Kobrick v. Stevens et al
Filing
145
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry). 105 107 102 Signed by Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner on 9/1/17. (sc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ALEXANDRA KOBRICK,
Plaintiff
v.
MATTHEW STEVENS, LAKELAND
SCHOOL DISTRICT, WESTERN
WAYNE SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR.
MARGARET BILLINGS-JONES,
THOMAS KAMEROSKI, ANDREW
FALONK, and PATRICK SHEEHAN,
Defendants
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-2865
(Chief Judge Conner)
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Alexandra Kobrick commenced this action advancing several
constitutional, statutory, and common law claims against her former teacher, two
school districts, and various administrators. (Doc. 1). Before the court are three
motions (Docs. 102, 105, 107) for summary judgment filed by the school districts and
administrators pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons that
follow, we will grant the pending motions.
I.
Factual Background & Procedural History1
This action arises from an approximately eight-month-long sexual
relationship between plaintiff Alexandra Kobrick (“Kobrick”) and defendant
Matthew Stevens (“Stevens”), her former music teacher and band director, which
began during her senior year in high school. (See Doc. 1).
Stevens was hired as the assistant marching band director by defendant
Western Wayne School District (“Western Wayne”) in June of 2009. (Doc. 103 ¶ 2;
Doc. 108 ¶ 22).2 Stevens’ direct supervisor at Western Wayne was Ray Stedenfeld
(“Stedenfeld”), director of the band. (See Doc. 140 ¶¶ 17-86). Stevens was hired at
Western Wayne for the fall 2009 marching band season. (Doc. 103 ¶ 2; Doc. 129 ¶ 2).
1
Local Rule 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 be supported “by a separate, short, and concise
statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving
party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” LOCAL RULE OF COURT 56.1.
A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement
of material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving
party’s statement and identifying genuine issues to be tried. Id. Unless otherwise
noted, the factual background herein derives from the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements
of material facts. (See Docs. 103, 106, 108, 129, 131, 140). To the extent the parties’
statements are undisputed or supported by uncontroverted record evidence, the
court cites directly to the statements of material facts. We note as a preliminary
matter that Kobrick largely fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 56.1. She
responds to many defense statements with the phrase “denied as stated” without
citing to contradictory record evidence. The vast majority of Kobrick’s denials
represent disagreement as to proper inferences to be drawn from a fact—not a
denial of the fact itself. The court has independently examined the entire Rule
56 record. Citation to any statement of fact reflects the court’s determination
that the fact is supported by uncontroverted record evidence.
2
Kobrick denies “as stated” paragraphs 17 through 86 of the Western Wayne
defendants’ statement of facts (Doc. 108) and proceeds to supply her own nine-page
description of the genesis of her claims. (See Doc. 140 ¶¶ 17-86). Kobrick does not
specifically deny the substance of these paragraphs, nor does she cite to evidence
contradicting defendants’ statements. (See id.) The court’s review of the record
reveals that each “denied” paragraph is fully supported by the record evidence.
2
According to Stevens’ resume, his employment with Western Wayne ended in
December of 2009. (Doc. 103 ¶ 2; Doc. 129 ¶ 2). Stevens’ resume includes prior
employment as a student teacher at two schools, Western Wayne and Lakeside
Elementary School, as well as an interim high school music teacher position at Blue
Ridge School District from November of 2009 to February of 2010. (Doc. 103 ¶ 2;
Doc. 129 ¶ 2).
On November 18, 2009, Joseph Totsky (“Totsky”), a guidance counselor
at Western Wayne, received an anonymous call from someone claiming to have
“some news the school should be made aware of.” (Doc. 108 ¶¶ 81, 84). The caller,
later identified as a parent of a Western Wayne student, expressed concern about
what she believed to be an “inappropriate relationship” between another student,
C.N.,3 and Stevens during the 2009 band season. (Id. ¶¶ 45, 84-85). Totsky met with
the parent in his office that day. (See Totsky Dep., 21:22-22:24, 33:9-34:6, Aug. 12,
2015).4 The parent explained that she had noticed text messages on her daughter’s
phone which suggested that C.N. (a friend of her daughter) was involved in a sexual
relationship with Stevens. (Id. at 26:10-27:22). Totsky immediately reported what
he learned to defendant Patrick Sheehan (“Sheehan”), principal at Western Wayne
at the time. (Doc. 108 ¶¶ 32, 35, 37, 44). Sheehan in turn reported the information to
3
C.N. is no longer a minor. However, because C.N. is not a party to this
lawsuit, the court uses her initials throughout this memorandum to protect her
privacy.
4
Partial transcripts of Totsky’s deposition are filed by the parties at
numerous, separate docket entries. Unless otherwise noted, the court will cite to
this deposition passim as “Totsky Dep.” without docket entry citations. The court
employs this citation convention for all deposition transcripts identified herein.
3
defendant Andrew Falonk (“Falonk”), then-superintendent of Western Wayne.
(See id. ¶¶ 21, 24-25).
Falonk testified that, when he first received word of the anonymous call, he
believed the report to likely be a “rumor.” (See Falonk Dep. 65:1-6, Apr. 2, 2015).
Nonetheless, because the report was “at this level,” Falonk thought it was “worth
. . . looking into it so that we could answer any questions if, in fact, someone asked
or came forward.” (Id. at 68:14-24). Falonk tasked Sheehan to escort C.N. to the
nurse’s office or the guidance office to ask whether the rumor was true. (Doc. 108
¶¶ 26-27). Falonk also ordered Sheehan to speak with C.N.’s parents. (Id. ¶ 29).
Both C.N. and her parents denied the rumor. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 30, 34). A female
guidance counselor, Joanne Tagle (“Tagle”), interviewed C.N. (See id. ¶¶ 62-63,
65-66). C.N. reported to Tagle that she “felt comfortable” around Stevens. (Id.
¶ 72). Tagle queried whether C.N. was in a “sexual relationship” with Stevens. (Id.
¶ 73). C.N. answered, “No.” (Id. ¶¶ 20, 73). Tagle also asked whether the pair had
any inappropriate contact, including hugging or kissing. (Id. ¶¶ 74-75). C.N. denied
any physical contact. (Id. ¶¶ 74-75). During later criminal proceedings related to
this litigation, C.N. admitted that she had “denied everything” when interviewed
by Tagle. (Id. ¶ 20).
Tagle also called C.N.’s father, whom she knew through his employment
with Children and Youth Services. (See id. ¶ 78; Tagle Dep. 59:4-8, Aug. 12, 2015).
C.N.’s father denied the rumor. (See Doc. 108 ¶¶ 54-55; see also id. ¶¶ 29-30, 34, 51).
Western Wayne concluded that accusation was “unfounded” and believed “there
was no further investigating necessary” based on the responses of C.N. and her
4
father. (Id. ¶¶ 53-54). It is not entirely clear from the record whether Stevens was
still employed at Western Wayne at the time of this investigation or whether his
term as assistant band director had expired. It is undisputed that Falonk and
Sheehan never spoke to Stevens regarding the “rumor.” (Id. ¶ 23; Sheehan Dep.
66:3-11, Mar. 30, 2015).
Defendant Lakeland School District (“Lakeland”) received Stevens’ standard
application for teaching in Pennsylvania public schools on June 29, 2010. (Doc. 103
¶ 2; Doc. 129 ¶ 2). Stevens’ resume identified his educational background, his prior
experience at Western Wayne and Blue Ridge, and four references. (Doc. 103 ¶ 2;
Doc. 129 ¶ 2). The application contained three favorable recommendation letters,
including one authored by Stedenfeld in his capacity as Stevens’ direct supervisor
at Western Wayne. (Doc. 103 ¶ 2; Doc. 129 ¶ 2; see Doc. 106 ¶ 215). The application
also contained a mandatory background check and child abuse history clearance,
both reflecting no history of child abuse. (Doc. 103-3 at 104-05; see Doc. 103 ¶ 3; Doc.
129 ¶ 3). A member of the Lakeland school board highly recommended Stevens for
the job. (Doc. 103 ¶ 5; Doc. 129 ¶ 5). Lakeland did not separately contact Western
Wayne for additional information. (Sheehan Dep. 181:22-25). Sheehan testified
that, had someone from Lakeland contacted him about Stevens’ application, he
likely would have disclosed the 2009 rumor. (See id. at 181:4-182:25).
