Moffitt v. Tunkhannock Area School District et al

Filing 99

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable Malachy E Mannion on 08/15/16. (ep)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOSEPH P. MOFFITT,
Plaintiff,
v.

:
:

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-1519

:

(JUDGE MANNION)

TUNKHANNOCK AREA SCHOOL :
DISTRICT and the TUNKHANNOCK
AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD :
OF SCHOOL DIRECTORS,
:
Defendants.
:
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the court are several post-trial issues remaining after
a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Joseph P. Moffitt. On April 19, 2016, after
a two-day trial, the jury found that the defendant, Tunkhannock Area School
District (the “School District”), violated the plaintiff’s constitutional due process
rights when the defendant suspended the plaintiff from his elementary school
principal position, without pay, on June 7, 2012.1 First, the parties filed
submissions regarding the calculation of damages for the plaintiff’s back pay
award. (Doc. 80, Doc. 81). Second, the defendant and counsel for the
1

Both parties refer to the Tunkhannock Area School District Board of
School Directors (the “School Board”) as a defendant. On April 19, 2016, the
court terminated the School Board as a party. The School District is the sole
defendant left in the action.

defendant, Robin B. Snyder, Esq., (“Snyder”), filed motions to quash the
plaintiff’s subpoena to produce documents relating to the defendant’s legal
fees in the litigation. (Doc. 88, Doc. 91). Third, the plaintiff filed a motion for a
hearing on the issue of the plaintiff’s award for attorney’s fees. (Doc. 95). For
the reasons discussed below, the motions to quash are GRANTED. The
plaintiff’s motion for a hearing on the issue of attorney’s fees is GRANTED and
a hearing will be held on the issues of back pay and attorney’s fees as noted
below.

I.

DISCUSSION
A.

Back Pay

During the trial, the court instructed the jury after the close of evidence
that, in awarding the plaintiff any damages, the jury should consider emotional
and mental harm, harm to the plaintiff’s reputation, and/or the penalty for the
plaintiff’s early withdrawal of his 403(b) retirement plan during his suspension
and associated tax. The court further instructed the jury that damages, if any,
for back pay, contractual retirement contributions, attorney’s fees, and costs
of litigating the case would be determined by the court.
Following deliberations, the jury awarded the plaintiff $40,000.00, and at
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the conclusion of trial, the court ordered the parties to submit letter briefs on
the computation of damages for back pay. On April 29, 2016, the plaintiff
submitted a letter brief arguing that he is entitled to 116 days of back pay in
the amount of $44,014.12, which includes prejudgment interest. (Doc. 80). The
plaintiff also contends that he will be subject to a 10% increased tax burden
resulting from a lump sum back pay award and argues that he is entitled to an
additional $4,401.41 to “offset” the negative tax consequences, to bring the
total award for back pay to $48,415.53. On April 29, 2016, the defendant also
submitted a letter brief arguing that the plaintiff is only entitled to 114 days of
back pay in the total amount of $19,587.26, which includes prejudgment
interest but accounts for several deductions, including federal and state
income taxes, retirement contributions, and insurance premiums. (Doc. 81,
Doc. 81-1). The defendant opposes any offset to the plaintiff for alleged
negative tax consequences.
What should have been a simple and straightforward mathematical
computation of back pay has instead turned into a battle over numbers,
prolonging these proceedings. A hearing will be held on the damages for back
pay, during which the parties must provide proof, including supporting
documentation, for their back pay calculations.

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B.

