Moore v. Mann et al
Filing
148
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 143 MOTION to Compel Discovery filed by Brian C Moore. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on September 2, 2021. (kjn)
Case 3:13-cv-02771-MCC Document 148 Filed 09/02/21 Page 1 of 12
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BRIAN C. MOORE,
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
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Plaintiff
v.
ANGELA D. MANN, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil No. 3:13-CV-2771
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This case comes before us for resolution of a motion to compel. (Doc. 143).
By way of background, Brian C. Moore is an inmate in the custody of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, currently housed at the State Correctional
Institution-Mahanoy where he is serving a lengthy sentence. Moore was previously
housed at SCI-Coal Township and SCI-Smithfield, and his allegations in this case
concern issues that allegedly arose at both of those institutions.
Moore alleges that in 2011, he witnessed his former counselor at SCI-Coal
Township, Angela Mann, engaging in inappropriate sexual contact with other
inmates. He claims that when Mann became aware that he had witnessed the
misconduct, she and four other corrections staff members retaliated against him by
making inflammatory statements about Moore’s criminal past, identifying him as a
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pedophile, homosexual, and labeling him a “snitch.” Moore alleges that by
recklessly spreading this information among inmates at the prison, the defendants
violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by
placing Moore in a class of vulnerable inmates that are frequently subject to assault
and serious bodily injury. Moore has both alleged and sworn that the defendants
spread the information about him and that he has been threatened and is in danger
because of the information that the defendants shared with other inmates. This case
is proceeding forward on an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim and the
parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Presently, there are two
motions pending before the court: a defense motion for summary judgment, (Doc.
139) and the plaintiff’s motion to compel. (Doc. 143).
In his motion to compel, Moore seeks three categories of information: First,
he requests information concerning the whereabouts or last known address of three
potential inmate-witnesses. Second, Moore demands copies of any emails or other
electronic records authored by Defendant Mann while employed as a counselor at
SCI Coal Township from November 3-11, 2011; February 19, 2012 through March
19, 2021; and May 1, 2012 through August 2, 2012. Finally, Moore requests any
information from the personnel files of the defendants which relate to investigations
of, or disciplinary actions arising out of, the events alleged by the plaintiff. (Docs.
143, 144).
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The defendants have responded to this motion. (Doc. 145). In this response,
the defendants generally argue that Moore’s motion is untimely,1 but also assert a
number of more specific arguments. At the outset, the defendants assert that they
have already answered a number of Moore’s discovery requests, at least in part. For
example, they have previously notified Moore that they no longer possess emails or
electronic media produced by Mann during her tenure as a prison counselor some
ten years ago. In addition, they have disclosed that two of the three potential inmatewitnesses identified by Moore have been released from custody. Further, while they
have objected to the request to examine staff personnel files, they have provided
Moore with copies of Mann’s 2012 resignation letter, and have averred that “nothing
exists regarding any discipline relating to the remaining claim in this case.” (Id., at
2).
Upon consideration of the parties’ positions, for the reasons set forth below,
we will DENY this motion to compel, in part, and GRANT this motion, in part, as
discussed below.
With respect to this timeliness argument, we recognize that this motion comes late
in the day, as does the defense summary judgment motion. However, given the
procedural history of this case, we have previously notified all parties that we would
entertain a final series of discovery and dispositive motions. (Doc. 136). Therefore,
we will address this motion on its merits.
1
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II.
Discussion
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery are matters consigned to the
court’s discretion and judgment. A court’s decisions regarding the conduct of
discovery will be disturbed only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion.
Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This far-reaching
discretion also extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on discovery
matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs.
Nat’l Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J. 1997). When a magistrate judge’s decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . ., “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United
States, 943 F. Supp. 501, 502 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). Under the standard, a
magistrate judge’s discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and
is reversible only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic
Commc’ns and Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J. 1996); see also
Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45
(N.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under
abuse of discretion standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v.
Mr. Gold, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that a
magistrate judge’s resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial
deference and should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 2735702, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2010).
The exercise of this discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles.
At the outset, Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally defines
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the scope of discovery permitted in a civil action, prescribes certain limits to that
discovery and provides as follows:
(b) Discovery Scope and Limits.