Stevens participated in two interviews, the first with defendant Margaret
Billings-Jones (“Billings-Jones”), then-superintendent of Lakeland, and the second
with Billings-Jones and the school board. (Doc. 103 ¶ 4; Doc. 129 ¶ 4). On July 21,
2010, Lakeland hired Stevens as a secondary music teacher for the 2010-2011 school
5
year. (Doc. 103 ¶ 6; Doc. 129 ¶ 6). Stevens was appointed to the additional post of
assistant band director in October of 2010. (See Doc. 103 ¶ 6; Doc. 129 ¶ 6). During
his first year at Lakeland, Stevens participated in new teacher induction training
conducted by a local intermediate unit. (See Doc. 103 ¶ 8; Doc. 106 ¶ 265; Doc. 129
¶ 8). This training is mandated under state law and includes instruction on the
Code of Professional Practice and Conduct for Educators. (See Doc. 106 ¶ 263).5
The training program covers, inter alia, appropriate professional conduct and
“teacher-student sexual conduct.” (Id.)
Kobrick first met Stevens at band camp in the summer preceding the 20102011 school year, which was her junior year at Lakeland. (See Kobrick Dep. 170:12171:3, Apr. 1, 2015). Kobrick described her relationship with Stevens during her
junior year as a “normal” teacher-student relationship. (Id. at 364:3-5). Kobrick
spent much time in the band room both during and after school throughout her
junior year due to her music-focused curriculum. (See Doc. 103 ¶ 10; Doc. 129 ¶ 10).
During the 2010-2011 school year, in advance of a school trip, Stevens exchanged
cell phone numbers with all band members for use in the event of an emergency.
(Kobrick Dep. 211:18-213:8).
Kobrick intended to pursue a career in music education after graduation, and
her curriculum and extracurricular activities were focused toward that goal. (See
id. at 68:8-69:9, 90:23-91:4). Kobrick auditioned and was selected for the position of
5
Kobrick does not respond to this paragraph of Billings-Jones’ statement of
facts. (See Doc. 131). Although Kobrick contends throughout her papers that the
teacher induction training is inadequate, she does not deny that it occurred. (See,
e.g., Doc. 129 ¶ 8).
6
drum major at the end of her junior year. (Id. at 24:18-26:13; see also Doc. 103 ¶ 11;
Doc. 106 ¶ 38; Doc. 129 ¶ 11). Kobrick’s senior year class schedule included music
appreciation, jazz band, and instrumental music courses, in addition to her drum
major responsibilities. (Doc. 103 ¶ 15; Doc. 129 ¶ 15; see Doc. 106 ¶ 40). Kobrick’s
schedule resulted in her having more contact with Stevens than other members of
the band. (Doc. 103 ¶¶ 13-14; Doc. 129 ¶¶ 13-14). At some point during Kobrick’s
senior year, Stevens arranged with a study hall teacher, Derrick Shayka (“Shayka”),
for Kobrick to spend her study hall period in the band room. (Kobrick Dep. 194:8195:19, 198:20-200:5). Neither school staff nor Kobrick’s parents were concerned
that she spent so much of her time in the band room with Stevens given her musicoriented studies. (See Doc. 103 ¶¶ 18-19, 23, 27, 31, 34-36, 41-42, 64-65, 71, 95; Doc.
106 ¶¶ 37-41, 45, 95, 126, 146, 166, 192-93).
Stevens began texting Kobrick about topics “outside of school,” including
their personal lives, sometime in the fall of 2011. (Doc. 108 ¶¶ 7-8; Doc. 140 ¶¶ 7-8;
Kobrick Dep. 213:13-24). On December 31, 2011, Kobrick texted Stevens and joked
that she wished she had someone to share a New Years’ Eve kiss with, and Stevens
replied that he would kiss Kobrick. (Kobrick Dep. 217:14-218:23). Kobrick was 17
years’ old at the time. (See Doc. 101 ¶ 1; Doc. 138 ¶ 1). Stevens was 29. (See Doc.
101 ¶ 9; Doc. 138 ¶ 9).
The relationship between Stevens and Kobrick became physical in January
of 2012, when Stevens kissed Kobrick on the lips while she was helping him to sort
records in the band room. (See Doc. 106 ¶¶ 99-100; Doc. 131 ¶¶ 99-100; Kobrick Dep.
222:15-224:21). Kobrick was “shocked” by the kiss but did not leave the room. (See
7
Kobrick Dep. 224:22-225:14). Stevens touched Kobrick in “private areas over [her]
clothes” during a second incident later that afternoon, and a second kiss and more
sexual touching occurred the next day. (Id. at 230:23-236:17, 240:5-17, 243:20-249:1;
see also Doc. 106 ¶ 104; Doc. 108 ¶¶ 10-11; Doc. 140 ¶¶ 10-11). Kobrick did not report
these incidents to her friends, parents, or Lakeland administrators. (Kobrick Dep.
227:18-228:1, 249:14-19, 269:23-274:14). Kobrick explained that she did not think her
mother—a colleague of Stevens at the high school—would believe her because
Stevens “was a teacher . . . in a place of authority.” (Id. at 228:11-229:14, 237:3-12).
Kobrick testified that, although she was initially shocked at Stevens’ conduct, she
enjoyed his attention. (Id. at 269:23-272:8).
The sexual contact between Stevens and Kobrick began occurring regularly
and escalated to include other sexual acts, including oral sex. (Id. at 251:24-253:13,
267:21-268:20). Relations took place in the band room—including in Stevens’ office,
a practice room, and a drum closet—both during and after school. (Id. at 253:14254:16, 255:25-256:3; see also Doc. 106 ¶¶ 106-07). On several occasions, the acts
transpired with other students in the band room: the pair would hide in a drum
closet and close the door to avoid discovery. (Kobrick Dep. 255:4-257:8). Sexual
contact even occurred on an overnight school trip, when Kobrick snuck out of a
room she was sharing with her mother to visit Stevens. (Doc. 106 ¶¶ 116-17; Doc.
131 ¶¶ 116-17). Kobrick testified that the only person who may have known of the
relationship was defendant Thomas Kameroski (“Kameroski”), then-principal at
Lakeland, who “walked in one time” when Kobrick had her “arms wrapped around
[Stevens’] waist.” (Kobrick Dep. 259:18-262:2). As soon as Kameroski entered the
8
room, Kobrick “immediately” dropped her arms. (Id. at 264:1-23). Kobrick believes
Kameroski witnessed the embrace. (Id. at 263:17-25, 264:24-265:5).6 Kameroski
denies that this incident occurred. (Doc. 103 ¶¶ 57, 85).
Kobrick estimated that she and Stevens had sexual contact two or three
times weekly through the end of the school year. (Kobrick Dep. 258:2-259:1, 269:2022). Kobrick graduated from Lakeland on June 1, 2012 and turned 18 one month
later. (See Kobrick Dep. 285:9-12, 293:7-17). According to Kobrick, at the time she
graduated, “nobody knew what was going on between [Kobrick] and Mr. Stevens
other than [Kobrick] and Mr. Stevens.” (Id. at 274:7-14). Kobrick did not disclose
the relationship to her friends or family or to any staff while at Lakeland. (Id. at
294:24-296:7). During the course of the relationship and until she left for college,
Kobrick thought of Stevens as a “boyfriend.” (Id. at 297:1-16, 394:20-5). At the time,
she believed their relationship was consensual. (Id. at 268:21-269:16, 271:25-272:15).
The relationship continued during the summer after Kobrick’s graduation.
(Id. at 285:9-17). When Kobrick left for college in mid-August, the physical aspect
of the relationship ended, but Kobrick and Stevens exchanged text messages and
talked on the phone while she was away. (Id. at 292:14-24, 301:24-302:16, 303:25304:22). Their relationship devolved when, in September of 2012, Stevens called
Kobrick and became pushy asking her to touch herself while on the phone with
him. (Id. at 304:23-308:7). Kobrick refused and decided to cease all contact with
6
Lakeland and Kameroski remonstrate cursorily that this testimony is both
“incompetent” and “inadmissible” but articulate no basis for this claim. (See Doc.
104 at 24-25). We assume admissibility for purposes of this motion.
9
Stevens. (Id. at 311:13-20). Stevens texted Kobrick a handful of times thereafter,
but Kobrick made excuses to avoid talking to him. (Id. at 312:7-313:18).
When Kobrick returned to Lakeland for a classroom observation in January
of 2013, she saw Stevens in the band room behaving flirtatiously with two younger
students. (See id. at 323:20-326:2, 330:10-334:5; see also Doc. 103 ¶ 50; Doc. 129 ¶ 50).
Kobrick warned Stevens to “watch himself and watch how he was acting with those
girls because he’s going to get caught.” (Kobrick Dep. at 334:6-13). She testified
that this conversation was her last with Stevens. (See id. at 335:1-3).