Motions to Quash and Motion for Hearing

Unsurprisingly, the parties also disagree on many points regarding the
plaintiff’s attorney fee award. Following the trial, on May 3, 2016, the plaintiff
filed a motion for attorney’s fees, and a supporting brief on May 17, 2016.
(Doc. 82, Doc. 83). The defendant filed an opposing brief on May 31, 2016,
raising the following objections: 1) the motion seeks fees for tasks not related
to this litigation, namely fees for administrative proceedings; 2) the number of
hours claimed by plaintiff’s counsel is unreasonable; 3) the billing rate of
plaintiff’s counsel is unreasonable; 4) the amount claimed for the work of
attorney Theresa Moffitt, plaintiff’s sister, should not be awarded; and 5) the
results obtained should reduce the lodestar. (Doc. 85).
On June 14, 2016, the plaintiff filed a reply brief in support of his motion
for attorney’s fees. (Doc. 87). The plaintiff noted that he issued subpoenas
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 to Snyder, Board of Education Solicitor, Frank J.
Tunis, Jr., and Tunkhannock Area School District attorney, Jeffrey Tucker. The
subpoenas demanded that the three attorneys produce retainer agreements,
legal invoices, and time records in this litigation. At issue is the subpoena

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directed towards Snyder. (Doc. 93).2 The other attorneys have been silent on
the issue.
In response, the defendant filed a motion to quash the subpoena and a
supporting brief on July 1, 2016. (Doc. 88, Doc. 90).3 On July 5, 2016, defense
counsel Snyder also filed a motion to quash and a supporting brief. (Doc. 91,
Doc. 92). The defendant and Snyder, (collectively, the “defense”), argue that
the information that plaintiff seeks is irrelevant and lacks any probative value.
Further, they contend that the subpoena is unduly burdensome because it
requires the expense of a considerable amount of time in producing the
records. Finally, they assert that counsel’s billing and time records are
protected by the attorney-client privilege. Because the motions to quash are
nearly identical, the court considers the two motions collectively.

2

The subpoena commands Snyder to produce:
1. Any and all time keeping slips and records regarding time spent defending
the Tunkhannock Area School District and/or its Board of School Directors in
the above-captioned matter.
2. Any and all bills, invoices, and/or other correspondence for payment of
attorney’s fees for defending the Tunkhannock Area School District and/or its
Board of School Directors in the above-captioned matter.
3. Any and all retainer agreements between you and/or your respective law
firm for defending the Tunkhannock Area School District and/or its Board of
School Directors in the above-captioned matter.
3

The defendant also filed amended exhibits to its supporting brief. (Doc.

93).
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On July 15, 2016, the plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to Snyder’s
motion to quash. (Doc. 94). The same day, the plaintiff filed a motion for a
hearing on the issue of attorney’s fees. (Doc. 95). On August 1, 2016, the
defense filed a reply brief in support of the motions to quash. (Doc. 96). The
plaintiff argues that the information regarding defense counsel’s fees is highly
relevant, especially in light of the objections raised against the plaintiff’s
attorney fee petition. The plaintiff points to the defendant’s allegation that the
amount of time claimed by plaintiff’s counsel is excessive and states, “it is
axiomatic that the reasonableness of fees can be demonstrated by those
expended by the opposing party.” (Doc. 94 at 3) (citations omitted).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 authorizes parties to serve subpoenas on parties or
non-parties commanding the production of books, documents, electronically
stored information, or tangible items. Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(d)(3) mandates that a
court quash or modify a subpoena, “upon timely motion,” for 1) failing to
provide a reasonable time to comply; 2) requiring a person to comply beyond
the geographical limits as stated in the Rules; 3) requiring “disclosure of
privileged or other protected matter”; or 4) subjecting a person to an “undue
burden.”
“Although irrelevance is not among the litany of enumerated reasons for

