
redressed with gauze. Id.
On October 27, 2011, Abdullah was seen for a follow-up encounter.
(Doc. 35-2 at 39-42). His hand wound is noted as healing well and the other
wound is found to be mostly healed with some drainage. Id. At that time,
Plaintiff mentioned a recurrence of hand pain. Id.
On October 28, 2011, Plaintiff’s wound was cleaned and minimal
drainage was noted. (Doc. 35-2 at 43-45, Bureau of Prisons Health Services
Clinical Encounter).
On October 31, 2011, Abdullah’s bandaged was redressed and the left
elbow wound showed healing with no signs of suppuration. (Doc. 35-2 at 4648, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounter).
On November 2 and 4, 2011, Abdullah’s bandage was redressed. (Doc.
35-2 at 49-53, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounter).
On November 7, 2011, Abdullah was seen for a Chronic Care clinic at

19

health services for hypertension. (Doc. 35-2 at 54-58, Bureau of Prisons
Health Services Clinical Encounter). At this time, he stated that he continues
to have severe pain in his left arm and hand, as well as decreased mobility.
Id. Examination noted that Abdullah’s left wrist has reduced range of motion
and that he has interosseus wasting in the left hand which is related to disuse
or neuropathy. Id. Abdullah states that this had improved for him. Id.
On November 9, 2011, Abdullah was seen by Dr. Ball for a follow-up
appointment. (Doc. 35-2 at 59-60, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical
Encounter). Dr. Ball examined Abdullah and noted he had increased
sensation in his left fifth digit and that Abdullah stated the “nerve slowly
getting better.” Id.
On November 10, 2011, Abdullah was seen for a post-consultation
visitation, where the following was noted:
Patient seen by contract orthopedist in follow-up to his ulnar nerve
transposition and carpal tunnel release. Doing better. Wound
healed well. Still with some pain in 5th digit. “Slowly getting better.”
Requests something for pain. Will use gabapentin for a short time
since he’s on coumadin. Re-check pm.
(Doc. 35-2 at 61-63, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounter).
On February 16, 2012, following a review of Abdullah’s records, the
following was determined:

20

Review of EMR indicates patient underwent ulnar nerve
transposition and carpal tunnel release this past October. Well
healed & released from orthopedic care.
No clear indication in record for continued modification of
application of hand restraints.
Discussed with Clinical Director who advised to discontinue
modification at this time. Will no longer be approved for rapid
restraints applied end-to-end.
(Doc. 35-2 at 64-66, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounter Administrative Note).
On April 17, 2012, gabapentin was confiscated from Abdullah’s cell.
(Doc. 35-2 at 68-69, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounter).
This is a restricted medication which is delivered to pill line daily and the
patient prescribed the medication is to ingest it immediately in front of staff.
Id. Abdullah’s prescription was discontinued for failure to follow pill line
procedures. Id.
On June 4, 2012, the prescription for gabapentin was renewed. (Doc.
35-2 at 70-71, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounter).
On July 27, 2012, gabapentin and coumadin were confiscated from
Abdullah’s cell. (Doc. 35-2 at 72, Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical
Encounter - Administrative Note). Both medications are restricted and
delivered to pill line daily. Id. The patient prescribed the medication is to
21

ingest it immediately in front of staff. Id.
On July 30, 2012, the prescription for gabapentin was discontinued for
the second time and renewed on August 15, 2012. (Doc. 35-2 at 72-75,
Bureau of Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounter - Administrative Note).
Abdullah’s prescription for gabapentin was renewed on February 12, 2013,
March 14, 2013, and April 12, 2013. (Doc. 35-2 at 76-82, Bureau of Prisons
Health Services Clinical Encounter - Administrative Note).
On April 22, 2013, gabapentin was again confiscated from Abdullah’s
cell and the medication was discontinued. (Doc. 35-2 at 83-86, Bureau of
Prisons Health Services Clinical Encounter - Administrative Note).
Subsequent to the April 17, 2011 use of ambulatory restraints, Plaintiff
was also placed in ambulatory restraints on the following dates without any
medical complaints: November 3, 2011, April 17, 2012, and March 14, 2013.
(Doc. 35-1 at 12, Declaration of Dr. Kevin Pigos, USP-Lewisburg Clinical
Director).

IV.

Discussion
A.