Kobrick called her mother on February 14, 2013 and disclosed that she had
sexual relations with Stevens during her senior year. (Doc. 103 ¶¶ 52-53; Doc. 106 ¶¶
51, 53). Kobrick’s mother contacted the Pennsylvania State Education Association
(“PSEA”) for guidance. (Doc. 106 ¶ 54). A PSEA representative advised that the
incident should be reported to Billings-Jones. (Id. ¶ 55). Kobrick’s mother met with
Billings-Jones that afternoon and relayed Kobrick’s report. (Doc. 103 ¶ 55; Doc. 106
¶¶ 57, 59). Billings-Jones immediately notified the district attorney and thereafter
contacted Kameroski, the district’s counsel, and its solicitor. (See Doc. 103 ¶¶ 55-56;
Doc. 106 ¶¶ 59-60, 72-74). Billings-Jones directed Kameroski to ensure that Stevens
was not alone with students and to escort him from school property. (See Doc. 103
¶¶ 56-57; Doc. 106 ¶¶ 69-70). Billings-Jones also contacted the Department of
Education to report Kobrick’s allegations. (Doc. 106 ¶ 83).
On February 15, 2013, Kobrick provided a written statement to the district
attorney’s office detailing the sexual contact with Stevens. (Kobrick Dep. 345:6-10).
Stevens was charged with institutional sexual assault, unlawful contact with minor,
10
and corruption of minors and was arrested on February 19, 2013. Commonwealth
v. Stevens, No. CP-35-CR-563-2013 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2013)7; (see also Doc. 103 ¶ 58;
Doc. 106 ¶ 85). Lakeland terminated Stevens’ employment following his arrest.
(Doc. 103 ¶ 60; Doc. 106 ¶ 86). On June 16, 2014, Stevens entered a plea of guilty to
one count of corruption of minors. Commonwealth v. Stevens, No. CP-35-CR-5631023 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. June 16, 2014); (Doc. 101 ¶ 111). The state court sentenced
Stevens to a term of 6 to 23 months’ imprisonment. Commonwealth v. Stevens,
No. CP-35-CR-563-2013 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Oct. 1, 2014). Prior to this incident, no
administrator or staff member at Lakeland had ever received any reports of or
otherwise suspected sexual misconduct by Stevens. (See Doc. 103 ¶¶ 20, 25, 30, 32,
39-40, 45, 103; Doc. 106 ¶¶ 108-13, 122-24, 133-35, 137, 139, 145, 153, 155, 157, 159, 161,
164, 167, 170-75, 179-81, 184-89, 194, 196).
At her mother’s recommendation, Kobrick commenced counseling on the
day she reported Stevens’ conduct to authorities. (Kobrick Dep. 341:16-21, 342:119). Kobrick began suffering from anxiety after reporting the relationship and is
prescribed Zoloft to manage her symptoms. (See id. at 362:5-363:1). Kobrick also
suffers from nightmares and crying spells, and “get[s] sick to [her] stomach” talking
about what happened. (Id. at 378:12-379:10). Kobrick testified that, over the course
of two years preceding her deposition, she treated with a counselor while at school,
a social worker while at home, and her primary care physician concerning her
anxiety and stress. (Id. at 353:6-362:4). Kobrick also testified that she has been
7
We take judicial notice of the public docket of proceedings in the Court of
Common Pleas of Lackawanna County. See FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2).
11
unable to work in a classroom and had to change her music education major. (See
id. at 90:2-91:18).
Kobrick commenced this action with the filing of a 14-count complaint (Doc.
1) on November 25, 2013. Kobrick generally catalogues the defendants into three
groups: the Western Wayne defendants (Western Wayne School District, Falonk,
and Sheehan); the Lakeland defendants (Lakeland School District, Billings-Jones,
and Kameroski); and Stevens, individually. After Rule 12(b)(6) motion practice, the
following claims remain against the Western Wayne and Lakeland defendants:
Count 4: a claim against the Lakeland School District, Billings-Jones, and
Kameroski pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of substantive due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment;
Count 5, a claim against Lakeland School District for discrimination in
violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments Act (“Title IX”), 20
U.S.C. § 1681(a);
Count 6: a claim against Western Wayne School District, Falonk, and
Sheehan pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of substantive due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment;
Count 7: a claim against Lakeland School District for discrimination in
violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); and
Count 14: a claim against Kameroski and Sheehan for intentional
infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania law.
See Kobrick v. Stevens, No. 3:13-CV-2865, 2014 WL 4914186, at *9-19 (M.D. Pa. Sept.
30, 2014) (Mannion, J.).8
8
Judge Malachy E. Mannion presided over this case throughout the
pleading stage and during discovery. Judge Mannion entered a recusal order on
July 10, 2017, and the matter was reassigned to the undersigned. (Doc. 142).
12
All defendants moved for summary judgment on July 15, 2016. (Docs. 100,
102, 105, 107). The motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition. In view of the
distinct theories of liability attending Kobrick’s claims against Stevens, the court
addresses Stevens’ motion (Doc. 101) by separate memorandum of today’s date. We
analyze the school district and administrator defendants’ Rule 56 motions herein.
II.
Legal Standard
Through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that
do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact” and for which a jury trial
would be an empty and unnecessary formality. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The burden of
proof tasks the non-moving party to come forth with “affirmative evidence, beyond
the allegations of the pleadings,” in support of its right to relief. Pappas v. City of
Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). This evidence must be adequate, as a matter of law,
to sustain a judgment in favor of the non-moving party on the claims. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-57 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986). Only if this threshold is met
may the cause of action proceed. See Pappas, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 315.
III.
Discussion
Kobrick’s claims against the Western Wayne and Lakeland defendants
are threefold: first, that the defendants, individually and at the institutional level,
failed to protect Kobrick’s bodily integrity and thereby violated her Fourteenth
Amendment right to substantive due process; second, that the defendant school
districts were deliberately indifferent to known sexual harassment in violation of
13
Title IX; and third, that defendants Kameroski and Sheehan intentionally inflicted
emotional distress upon Kobrick. The court addresses each claim seriatim.
A.
Section 1983 Claims
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code creates a private cause of
action to redress constitutional wrongs committed by state officials. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The statute is not a source of substantive rights, but serves as a mechanism
for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536
U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To state
a claim under Section 1983, plaintiffs must show a deprivation of a “right secured
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States . . . by a person acting under
color of state law.” Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1204 (quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro,
51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995)). The defendants do not dispute that they were
state actors at all times relevant herein. We must thus determine whether any
defendants’ conduct deprived Kobrick of rights secured by the United States
Constitution.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no
state may “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.” U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court of the United States
interprets this clause to transcend “fair process” and proscribe certain substantive
government actions without regard to the fairness of procedures implementing
them. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997); Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 331 (1986). To prevail on a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff
must prove that she has a “fundamental” liberty interest implicating Fourteenth
14
Amendment protection and that a defendant’s conduct anent said interest was “so
egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary
conscience.” Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998).9
Among the fundamental liberty interests protected by substantive due
process is the “right to bodily integrity.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 255, 272 (1994)
(citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-49 (1992)); Phillips
v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). This right
includes the right to be free from “invasion of . . . personal security through sexual
abuse.” Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 726 (3d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990). In the public school context, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals has expressly held that the Due Process Clause encompasses and defends a
student’s right “to be free from sexual abuse by school staff.” Id. at 726-27.
By separate memorandum of today’s date, we determined that Kobrick’s
claim against Stevens for violation of her right to bodily integrity survives Rule 56
scrutiny. The instant motions task the court to determine whether either school
district or any administrator may be held to account for Stevens’ conduct.
9
Kobrick’s complaint purports to assert a due process claim under the Fifth
Amendment. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 87, 111). In responding to the instant Rule 56 motions,
Kobrick appropriately concedes that the Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee
applies only to the federal government. (See Doc. 130 at 30); see also B&G Constr.
Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 662 F.3d 233, 246 n.14
(3d Cir. 2011).
15
1.
Monell Claims Against Western Wayne and Lakeland
School Districts
Municipalities and other local government entities are “persons” for
purposes of Section 1983 liability. Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 690 (1978). But such entities may not be held liable in a Section 1983 suit for
conduct of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior liability. Bd. of
Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692); see
also Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1027 (3d Cir. 1991). Municipal
liability only arises when a government causes an employee to violate another’s
constitutional rights by an official custom or policy. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-94;
see also Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1998). To establish
liability under Monell, a plaintiff must identify the challenged policy or custom,
demonstrate proper attribution to the public entity, and show a causal link between
the execution of the policy or custom and the injury suffered. See Natale v. Camden
Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003).