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quashing a subpoena found in Rule 45, courts have incorporated relevance as
a factor when determining motions to quash a subpoena.” Moon v. SCP Pool
Corp., 232 F.R.D. 633, 637 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Evaluation of relevancy follows
from the rule that a subpoena may only seek information that is discoverable,
i.e., information that is not privileged and relevant to the claim or defense of
any party, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), “or if the court has broadened the scope of
discovery, relevant to the subject matter involved in the action,” Prac. Guide
Fed. Civ. Proc. Before Trial (5th Cir.) Ch. 11(IV)-F (quotation omitted). The
Third Circuit has upheld district court orders quashing subpoenas due to the
responding party’s failure to demonstrate the relevance of the desired
information. See Smith v. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 202 (3d Cir. 1989); Ekhato
v. Rite Aid Corp., 529 F. App’x 152, 154 n.3 (3d Cir. 2013) (non-precedential
opinion). Therefore, relevancy of the information demanded is a significant
factor in determining whether to quash a subpoena.
Here, the parties disagree on the amount of attorney’s fees to which
plaintiff’s counsel is entitled. The defense argue that the information sought by
the plaintiff is not relevant to the issue of attorney’s fees and has no probative
value. The plaintiff acknowledges the split of authority on the relevancy of an
opposing party’s billing records to an attorney fee award but argues that the

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defense have put the reasonableness of hours and rates at issue, warranting
an examination of the defendant’s records. (Doc. 94 at 5). In In re Fine Paper
Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 587 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Fine Paper”), the Third
Circuit described information on the opposing party’s legal fees as “relevant,
and arguably even helpful” in determining an attorney fee award, but the Third
Circuit upheld the district court’s decision quashing subpoenas seeking this
information. Noting that “discovery rulings are reviewed . . . for abuse of
discretion,” the Third Circuit concluded that it “cannot hold that the court
abused its discretion in denying the motion” after “[c]onsidering all the
evidence offered on hours and rates, and the likelihood that such discovery
would generate inquiries into collateral matters, such as privilege . . . .” Id.
In the instant matter, the court exercises its discretion to quash the
plaintiff’s subpoena because the subpoena seeks information that is only
marginally relevant. This is not a complicated case involving complex litigation
as in the antitrust class action in Fine Paper. Similar to the issues at trial,
which only lasted two days, the issues regarding attorney’s fees in this matter
are relatively simple. “The most useful starting point for determining the
amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on
the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. This calculation provides

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an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a
lawyer’s services.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). As the
plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of both the hours
expended and hourly rates, the plaintiff has provided the court with information
in support of his petition. See Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 426
F.3d 694, 703 (3d Cir. 2005). The court sees no need to go much further than
this starting point, certainly not to information on defense counsel’s fees.
Although the defendant argues that information regarding its legal fees
is privileged and confidential, the court disagrees with this blanket assertion.
The court acknowledges the possibility that some information in the
defendant’s billing and time records may be privileged and thus would need to
be redacted by defense counsel. See Montgomery County v. MicroVote Corp.,
175 F.3d 296, 305 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding that while the fee agreement
between the attorney and client was not privileged, the specific billing records
at issue were privileged). Thus, delving into defense counsel’s records would
indeed “generate inquiries into collateral matters, such as privilege.” Fine
Paper, 751 F.2d at 587. The marginal relevance of the information does not
warrant the burden imposed on defense counsel or the court’s attention.
Accordingly, the court will grant the motions to quash.

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Finally, the plaintiff filed a motion for “an evidentiary hearing in support
of the Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys Fees and concerning the matters raised
by the Plaintiff’s issuance of subpoenas . . . .” (Doc. 95). In light of the court’s
ruling on the motions to quash, the court will not permit the plaintiff to present
evidence supporting his demand for information on the defendant’s legal fees.
At the upcoming hearing, in addition to the issue of back pay, the parties
should be prepared to present evidence and argue their respective positions
regarding the issue of attorney’s fees, including whether the plaintiff should be
awarded attorney’s fees in connection with the administrative proceedings.

II.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the motions to quash will be granted. The plaintiff’s motion

for a hearing will be granted, as noted above, and a hearing will be held on the
issues of the plaintiff’s damages for back pay and award for attorney’s fees on
August 22, 2016 at 1:30 P.M.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
Date: August 15, 2016
O:\Mannion\shared\MEMORANDA - DJ\CIVIL MEMORANDA\2013 MEMORANDA\13-1519-04.wpd

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