Constitutional Standards Governing Eighth Amendment
Claims

As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
22

observed:
The Eighth Amendment protects against infliction of “cruel and
unusual punishment.” However, “not every governmental action
affecting the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject to
Eighth Amendment scrutiny.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319
(1986). “After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (citation and internal
quotations omitted). “It is obduracy and wantonness, not
inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct
prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing
conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring
official control over a tumultuous cellblock.” Id.
Resolution of an Eighth Amendment claim therefore “mandate[s]
an inquiry into a prison official's state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294, 299 (1991). Two considerations define that inquiry.
We must first determine if the deprivation was sufficiently serious
to fall within the Eighth Amendment’s zone of protections. Id. at
298. If not, our inquiry is at an end. However, if the deprivation is
sufficiently serious, we must determine if the officials acted with
a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. In other words, we must
determine if they were motivated by a desire to inflict unnecessary
and wanton pain. “What is necessary to establish an
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ...’ varies according to
the nature of the alleged constitutional violation.” Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992).
Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 344-45 (3d Cir. 2000).
With these principles as the backdrop, the Court considers that
individual Eighth Amendment claims advanced by Abdullah.

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1. Excessive Force Claims
At the outset, Eighth Amendment excessive force claims entail a
showing of some subjective intent to injure. In an excessive force case, where
“prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is that
set out in Whitley[v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986)]: whether force was applied
in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992).
Thus, the keystone to analysis of an Eighth Amendment excessive force
claim often entails issues of motivation–whether force was applied in a
good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992).
However, the issue of whether excessive force was used is one which, in
proper circumstances, can be determined as a matter of law. In such cases,
summary judgment is appropriate when “it appears that the evidence, viewed
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will [not] support a reliable inference
of wantonness in the infliction of pain.” Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d
Cir. 2000) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322). There are several factors that
a court examines in determining whether a correctional officer has used

24

excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, including: “(1) ‘the need
for the application of force’; (2) ‘the relationship between the need and the
amount of force that was used’; (3) ‘the extent of injury inflicted’; (4) ‘the
extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived
by responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them’; and (5) ‘any
efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.’” Id. at 106.
When considering such claims, the reasonableness of a particular use
of force is often dependent upon factual context and must be “judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20
vision of hindsight.”, 490 U.S. 386, 396-7 (1989). Moreover, in the context of
prison excessive force claims, in determining “whether force was applied in
a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm,” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992),
“even if we concede [that an inmate] has established at most that prison
officials over-reacted to the disturbance that he caused. . . , any such
over-reaction would still fall short of supporting a finding that prison officials
acted ‘maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’” Fuentes v. Wagner, 206
F.3d 335, 346 (3d Cir. 2000).
Further, in the specific factual context of excessive force claims based

25

upon allegations relating to a prisoner’s handcuffing, courts have
acknowledged that, in certain instances, government officials are entitled to
qualified immunity as a matter of law. Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d. 197, 207 (3d
Cir. 2005). With respect to these particular excessive force claims, the test for
qualified immunity can be simply stated: “In these cases, summary judgment
for an officer who claims qualified immunity is appropriate where, ‘after
resolving all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff,[ ] the officer’s use of force
was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.’ ” Id.
2. Deliberate Indifference Claims
In order to establish an Eighth Amendment medical claim, a plaintiff
must show “(i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison
officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden
Cty. Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). See also Rouse
v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A serious medical need is one
that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one that is
so obvious that a layperson would recognize the need for a doctor’s attention.
Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d
326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). In addition, “if unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain results as a consequence of denial or delay in the provision of adequate

26

medical care, the medical need is of the serious nature contemplated by the
eighth amendment.” Id.
A prison official acts with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious
medical needs when he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994). Thus, a complaint that a physician or a medical department “has been
negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid
claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment...” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). For instance, a “medical decision not to
order an X-ray, or like measures, does not represent cruel and unusual
punishment. At most it is medical malpractice.” Id., 429 U.S. at 107. “[A]s long
as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate
a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903
F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990). Further, a doctor’s disagreement with the
professional judgment of another doctor is not actionable under the Eighth
Amendment. See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990). In
sum, negligence, unsuccessful medical treatment, or medical malpractice