A policy exists when a decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish
public policy with respect to the disputed action issues an official proclamation,
policy, or edict. Id. at 584 (quoting Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1212). By contrast, a custom
is an act that is not formally approved but is nonetheless “so widespread as to have
the force of law.” Id. (quoting Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 404). A plaintiff may also
establish municipal liability by demonstrating that a policymaker failed to take
affirmative action despite an obvious need to correct the “inadequacy of existing
practice [which is] so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights” that
16
inaction exhibits “deliberate indifference” to the need. Id. (quoting Bryan Cty.,
520 U.S. at 417-18). Kobrick’s claims against the Western Wayne and Lakeland
defendants implicate the third scenario.10
A government entity exhibits deliberate indifference when it “disregard[s] a
known or obvious consequence of [its] . . . action.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.
51, 61 (2011); see Vargas v. City of Phila., 783 F.3d 962, 974 (3d Cir. 2015). Failure
to train amounts to deliberate indifference when it causes a pattern of cognate
constitutional violations. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62; Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle,
622 F.3d 248, 265 (3d Cir. 2010). Alleged training deficiencies must closely relate to
the constitutional injury. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989). The
failure-to-act theory of liability is governed by the same causation principles. See
Berg v. Cty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d Cir. 2000).
a.
Student Sexual Abuse
The Third Circuit set the standard for school district liability in cases of
teacher sexual misconduct in Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, 882 F.2d
720 (3d Cir. 1989). In Stoneking, a student alleged that the school district’s principal
and assistant principal were regularly and recklessly indifferent to reports of sexual
abuse by teachers. See id. at 724-25. Administrators took no action in response to
reports of sexual abuse made by students, parents, and teachers alike; what is more,
some students were criticized for reporting and at least one was forced to publicly
10
Kobrick’s briefing does not articulate her theories of liability against the
school districts or the administrators with precision. (See Doc. 130 at 7-23; Doc. 132
at 5-20; Doc. 141 at 10-28). Consequently, the distillation which follows reflects the
court’s best effort at interpreting Kobrick’s less-than-pellucid submissions.
17
apologize to her abuser. See id. at 727-29. The principal also concealed the abuse
by maintaining records of the allegations in a “secret file” at his home rather than
disciplining the abusers, reporting them to authorities, or otherwise handling the
allegations appropriately. Id. at 728-29. The Third Circuit agreed with the plaintiff
that the administrators’ inaction “at a minimum” facilitated a pattern of abuse. Id.
at 725, 727. The court also agreed that the ostensible condonation of the teachers’
actions evinced an “affirmative link” between the administrators’ practices and
repeated assaults suffered by the plaintiff. Id. at 730-31. The court concluded that
although “inaction and insensitivity” cannot justify municipal liability, “toleration,
condonation[,] or encouragement” of sexual misconduct well may. Id.
In nearly 30 years since Stoneking was issued, courts have had all-toofrequent opportunity to apply its guidance to cases involving sexual misconduct by
teachers. From Stoneking and its progeny, the following principles have emerged.
First, actual knowledge is paramount to Section 1983 liability; a district’s failure to
act, or to train its employees to act, can only constitute deliberate indifference if the
plaintiff proves that policymakers were on notice of a need to do so. See, e.g., Kline
ex rel. Arndt v. Mansfield, 255 F. App’x 624, 629-30 (3d Cir. 2007)11; M.S. ex rel. Hall
v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 43 F. Supp. 3d 412, 421-22 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Douglas
v. Brookville Area Sch. Dist., 836 F. Supp. 2d 329, 364 (W.D. Pa. 2011). Second,
11
The court acknowledges that Kline is a nonprecedential decision.
Nonetheless, the court has considered the panel’s ratio decidendi and is persuaded
by the same. Kline was decided on substantially similar facts to those sub judice,
and its analysis and result rest on a careful application of binding decisional law,
including Stoneking and Black by Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707
(3d Cir. 1993).
18
courts cannot infer knowledge based on unsubstantiated rumors or suspicion; a
plaintiff must prove something “more culpable” than failure to recognize a risk of
harm, Black, 985 F.2d at 712-13 (quoting Colburn, 946 F.2d at 1025), and show that
the school’s policymakers were “aware of the constitutionally violative sexual
relationship while the relationship was ongoing.” M.S., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 421-22
(citing Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 144 (3d Cir. 2002)). Third,
once such knowledge is shown, inaction or recalcitrance by school officials is
sufficient to establish deliberate indifference. Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 725; see,
e.g., Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 10 F. Supp. 3d 637, 650-51 (E.D. Pa. 2014);
C.M. v. Se. Delco Sch. Dist., 828 F. Supp. 1179, 1184-85 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
Against this backdrop, we examine Kobrick’s claims against the Western
Wayne and Lakeland School Districts.
b.
Western Wayne School District
Kobrick asserts a failure-to-act claim against the Western Wayne School
District. Specifically, she contends that the district failed to appropriately respond
upon learning that Stevens posed a threat to present and future students. (Doc. 141
at 10-24). Her claim is predicated on Stevens’ alleged sexual relationship with a
student, C.N., during the fall of 2009 when Stevens was assistant marching band
director at Western Wayne. (Id.) The school district rejoins that its response to the
rumored relationship was entirely appropriate and that Kobrick fails to establish
either knowledge or deliberate indifference. (See Doc. 113 at 8-10).
We agree that the probata does not establish actual, contemporaneous
knowledge of abuse on the part of Western Wayne. In the context of failure to share
19
information with prospective employers—the very charge levied against Western
Wayne—Doe v. Methacton School District, 880 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Pa. 1995), is
particularly instructive. In Doe, a music teacher began a physical “relationship”
with his 12-year-old student. Id. at 382. Administrators learned of this conduct and
warned the teacher to end it. Id. The relationship continued, and administrators
met with the teacher, who admitted physical contact with the minor, to discuss how
to proceed. Id. at 382-83. The district allowed the teacher to resign “to avoid an
investigation and suspension,” directing him to sign a prepared letter that cited
“personal reasons” for his departure. Id. at 383. When a different school district
later sought a reference for the teacher, administrators described his performance
as “satisfactory” and concealed the abuse. Id. The teacher sexually abused a nineyear-old student after he was hired by the new school district. Id. at 382-83. The
district court held that these facts evinced an “affirmative cover-up” and exhibited
the district’s deliberate indifference to the welfare of future students’ constitutional
rights. Id. at 384.
The uncontradicted evidence sub judice is in stark contrast. That evidence
reflects that, in November of 2009, a guidance counselor at Western Wayne received
an anonymous tip that an “inappropriate relationship” may have occurred between
Stevens and a female student during marching band season. (Doc. 108 ¶¶ 84-85).
Pursuant to district policy, the counselor reported the information to the principal,
who in turn relayed it to the superintendent. (Id. ¶¶ 24-25, 32, 40, 43-47, 86; see Doc.
108-5). Despite construing the matter initially as a mere rumor, the superintendent
immediately began an investigation, directing a female guidance counselor to
20
interview both the student in question and her parents. (See Doc. 108 ¶¶ 26-27, 29,
35, 46, 48, 50, 65-66). The counselor reported back that both the student and her
father denied the rumor. (See id. ¶¶ 28, 34, 68-70, 72-78). In a statement to law
enforcement issued years later, the student confirmed that she had denied any
wrongdoing by Stevens. (Id. ¶ 20). Because the student and her father both
denied the unsubstantiated rumor, Western Wayne did not report Stevens to law
enforcement or investigate further. (See id. ¶¶ 53-54, 58; see also Falonk Dep. 126:68).
We cannot conclude that the risk presented by Stevens was “known” to
Western Wayne policymakers at the relevant time. See Kline, 255 F. App’x at 62930 (quoting Black, 875 F.2d at 712-13); M.S., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 421-22; cf. Doe, 880 F.
Supp. at 382-85. Moreover, given the celerity of the investigation following receipt
of the initial report, the administration could not be said to have been deliberately
indifferent. See Black, 875 F.2d at 713. The record at best permits an inference that
Western Wayne could have done more to ascertain the underlying truth. That a
public entity may have been “negligent in failing to recognize a high risk of harm,”
however, is not a wrong of constitutional dimension. Kline, 255 F. App’x at 628-29
(citing Black, 985 F.2d at 712-13). No reasonable juror could conclude that Western
Wayne was deliberately indifferent to a known risk of harm to current or future
students. Consequently, we will grant summary judgment to Western Wayne
School District with respect to Count 6 of Kobrick’s complaint.
21
c.
