HILL v. SAMUELS et al

Filing 81

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Therefore, Plaintiff's action to the extent that it seeks injunctive and declaratory relief based upon conditions which existed during his prior confinement at USP-Lewisburg is subject to dismissal on the basis of mootness. An appropriate Order will enter.Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 3/18/16. (cc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

HOWARD L. HILL, II,
Plaintiff

v.

CIVIL NO. 3:CV-13 - 2984 F ILE D

CHARLES E. SAMUELS, JR., ET AL.,:

. C of NTO

(Judge Conaboy)

Defendants

,\

MEMORANDUM

Background

. 1

~

2016

--, , ----'-~~--+--

Howard L. Hill, II an inmate presently confined at the
Canaan United States Penitentiary, Waymart, Pennsylvania

f,~~___ _

this Bivens1-type pro se civil rights action in the United
'. ~

States District Court for the District of Columbia.

2

Plaintiff's action was subsequently dismissed in part by the
District of Columbia with the remaining portion of his action
being transferred to this Court.

See Doc. 27.

Remaining Defendants are two employees at Plaintif f 's prio r

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens stands for the proposition
that "a citizen suffering a compensable injury to a
constitutionally protected interest could invoke the general
federal question jurisdiction of the district court to obtain an
award of monetary damages against the responsible federal
official." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978).
The Complaint is dated January 23, 2013 and will be deemed
filed as of said date. See Houston v Lack , 487 U.S. 266 (1988).
1

place of confinement, the United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg,
pennsylvania (USP-Lewisburg), Warden J.E. Thomas and Supervisor
of Education Vince Cahill as well as Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
Northeast Regional Director J. L. Norwood.
Hill states that he is presently serving a criminal
sentence which was imposed by the Superior Court for the
District of Columbia. 3

Pursuant to the provisions of National

Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act of
1 9 97

(" Re v it a lizati o n Act U

),

Pub. L. No . 105-33,

§

112 3 1 (a ),

II I

Stat. Ann. 712, 745 (effective date Aug. 5, 1998), the Plaintiff
was transferred into BOP custody on or about April 18, 2002.
See Doc. 1,

~

15.

Plaintiff asserts that while previously confined at USP­
Lewisburg 4 he was denied access to the courts because the
prison' s law librar y lacked District o f Co lumbia l e g a l reference
materials or staff trained in District of Col umbia law.
id.,

~

13.

Se e

Hill also asserts that he was denied free

photocopies of legal material and that his right to privacy was
violated because prison officials were able to view the research
J
Documents provided by the Remaining Defendants indicate
that Hill is serving a 30 year sentence for first degree felony
murder while armed and is scheduled for release in 2028.

Remaining Defendants acknowledge that plaintiff wa s
confined a t USP-Lewisburg from May 9, 2011 to March 11, 2013.
He
was also returned to that facility for a period of time in 2014 a
time frame which is not the subject of this action.
2

he conducted when using the prison's Electric Law L
(ELL)

.5

ra

iff also vaguely challenges the Ie

The PI

BOP Program Statement 1315.07 regarding the

lity of

research and

activities of inmates on the basis

litigation reI
his case s

hindered his ability to collaterally

challenge his

I conviction.

he

ly challenge his underlying c

was unable to col
conviction or

plaintiff concludes t
I

Ie a request under the Freedom of Information

Act (FOIA). 6

. at

and declaratory re

ef as well as compensatory and pun

~

27.

The Complaint seeks injunct
ive

damages.
Present
summary judgment.

ng is Defendants' motion to di
Doc. 59.

ss

r

Also before the Court is

Plaintiff's cross summary judgment motion.

See Doc. 72.

Both

motions are ripe for consideration.

Discussion

Motion to Dismiss

Remaining De

dispositive motion is

s'

5 ELL provides inmates with computerized access to a wide
variety of
gal materials including the D.C. Code, D.C. Court
Rules, and D.C. judicial decisions.

