Rowe v. Giroux et al
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 50 MOTION for Reconsideration re 49 Order Adopting Report and Recommendations, Order Dismissing Case filed by Gregory Alan Rowe. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/1/17. (jam)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GREGORY ALAN ROWE,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-02444
SUPT. NANCY GIROUX, et al.,
Presently before the Court is Petitioner Gregory Alan Rowe‘s Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court’s decision to dismiss his § 2254 habeas petition as
untimely. (Doc. 50.) For the reasons stated below, the Motion will be denied.
As the relevant facts are set forth in the August 23, 2016 Memorandum (Doc. 48),
they will not be repeated at length herein.
Petitioner Gregory Alan Rowe was convicted before the Court of Common Pleas
of Pike County of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of third degree murder,
endangering the welfare of a child, and possession of an instrument of crime.
Commonwealth v. Rowe, No. CP-52-CR-0000181-2004 (Pike County C.C.P.).1 On
February 8, 2006, Rowe was sentenced to two (2) consecutive life terms followed by
eighteen (18) months to ten (10) years imprisonment. Rowe’s conviction became final on
A federal habeas court may take judicial notice of state court records. See
Reynolds v. Ellingsworth, 843 F.2d 712, 714 n.1 (3d Cir. 1988).
March 27, 2008, ninety (90) days after the date on which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court denied Rowe’s petition for allowance of appeal. Thus, absent any applicable tolling
period, Rowe had until March 27, 2009 to timely file a federal habeas petition. See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
Rowe filed his first petition for collateral relief under the Pennsylvania Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) in the Pike County Court of Common Pleas on December
15, 2008, thereby tolling the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(2). Counsel was appointed to represent Rowe with respect to his PCRA petition.
The Court of Common Pleas denied Rowe’s petition on December 23, 2009. Rowe
appealed this decision up to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which denied his petition
for allowance of appeal on July 25, 2011. The AEDPA’s statute of limitations again began
to run from this date.2
Rowe subsequently filed a motion for DNA testing pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 9543.1, and a second PCRA petition with the Court of Common Pleas on
September 6, 2011. However, despite Rowe’s instructions to docket the two filings
separately, the Court of Common Pleas construed Rowe’s filings as only one motion for
post-conviction DNA testing. Rowe’s motion for DNA testing was denied on January 9,
2012 and, ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Rowe’s petition for
As noted in the Court’s prior Memorandum, the ninety (90) day period during
which a state prisoner may file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court from the denial of his PCRA petition “does not toll the one
year limitations period set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2),” Stokes v. Dist. Att’y of
Cty. of Phila., 247 F.3d 539, 543 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 959
(2001), “especially where the state prisoner fails to file such a petition,” Hubley v.
Superintendent, SCI Camp Hill, 57 Fed. Appx. 927, 929 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing
Stokes, 247 F.3d at 542-43). (See Doc. 48, at 7 n.4.)
allowance of appeal with respect to that motion on December 3, 2013.
Rowe filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on
September 24, 2013. After the Magistrate Judge issued an initial Report and
Recommendation on August 10, 2015, this Court found that part of Rowe’s second postconviction filings with the Court of Common Pleas should have been construed as a
second PCRA petition, rather than only a motion for DNA testing. (See Doc. 24.) The
Court rejected the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to deny Rowe’s habeas petition
as untimely, granted Rowe’s motion for expansion of the record, and recommitted the
matter to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings. (Doc. 25.)
On June 1, 2016, the Magistrate Judge issued another Report and
Recommendation, which recommended the Court dismiss with prejudice Rowe’s habeas
petition as time-barred. (See Doc. 42.) The Report and Recommendation noted that this
was the first occasion for both the Magistrate Judge and this Court to consider the issue
of timeliness with the benefit of full briefing, a complete record of the state court
proceedings, and in light of the Court’s decision to construe Rowe’s second postconviction filing as a second PCRA petition. (See id. at 6 n.4.) The Court adopted the
Report and Recommendation and dismissed with prejudice Rowe’s habeas petition.