Lakeland School District
Against the Lakeland School District, Kobrick asserts three variations of
Monell liability: first, that the district failed to act appropriately upon learning that
Stevens might have been abusing Kobrick; second, that the district failed to train
staff to identify signs of “grooming” behavior and to report it; and third, that the
district was negligent in hiring Stevens in the first instance.12 (See Doc. 130 at 7-23).
i.
Failure to Act
Kobrick’s failure-to-act claim against Lakeland School District is premised
on the district’s alleged failure to respond to both known grooming activities and
known sexual abuse. (See id.) To prevail on this claim, Kobrick must establish a
practice of “reckless indifference to instances of known or suspected sexual abuse
of students by teachers.” Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 724-25. Courts require proof that
school administrators were placed on actual notice of the abusive contact before
imposing constitutional liability for teacher misconduct to the district. See Kline,
255 F. App’x at 629-30; M.S., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 421-22; C.M., 828 F. Supp. at 1185.
The mere failure to recognize a risk of harm will not suffice. See Kline, 255 F.
App’x at 628-29 (quoting Black, 985 F.2d at 712-13).
Kobrick first asserts that Kameroski and Billings-Jones “knew” Stevens was
engaged in grooming activities with students. (See Doc. 130 at 8, 10-11). Kobrick
12
Kobrick does not respond to the Lakeland School District’s municipal
liability arguments in her opposition brief. (See Doc. 130 at 7-23). Nonetheless,
because Kobrick does respond to similar arguments raised by Billings-Jones and
Kameroski, (see id.; see also Doc. 132 at 5-24), we decline to exercise our discretion
to deem the claims waived. See D’Angio v. Borough of Nescopeck, 34 F. Supp. 2d
256, 265 (M.D. Pa. 1999).
22
cites no record evidence to support this assertion. (See id.) What the record does
show is that Billings-Jones and Kameroski knew Kobrick spent much of her time in
the band room, but suspected nothing inappropriate given Kobrick’s music-focused
curriculum and career plans. (See Doc. 103 ¶¶ 18-19, 95; Doc. 106 ¶¶ 37-39, 95).
Kameroski and Billings-Jones deny knowledge of any sexual or other inappropriate
contact between Stevens and Kobrick. (Doc. 103 ¶ 57; Doc. 106 ¶¶ 133-35). Kobrick
adduces no contradictory evidence. Courts routinely hold that, without more, the
mere fact of a teacher spending time with a student is not enough to raise the
specter of potential sexual abuse. See Kline, 255 F. App’x at 628-29; M.S., 43 F.
Supp. 3d at 421-22; Douglas, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 361-63.
Kobrick also contends that at least one administrator, Kameroski, was
actually aware of the sexual relationship that developed between Kobrick and
Stevens. (Doc. 130 at 8). Kobrick testified that Kameroski “walked in one time”
when she had her “arms wrapped around [Stevens’] waist.” (Kobrick Dep. 259:18262:2). Kobrick further testified that as soon as Kameroski entered the room, she
“immediately” dropped her arms. (Id. at 264:1-23). When questioned by counsel
whether she thought Kameroski witnessed the embrace, Kobrick answered “Yes.”
(Id. at 263:17-25, 264:24-265:5). Kobrick maintains that this incident sufficiently
placed the school on notice of sexual misconduct—or at least of “grooming”
activities which might lead to sexual misconduct. (Doc. 130 at 8).
We assume the truth of Kobrick’s account for purposes of Lakeland’s
Rule 56 motion. We also assume without deciding that Kameroski was a district
policymaker for purposes of Monell liability. Even so, the incident at worst evinces
23
negligence on Kameroski’s part for failing to investigate further. Kobrick testified
that she withdrew from the contact “immediately” upon seeing Kameroski, and that
Stevens explained the incident away by telling Kameroski that Kobrick had been
“reaching for [Stevens’] keys.” (Kobrick Dep. 264:1-23, 265:15-266:21). Kobrick did
not describe the embrace allegedly observed by Kameroski as sexual or otherwise
inappropriate in nature. (Id. at 259:18-262:2). For his part, Kameroski testified that
he was aware that students spent considerable time in the band room but that he
never once had reason to suspect sexual abuse. (See Doc. 103 ¶¶ 18-19).
We agree that a diligent principal likely would have investigated the incident.
However, as noted supra, negligent failure to discover sexual abuse does not suffice
for municipal liability. Kline, 255 F. App’x at 628-29 (quoting Black, 985 F.2d at 71213; Maier ex rel. B.T. v. Canon McMillan Sch. Dist., No. 08-0154, 2009 WL 2591098,
at *9 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (same). A jury could not find on the basis of this isolated
incident that Kameroski was actually aware of a “constitutionally violative sexual
relationship” while it was ongoing. See M.S., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 421 (citing Johnson,
283 F.3d at 144); see also Kline, 255 F. App’x at 628-29.
Kobrick also devotes much of her briefing to a claim that Shayka, a fellow
teacher, warned Stevens that the latter had “crossed the line from professional to
personal because of his observation of [Stevens’] closeness with students.” (Doc.
130 at 8). Shayka is not an administrator or policymaker, and his alleged knowledge
of grooming activities cannot be imputed to the school district under Monell. See
Johnson, 283 F.3d at 144 n.1 (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483
(1986)). More pertinently, Kobrick takes much of Shayka’s testimony out of context
24
and at times misrepresents it.13 Shayka did testify that he advised Stevens to “try to
keep your boundaries” on one or two occasions. (Shakya Dep. 18:13-22). But he did
not describe “inappropriate personal closeness” with students. (Cf. Doc. 129 ¶ 20).
Shayka testified only that Stevens was sometimes informal with students in a way
that Shayka was not, for example, by trying to be funny or “telling a story that . . .
might have some profanity in it.” (Shayka Dep. 16:3-25, 54:8-25). He flatly denied
observing any indicia of a sexual relationship between Stevens and Kobrick or any
other student. (Id. at 54:22-25; Doc. 106 ¶¶ 168-72). In fact, he testified that he
regularly saw Stevens and Kobrick together and never noticed “anything out of the
ordinary or anything that would . . . make me suspicious in the least.” (Shakya Dep.
35:18-36:1). Hence, even if Shayka were a policymaker for Monell purposes,
Kobrick has not shown that he was aware of Stevens’ misconduct.
The proof sub judice falls well short of the actual notice typically sufficient to
survive Monell scrutiny. Kobrick concedes that she did not report the relationship
to administrators until more than a year after it occurred. (Kobrick Dep. 294:24296:7). Lakeland’s administrators unanimously testified that they were unaware of
any sexual misconduct by Stevens until Kobrick came forward. (See Doc. 103 ¶¶ 20,
25, 30, 32, 39-40, 45, 103; Doc. 106 ¶¶ 108-13, 122-24, 133-35, 137, 139, 145, 153, 155,
157, 159, 161, 164, 167, 170-75, 179-81, 184-89, 194, 196). And Kobrick testified that
13
For example, Kobrick avers that the study hall arrangement “led Mr.
Shayka to tell Mr. Stevens that Mr. Stevens had crossed the line from professional
to personal.” (Doc. 129 ¶ 19). Kobrick identifies no record evidence to support this
statement. When Kobrick’s counsel asked Shayka whether he had concerns or ever
spoke to Stevens “about [Kobrick] going to see him on a regular basis,” Shayka
answered with an unequivocal “No.” (Shayka Dep. 33:8-11).
25
she deliberately kept the relationship from family, friends, fellow bandmates, and
administrators. (See Kobrick Dep. 269:23-272:8). The record permits no inference
that Lakeland School District had an unwritten policy or practice of condoning or
covering up known sexual abuse.
ii.
Failure to Train
Kobrick claims that Lakeland failed to train staff to identify and to report
inappropriate teacher-student sexual relationships.14 (Doc. 130 at 16-21). She
contends that staff should have been trained to detect signs of “grooming” in
teacher-student relationships and that the lack of this training is one cause of
her constitutional injury. (See id.)
To prevail on a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must identify a training
deficiency which has a “causal nexus” to their injuries and demonstrate that the
lack of training reflects deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. See M.S., 43
F. Supp. 3d at 424 (quoting Reitz v. Cty. of Bucks, 124 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1997)).
Knowledge of a need for training is critical to a deliberate indifference finding. See
Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (citing Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 407). To show knowledge, a
plaintiff generally must establish “a pattern of similar constitutional violations”
committed in the past by untrained employees. Douglas, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 357
(quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 62). However, the Supreme Court has also held that
14
As a threshold matter, it is not clear whether a cause of action exists for
failure to train employees other than the employee effecting the constitutional
violation. See Douglas, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 364-65 (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 61);
but see Kline, 255 F. App’x at 629-30. We need not address this difficult question,
because Kobrick fails to substantiate a failure-to-train claim either way. See, e.g.,
Douglas, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 364-65.
