McBride v. Infinity Property and Casualty Corporation et al

Filing 34

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)An Order consistent with the preceding discussion will be issued simultaneously herewithSigned by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 3/24/14. (cc)

In the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
James McBride

:

Plaintiff

: (Case No. 3:13-CV-1737

v.

: (Judge Richard P. Conaboy)

Infinity Property & Casualty
Corporation et al.

:

Defendant.
:
___________________________________________________________________
Memorandum
We consider here three motions by Defendant Infinity Property
& Casualty Corporation (“Defendant”) to compel discovery responses
and/or strike objections by Plaintiff James McBride (“Plaintiff”)
to various subpoenas that Defendant had issued to third parties.
These motions (Doc. 17, 19, and 21) had been fully briefed and are
ripe for disposition.

We shall consider them in their order on the

docket.
I.

Background.
This case arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred

on December 17, 2012 in Brooklyn, New York.

The Plaintiff alleges

that he suffered physical injuries that required medical treatment
when the vehicle he was operating was struck from the rear.
On the date the accident occurred, Plaintiff was a covered
person pursuant to an automobile insurance policy issued by the
Defendant on June 23, 2012.

Pursuant to that policy, Plaintiff had

coverage for first party medical expenses in the amount of
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$5,000.00.

When Plaintiff made a claim for payment in that amount

to defray the cost of medical treatment allegedly received in
connection with the accident, Defendant declined to render payment.
Defendant’s basis for refusing to extend the coverage provided
by its policy is its conviction that Plaintiff misrepresented his
state of domicile at the time he made his application for
insurance.

Plaintiff had represented on his application that he

was a Pennsylvania resident living in Bushkill, Pennsylvania.
Defendant contends that its investigation reveals that Plaintiff
was actually a resident of New York at the time he purchased the
policy in question.

This, Defendant contends, was a material

misrepresentation that exonerates it from its obligation to provide
the first party medical benefits which are the bone of contention
here.
Plaintiff filed suit in the Lackawanna County Court of Common
Pleas seeking recovery of first party medical benefits under the
insurance contract and damages pursuant to the Pennsylvania Bad
Faith Statute.

Defendant, an Alabama corporation, then removed the

case to this Court.
II.

Legal Standard.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (b)(1) provides in relevant
part:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense -

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including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any documents or tangible
things and the identity and location of persons who know
of any discoverable matter... .

Relevant information

need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
Rule 26 establishes a liberal discovery policy, Great
West Life Assurance Company v. Levithan, 152 F.R.D. 494, 497
(E.D.Pa. 1994).

Discovery is generally permitted of any items

that are relevant or may lead to the discovery of relevant
information.

Hicks v. Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America,

168 F.R.D. 528, 529 (E.D.Pa. 1996); Stabilus v. Haynsworth,
Baldwin, Johnson, and Greaves, P.A., 144 F.R.D. 258, 265-66
(E.D.Pa. 1992)(when there is no doubt about relevance a court
should tend toward permitting discovery).

Moreover, discovery

need not be confined to items of admissible evidence but may
encompass that which appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence.

Callahan v. A.E.D.,

Inc. 947 F.Supp. 175, 177 (W.D.Pa. 1996); Momah v. Albert
Einstein Medical Center, 164 F.R.D. 412, 417 (E.D.Pa. 1996).
Although “the scope of relevance in discovery is far
broader than that allowed for evidentiary purposes, it is not
without its limits.” Stabilus, 144 F.R.D. at 265.

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The Court

will not permit discovery where a request is made in bad
faith, unduly burdensome, irrelevant to the general subject
matter of the action, or relating to confidential or
privileged information.

S.S. Fretz, Jr., Inc. v. White

Consolidated Industries, Inc., No. 90-1731, 1991 W.L. 21655,
at 2 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 15, 1991).
The burden is on the objecting party to demonstrate in
specific terms why a discovery request is improper.