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope
of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the
issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties'
relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be
admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
Thus, our discretion is limited in a number of significant ways by the scope
of Rule 26 itself, which provides for discovery of only “nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Accordingly, “[t]he Court’s discretion in
ruling on discovery issues is, therefore, restricted to valid claims of relevance and
privilege.” Robinson v. Folino, No. 14-227, 2016 WL 4678340, at *2 (citing Jackson
v. Beard, No. 11-1431, 2014 WL 3868228, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2014) (“Although
the scope of relevance in discovery is far broader than that allowed for evidentiary
purposes, it is not without its limits....Courts will not permit discovery where a
request is made in bad faith, unduly burdensome, irrelevant to the general subject
matter of the action, or relates to confidential or privileged information”)).
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Therefore, at the outset, it is clear that Rule 26's definition of that which can
be obtained through discovery reaches any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party’s claim or defense, and valid claims of relevance and privilege still cabin
and restrict the court’s discretion in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the
scope of discovery permitted by Rule 26 embraces all relevant information, a
concept which is not confined to admissible evidence but is also defined in the
following terms: “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible
in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Rather, Rule 26 states that
“[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant
to any party's claim or defense.” This concept of relevance is tempered, however, by
principles of proportionality. Thus, we are now enjoined to also consider whether
the specific discovery sought is “proportional to the needs of the case, considering
the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the
parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance
of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Thus, it
has been said that the amended rule ‘restores the proportionality factors to their
original place in defining the scope of discovery.’ ” Fassett v. Sears Holdings Corp.,
319 F.R.D. 143, 150 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (quoting Wertz v. GEA Heat Exchangers Inc.,
No. 1:14-CV-1991, 2015 WL 8959408, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2015)).
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A party moving to compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving the
relevance of the requested information. Morrison v. Philadelphia Housing
Auth., 203 F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Once that initial burden is met, “the
party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevance by
demonstrating that the requested discovery (1) does not come within the broad scope
of relevance as defined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b) (1), or (2) is of such marginal
relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the
ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure.” In re Urethane Antitrust
Litigation, 261 F.R.D. 570, 573 (D. Kan. 2009).
Several other considerations guide us in addressing this discovery dispute.
First:
[T]o the extent that litigants seek personnel files in discovery, courts
have long recognized that:
Although personnel files are discoverable, they contain
confidential information and discovery of them should be
limited. See, e.g., Reagan–Touhy v. Walgreen Co., 526
F.3d 641, 648 (10th Cir.2008) (“Personnel files often
contain sensitive personal information ... and it is not
unreasonable to be cautious about ordering their entire
contents disclosed willy-nilly.... This is not to say
personnel files are categorically out-of-bounds.”); Miles
v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 112, 115 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(“[P]ersonnel files are confidential and discovery should
be limited.”). The court must weigh the right to relevant
discovery against the privacy interest of non-parties. The
court finds that plaintiff is not entitled to the entire
personnel records of all the individuals without a more
particularized showing of relevance.
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Harris v. Harley–Davidson Motor Co. Operations, Inc., No. 09–1449, 2010 WL
4683776, *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov.10, 2010). Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 112, 115
(E.D.Pa.1994) (“personnel files are confidential and discovery should be limited.”).
Finally, one other immutable rule defines the court's discretion when ruling
on motions to compel discovery. It is clear that the court cannot compel the
production of things that do not exist. Nor can the court compel the creation of
evidence by parties who attest that they do not possess the materials sought by an
adversary in litigation. See, e.g., AFSCME District Council 47 Health and Welfare
Fund v. Ortho–McNeil–Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 08–5904, 2010 WL
5186088 (E.D. Pa. Dec.21, 2010); Knauss v. Shannon, No. 08–1698, 2009 WL
975251 (M.D. Pa. April 9, 2009).
With these legal guideposts in mind, we turn to consideration of Moore’s
various discovery requests.
At the outset, considering Moore’s request for access to any electronic media
or emails of Defendant Mann, the defendants have asserted that no such material
exists for this defendant, who left state employment in 2012. It is axiomatic that we
cannot compel the production of information that does not exist. Therefore, this
request will be denied.
As for Moore’s request for further information regarding the whereabouts and
last known addresses of three potential inmate witnesses, this request is granted.