(Doc. 49.) The Court agreed with the Magistrate Judge’s findings that Rowe’s second
PCRA petition was not “properly filed” because it was not filed within one year from the
date on which his conviction became final. (See Doc. 48, at 8-9.) The Court further noted
that “none of the exceptions to the PCRA’s statute of limitations . . . apply here, nor did
Rowe raise any of these exceptions on collateral review or in support of the instant
habeas petition.” (Id. at 9 n.6.)
On September 6, 2016, Rowe filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration. (Doc.
50.) In support of his Motion, Rowe argues that there is a need to correct a clear error of
law or fact or to prevent a manifest injustice.
II. Legal Standard
The scope of a motion for reconsideration is extremely limited. Blystone v. Horn,
664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011). A judgment may be altered or amended if the party
seeking reconsideration shows at least one of the following grounds: (1) an intervening
change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available
previously; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest
injustice. Max's Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros , 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d
A motion for reconsideration is not intended to give an unhappy litigant an
additional chance to rehash or reargue issues which have already been considered and
disposed of by the Court. See Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F. Supp. 2d 588, 606
(M.D. Pa. 2002). A losing party may not use a motion for reconsideration to raise new
arguments that it could have raised previously, but did not. See McDowell Oil Serv., Inc.
v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 817 F. Supp. 538, 541 (M.D. Pa. 1993). Indeed, a m otion
for reconsideration is not a substitute for appeal nor a vehicle whereby a party may
present arguments inexplicably omitted in prior proceedings. Karr v. Castle, 768 F. Supp.
1087, 1093 (D. Del. 1991), aff'd sub nom. 22 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub
nom., 513 U.S. 1084 (1995). “A party seeking reconsideration must show more than a
disagreement with the Court's decision, and ‘recapitulation of the cases and arguments
considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving
party's burden.’” Database Am., Inc., v. Bellsouth Advert. & Pub. Corp., 825 F. Supp.
1216, 1220 (D.N.J. 1993) (quoting G-69 v. Degnan, 748 F. Supp. 274, 275 (D.N.J.
“Because federal courts have a strong interest in the finality of judgments, motions
for reconsideration should be granted sparingly.” Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Diversified Indus.,
Inc., 884 F. Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995). In order to succeed on a motion for
reconsideration, “the movant must demonstrate a ‘definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed,’ or that the court overlooked arguments that were
previously made.” United States v. Berger, Crim. No. 09-308, Civ. No. 15-1086, 2016 WL
2726600, at *1 (W.D. Pa. May 10, 2016) (quoting United States v. Jasin, 292 F. Supp. 2d
670, 676 (E.D. Pa. 2003)).
Rowe argues in the present Motion that the Court’s August 23, 2016 Memorandum
and Order adopting the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Mehalchick
and dismissing with prejudice his § 2254 petition as time-barred contained a clear error of
law or fact or resulted in a manifest injustice. (Pet.’s Mot. 4, Doc. 50.) Rowe rests his
Motion on four separate grounds, arguing the Court clearly erred in: (1) applying the oneyear filing requirement to his second PCRA petition when it should have applied the “new
facts” exception; (2) finding that equitable tolling was not justified; (3) adopting a Report
and Recommendation that dismissed Rowe’s habeas petition as time-barred; and (4)
finding that he failed to support his assertion that the “overwhelming evidence of guilt”
was “either unconstitutional/inadmissible; unreliable and speculative, and easily proven
as untruthful, deceitful and a complete contradiction to the actual physical and
corroborating evidence of innocence.” Many of these arguments were raised in Rowe’s
objections to the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 47), considered by the Court, and
rejected in its August 23, 2016 Memorandum and Order (Docs. 48 & 49).
Rowe Argues the Court Erred in Finding That His Second PCRA Petition Was
Not “Properly Filed”
Rowe’s primary contention is that the Court erred in finding that his second PCRA
petition was not “properly filed” for purposes of tolling the AEDPA’s statute of limitations
because it was filed over one year from the date on which his judgment became final.