Hicks,

168 F.R.D. at 529; Goodman v. Wagner, 553 F.Supp. 255, 258
(E.D.Pa. 1982).

The party objecting to discovery must show

that the requested materials do not fall “within the broad
scope of relevance...or else are of such marginal relevance
that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh
the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure....”
Burke v. New York City Police Department, 115 F.R.D. 220, 224
(S.D.M.Y. 1987).
III. Discussion.
1.

Defendant’s Motion to Strike Objections and to
Compel Discovery Responses (Doc. 17).

Defendant’s Motion (Doc. 17) seeks to compel responses to its
requests for production numbered 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21,
22, 23, and 25.

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Defendant’s motion also requests that the Court

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Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s motion indicates that its objection to
production request No. 17 has been withdrawn and , as such, the Court need not consider it.
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strike objections to subpoenas it had directed to two banks where
Plaintiff maintains accounts.

We shall consider these requests in

turn with the previously discussed legal principles in mind.
Defendant’s production request no. 11 requests, essentially,
Plaintiff’s litigation file with respect to his third party action
against the tortfeasor’s insurer.

Because Plaintiff’s claim in

this case concerns only his right to recoup $5,000.00 in first
party medical benefits from the Defendant, the Court will not
permit discovery into the third party case.

The Court regards such

information as irrelevant to the question whether Plaintiff
incurred medical costs aggregating to $5,000.00 in connection with
the accident.

The answer to that question can be gleaned from the

records of the physicians who treated Plaintiff or, if necessary,
by deposing those physicians.

There is no need to intrude into

Plaintiff’s litigation file, which includes documents that
generally fall under the protection of the attorney/client
privilege, when the relevant information is easily obtainable from
other reliable sources.
Defendant’s production request no. 14 seeks tax returns
(local, state, and federal) from the years 2007 to present.
Inasmuch as Plaintiff has admitted that he did not move to
Pennsylvania until April of 2012 (see Doc. 25 at 8), the Court sees
no relevance in his tax returns for the years 2007 through 2011.
Plaintiff, however, will be directed to provide Defendant a copy of

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his 2012 tax return because his residence as stated on that
document is germane to the question whether he was a Pennsylvania
domiciliary at the time he made application for insurance with
Defendant.
Defendant’s production request no. 15 seeks copies of
Plaintiff’s voter identification documents for the years 2007
through 2012.

Because Plaintiff has indicated that he resided in

Pennsylvania only since April of 2012, he will be required to
supply Defendant with his voter identification documents, to the
extent such documents exist, for 2012 and 2013 as they are,
potentially, germane to the question of his domicile at the time of
his application for insurance and the accident in question.
Defendant’s production request no. 18 seeks copies of all
statements for any bank accounts Plaintiff owned, individually or
jointly, in any jurisdiction for the period from June 23, 2011 to
the present.

Because such statement could shed light on the extent

of Plaintiff’s daily travel - - germane because his policy
application indicated that he would generally be within a 50 mile
radius of Bushkill, Pennsylvania - -, Plaintiff will be directed to
provide all such statements.

However, these statements need be

furnished only for the period from January 1, 2012 through May 31,
2013.

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Plaintiff may redact the balances and amounts of

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Plaintiff’s complaint indicates that he remained a Pennsylvania domiciliary as of May 31,
2013. (Doc. 1-1, p. 5, ¶ 1).
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transactions detailed on these documents because how much money he
has is not Defendant’s concern nor is it relevant to his claim.
Defendant’s production request no. 19 seeks Plaintiff’s credit
card statements for the period June 23, 2011 to the present.

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These documents are also relevant to demonstrate the extent and
frequency of Plaintiff’s travel.

Plaintiff will be directed to

furnish Defendant with copies of such documents for the period from
January 1, 2012 through May 31, 2013.

Like Plaintiff’s bank

account records, these may be redacted to obscure the balances on
the accounts and the amounts of the itemized transactions.
Defendant’s production request no. 20 seeks documents related
to Plaintiff’s receipt of any government benefits for the period
2007 to present.

This request is temporally overbroad.