27

does not give rise to a §1983 cause of action, and an inmate’s disagreement
with medical treatment is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. See
Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993).
Further, a non-physician defendant cannot be found deliberately
indifferent under the Eighth Amendment because he or she fails to respond
to the medical complaints of an inmate being treated by a prison physician,
or because, as non-physicians, they defer to the medical judgment of the
inmate’s treating physicians. Id., 991 F.2d at 69. If, however, non-medical
prison personnel had “a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison
doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner,” liability
may be imposed. Spruill, 372 F.3d 236.
A mere difference of opinion between the prison’s medical staff and the
inmate regarding the diagnosis or treatment which the inmate receives does
not support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. Farmer v. Carlson, 685
F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (M.D. Pa. 1988). See McCracken v. Jones, 562 F.2d 22,
24 (10th Cir. 1977); Smart v. Villar, 547 F.2d 112, 113 (10th Cir. 1976).
Additionally, if there is a dispute over the adequacy of the received
treatment, courts have consistently been reluctant to second guess the
medical judgment of the attending physician. Little v. Lycoming County, 912

28

F. Supp. 809, 815 (M.D. Pa.), aff’d, 101 F.3d 691 (3d Cir. 1996). The key
question is whether the defendant has provided the plaintiff with some type
of treatment, regardless of whether it is what the plaintiff desires. Farmer v.
Carlson, 685 F. Supp. at 1339.
B.

Abdullah’s Eighth Amendment Claims Fail

Turning first to the decision to apply restraints after Abdullah refused to
give staff his food tray and displayed signs of imminent violence by stating he
would assault staff, and recognizing that summary judgment is appropriate
only when the evidence, “viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will
[not] support a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.”
Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S.
at 322), we find that the initial decision to impose these restraints Plaintiff did
not violate the Eighth Amendment. In this regard the Court is persuaded that
the factors which govern use of force in this setting: “(1) ‘the need for the
application of force’; (2) ‘the relationship between the need and the amount
of force that was used’; (3) ‘the extent of injury inflicted’; (4) ‘the extent of the
threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by
responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them’; and (5) ‘any
efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response’”, id. at 106, which

29

all show that the use of these restraints was a prudent and necessary
response to the display of imminent violence threatened by Abdullah. Thus,
circumstances of the situation amply justified the use of force; the force
applied was modest, given the dangers inherent in Abdullah’s threatening
conduct; the risk to staff and others posed by Abdullah’s conduct was great;
and Abdullah’s verbal threat of assault demonstrated that it would have been
extremely dangerous to further temper these security measures. Therefore,
when considering the reasonableness of this authorized use of force, which
must be “judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 396-97 (1989), the Court finds that the actions of the prison officials “
would still fall short of supporting a finding that prison officials acted
‘maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’ ” Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d
335, 346 (3d Cir. 2000).
Nor can Plaintiff sustain a deliberate indifference claim based upon the
fact that he was held in restraints for a 24 hour period after his angry outburst.
At the outset, the duration of this period of restraint–24 hours–simply does not
implicate grave Eighth Amendment concerns. See, e.g., Key v. McKinney,
176 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 1999) (no Eighth Amendment violation where

30

prisoner handcuffed and shackled for 24 hours); Hunter v. Bledsoe, No.
10-CV-927, 2010 WL 3154963 (M.D.Pa. Aug.9, 2010) (ambulatory restraints
used for 24 hours); Holley v. Johnson, No. 08-CV-629, 2010 WL 2640328
(W.D.Va. June 30, 2010) (ambulatory restraints used for 48 hours);
Zimmerman v. Schaeffer, 654 F.Supp.2d 226, 232 (M.D.Pa. 2009)(19 hours
or more in restraint chair); Moore v. Miller, No. 7:08CV00614, 2009 WL
113258 (W.D.Va. Jan.15, 2009) (26 hours); Keyes v. O’Brien, No. Civ. A.
7:06CV00437, 2006 WL 2125912 (W.D.Va. July 27, 2006) (no Eighth
Amendment violation where prisoner placed in ambulatory restraints for 30
hours); Saleh v. Ray, No. Civ. A. 02–3214, 2003 WL 23484639, at * 6 (D.Kan.
2003) (24 hours in ambulatory restraints, no Eighth Amendment violation).
Moreover, the use of these restraints was both reasonable and
necessary in light of Abdullah’s threatening behavior. Indeed, it is undisputed
that staff6 used the restraints in a manner which was directly linked to the
6