26
there exists a “narrow range of circumstances” in which a single violation may
permit failure-to-train liability. M.S., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 424-25 (quoting Bryan Cty.,
520 U.S. at 409). This theory of liability requires proof that the need for training was
“so obvious” in view of a given employee’s duties that failure to train necessarily
amounts to deliberate indifference. Id. (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390).
That a constitutional injury may have been avoided by better training, however,
does not suffice for Monell liability. See Kline, 255 F. App’x at 629 (citing City of
Canton, 489 U.S. at 391).
Kobrick’s failure-to-train claim does not survive Rule 56 scrutiny. At the
motion to dismiss stage, the court allowed this claim to proceed based on Kobrick’s
allegation that Lakeland “knew about the inappropriate relationship . . . and failed
to act.” Kobrick, 2014 WL 4914186, at *17. But the Rule 56 record reveals a fatal
variance between the allegata and the probata. There is no genuine dispute that
Lakeland administrators were entirely unaware of the misconduct perpetrated by
Stevens. See supra at 22-26. Kobrick has adduced no evidence that a “pattern of
similar constitutional violations” put Lakeland on notice of a need to train other
teachers to identify signs of sexual misconduct. See Kline, 255 F. App’x at 630;
M.S., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 424.
Absent proof of a pattern of past violations, Kobrick can only proceed on
a “single incident” theory. Kobrick does not invoke this theory, (see Doc. 130 at
16-21), and the record does not support it. In Kline, the Third Circuit held in no
uncertain terms that single incident liability cannot lie in such cases. See Kline,
255 F. App’x at 630. Specifically, Kline states that sexual abuse of students is so
27
obviously inappropriate that failure to train employees to detect signs of sexual
misconduct cannot be said to be deliberately indifferent. Id.; see also M.S., 43 F.
Supp. 3d at 425; Jankowski v. Lellock, No. 2:13-CV-194, 2013 WL 5945782, at *9
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2013). Hence, Kobrick could not prevail on a single incident
theory of liability.
Kobrick relies heavily on the report of her expert, Charol Shakeshaft, Ph.D.
(“Dr. Shakeshaft”), in support of her failure-to-train claim. (Doc. 130 at 15-16; see
Doc. 131-7). In her report, Dr. Shakeshaft opines that all school districts should
maintain “clear polices and regulations that describe educator sexual abuse” which
“detail acceptable and unacceptable behavior.” (Doc. 131-7 at 18). She suggests
that such policies should expressly enumerate inappropriate behavior, including
prohibitions on being alone with a student, and that districts should regularly train
staff and students on those policies. (Id.) She believes that the lack of such training
allowed Stevens’ misconduct to continue undetected. (See id. at 24). That an injury
“could have been avoided” with “better or more training” is not by itself sufficient
for municipal liability. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391; Kline, 255 F. App’x at
630. Regardless of Dr. Shakeshaft’s opinions—or the very plausible merit of the
training program she proposes—the fact remains Kobrick has not established that
Lakeland knew of and was deliberately indifferent to an actual risk of harm.
Shakeshaft further suggests that Lakeland failed to properly train staff in
the first instance that teacher-student sexual relationships are inappropriate. (See
Doc. 131-7 at 25). Shakeshaft specifically notes that she observed “no indication . . .
that training on the prohibition of sexual misconduct occurred.” (Id.) Shakeshaft’s
28
report does not expressly address the adequacy of the one-time induction training
provided to all new teachers by the NEIU. There is no dispute that this training
was provided to Stevens and covers subjects such as teacher-student sexual abuse.
(See Doc. 103 ¶¶ 74, 102; Doc. 106 ¶ 263; Doc. 129 ¶¶ 74, 102). Shakeshaft ostensibly
believes this state-mandated training to be insufficient. (Doc. 131-7 at 24 (stating
that “annual training of all employees [should] be mandated”)). Kobrick does not
appear to premise her failure-to-train claim on this observation. In any event, as
noted supra, courts in the Third Circuit regularly hold that the duty to refrain from
sexual abuse of students is self-evident. Douglas, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 361 (quoting
Connick, 563 U.S. at 66; Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 727); see also Nace v. Pennridge
Sch. Dist., 185 F. Supp. 3d 564, 578 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (quoting Kline, 255 F. App’x at
630). Thus, misconduct of the nature committed by Stevens cannot be fairly
attributed to a failure to train.
iii.
Negligent Hiring
Kobrick lastly contends that Lakeland’s deficient hiring practices directly
caused her constitutional injury. (See Doc. 130 at 11-13, 21-23). Specifically, she
contends that Lakeland erred by relying exclusively on a recommendation letter
from Stevens’ former supervisor at Western Wayne and should have contacted
Western Wayne’s administration for a reference. (Id.) Kobrick does not identify a
pattern of deficient hiring practices and ostensibly proceeds on a single incident
theory. (See id.)
Failure to adequately screen employees will ordinarily support Monell
liability only when the failure causes a pattern of violations. See Berg, 219 F.3d at
29
276 (quoting Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 404). In its only opinion on the subject, the
Supreme Court “assume[d] without deciding that proof of a single instance of
inadequate screening could ever trigger municipal liability.” Bryan Cty., 520 U.S.
at 412. The Court explained that in a negligent hiring case, the evidence must
exceed a “mere probability” that a poorly-screened candidate may inflict some
constitutional harm; rather, the plaintiff must establish that “this officer was highly
likely to inflict the particular injury suffered.” Id. An undisclosed incident in a
candidate’s record must be “basically identical to the harm eventually caused.”
M.S., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 426-27 (citation omitted). In addition to this causal
connection, a plaintiff must show that the hiring decision flowed from deliberate
indifference to the risk that constitutional harm will follow. Id. (citing Bryan Cty.,
520 U.S. at 410).
There is no genuine dispute that the injury caused by Stevens in the past—
sexual misconduct with a minor student—is identical to the injury inflicted upon
Kobrick. But our analysis cannot end there. The proper inquiry is whether the
decision to hire Stevens manifests deliberate indifference to Kobrick’s right to
bodily integrity. See Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 414-15. Hence, we consider not
whether better practices would have avoided the injury, but instead whether
Lakeland’s hiring practices as implemented reflect deliberate indifference to a
“highly predictable” risk of that injury in the first instance. See id. at 409.
No reasonable jury could conclude that Lakeland was deliberately indifferent
to a risk of harm to its students. Administrators reviewed Stevens’ application in
full before deciding to invite him to interview. (See Doc. 103 ¶ 2; Doc. 129 ¶ 2). The
30
application identified four references, including Stedenfeld, the band director who
directly supervised Stevens at Western Wayne. (Doc. 103 ¶ 2; Doc. 129 ¶ 2). The
application contained three favorable letters of recommendation, one of which was
authored by Stedenfeld. (Doc. 103 ¶ 2; Doc. 129 ¶ 2). A background check revealed
that Stevens had no criminal record, and a child abuse history clearance reported
no known record of child abuse. (Doc. 103-3 at 104-05). Stevens was also strongly
recommended by a member of Lakeland’s school board. (Doc. 103 ¶ 5; Doc. 129 ¶ 5).
With this extensive background in hand, failure to also contact Western
Wayne administrators could not be deemed deliberate indifference. As we have
observed passim, mere negligence does not equate to indifference of a constitutional
dimension. See M.S., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 427 (citations omitted). Lakeland had in its
possession a “strong letter of reference” from Stevens’ direct supervisor at Western
Wayne, together with a criminal background check and clearance revealing no past
instances of sexual abuse. (See Doc. 103 ¶¶ 2-3; Doc. 129 ¶¶ 2-3; Doc. 106 ¶ 215; Doc.
103-3 at 104-05). The lack of additional inquiry under such circumstances cannot
constitute deliberate indifference to students’ constitutional rights.
Even if Lakeland had conducted a more thorough investigation, Western
Wayne could at most have reported that a “rumor” of an inappropriate relationship
existed, was fully investigated, and was deemed unfounded. (See Sheehan Dep.
181:4-11). This information may have been a red flag and certainly may have
impacted the decision of Lakeland’s board to hire Stevens. But it does not, on its
own, support a conclusion by Lakeland’s administration that the “plainly obvious
31
consequence” of hiring Stevens would be sexual abuse of a minor student. See
Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 411.
A school district is responsible for its “own illegal acts.” Pembaur, 475
U.S. at 479. The undisputed record evidence belies any finding that the district
committed a constitutional wrong. It was Stevens’ wrongdoing—not wrongdoing
on Lakeland’s part—that led to the alleged violation of Kobrick’s substantive due
process rights. The court will grant summary judgment to Lakeland on Kobrick’s
failure-to-act, failure-to-train, and negligent hiring claims.
