Brethren Mutual Insurance Company v. Loughney et al

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 12 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Brethren Mutual Insurance Company. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/5/15. (jam)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BRETHREN MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-CV-1880

Plaintiff,
(JUDGE CAPUTO)
v.
MARK P. LOUGHNEY and COREY
MILES,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Brethren Mutual Insurance Company’s
(“Brethren”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 12) on its declaratory judgment complaint
(Doc. 5). Brethren, an insurance company, seeks a declaration that it is not liable for the
bodily injury claims of Corey Miles arising from the actions of Mark Loughney on July 15,
2012.

Because Mr. Miles’ injuries were not the result of accidental conduct on Mr.

Loughney’s part, even if Mr. Loughney may not have specifically intended to harm Mr. Miles,
the insurance policy issued by Brethren does not cover Mr. Miles’ claims against Mr.
Loughney, and Brethren’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 12) will be granted.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff Brethren Mutual Insurance Company is a corporation.

(Doc. 5, ¶ 1.)

Defendant Mark Loughney is an adult individual who was incarcerated at the time the
complaint was filed, but whose permanent address is 1615 Electric Street, in Dunmore,
Pennsylvania (“Dunmore”). (Id., ¶ 2.) Defendant Corey Miles is an adult individual who
resides in Dunmore. (Id., ¶ 3.)
Prior to July 15, 2012, Corey Miles and Mark Loughney had shared one brief
interaction. (Miles Dep. 18:9-16, March 27, 2014.) On the night of July 15, 2012, Defendant
Miles was at 1611 Electric Street, Dunmore, as a guest. (Doc. 13, ¶ 2; Doc. 16, ¶ 5.) An
argument and physical dispute occurred between Mr. Loughney and occupants of 1611

Electric Street, not including Mr. Miles. (Doc. 13, ¶¶ 13-16.) At some point that night,
Defendant Loughney brought a container of gasoline to 1611 Electric Street, and poured
gasoline throughout the property. (Doc. 13, ¶ 28; Doc. 16, ¶ 7.) He then lit a match or
lighter, and ignited a fire. (Id.) As a result, Corey Miles’ legs caught on fire and were badly
burned. (Doc. 13, ¶ 9; Doc. 16, ¶ 7.)
Brethren had issued an insurance policy to Patrick and Donna Loughney, the parents
of Defendant Mark Loughney, which was in effect from April 4, 2012, through April 4, 2013.
(Doc. 1, ¶ 4). A copy of the policy is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit A (Doc. 5-1).
Corey Miles is pursuing or intends to pursue a personal injury claim against Mark
Loughney. A claim was presented to Brethren for compensation of personal injuries
sustained by Mr. Miles as a result of the fire. (Doc. 13, ¶ 57.) Mr. Miles asserts that he was
injured as the result of a covered occurrence under the Homeowner’s Policy and so is
entitled to be compensated by Brethren for his injuries. (Id., ¶ 59.) Brethren seeks a
declaration that its policy issued to the Loughney family does not cover the claims that
Defendant Miles brings against Defendant Loughney.
The policy provides coverage for an “occurrence,” which is defined in the policy as:
[a]n accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same
general harmful conditions, which results, during the policy period, in:
a. “Bodily injury”; or
b. “Property damage”.
(Doc. 5-1, 10.) The policy contains an exclusion in its coverage for “Expected or Intended
Injury,” which Brethren asserts applies here. (Doc. 13, ¶ 61.) This exclusion states:
E. Coverage E – Personal Liability And Coverage F – Medical Payments To Others
Coverages E and F do not apply to the following:
1. Expected Or Intended Injury
“Bodily injury” or “property damage” which is expected or intended by an “insured”
even if the resulting “bodily injury” or “property damage”:
a. Is of a different kind, quality or degree than initially expected or intended; or
b. Is sustained by a different person, entity, real or personal property, than
initially expected or intended.
(Doc. 5-1, 26.)

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B. Procedural Background
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Brethren filed a Complaint on July 10, 2013 (Doc.
1), which it amended on July 12, 2013 (Doc. 5). Brethren seeks a declaration that it is not
liable for coverage for the bodily injury claim of Corey Miles arising from the actions of Mark
Loughney on the night of July 12, 2012.
On August 12, 2013, Defendant Corey Miles filed an Answer to this Complaint (Doc.
10). Discovery commenced thereafter.
On March 30, 2015, Brethren filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 12) as well
as a Statement of Facts (Doc. 13), a Brief in Support (Doc. 14), and an Appendix with
supporting exhibits (Doc. 15). On April 20, 2015, Defendant Corey Miles files a Statement
of Facts in response (Doc. 16), with attached exhibits. Thus, this motion is fully briefed and
ripe for disposition.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Summary judgment is appropriate when ‘the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.’” Wright v. Corning, 679 F.3d 101, 103 (3d Cir. 2012)
(quoting Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995)). A fact is material if
proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the suit under the
applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Where there is no material fact in dispute, the moving party need only establish that
it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Edelman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 83 F.3d
68, 70 (3d Cir. 1996). Where, however, there is a disputed issue of material fact, summary
judgment is appropriate only if the factual dispute is not a genuine one. Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 248. An issue of material fact is genuine if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Id. Where there is a material fact in dispute, the moving party has the
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initial burden of proving that: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; and (2) the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Howard Hess Dental Labs., Inc.
v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010). The moving party may present its
own evidence or, where the non-moving party has the burden of proof, simply point out to
the court that “the non-moving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential
element of her case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
“When considering whether there exist genuine issues of material fact, the court is
required to examine the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment, and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Wishkin v.
Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). Once the moving party has satisfied its initial
burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to either present affirmative evidence
supporting its version of the material facts or to refute the moving party's contention that the
facts entitle it to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. The Court
need not accept mere conclusory allegations, whether they are made in the Complaint or a
sworn statement. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must show
specific facts such that a reasonable jury could find in that party's favor, thereby establishing
a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm'n, 490 F.3d 265, 270 (3d
Cir. 2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “While the evidence that the non-moving party
presents may be either direct or circumstantial, and need not be as great as a
preponderance, the evidence must be more than a scintilla.” Id. (quoting Hugh v. Butler
Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005)). In deciding a Summary Judgment
Motion, “the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of
the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 249.