It is noted that District of Columbia offenders such as
Hill are considered state prisoners for purposes of the federal
habeas corpus statutes.
Madley v. United States Parole Comm'n,
278 F.3d 1306, 1309 (D.C.
2002).
3

supported by evidentiary materials outside the pleadings.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) provides in

as

follows:
If, on a motion under Rule 12(b) (6) or
12(c), matters outside the pleading are
presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion must be treated as one for
summary judgment under Ru
56. All parties
must be given reasonable opportunity to
present all the material that is pertinent
to
motion.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (d).
This Court will not exclude the

denti

accompanying Remaining Defendants' motion.
construed as sole
~~~~~~=,

materials

Thus,

seeking summary judgment.

306 Fed. Appx. 716, 718 (3d C

it will

See
. 2009) (when a

motion to dismiss has been framed alternatively as a motion for
summary judgment such as in the present case, the

rnative

filing is sufficient to place the parties on notice that summary
judgment might be entered).
Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper if "

pleadings, the discove

and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movaht is entitled to a judgmeht as a matter of law."
Civ. P. 56(c);
231-32

Fed. R.

also Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228,

(3d Cir. 2001).

A factual dispute is "material" if it
4

outcome of the suit under the applicable law.

fect

might

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

A

factual

is "genuine" only if there is a sufficient

evident

basis that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to
for the non-moving party.

return a

ld. at 248.

The

court must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine
issue of

I fact in favor of the non-moving party.
260 F.

at 232; see also Reeder v. Sybron Transition

Corp., 142 F.R.D. 607, 609 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
br

arguments made
facts.

Unsubstantiated

fs are not considered evidence of ass

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,

984 F.2d 1359, 1370 (3d

Cir. 1993).
moving party has shown that there is an absence of

Once

evidence to support the claims of the non-moving party, the non­
may not simply sit back and rest on the allegations

moving

324

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

s

in

(1986).

Instead, it must "go beyond the

by

tS f or by the depositions, answers to

s] own
Sf

facts

s

and admissions on file, designate

if

that there is a genuine issue for trial."
quotations omitted); see also Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232

(i
(citat

omitted).

Summary judgment should be

where a

y "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

5

existence of an element essential to that pa

's case, and on

which that party will bear the burden at tri

Celotex, 477

U.S. at 322 23.

"'Such affirmative evidence

regardless of

whether it is direct or circumstantial - must amount to more
lla, but may amount to less (in the evaluation of

than a sc

,"

the court) than a

Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232

{quoting williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460­
61 (3d Cir. 1989)).

Plaintiff's Cross Motion
to the Rema

In
motion, Pl

iff has fil

ng Defendants'
a "counter cla

judgment" which will be const
motion.

spositive
for summary

as a cross summary judgment

Doc. 72.

Based on this Court's

ew of the Pla

supporting documents, he has

iff's motion and

led to set forth any authori

establishing that he is ent

led to judgment as a matter of law

with respect to his claims

fore this Court.

The motion, brief

in support, and statement of material facts merely reasserts
Hill's
relief.

sly raised fact
Plaintiff's fil

averments and claims for
are devoid of any arguments,

authority, or supporting case law which could warrant entry of
summary judgment in his favor.
Hill has also not satisfied his burden of proof of

6

establishing all the essential elements
t to his surviving claims.

red to succeed with

Consequently, based on an

ication of the well settled Rule 56 standards,

Plaintiff's

cross motion for summary judgment will be denied.
Administrative Exhaustion

Remaining Defendants acknowledge
an administrative grievance regarding
sufficient access to

Plaintiff exhausted
s claims of having

strict of Columbia legal research

materials, lack of a trained assistant, and denial of
photocopying.

See Doc. 67, p. 10.

ll's claim of lack a

However, they contend that

cyan ELL was not fully exhausted

before this action was filed.

Furthermore, the Plaintiff did

file any administrative grievance regarding

challenge to the

constitutionality of BOP Program Statement 1315.07.
Section 1997e(a) of t

le 42 U.S.C. provides:

No action shall be brought with
t to
prison condit
s under Section 1979 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States (42
U.S.C. 1983), or any other federal
, by a
prisoner conf
any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such
administrat
s as are available are
exhausted.
Section 1997e(a) requ

s administrative exhaustion

"irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through