(Pet.’s Mot. 10-19.) Rowe argues that the Court should have applied the “new facts”
exception to his second PCRA petition, which allows a PCRA court to accept a petition
filed after the PCRA’s one-year jurisdictional time bar if the petitioner alleges and proves
that “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and
could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). If Rowe’s second PCRA petition was “properly filed,” then his
habeas petition would be considered timely. (See Doc. 48, at 7.)
After considering Rowe’s objections to the Report and Recommendation which
raised this same argument (see Doc. 47, at 14-15), the Court concluded that an
exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time bar does not apply to Rowe’s case. (Doc. 48,
at 9 n.6.) Rowe fails to demonstrate that this conclusion was based on a clear error of law
or fact or has resulted in a manifest injustice. Instead, Rowe reargues that his second
PCRA petition alleged that his original PCRA counsel provided ineffective assistance,
and thus the facts forming the basis of his second PCRA petition’s ineffective assistance
claims could not have been discovered with due diligence prior to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s denial of his petition for allowance of appeal on July 25, 2011. However,
this argument is again without merit. See Commonwealth v. Gamboa–Taylor, 753 A.2d
780, 785-86 (Pa. 2000) (holding that an allegation of PCRA counsel's ineffectiveness
could not be invoked as a newly-discovered “fact” for purposes of § 9545(b)(1)(ii)). Rowe
has failed to demonstrate that the Court’s conclusion that his second PCRA petition w as
untimely constituted a clear error or resulted in a manifest injustice. As such, the Court
finds no basis for reconsidering its determination that Rowe’s second PCRA petition does
not constitute a “properly filed” application for state collateral review sufficient to toll the
AEDPA’s statute of limitations.3
Rowe Argues That Equitable Tolling of the AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations Is
Rowe argues again, in the alternative, that the Court erred in finding no legal
authority supported his claim for equitable tolling. (Pet.’s Mot. 19-24.) In support of this
claim, Rowe generally rehashes the same factors that he raised in his objections to the
Report and Recommendation, which the Court concluded were insufficient to justify
equitable tolling. (Compare Doc. 47, at 19, with Doc. 50, at 24; see Doc. 48, at 14 n.7.)
Rowe also raises a new ground in support of equitable tolling, arguing the state courts
The Court notes again that the proper filing of a first PCRA petition does not toll
the one-year timeliness requirement under the PCRA with respect to the filing of a
successive PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 816 A.2d 1129, 1134-35
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). Thus, the PCRA’s one-year jurisdictional time bar was not
tolled when Rowe properly filed his first PCRA petition on December 15, 2008.
(See Doc. 48, at 9 n.6.)
implied that his second PCRA petition was timely filed, and therefore he reasonably
believed that the petition was timely pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9545(b)(2).
(Pet.’s Mot. 21-22.) As explained below, Rowe fails to demonstrate that the Court’s prior
decision finding equitable tolling inappropriate constituted a clear error or resulted in a
First, Rowe argues that “unprofessional attorney conduct,” which rises to the level
of “egregious” neglect, may constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” that warrants
equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. (Pet.’s Mot. 19-20.) This argument
is merely an extension of the same argument Rowe raised in his objections to the Report
and Recommendation (see Doc. 47, at 18), and is still without merit. It is well-settled that,
in non-capital cases, attorney error is generally an insufficient basis for equitable tolling of
the AEDPA’s limitations period. See Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 76 (3d Cir. 2004).
Furthermore, Rowe’s allegations fail to demonstrate egregious attorney neglect which
prevented him from timely filing a federal habeas petition. Cf. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S.
631, 652-54 (2010) (finding equitable tolling may be appropriate when egregious attorney
neglect results in a failure to timely file a federal habeas petition despite a client’s many
admonitions to his attorney on the importance of doing so); Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp.
& Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 241-42 (3d Cir. 1999) (permitting equitable tolling when
plaintiff’s attorney affirmatively misrepresented that he had filed a complaint on plaintiff’s
behalf within the limitations period when he had not). And to the extent Rowe attempts to
argue for the first time that his PCRA counsel “abandoned” him, the Court finds that such
a claim has no merit. See Daniels v. Walsh, No. 12-3461, 2013 WL 5049775, at *6 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 12, 2013) (“Petitioner's counsel certainly did not abandon him, as he properly
pursued Petitioner's appeal through the PCRA Court, Superior Court, and Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.”). Rowe thus fails to show that the Court’s prior opinion overlooked a
salient argument or rested upon a clear error.
Second, Rowe argues that equitable tolling is warranted because the
Pennsylvania state court which docketed his second PCRA petition implied that the
petition was timely filed because it never expressly found the petition to be untimely.
(Pet.’s Mot. 21-22.) In support of this proposition, Rowe cites to the Third Circuit’s
decision in Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands, 705 F.3d 80 (3d Cir. 2013). In
Jenkins, the Third Circuit explained that a court’s directive which implies that a pleading is
timely filed might constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying equitable tolling if it
misleads a litigant and prevents him from timely filing his federal habeas petition. See id.
at 90-91. Rowe did not raise this argument in his objections to the Report and
Recommendation despite raising other grounds in support of equitable tolling. (See Doc.
47, at 18-29.) A motion for reconsideration is not an appropriate vehicle for advancing a
new argument that could have been raised previously, but was not. See McDowell Oil
Serv., Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 817 F. Supp. 538, 541 (M.D. Pa. 1993).
Nevertheless, Rowe’s reliance on Jenkins, although not entirely without merit, is
In Jenkins, the petitioner properly filed his PCRA petition on October 1, 2008.
Jenkins, 705 F.3d at 83. At the time the PCRA petition was filed, 279 days of the
AEDPA’s 365-day limitations period had run. Id. at 85. The Court of Common Pleas
denied the petitioner’s PCRA petition, and the Superior Court af firmed the denial on
November 10, 2009. Id. at 83. Accordingly, the petitioner had until December 10, 2009 to
file a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See id. at
83, 85. On December 2, 2009, the petitioner filed a pleading with the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court which, inter alia, requested an extension to file his petition for allowance
of appeal. See id. at 83, 86. On December 10, 2009, the petitioner’s 30-day window in
which to file a petition for allowance of appeal with the state Supreme Court expired. See
id. at 85. On December 16, 2009, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a defective
filing notice to the petitioner which informed him that his pleading failed to comply with
certain rules of appellate procedure. Id. at 83. The notice, however, did not indicate that
the pleading was untimely. See id. at 83, 90. Instead, the notice implied that the pleading,
if perfected, would hold a place for the petitioner on the Supreme Court’s allocatur
docket, which would continue to toll the AEDPA’s limitations period. See id. at 90. The
petitioner perfected his pleading on December 29, 2009. Id. at 83. However, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently denied the pleading on April 27, 2010, in an
unpublished per curiam order without an opinion. 4 Id. at 83-84. The petitioner swiftly filed
a federal habeas petition with this Court on May 7, 2010, which was dismissed as
untimely. Id. at 84. This Court concluded that the petitioner’s PCRA petition stopped
pending when time to file an appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expired on
December 10, 2009, that the petitioner’s December 2, 2009 pleading was not “properly
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s order provided no indication about whether it
denied the petitioner’s pleading as untimely, improperly filed, or on the merits.
Jenkins, 705 F.3d at 86.
filed” for purposes of tolling the AEDPA’s limitations period, and thus the federal habeas
petition was untimely. See Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands , No. 3:CV-100984, 2010 WL 4623859, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2010).