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III. Discussion
Plaintiff Brethren requests summary judgment in its favor in the form of a declaratory
judgment that it is not liable to pay for the injuries sustained by Defendant Corey Miles as
a result of the fire at 1611 Electric Street started by Defendant Mark Loughney. Brethren
asserts that the actions of Mark Loughney on July 15, 2012 do not give rise to a covered
occurrence under the Brethren Homeowners Insurance Policy issued to Defendant
Loughney’s parents. It asserts that the coverage for Corey Miles’ bodily injury claim is
excluded under the expected or intended injury exclusion in the Brethren policy. Brethren
argues that summary judgment in its favor is warranted because a claim arising from an
intentional act by a covered person (in this case, Loughney) cannot constitute an occurrence
as defined in its policies.
Defendant Miles asserts that Loughney’s actions the night of July 15, 2012, did not
constitute an “intentional act,” and also do not fall under the exception outlined in section E
for “expected or intended injury”:
E. Coverage E – Personal Liability And Coverage F – Medical Payments To Others
Coverages E and F do not apply to the following:
1. Expected Or Intended Injury
"Bodily injury" or "property damage" which is expected or intended by an "insured"
even if the resulting "bodily injury" or "property damage":
a. Is of a different kind, quality or degree than initially expected or intended; or
b. Is sustained by a different person, entity, real or personal property, than
initially expected or intended.
Defendant Miles asserts that Loughney did not intend to injure him or anyone as a result of
his conduct on the night at issue, rather, he just intended to “scare” them. Defendant Miles
contends that Loughney “is responsible for his conduct through acts of recklessness and
negligence.” (Doc. 10, 3.) Thus, the question is whether Defendant Loughney’s actions and
Defendant Miles’ resulting injuries were expected or intended, or were an accident.
Even viewing the record and the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving
parties, and resolving all inferences in their favor, Defendant Loughney’s actions constituted
intentional acts, and even if they did not, his conduct falls under the exclusion as outlined
in “E”. Thus, Brethren is not liable to Defendant Miles for his injuries sustained as a result
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of Mr. Loughney’s conduct.
Under Pennsylvania law, in determining whether a party’s injuries resulted from an
accident as covered by an insurance policy, a court must view the facts from the perspective
of the insured party. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Estate of Mehlman, 589 F.3d 105, 111
(3d Cir. 2009). Thus, I view Mr. Miles’ injuries from the perspective of Mr. Miles. The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit relies upon the definition of an “accident” set out by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court:
An accident, simply stated, is merely an unanticipated event; it is something which
occurs not as the result of natural routine but as the culmination of forces working
without design, coordination or plan. And the more disorganized the forces, the more
confusedly they operate, the more indiscriminately haphazard the clash and
intermingling, the more perfect is the resulting accident.
State Farm, 589 F.3d at 111 (citing Brenneman v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 411 Pa.
409, 192 A.2d 745, 747 (1963)). The fire that resulted when Defendant Loughney poured
gasoline around the property at 1611 and lit it on fire cannot be construed as “the
culmination of forces working without design, coordination or plan.”
Furthermore, “[i]n Pennsylvania, as elsewhere, insurance is not available for losses
that the policyholder knows of, planned, intended, or is aware are substantially certain to
occur.” State Farm, 589 F.3d 112 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A large
fire and resulting injuries to the occupants of 1611 Electric Street was an extremely
foreseeable and likely result of Defendant Loughney’s actions. Defendant Loughney testified
in a deposition that he was angry at the occupants of 1611 Electric Street, and wanted to
make sure that he did not have problems with them going forward. (Loughney Dep., 22:2323:2.) While he stated that he set the house on fire not to harm them, but to scare them,
harm is an expected outcome of pouring large amounts of gasoline throughout a home and
lighting that gasoline on fire.
Much of Defendant Miles’ argument that his injuries were not the result of an
intentional act centers on the idea that Loughney sought to harm other occupants of 1611
Electric Street, not Mr. Miles. However, policy exclusion “E” covers instances where the

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injury “b. Is sustained by a different person, entity, real or personal property, than initially
expected or intended.” Thus, this argument does not apply.
Additionally, while Defendant Miles argues that Defendant Loughney did not
contemplate or intend the specific degree or kind of damage he caused Defendant Miles to
suffer, the exclusion covers bodily injury “which is expected or intended by an ‘insured’ even
if the resulting ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’: a. Is of a different kind, quality or degree
than initially expected or intended. . .” Furthermore, Defendant Miles argues that Defendant
Loughney merely sought to scare the occupants of 1611 Electric Street. By pouring gasoline
throughout the property and striking a match and/or lighter, Mr. Loughney intended–or at
least could have expected–some sort of harm or damage. While he may not have intended
damage to Mr. Miles to the degree that Mr. Miles suffered, his actions on the night of July
15, 2012 fall under the exclusion. Based on the foregoing, Brethren has established that it
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and summary judgment is warranted.

IV. Conclusion
For the above reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted. An
appropriate order follows.

August 5, 2015
Date

/s/A. Richard Caputo
A. Richard Caputo
United States District Judge

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