nistrative avenues."

Porter v. Nussle, 122 S.Ct. 983, 992

7

(2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n. 6 (2001).
relief are not excused from the exhaustion

for monet
requirement.
~ismissal

Cl

Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 74 (3d Cir. 2000).

of an inmate's cia

is appropr

e when a prisoner

has failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies
s action.

before bringing a civil r
F. Supp. 2d 838, 843

(E.~.

Ahmed v. Sromovski, 103

Pa. 2000).

ion must occur

prior to filing suit, not while the suit is

"

Harvey, 248 F.3d 1152, 2000 WL 167468, *2 (6 th C
Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645
v. united States, 165 Fed.

(6t~

C

. 991, 993 (3d

The united States Supreme Court in

Tribe v.

. 2000)(citing

. 1999»; Oriakhi
. 2006).

""-'='~=--"-"----'=~,

5 4 9 U. S •

199, 219 (2007), stated that the primary purpose of the
exhaust

irement is to allow "a prison to address

complaints about the program

administers before being

subjected to suit, reducing 1

gation to the extent compla

s

are satisfactorily resolved, and improving litigation that does
occur by

to the preparation of a useful record."

The administrative exhaustion mandate also
default component.

ies a procedural

Spruill v. Gillis 372 F.3d 218, 222 (3d

2004).
As explained by the Th
rule "

s an end-run a

Circuit, a procedural default
the exhaustion requirement."

8

rd. at 230.

It also ensures "prisoner compliance with the

specific

irements of the grievance system" and encourages

inmates to

ue their administrative grievances "to the

fullest."

Similarly, the Supreme Court has observed that

proper

stion of available administrative remedies is
that prisoners must comply with

mandatory, mean

ral rules, including time 1

system's
-"-"---"-'-"''-=,

tations.

Woodford

5 4 8 U. S. 81 ( 2006 ) .

"There is no
requirement."
(citing

ility exception" to the exhaust

Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 112 (3d c
, 204 F.3d at 75.

Appeals re

The Third Circu

Court of

that exhaustion should be excused

cause

es were regularly rejected.

prisoner gr

Appx. 271, 274 (3d Cir.

2006).

retaliation' as a basis

186

The Court of Appeals has

also rejected "sensitive' subject matter o r '

exhaust."

. 2002)

its no futility exception by rejecting an

inmate's a

Fed.

ievance

of

r excusing a prisoner's failure to

~~-=~~~~~~~~,

281 Fed. Appx. 110, 113 (3d

Cir. 2008).
An inmate is not required to specifically plead or
tion in his or her complaint.

demonstrate
U.S. at 216;

see

==~-=~~~==~==,

See,

"'-'=~"'-'='-,

549

285 F.3d 287 (3d Cir.

2002)(a prisoner does not have to allege in his complaint that

9

he has exhausted administrative remedies).

Rather, pursuant to

the standards announced in Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d

568,

573 (3d Cir. 1997), it is the burden of a defendant asserting
the defense of non-exhaustion to plead and prove it.7
The BOP has a well established

three (3) s

Administrative Remedy Program whereby a federal prisoner may
review of any aspect of his imprisonment.
542.10-542.19.

See 28 C.F.R.

After attempting to informally resolve the

issue, a BOP inmate can initiate the first step of the grievance
process by submitting
Re
cal

st, on the appropriate form (BP 9),n within twenty ( 0)
e on which

days "following the
st occurred.

twe

"a formal written Administrative Remedy

(20)

n

See

28 C.F.R.

§

basis for t

542.14(a).

The Warden has

calendar days from the date the Request or Appeal

is filed in whi

to respond.

n

See

28 C.F.R.

§

542.18.

If not

satisfied with the warden's response, an inmate may appeal (step
two) on the appropr

form (BP-I0) to the Regional Director

within twenty (20) calendar days of the date the Warden signed
the response.
is dissatisf

See

28 C.F.R.

§

542.15.

Finally, if the inmate

with the Regional Director's response, that

In Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003), the
united States Court
Appeals for the Third Circu
similarly
stated that "[fjailure to exhaust administrat
remedies is an
affirmat
defense for the defendant to plead. n
10

decision may then be appealed (step three) on the appropriate
form (BP-11) to the Central Office within thirty (30) calendar
days from the date the Regional
Id.

rector signed the response.

Additionally, "[iJf the inmate does not receive a response

within the time allotted for reply, including extension, the
inmate may consider the absence of a response to be a denial at
that level."

Id.

In support of the non-exhaustion argument, Remaining
Defendants have submitted a declaration under penalty of perjury
submitted by non-Defendant USP-Lewisburg Attorney Advisor
Jennifer Knepper.
the course of
grievances.

Doc. 68-1, p. 23.

s BOP incarceration PI

Knepper states during
ntiff initiated 120

While Hill filed grievances regarding insufficient

access to legal materials and a trained legal assistant as well
as denial of free photocopying, those two grievances were
"effectively exhausted" by the BOP's Central Office on January
id. at

18, 2013.
As

~

6.

sly noted, Hill's Complaint is dated Janua

23,

2013 and must be deemed filed as of said date pursuant to the
standards announced in
Accordi

y,