On appeal, the Third Circuit explained that the petitioner was likely entitled to
equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s limitations period because the defective filing notice
misled the petitioner into thinking his December 2nd pleading would be deemed timely
filed so long as he perfected the defects specified therein.5 See id. at 90 (“[B]y explicitly
directing [petitioner] to cure certain filing defects, the notice implied that his pleading
otherwise satisfied the Rules not referenced therein. . . .”). Relying on this notice, the
petitioner perfected his pleading and waited for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
decision under the reasonable assumption that his now-perfected pleading was properly
before the state Supreme Court and tolling the AEDPA’s limitations period. See id. That
is, the notice’s implicit suggestion of timeliness misled the petitioner into believing that his
right to file a federal habeas petition was being preserved. Under these circumstances,
the Jenkins court noted that the petitioner made a “strong showing for equitable tolling.”
Id. at 85.
The circumstances in the present case, although similar in some respects, differ
materially. Unlike Rowe, the Jenkins petitioner received an explicit directive from the state
court which misled him into believing that once he perfected his pleading, it would be
deemed properly filed and therefore toll the AEDPA’s limitations period. See also
Because the Third Circuit concluded that the petitioner’s December 2nd pleading
statutorily tolled the AEDPA’s limitations period, the court’s equitable tolling
analysis was not dispositive. See Jenkins, 705 F.3d at 88-89.
Copeland v. Wingard, No. 14-5754, 2015 WL 6688073, at *7-*8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2015)
(finding equitable tolling appropriate where, inter alia, the PCRA court sent petitioner a
letter stating his second PCRA petition would be timely if he resubmitted it, but
subsequently concluding that the petition was untimely). As such, it would have been
inequitable to prohibit the Jenkins petitioner from filing a habeas petition due to his
reasonable reliance on a directive from the state Supreme Court which implicitly
represented that his pleading was timely. Notably, at the time the petitioner received the
misleading notice, the AEDPA’s limitations period had not yet expired, and his reliance on
the notice thus served to prevent the petitioner from filing his habeas petition within the
one-year limitations period.
The same cannot be said of Rowe. The PCRA court did not mislead Rowe
regarding the steps he needed to take to preserve a claim. Cf. Munchinski v. Wilson, 694
F.3d 308, 329-30 (3d Cir. 2012). Additionally, the PCRA court never sent a directive to
Rowe that implied his second PCRA petition was timely filed, or that it would be
considered timely filed if Rowe corrected certain technical defects. Cf. Jenkins, 705 F.3d
at 90; Copeland, 2015 WL 6688073, at *7-*8; see also Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 235
(2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[I]f the petitioner is affirmatively misled, either by the
court or by the State, equitable tolling might well be appropriate.”). The Court recognizes
that improper docketing at the state court likely contributed to the PCRA court’s failure to
expressly acknowledge that Rowe’s second PCRA petition was not timely filed. However,
the Court cannot conclude that it committed a clear error in finding equitable tolling of the
AEDPA’s limitations period inappropriate in Rowe’s case.
Lastly, in support of equitable tolling Rowe generally rehashes the same
arguments that he raised in his objections to the Report and Recom mendation, which
have already been considered and rejected by the Court. (See Pet.’s Mot. 23-24.) In so
doing, Rowe fails to demonstrate that the Court’s prior decision contained a clear error of
law or fact or resulted in a manifest injustice. As such, these arguments provide no basis
for granting a motion for reconsideration.6
Rowe Argues That the Court Erred in Adopting the Magistrate Judge’s
Report and Recommendation
Rowe again argues that the Court erred in finding his habeas petition untimely
because the Court previously issued a Memorandum which, inter alia, initially found that
his habeas petition was timely filed. (Pet.’s Mot. 25-29; see Doc. 24, at 14-15.) Rowe
already presented this argument in his objections to the Report and Recommendation
(see Doc. 47, at 2-11), and it was considered by the Court prior to rendering its August
To the extent Rowe contends that the Court erred in not addressing his exhaustion
argument (Pet.’s Mot. 14-16), Rowe still presents no grounds to support either
statutory or equitable tolling based on the fact that he believed he needed to file a
second PCRA petition in order to exhaust certain claims. First, Rowe’s ineffective
assistance claims against his PCRA counsel “are not cognizable on federal habeas
review in the first place,” and therefore there was nothing to exhaust. Green v.