To the extent that Plaintiff believes he should be allowed to amend his
complaint to include the name of the members of the Force Team that
participated in placing Plaintiff in restraints on April 17, 2011 (see Doc. 29),
such amendment is unnecessary as there are no allegations in Plaintiff’s
complaint directed at any particular team member as using unnecessary
force, and the undisputed record demonstrates that, not only did Plaintiff
submit to the restraints, the only claimed injury related to the stringency of the
restraints, which was immediately checked by medical personnel and
(continued...)
31

penological goals of ensuring institutional safety. Furthermore, the care and
attention which Plaintiff received from prison medical and correctional staff
while in restraints belies any claim of deliberate indifference to his physical
needs. In sum, the use of restraints here was in direct response to Plaintiff’s
threatening behavior. Those restraints were employed for a limited period of
time, and were removed promptly once Plaintiff exhibited behavior which
indicated that he no longer presented a threat to himself, fellow inmates, or
staff. On these facts, a deliberate indifference claim fails, and the defendants
are entitled to summary judgment in their favor.
In addition, we note that the use of these restraints was closely
monitored by medical personnel and those medical staff observed no medical
reason to remove these restraints. Since it is axiomatic that correctional staff
cannot be held deliberately indifferent when they defer to medical personnel
on medical matters, Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d. Cir. 1993), this
fact also compels summary judgment in favor of Defendant Seeba on this
deliberate indifference claim.
Finally, as to the medical staff named as Defendants, the undisputed

6

(...continued)
determined to be adequate. Thus, such amendment would be futile. See
Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3rd Cir. 2002).
32

factual record plainly shows that Plaintiff was assessed by medical staff for
circulation, or other medical concerns, and none were apparent. Although, the
record does demonstrate that during one of the wellness checks, staff noted
that Plaintiff was manipulating the restraints, so as to cause swelling of the
wrists. Plaintiff, however, refused to be counseled on the possible
consequences of failing to comply with accepting medical treatment and the
medical advice of moving his extremities. Additionally, aside from Plaintiff’s
conclusory allegation that Defendant George told Lt. Seeba to loosen
Plaintiff’s restraints (see Doc. 1, complaint), there is no evidence of record
demonstrating that Defendant George, or any other medical staff member, at
any time, recommended adjustment of Abdullah’s restraints because of
circulation or other medical concerns.
Moreover, following the removal of the ambulatory restraints, Plaintiff
was afforded an extremely wide array of medical care, medication, testing and
referrals to outside specialists, in order to determine, treat and repair his
carpal tunnel syndrome on his left wrist and ulnar nerve transposition in his
left arm. A condition that, once identified, was verified by the treating
neurologist as an injury not consistent with an injury involving restraint
application, given that the location is far above the restraint sites. Plaintiff

33

offers nothing to refute this. Thus, the record establishes meaningful efforts
by the Defendants to provide Plaintiff with necessary medical care, and an
attendant mental state that falls woefully short of deliberate indifference. As
such, there is insufficient proof in the record for a fair-minded jury to conclude
that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Monmouth County
Correctional Institution Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346; West v. Keve,
571 F.2d at 161. Indeed, the extent and quality of medical attention that the
Defendants provided Plaintiff precludes a finding of deliberate indifference.
C.

Qualified Immunity

Even if Abdullah had stated a colorable constitutional claim relating to
his cell extraction, the Defendants would still be entitled to qualified immunity
from these claims for damages. In order to establish a civil rights claim
Abdullah must show the deprivation of a right secured by the United States
Constitution or the laws of the United States. Satisfying these elements alone,
however, does not guarantee that Abdullah is entitled to recover damages
from these public officials. Government officials performing “discretionary
functions,” are insulated from suit if their conduct did not violate a “clearly
established statutory or constitutional right[ ] of which a reasonable person

34

would have known.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609(1999); see also
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). This doctrine, known as qualified
immunity, provides officials performing discretionary functions not only
defense to liability, but also “immunity from suit.” Crouse v. S. Lebanon Twp.,
668 F.Supp.2d 664, 671 (M.D.Pa.2009) (Conner, J.) (citations omitted).
“Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold
public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the
need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they
perform their duties reasonably. The protection of qualified immunity applies
regardless of whether the government official’s error is ‘a mistake of law, a
mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact’.”
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
Determinations regarding qualified immunity, and its application in a
given case, require a court to undertake two distinct inquiries. First, the court
must evaluate whether the defendant violated a constitutional right. Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001), abrogated in part by Pearson, 555 U.S.
223; Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2007); Williams v. Bitner, 455
F.3d 186, 190 (3d Cir.2006). If the defendant did not actually commit a
constitutional violation, then the court must find in the defendant’s favor.