2.
Supervisory Liability Against Billings-Jones, Kameroski,
Falonk, and Sheehan15
The supervisory defendants each raise a parallel defense, maintaining
that they did not know of the threat posed by Stevens and could not have been
deliberately indifferent to that threat. (Doc. 104 at 20-25, 32-33; Doc. 112 at 8-9; Doc.
113 at 8-10). Each defendant accordingly invokes the protective shield of qualified
immunity. (See Doc. 104 at 49-51; Doc. 112 at 4-9; Doc. 113 at 10-13). The court will
address Kobrick’s claims against the supervisory defendants through the prism of
the qualified immunity doctrine.
15
It is unclear whether Kobrick attempts to pursue official capacity claims
against defendants Billings-Jones, Kameroski, Falonk, and Sheehan. However, it is
settled law that a suit against a government employee in his or her official capacity
is synonymous with a claim against the public entity that employs him or her. See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Redundant official-capacity claims warrant dismissal.
Snell v. City of York, 564 F.3d 659, 120 (3d Cir. 2009). Kobrick asserts claims against
both the individual defendants and the school districts that employ them. Thus, to
the extent Kobrick asserts official capacity claims against an individual defendant,
the claims will be dismissed as duplicative.
32
Qualified immunity protects a state actor who has committed a constitutional
violation if the plaintiff’s rights were not “clearly established” when the individual
acted. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244-45 (2009). No liability will attach if a
reasonable actor could have believed the challenged conduct was in compliance
with settled law. Id.; see also Springer v. Henry, 435 F.3d 268, 280 (3d Cir. 2006).
The doctrine cloaks government officials with “immunity from suit rather than a
mere defense to liability,” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis
omitted), and “ensure[s] that insubstantial claims against government officials [will]
be resolved prior to discovery.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-32 (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n.2 (1987)). The defense generally “protects ‘all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). The
burden to establish qualified immunity rests with the defendant claiming its
protection. Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 142 n.15 (3d Cir. 2001).
A court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity considers two distinct
inquiries: whether, based on the record evidence, a constitutional right has been
violated and, if so, whether the right was “clearly established” at the time of the
alleged violation. Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 800 F.3d 633, 637 (3d Cir.
2015) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). A court may begin its qualified immunity
analysis with either prong. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237. Nearly three decades ago,
the Third Circuit affirmed that a student’s right to be free from sexual abuse at the
hands of her teacher is clearly established. See Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 727. Hence,
33
we assess whether any supervisory defendant violated Kobrick’s clearly established
right.
Like municipalities, a supervisory defendant in a Section 1983 action may not
be held liable merely on a theory of respondeat superior. See M.S., 43 F. Supp. 3d at
428 (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). Supervisory
liability attaches in one of two ways: (1) the supervisor, “with deliberate indifference
to the consequences,” establishes and maintains a policy, practice, or custom that
directly causes the alleged constitutional violation, or (2) the supervisor participates
in or directs the alleged constitutional violation, or has knowledge of and acquiesces
in the unconstitutional action of a subordinate. Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766
F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct.
2042 (2015). Knowledge of the constitutional violation, or substantial risk of such
violation, is a requisite component of either theory. M.S., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 428 &
n.7 (citations omitted). In the context of teacher-student sexual misconduct, the
Third Circuit in Stoneking drew a line between failure to act or investigate, which
does not invite liability, and “affirmative acts” conveying “toleration, condonation,
or encouragement” of sexual abuse, which does. Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 731.
We conclude that Kobrick’s claims against the individual defendants fail
for the same reasons as the Monell claims against their respective employers. See
M.S., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 428 (quoting Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 356 (3d Cir.
1999)). Kobrick’s position with respect to Sheehan and Falonk is virtually identical
to her Monell claim against Western Wayne: suggesting that they should have done
more to ascertain the truth of the rumor about Stevens. (Doc. 141 at 25-26). The
34
record, however, establishes that Sheehan and Falonk fully investigated the claim
of an “inappropriate relationship” and believed both the student and her father that
nothing untoward had occurred. (See Doc. 108 ¶¶ 24-30, 32, 34-35, 40, 43-48, 50, 58,
65-66, 68-70, 72-78, 86; see also Falonk Dep. 126:6-8). There is no basis on this
record for a jury to conclude that Sheehan and Falonk had actual knowledge of an
ongoing sexual relationship between Stevens and a student or that they were
deliberately indifferent to that knowledge. Accordingly, because neither defendant
deprived Kobrick of her constitutional rights, both Sheehan and Falonk are entitled
to qualified immunity.
The record is likewise devoid of evidence that Billings-Jones and Kameroski
knew of ongoing sexual misconduct by Stevens. Kobrick claims broadly that both
individuals “knew of behavior that would suggest sexual assault.” (Doc. 132 at 9).
She cites no evidence to support this proposition. There is a dearth of proof from
which a reasonable jury could find or infer that either Billings-Jones or Kameroski
was actually aware of the sexual misconduct while it was ongoing or had observed
indicia of sexual abuse. See supra at 22-26; see also M.S., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 421. The
only evidence on this point is testimony of Billings-Jones and Kameroski, each of
whom categorically denies any contemporaneous awareness of an inappropriate
relationship between Stevens and Kobrick. Kobrick also attempts to impute
knowledge of the relationship based on the administrators’ alleged knowledge
of “grooming” behaviors, specifically, their general awareness that Stevens and
Kobrick spent considerable time together, in addition to Kameroski’s alleged
knowledge of Kobrick embracing Stevens. (See Doc. 130 at 8-11, 15-16; Doc. 132 at
35
9-12). We have already concluded that this evidence does not establish actual
knowledge of sexual misconduct. See supra at 22-26; see also Kline, 255 F. App’x
at 628-29; M.S., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 421-22; Douglas, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 361-63.
Kobrick asserts, in essentia, that Billings-Jones or Kameroski could have
(and should have) done more to forestall Stevens’ abuse. This is not the standard
for Section 1983 liability. It is not enough for Kobrick to aver that either defendant
“could have averted her injury and failed to do so.” Black, 985 F.2d at 712. Kobrick
must show that each defendant played an “affirmative role in bringing about the
sexual abuse.” Id. (quoting Colburn, 946 F.2d at 1025); Douglas, 836 F. Supp. 2d at
354-55. Neither Billings-Jones nor Kameroski engaged in any affirmative act which
suggested that sexual abuse was tolerated, condoned, or encouraged at Lakeland.
See Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 731.
Nor could it be said that either defendant was deliberately indifferent
to Kobrick’s constitutional rights. Billings-Jones sprang into action immediately
when Kobrick’s mother reported the relationship, contacting the district attorney
and Kameroski as well as the district’s special counsel and solicitor. (Doc. 103 ¶¶ 5556; Doc. 106 ¶¶ 59-60, 72-74; Doc. 129 ¶¶ 55-56; see Doc. 131 ¶¶ 59-60, 72-74). BillingsJones had Kameroski escort Stevens from school property, reported the allegation
to the Department of Education, and terminated his employment. (See Doc. 103
¶¶ 56-57; Doc. 106 ¶¶ 69-70, 83-88). The administrators cooperated fully with law
enforcement’s investigation. (See Doc. 106 ¶¶ 63, 73-75, 77, 79). That Billings-Jones
and Kameroski acted as professional administrators upon learning of Stevens’
misconduct is beyond peradventure. Kobrick has not established that either
36
defendant violated her constitutional rights. Accordingly, Billings-Jones and
Kameroski are entitled to qualified immunity. The court will grant summary
judgment to the supervisory defendants.16
B.
Title IX
Kobrick asserts claims against both school districts under Title IX.
Title IX proscribes discrimination, exclusion, or denial of benefits on the basis of
sex in educational institutions or programs which receive federal funding. See 20
U.S.C. § 1681. The Supreme Court has recognized an implied private right of action
thereunder, see Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979), as well as a monetary
damage remedy in such private actions. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch.,
503 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1992). To succeed on a Title IX sexual harassment claim, a
plaintiff student must show: (1) quid pro quo sexual harassment, or a sexually hostile
educational environment; (2) actual notice to an “appropriate person” who has the
authority to institute corrective measures; and (3) a response to the harassment that
amounts to deliberate indifference. Bennett v. Pa. Hosp. Sch. of Nurse Anesthesia,
No. 01-CV-4098, 2002 WL 32341792, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2002) (citing Gebser v.