~~~~~~~,

487 U.S. 266 (1988).

s Court concurs with Remaining Defendants'

observation that Hill's claims of having insufficient access to
District of Columbia legal research materials, lack of a trained

11

assistant, and denial of photocopying were exhausted.
Knepper also admits that Plaintiff filed a grievance
regarding
10, 2012.

s lack of privacy claim while using ELL on December
However, the declarant points out that the final

administrative appeal of the grievance was not "cons
denied

to time lapse" until Februa

As such, Knepper concludes that the lack

8, 2013.

rd. at ,

privacy cl

7.

was

not administratively exhausted prior to the filing of this
action.
adds that

only other

ievance filed by Hill

concerned a law library at another correctional facil

, as

such, Remaining Defendants maintain that the Plaintiff did file
any admi

strative grievance regarding his challenge to the

constitutionality of BOP Program Statement 1315.07.

Plaintiff

does not dispute the above assertions but states that his non­
exhaus
Bas

should be excused as harmless error.
upon the undisputed evidence submitted by t

Remaining Defendants,
establi
doing

that Pla

their burden of

iff's claim of a lack of privacy while

on ELL was not administratively exhausted until

February 8, 2013.
adminis

have satisf

Since Plaintiff

s that his final

appeal was still pending at the time this matter

was filed, Remaining Defendants have satisfied their burden

12

under Williams of establishing that this lawsuit was initiated
pr

r to his completion of the BOP's administrative grievance

procedure.
and Oriakhi,

Pursuant to the standards developed in
Hill's

of privacy claim was not administratively exhausted

before the filing of this action and as such entry of summary
judgment on the basis of non-exhaustion with respect to said
cia

is appropriate.
It is also undisputed that Plaintiff did not file any

administrative grievance regarding his present challenge to the
legality of BOP Program Statement 1315.07.

Accordingly, the

request for entry of summary judgment on the basis of non­
exhaustion is also meritorious with respect to that cia
Personal Involvement

Remaining

s' second argument cont

that

are entitled to entry of summary judgment because there are no
allegations that they had personal involvement in the alleged
constitutional violations.

See Doc. 67, p. 18.

They note that

the Complaint contends only that "Supervisor Cahill den

d his

formal requests to staff, warden Thomas denied his
administrative remedies at the institution level and Regional
Director Norwood denied his appeal at the regional level."
They conclude that since

Id.

appears that Hill is attempting to

13

establish liability

based upon either their respect

supervisory capacities or the handling of his administrat
grievances, entry of summary judgment is appropriate.
iff, in order to state an actionable civil rights

A pIa

claim, must plead two essential elements:

(I) that the conduct

complained of was committed by a person acting under color of
law, and (2) that s
right, privi

d conduct deprived the plaintiff of a

, or immunity secured by the Constitution or

laws of the United States.
F.3d 628! 638 (3d C

Groman v. Township of Manalapan! 47

. 1995); Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920

F.2d 1135 1 1141 42 (3d C

. 1990).