35

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If the defendant is found to have committed a
constitutional violation, the court must undertake a second, related inquiry to
assess whether the constitutional right in question was “clearly established”
at the time the defendant acted. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232; Saucier, 533 U.S.
at 201–02. The Supreme Court has instructed that a right is clearly
established for purposes of qualified immunity if a reasonable state actor
under the circumstances would understand that his conduct violates that right.
Williams, 455 F.3d at 191 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202).
In order to find that a right is clearly established, “the right allegedly
violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity.” Wilson, 526
U.S. at 615. The Supreme Court has explained that, at least in some cases,
“a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply
with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though the very
action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful.” Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271
(1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). In some cases,
“officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even
in novel factual circumstances.” Wilson, 455 F.3d at 191 (quoting Hope, 536
U.S. at 741).

36

The court is no longer required to conduct these two inquiries
sequentially, Pearson, 555 U.S. at 239–40, and it may forego difficult
constitutional issues and award qualified immunity to a defendant if it is
apparent that the defendant did not violate rights that were clearly established
at the time the defendant acted. Id. Where a court elects to address the
alleged constitutional violations, however, the court’s analysis of the merits for
purposes of summary judgment merges with analysis of the deprivation of
federal rights for purposes of qualified immunity. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d
290, 299–300 (3d Cir.2000); Crouse, 668 F.Supp.2d at 671; see also Grant
v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir.1996) (“[C]rucial to the
resolution of [the] assertion of qualified immunity is a careful examination of
the record ... to establish ... a detailed factual description of the actions of
each individual defendant (viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff).”)
Because qualified immunity entails a consideration of whether the law was
clearly established at the time of a defendant's conduct, this defense, which
focuses on the state of the law, presents a question of law for the court, and
one which can often be resolved on summary judgment. See Montanez v.
Thompson, 603 F.3d 243 (3d Cir.2010).
In the specific factual context of excessive force claims based upon

37

allegations relating to a prisoner’s handcuffing, courts have acknowledged
that, in certain instances, summary judgment is entirely appropriate. Gilles v.
Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 207 (3d Cir.2005). With respect to these particular
excessive force claims, courts agree that: “In these cases, summary judgment
for an officer who claims qualified immunity is appropriate where, ‘after
resolving all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff,[ ] the officer’s use of force
was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.’ ” Id.
Applying these benchmarks, the Court finds that the Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity in this case. The record does not evince
anything that would have alerted the Defendants that their actions violated
“clearly established statutory or constitutional right[ ] of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
Moreover, the duration of Abdullah’s detention in restraints fell squarely
within the 24 hour time frame which had previously and repeatedly been
recognized as a discrete period of time which did not give rise to constitutional
concerns. See, e.g., Key v. McKinney, 176 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir.1999) (no
Eighth Amendment violation where prisoner handcuffed and shackled for 24
hours); Hunter v. Bledsoe, No. 10–CV–927, 2010 WL 3154963 (M.D.Pa.
Aug.9, 2010) (ambulatory restraints used for 24 hours); Holley v. Johnson,

38

No. 08–CCV–629, 2010 WL 2640328 (W.D.Va. June 30, 2010) (ambulatory
restraints used for 48 hours); Zimmerman v. Schaeffer, 654 F.Supp.2d 226,
232 (M.D.Pa.2009) (19 hours or more in restraint chair). Accordingly,
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from damages in this case.

V.

Conclusion
Based upon the undisputed facts of record, Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force and
denial of medical care. Additionally, Defendants’ request for qualified
immunity will be granted with respect to Plaintiff's claim of being subjected to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. An appropriate order shall issue.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
Dated: September 29, 2014
O:\Mannion\shared\MEMORANDA - DJ\CIVIL MEMORANDA\2013 MEMORANDA\13-1227-01.wpd

39