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While we appreciate the defendants position concerning the availability and
reliability of any such testimony, but at this stage where the rules governing
discovery provide that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense,” we will direct the defendants
to provide the current whereabouts or last known address of these three potential
witnesses to the plaintiff.
Finally, we turn to Moore’s request for access to personnel files of the
defendants for information relating to the allegations in this case, we conclude as
follows: First, to the extent that Moore may seek wholesale access to these personnel
files, this request is denied. We also accept the defendants’ representation that the
files contain no disciplinary action against Defendant Mann but observe that the
previous discovery disclosures made by the defense suggest that Mann resigned in
August of 2012, in lieu of discharge. (Doc. 144-1, at 9-12). We cannot discern,
however, if these matters which led to Mann’s resignation touch upon the issues in
this case. We are also acutely mindful of the significant privacy issues that are
implicated by any inquiry into personnel files and recognize that we must strike a
balance between the plaintiff’s right to obtain relevant discoverable information and
these privacy interests. Therefore:
When striking this balance courts have, in the past, reconciled the
competing needs of civil rights litigants for information regarding facts
developed by agency officials, with the Government's need to protect
its deliberative processes, by directing the release of non-privileged,
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factual information in a report to the plaintiff. For example, in Sullivan
v. Pa. Dep't of Corrections, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19216, *1–2 (M.D.
Pa. 2007) (McClure, J.), the Court limited discovery of a report
regarding an investigation by the OPR concerning allegations made by
two former prison psychologists, holding that, after weighing the
parties' interests, only certain non-privileged material contained in the
investigation report was discoverable under Rule 26. Id. at *9.
Recognizing
that
these
prison
records
may
contain
arguably discoverable factual material, we have reconciled the interests
of inmate-plaintiffs and corrections officials by rejecting broadly
framed requests for access to prison records, see Paluch v.
Dawson, No. 06–1751, 2007 WL 4375937, *4–5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 12,
2007), while conducting an in camera review of those records which
may be relevant to more narrowly tailored discovery demands. Paluch
v. Dawson, No. 06–175, 2008 WL 2785638, *3 (M.D. Pa. July 17,
2008). See Williams v. Klem, No. CIV. 3:07-1044, 2011 WL 830537,
at *2–3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2011).
Torres v. Harris, No. 4:17-CV-1977, 2019 WL 265804, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18,
2019).
This is the course we will follow in this instant case. To the extent that the
defendants’ personnel files contain information: (1) relating to investigations of, or
disciplinary actions arising out of the events alleged by the plaintiff; (2) regarding
inappropriate contact between defendant Mann and inmates; or (3) information
relating to the circumstances under which Defendant Mann resigned in August of
2012, in lieu of discharge, that documentation will be provided to the court for its in
camera review on or before September 23, 2021. If no such material exists, the
defendants will attest to that fact.
An appropriate order follows.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BRIAN C. MOORE,
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Plaintiff
v.
ANGELA D. MANN, et al.,
Defendants
Civil No. 3:13-CV-2771
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
ORDER
AND NOW, this 2d day of September 2021, in accordance with the
accompanying Memorandum, IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion to compel
(Doc. 139) is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, as follows :
First, Moore’s request for access to any electronic media or emails of
Defendant Mann, is DENIED since the defendants have asserted that no such
material exists for this defendant.
Second, as for Moore’s request for further information regarding the
whereabouts and last known addresses of three potential inmate witnesses, this
request is GRANTED and the defendants will provide the current whereabouts or
last known address of these three potential witnesses to the plaintiff.
Third, with respect to Moore’s request for access to personnel files of the
defendants for information relating to the allegations in this case, to the extent that
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Moore may seek wholesale access to these personnel files, this request is DENIED.
However, IT IS ORDERED that to the extent that the defendants’ personnel files
contain information: (1) relating to investigations of, or disciplinary actions arising
out of the events alleged by the plaintiff; (2) regarding inappropriate contact between
defendant Mann and inmates; or (3) information relating to the circumstances under
which Defendant Mann resigned in August of 2012, in lieu of discharge, that
documentation will be provided to the court for its in camera review on or before
September 23, 2021. If no such material exists, the defendants will attest to that
fact.
/s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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