Federal civil rights claims brought cannot be premised on a
superior.

theory of
1195, 1207 (3d C

. 1988).

Rode v. Dellarciprete l

Rather l

845 F.2d

each named defendant must be

shown 1 via the complaint's allegations, to have been personal
involved in the events or occurrences which underlie a claim.
~~~~~~~=,

423 U.S. 362 (1976); Hampton v. Holmesburg

Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976).

As explained in

A defendant in a civil rights action must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.
[P]ersonal involvement can be shown through
allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of
participation or actual knowledge and
acquiescence, however, must be made with
appropr
part
larity.
14

Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
Inmates also do not have a constitutional right to a prison
grievance system.

See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners Labor

Union, 433 U.S. 119, 137-138 (1977); Speight v. Sims, No. 08­
2038, 2008 WL 2600723 at *1 (3d. Cir. Jun 30, 2008) (citing
Massey v. Helman, 2 5 9 F. 3d 64 1 , 64 7 (7th Cir. 20 0 1 ) (" [ TJ he
existence of a prison grievance procedure confers no liberty
int e rest o n a pri so ne r ." ) Co nse q uently, an y attempt b y Plaintiff
to establish liability against the Rema ining Defendants solely
based upon the substance or lack of response to his
institutional grievances does not by itself s upport a
constitutional due process claim.

See also Alexander v.

Gennarini, 144 Fed. Appx. 924, 925 (3d Cir. 2005) (involvement in
post-incident grievance proc e ss not a basis f o r

§

1983

liability); Pryor-El v. Kelly, 8 92 F. Supp. 261, 275 (D. D.C.
1995)

(because prison grievance procedure does not confer an y

substantive constitutional rights upon prison inmates, the
prison officials' failure to comply with grievance procedure is
not actionable).
Pursuant to the above discussion, entry of summary judgme nt
in favor of the Remaining Defendants is appropriate with respect
t o all cl a im s pr e mi se d upon the h andli n g o f Hill' s g rieva nc e s
and grievance appeals.

A review of the Complaint shows that
15

there are no other allegations set forth which could show that
the Remaining Defendants had any personal involvement in the
alleged unconstitutional deprivations which purportedly occurred
to Hill while at USP-Lewisburg. Since liability cannot be
premised against the Remaining Defendants on the basis of their
respective supervisory capacities, under the personal
involvement pleading requirements of Rode, they are entitled to
entry of summary judgment.
Access to the Courts

Remaining Defendants acknowledge that while housed at USPLewisburg,

11

led a pro se motion to vacate his District of

Columbia sentence which was denied on August 8, 2013.

He also

filed a motion to reduce his sentence which was denied on August
23, 2013.

See Doc. 67, p. 9.

However, they contend that the

Complaint fails to set forth any facts whatsoever which could
support a claim that Hill suffered any actual injury to a
litigation effort as a result of any deprivation or condition
existing at USP-Lewisburg.
Hill also alleges that the Remaining Defendants denied him
access to the courts because he was not provided with free
photocopying of legal materials.

Remaining Defendants assert

that entry of summary judgment with respect to this claim is
appropriate because Hill enjoys "no First Amendment right to

16

free or subsidized photocopying." Doc. 67, p. 23.
Prisoners enjoy a constitutional right of meaningful access
to the law libraries, legal materials, or legal services.
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-25 (1977).

The United States

Supreme Court in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-54 (1996),
clarified that an inmate plaintiff, in order to set forth a
viable claim under Bounds, must demonstrate that a non-frivolous
legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded.

A

plaintiff must also allege an actual injury to his litigation
efforts.

Under the standards mandated by Lewis, in order for an

inmate to state a claim for interference with his legal work, he
must demonstrate that he has suffered actual injury.

See Oliver

v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1997) (concluding that
Lewis effectively requires a showing of actual injury where
interference with legal mail is alleged).
Multiple courts have recognized that prisoners have no
right to free photocopying for use in lawsuits.
Moore, 948 F. 2d 517,521 (9 th Cir.

Johnson v.

1991) ("denial of free

