Boldrini v. Wetzel, et al.

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 21 Motion for Recusal and to Stay Proceeding. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/1/14 (jam)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTONELLO BOLDRINI,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:CV-13-2485
(JUDGE CAPUTO)
(MAGISTRATE JUDGE BLEWITT)

LEWIS WETZEL, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Antonello Boldrini’s Motion for Recusal and to
Stay Proceeding. (Doc. 21.)

Plaintiff seeks to have this action stayed pending a

determination of his request that I recuse myself (and Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Blewitt)
from hearing this case and any other case in which he is involved. Plaintiff’s sole basis for
seeking recusal relates to a “Verified Private Criminal Complaint” he filed with the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on October 11, 2013. In that complaint, I am
charged with the “commission of felony as accessory after the fact.”1 Essentially, Plaintiff
contends that I committed a crime by ruling against him in a prior civil action.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144, a federal district court judge must recuse if a party “files
a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge . . . has a personal bias or prejudice either
against [that party] or in favor of any adverse party.” Additionally, irrespective of whether
a party files a motion for recusal, a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
Plaintiff’s motion will be denied. As I have explained in another case,
Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion. Almost invariably, they are proper grounds for appeal, not for
recusal. “Opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or
events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior
proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless
they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair

1

The “Verified Private Criminal Complaint” sets forth the same charges against
Magistrate Judge Blewitt as well.

judgment impossible.”
Morris v. Kesserling, No. 09-1739, 2012 WL 278727, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2012) (internal
citation omitted) (quoting Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540, 554-55, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 127 L. Ed.
2d 474 (1994)); see also Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273,
278 (3d Cir. 2000) (“a party's displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis
for recusal”). For the reasons explained throughout his prior litigation, Plaintiff was unable
to establish his claims against Defendants in that case. Such a determination does not
demonstrate bias or partiality warranting recusal in this case.
Moreover, a litigant “cannot manufacture grounds for recusal by making outlandish
accusations against the presiding judge or vague accusations of conspiracy against him.”
Forrest v. Sauers, No. 12-318, 2013 WL 1857540, at *2 (W.D. Pa. May 2, 2013) (citing
Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1355-57 (3d Cir. 1990)); see also United
States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 1986) (“A judge is not disqualified by a
litigant’s suit or threatened suit against him, or by a litigant’s intemperate and scurrilous
attacks.”). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations of criminal wrongdoing are without foundation and
do not justify recusal.2 And, it is necessary to note that where issues of recusal arise, “a

2

Judge Browning of the United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico was presented with a similar factual scenario in Sain v. Snyder, No. 081019, 2009 WL 1329520 (D.N.M. Apr. 6, 2009). There, the plaintiff indicated
that he intended to bring criminal charges against Judge Browning. See id. at *1.
Judge Browning refused to recuse himself, noting that “although Sain also told the
Clerk's Office that he will seek criminal charges, Sain, a private citizen, has no
authority on his own to initiate any criminal charges and the Court sees no
grounds for such charges even if Sain could raise them. Nor is the Court aware of
any other basis for the Court to recuse itself at this time.” Id. at *5; see also
O’Dell v. United States Fed. Gov’t, No. 06-9156, 2007 WL 101037 at *3 n.7
(E.D. La. Jan. 8, 2007) (denying request for recusal notwithstanding criminal
charges of conspiracy filed against the judge because “[d]espite these allegations,
the Court does not find any reasons to conclude that its impartiality in this case
might reasonably be questioned”); In re Hassell, No. 04-494, 2004 WL 3201007,
at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2004) (denying recusal motion despite the fact that
criminal charges were filed against presiding judge because “Hassell has
attempted to inject frivolous grounds for recusal into these consolidated
2

federal judge has a duty to sit where not disqualified which is equally as strong as the duty
to not sit where disqualified.” Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837, 93 S. Ct. 7, 34 L. Ed. 2d
50 (1972); see also United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556, 1558 (11th Cir. 1986)
(holding that recusal based on the mere accusation of bias, without factual support, would
lead to the unacceptable result of giving litigants or third parties veto power over the
assignment of judges). As no legitimate justification for recusal has been presented,
recusal is not warranted.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Antonello Boldrini’s Motion for
Recusal and to Stay Proceeding (Doc. 21) is DENIED.

May 1, 2014
Date

/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. Richard Caputo
United States District Judge

bankruptcy appeals by naming me as a party in civil litigation and by making
criminal allegations against me. As stated above, however, recusal is not proper
when it is based upon the judge's rulings against the movant, nor is it proper when
based on the existence of litigation between the movant and the judge.”).
3