Plaintiff

will be directed to furnish any documents in this category for the
period January 1, 2012 through May 31, 2013.
Defendant’s production request no. 21 seeks documents (e.g.
titles, registration cards, loan documents, invoices for repairs,
etc.) related to the vehicle Plaintiff was driving at the time of
the accident for the period 2007 to the present.
Defendant’s request is overly broad.

Once again,

Plaintiff will be directed to

provide all documents regarding the ownership, registration or
repair of the subject vehicle from the period of January 1, 2012

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Defendant does not provide the Court with an explanation as to why June 23, 2011 should
be a significant date.
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through May 31, 2013.
Defendant’s production request no. 22 seeks “all ledgers,
journals, accounting records, tax records, worker’s compensation
records, state filings, permits and licenses regarding J. McBride
Construction.”

Because Plaintiff acknowledged in his brief that J.

McBride Construction “never got off the ground” (Doc. 25 at 12),
these documents, which would obviously be relevant and
discoverable, are likely not available inasmuch as they likely
never existed.

The Court will not order the production of

nonexistent documents.
Defendant’s production request no. 23 seeks: “all documents
regarding any real property you owned for the years 2007 to
present.

This includes mortgages, titles, liens and tax records.”

The Court must observe that the fact that a man owns property in
more than one state does not shed much light on his state of
domicile.

Nevertheless, Plaintiff will be directed to provide

documents responsive to Defendant’s production request No. 23 for
the period from January 1, 2012 through May 31, 2013.
Defendant’s production request No. 25 seeks “all letters,
faxes, correspondence, notes, memos, e-mails, records, bills,
invoices, payments, agreements, leases, contracts and checks”
between Plaintiff and his landlords in Bushkill, Pennsylvania and
Brooklyn, New York.

Plaintiff will be directed to furnish

Defendant with copies of all such documents that are related to the

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landlord/tenant relationship between Plaintiff and these landlords
for the period January 1, 2012 through May 31, 2013.

Plaintiff

need not produce correspondence of a purely personal nature between
him and these landlords.
With respect to Defendant’s request that this Court strike
Plaintiff’s objections to subpoenas Defendant directed to First
Keystone Community Bank of Berwick, Pennsylvania and Capital One
Bank of Brooklyn, New York, the Court notes that these subpoenas
have no temporal limitation.

Defendant is not entitled to such

open-ended discovery into Plaintiff’s financial affairs.

Defendant

is entitled to access the records of these banks in the relevant
time period - - January 1, 2012 through May 31, 2013.

To that end,

Defendant will be directed to reissue these subpoenas as temporally
limited to the relevant time frame.

Plaintiff is placed on notice

that the Court will deny future objections to these subpoenas if
reissued as per the aforementioned time parameters.
2.

Defendant’s Motion to Strike Objections to its Subpoena
Directed to the New York Office of Temporary and
Disability Assistance (Doc. 19)

This motion seeks to compel a response to the above-referenced
subpoena (Doc. 19-3).

While the information sought is potentially

relevant to resolution of the main issue in this case, its temporal
scope is overly broad in light of Plaintiff’s acknowledgment that
he was a New York resident until April of 2012.

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Accordingly,

Defendant is directed to reissue the subpoena, as redacted in
Document 19-3, for the period from January 1, 2012 through May 31,
2013.

Should Defendant do so, Plaintiff is cautioned against

further objection to this subpoena.
3.

Defendant’s Motion to Strike Objections to its Subpoena
Directed to the Doe Fund, Inc. (Doc. 21).

This motion seeks to compel a response to the above-referenced
subpoena (Doc. 21-3).

Here again the information sought is

potentially relevant but temporally over broad.

Accordingly,

Defendant is directed to reissue this subpoena, as redacted in
Document 21-3, for the period from January 1, 2012 through May 31,
2013.

Provided that Defendant refashions this subpoena as

directed, Plaintiff is instructed to lodge no further objection.
IV.

Conclusion.
An Order consistent with the preceding discussion will be

issued simultaneously herewith.
BY THE COURT

S/Richard P. Conaboy
Honorable Richard P. Conaboy
United States District Court

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