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 291-92 (1998)); see Bostic v. Smyrna Sch.
Dist., 418 F.3d 355, 359 (3d Cir. 2005).
16
To the extent Kobrick’s claims against the individual Lakeland defendants
are premised on the alleged negligent hiring of Stevens, those claims are meritless.
The allegata against Billings-Jones concerning negligent hiring is identical to that
asserted against Lakeland itself; the individual claim against Billings-Jones thus
falls with the Monell claim. As for Kameroski, the record establishes that he was
not involved in the hiring process. (Doc. 103 ¶ 92; Doc. 106 ¶¶ 8, 23, 30).
37
Under Title IX, an appropriate person “is, at a minimum, an official of the
recipient entity with authority to take corrective action to end the discrimination.”
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. A school principal and superintendent will ordinarily be
appropriate persons for purposes of Title IX. See Warren ex rel. Good v. Reading
Sch. Dist., 278 F.3d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 2002). Like Section 1983 cases, liability under
Title IX turns on actual knowledge of the misconduct and the failure to respond.
See Bostic, 418 F.3d at 362; Warren, 278 F.3d at 173-74. Knowledge requires more
than mere awareness of a risk of harm, but less than “absolute certainty” that it has
occurred. Dawn L. v. Greater Johnstown Sch. Dist., 586 F. Supp. 2d 332, 367 (W.D.
Pa. 2008) (citing Bostic, 418 F.3d at 360). Actual knowledge exists if the school was
aware of facts that indicated “sufficiently substantial danger to students.” Bostic,
418 F.3d at 361 (citation omitted).
A Title IX plaintiff must also establish deliberate indifference on the part of
persons with knowledge of the harassment. An official decision not to remedy any
type of discrimination demonstrates deliberate indifference. See Bostic, 418 F.3d at
360. A clearly unreasonable response to actual notice of harassment also amounts
to deliberate indifference. Chancellor v. Pottsgrove Sch. Dist., 501 F. Supp. 2d 695,
708 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
Kobrick’s Title IX theory of liability mirrors her constitutional charges.
Consequently, her Title IX claims necessarily fail for the same reasons as her
Monell claims. For liability to attach under Title IX based on a sexual relationship
between teacher and student, Kobrick must show, inter alia, that an “appropriate
person” had “actual notice of the relationship itself.” Douglas, 836 F. Supp. 2d at
38
346-47 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Bostic, 418 F.3d
at 360-61). Suggesting that an administrator should have known or had reason to
suspect is not enough. Id. Despite the benefit of every favorable Rule 56 inference,
Kobrick has not shown that any person at either district actually knew of Stevens’
misconduct. Nor could a reasonable juror conclude that either district acted with
deliberate indifference to that misconduct when it eventually became known. The
court will grant summary judgment to Lakeland and Western Wayne on Kobrick’s
Title IX claim.
C.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Kobrick also seeks to hold Sheehan and Kameroski liable under state law
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. A claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress requires proof that: (1) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and
outrageous; (2) the conduct caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress; and (3)
the defendant acted intending to cause such distress or with knowledge that same
was “substantially certain” to occur. Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 21718 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. d (AM. LAW.
INST. 1965)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet explicitly recognized the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Taylor v. Albert Einstein Med.
Ctr., 754 A.2d 650, 652 (Pa. 2000). The Third Circuit has predicted that the state’s
high court will ultimately adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ formulation.
Williams v. Guzzardi, 875 F.2d 46, 50 (3d Cir. 1989); Chancellor, 501 F. Supp. 2d at
710 (citing Williams, 875 F.2d at 50).
39
Whether conduct could reasonably be regarded as extreme and outrageous
is a threshold inquiry for the court’s determination. See M.S., 43 F. Supp. 3d at
430 (citing Rein v. Tien, 514 A.2d 566, 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). As a general rule,
mere negligence or passivity will not support an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim. Id. at 431 (quoting Thompson v. AT&T Corp., 371 F. Supp. 2d 661,
684 (W.D. Pa. 2005); Kazatsky v. King David Mem’l Park, Inc., 527 A.2d 988, 991 (Pa.
1987)).
Defendants’ answer to this claim is threefold: first, that Pennsylvania’s
Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”), 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 8541 et seq., immunizes them from liability; second, that defendants’ conduct
was neither extreme nor outrageous; and third, that Kobrick has not proven that
she suffers from severe emotional distress. (See Doc. 104 at 44-48; Doc. 113 at 1820). Kobrick offers a familiar rejoinder: that both defendants “knew” that Stevens
was sexually abusing a minor and failed to intervene. (See Doc. 130 at 27-29; Doc.
141 at 33-34).
We agree that both defendants are entitled to governmental immunity. The
PSTCA shields local agencies from tort liability to the extent that conduct does not
fall within specific statutory exceptions to immunity. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8541 et seq. This immunity extends to employees of local agencies for
actions taken “within the scope of [the employee’s] office or duties.” Id. § 8545. The
Act exempts from its protective scope any employee whose injurious act constitutes
a “crime, actual fraud, actual malice[,] or willful misconduct.” Id. § 8550.
40
Kobrick invokes the willful misconduct exception. To strip an employee of
governmental immunity, courts generally require proof that the employee “desired
to bring about the result that followed or at least was aware that it was substantially
certain to follow, so that such desire can be implied.” Bright v. Westmoreland Cty.,
443 F.3d 276, 287 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Robbins v. Cumberland Cty. Children &
Youth Servs., 802 A.2d 1239, 1252-53 (Pa. 2002)). The willful misconduct exception
requires something more than deliberate indifference on the part of agency actors.
M.S., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 433 (citing Owens v. City of Phila., 6 F. Supp. 2d 373, 395
(E.D. Pa. 1998)).
Our finding supra that neither Sheehan nor Kameroski was deliberately
indifferent to a risk of harm to Kobrick ipso facto defeats her willful misconduct
assertion. Assuming arguendo that governmental immunity does not apply,
Kobrick’s claim nonetheless fails on its merits. No record evidence suggests
that Sheehan or Kameroski acted with intent to cause distress or with knowledge
that distress was “substantially certain” to occur.17 See Brown, 269 F.3d at 217-18.
Nor has Kobrick proven the requisite degree of emotional distress to
substantiate her claim. Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must prove that she
suffered physical symptoms as a result of the emotional distress, see M.S., 43 F.
Supp. 3d at 430-31 (quoting Reeves v. Middletown Athletic Ass’n, 866 A.2d 1115,
17
Kobrick suggests in her opposition brief that Sheehan affirmatively acted
to cover up the rumor by directing Stedenfeld, the band director at Western Wayne,
not to tell anyone about Stevens’ misconduct. (Doc. 41 at 34). Relevant testimony
reflects only that Sheehan asked Stedenfeld “not to speak to [Stevens] or anyone
else about this issue at that point.” (Sheehan Dep. 140:19-141:16 (emphasis added)).
The intimation that Sheehan attempted to conceal the allegation against Stevens in
some permanent fashion is a misrepresentation of Sheehan’s testimony.
41
1122 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); Kazatsky, 527 A.2d at 995), and both the physical and
emotional aspect of her injury must be substantiated by expert medical evidence.
See Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 80 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Williams,
875 F.2d at 52; Kazatsky, 527 A.2d at 995). Kobrick has not supplied the court with
medical records substantiating her symptoms, diagnoses, or treatment. (See Docs.
129, 130, 140, 141). In her brief opposing Lakeland’s motion, Kobrick indicates that
she suffers from “depression and anxiety,” citing to records from a family physician,
Bria Tinsley. (Doc. 130 at 28). She notes that, for privacy reasons, “these records
will be mailed to the court for filing under seal.” (Id. at 28 n.1). The records were
never produced to the court. Even if we assume that the records support Kobrick’s
proposition—that she suffers “emotional distress of depression and anxiety”—she
nonetheless fails to establish that her condition is severe, attributable to either
principal’s conduct, or accompanied by physical symptoms. See M.S., 43 F. Supp.
3d at 430-31 (quoting Reeves, 866 A.2d at 1122; Kazatsky, 527 A.2d at 995). For all of
these reasons, we will grant summary judgment to Sheehan and Kameroski on
Kobrick’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
42
IV.
Conclusion
There is no dispute that Stevens’ conduct was deliberate and reprehensible.
Stevens’ conduct, however, is simply not attributable to Western Wayne, Lakeland,
or their respective administrators. For all of the reasons articulated herein, the
court will grant the motions (Docs. 102, 105, 107) for summary judgment filed by
the Lakeland defendants, the Western Wayne defendants, and Billings-Jones. An
appropriate order shall issue.
/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated:
September 1, 2017
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