photocopying does not amount to a denial of access to the
courts")

i

Harrell v. Keohane, 621 F. 2d 1059

PO"h Cir.

1980) i

Jenkins v. Porfiro, Civil Action No. 3:CV-95-2048, slip op. at 1
(M.D. Pa.

May 15, 1996)

(Caputo, J.).

It has also been held that there is no requirement that the

17

government or a defendant has to pay for an indigent plaintiff's

litigation efforts.
Cir.

2003).

Smith v. Yarrow, 78 Fed. Appx. 529, 544 (6 ch

Simply put, neither this Court nor prison

officials are constitutionally required to relieve Hill of
reasonable payment for the photocopying and service of
documents.

Accordingly, entry of summary judgment in favor of

the Remaining Defendants with respect to the merits of the
denial of photocopying claim is appropriate. 8
It

undisputed that ELL provided Plaintiff with

computerized access to a wide variety of legal materials
including the D.C. Code, D.C. Court Rules, and D.C.
decisions.

judicial

Moreover, Plaintiff admits that he was afforded

training in the use of ELL.

There is also no discernible claim

of interference with either Plaintiff's legal mail or his
personal legal materials.

Moreover, Hill also filed two

collateral challenges to his criminal sentence. 9
Based upon those considerations and the failure of the
Complaint to present facts showing that Hill suffered actual
injury to a non-frivolous litigation effort because of some
intentional impediment by the Remaining Defendants, summary

8
It is noted that Hill acknowledges in his Complaint that he
was provided with some free photocopies as an indigent inmate.
9
Hill also contends that he was unable to pursue an FOIA
request but he offers no reasons for his inability to do so.

18

judgment will be granted with respect to the denial of access to
the courts.

10

The mere fact that Plaintiff's collateral

challenges to his criminal conviction were denied does not by
itself warrant a finding that the denial stemmed from a denial
of access to the courts.
Mootness

It is additionally noted that federal courts can only
resolve actual cases or controversies,

u.s.

Const., Art. III, §

2, and this limitation subsists "through all stages of federal
judicial proceedings.
415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974)

"

Id. see also

Steffel v. Thompson,

(the adjudicatory power of a federal

court depends upon "the continuing existence of a live and acute
controversy)" (emphasis in original).

An actual controversy

must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time
the complaint is filed."

Id. at n.10 (citations omitted).

"Past exposure to illegal conduct is insufficient to sustain a
present case or controversy .

if unaccompanied by

continuing, present adverse effects."

Rosenberg v. Meese, 622

10
It is also noted that a declaration under penalty of
perjury Trust Fund Supervisor Doug Williams provides that although
USP-Lewisburg staff has access to an inmate's ELL usage data, time,
and and print requests for the purpose of billing and refunds the
content of prisoners' ELL usage is not monitored.
See Doc. 68-1,
p. 16. Based upon this undisputed declaration, Remaining Defendants
have also shown that Plaintiff's ELL related lack of privacy claim
lacks merit.

19

F. Supp. 1451, 1462 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)

(citing O'Shea v. Littleton,

414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)); see also Gaeta v. Gerlinski, Civil
No. 3:CV-02-465, slip Ope at p. 2 (M.D. Pa. May 17, 2002)
(Vanaskie, C.J.).
Furthermore, an inmate's claim for injunctive and
declaratory relief fails to present a case or controversy once
the inmate has been transferred.

Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169,

1173 (11th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted); see also Carter v.
Thompson, 808 F. Supp. 1548, 1555 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
When Plaintiff initiated this action he was confined at
USP-Lewisburg and his action seeks injunctive and declaratory
relief with respect to conditions at that facility.

He is no

longer confined at that prison and there is no indication that
Hill will be returned to USP-Lewisburg
future.

in the foreseeable

Therefore, Plaintiff's action to the extent that it

seeks injunctive and declaratory relief based upon conditions
which existed during his prior confinement at USP-Lewisburg is
subject to dismissal on the basis of mootness.
Order will enter.

An appropriate

11

DATED: MARCH

11
Based upon the Court's determinations herein, a discussion
of the request for qualified immunity is not necessary.

20