Klopotoski, No. 08-5581, 2009 WL 4582019, at *10 n.14 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2009)
(citing Tillet v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 106, 107-08 (3d Cir. 1989)). Second, to the
extent Rowe’s second PCRA petition raised cognizable federal constitutional
claims for the first time due to error on the part of his PCRA counsel, “attorney
misconduct does not warrant equitable tolling merely because it requires the
petitioner to file a second PCRA petition, even if the AEDPA limitations period
runs while the second PCRA is pending, because nothing prevents the petitioner
from filing a federal habeas petition at the same time.” Id. at *10. The fact that
Rowe is proceeding pro se does not excuse his untimeliness, and the fact that he
arguably pursued his state remedies diligently does not excuse his delay in
pursuing his federal rights. See id. at *10-*11.
23, 2016 Memorandum and Order.
While the Court did initially find Rowe’s habeas petition timely filed, this conclusion
was made prior to any briefing on the issue of timeliness in light of the Court’s decision to
construe Rowe’s second post-conviction filing as a second PCRA petition. 7 (See Docs. 33
& 40.) The Magistrate Judge properly noted that its June 1, 2016 Report and
Recommendation was the first opportunity for either the Magistrate Judge or this Court to
consider whether Rowe’s second PCRA petition was timely filed with the benefit of full
briefing. (Doc. 42, at 6 n.4.) Moreover, the Magistrate Judge correctly noted that
Respondents’ response was their first opportunity to raise a timeliness argument after the
Court construed Rowe’s second post-conviction filing as a second PCRA petition, rather
than only a motion for DNA testing. (Id.) Furthermore, Rowe had the opportunity to
respond to the Respondents’ timeliness argument in both his reply (Doc. 40) and
objections (Doc. 47) to the Report and Recommendation.
The Court reviewed the parties’ briefs and concurred with the Magistrate Judge’s
opinion that Rowe’s second post-conviction filing–now being construed as a second
PCRA petition–was not timely filed, and consequently Rowe’s habeas petition was not
timely filed. (Doc. 48, at 5.) The determination that Rowe’s second PCRA petition was
untimely is not a clear error of law, and the Court does not find that its decision to adopt
the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation dismissing Rowe’s habeas petition
as untimely constituted a clear error. Accordingly, Rowe’s rehashed argument does not
The Court explicitly stated in its August 23, 2016 Memorandum that the instant
Memorandum was controlling to the extent that it conflicted with the Court’s
October 14, 2015 Memorandum on the issue of timeliness. (Doc. 48, at 5 n.3.)
provide a basis for granting the instant Motion for Reconsideration.
Rowe Argues That the Court Erred in Finding His Actual Innocence Claim
Rowe’s final argument contends the Court erred in finding that he failed to support
his assertion that the “overwhelming evidence of guilt” was “either
unconstitutional/inadmissible; unreliable and speculative, and easily proven as untruthful,
deceitful and a complete contradiction to the actual physical and corroborating evidence
of innocence.” (Pet.’s Mot. 29-30.) However, Rowe only asserts that he, in fact,
sufficiently supported his claim of actual innocence, and the Court’s conclusion to the
contrary was mistaken. Rowe fails to demonstrate the existence of any clear error.
Because Rowe offers no reason for the Court to conclude its opinion contained a clear
error or resulted in a manifest injustice with respect to this claim, his final argument also
does not satisfy the stringent standard for granting a motion for reconsideration.
For the above stated reasons, Rowe has failed to demonstrate that the Court’s
prior opinion contained a clear error of law or fact or that a manifest injustice will result if
the Court does not reconsider its decision. Accordingly, Rowe’s Motion for
Reconsideration (Doc. 50) will be denied.
An appropriate order follows.
March 1, 2017
/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. Richard Caputo
United States District Judge
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