Robinson et al v. Littlefield et al

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the arbitration proceeding that gave rise to this matter was not finally resolved until June 16, 2014. The Court also finds that, because the parti es contract provided that the arbitration agreement would be governed by New York law, the Defendant has ninety (90) from June 16, 2014 to appeal the arbitrators ruling. An Order consistent with these findings will be issued simultaneously herewith.BY THE COURTre 6 MOTION to Dismiss Praecipe to Enter Judgment From Award of Arbitrator and Strike the Judgment filed by Boat-N-RV Superstore, Derwood Lee Littlefield Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 8/11/14. (cc)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
William E. Robinson,Sr.,
William E. Robinson,Jr., and
Tara Robinson, H/W,

:
:

Plaintiffs,

:(Case No. 3:14-CV-0195

v.

:

Derwood Littlefield, Individually
and D/B/A Boat-N-RV Superstore
And Boat-N-RV Superstore.

: Judge Richard P. Conaboy
:

Defendants.
:
___________________________________________________________________
Memorandum
We consider here a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Praecipe to
Enter Judgment from Award of Arbitrator and Strike Judgment (Doc.
6).

The judgment that Defendants Derwood Littlefield,

individually, and D/B/A Boat-N-RV Superstore and Tilden
Recreational Vehicles, Inc. (hereinafter collectively
“Defendants”)seek to strike was entered in the Schuylkill County
Court of Common Pleas on January 22, 2014 (Doc. 1-1).

The entry of

judgment was based on an Arbitration Award dated December 9, 2013
(Doc. 1-1, Ex. 1).

Defendants subsequently filed a motion to

modify the award with the American Arbitration Association due to a
clerical error and also sought clarification of which claims had
been granted.

The motion before this Court (Doc. 6) has been

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extensively briefed (Doc. 7, 10, 14, 17, 20-22) and is ripe for
disposition.

For the reasons that follow the Court will grant the

Motion to Dismiss/Strike (Doc. 6).
I.

Background.
This case arises from Plaintiffs’ purchase of a recreational

vehicle from Defendants on or about May 27, 2008.

Due to claims

regarding the quality and/or performance of the vehicle, this
matter went to arbitration before the American Arbitration
Association (“AAA”) pursuant to a clause in the contract of sale.
The arbitrator ruled for Plaintiffs and issued an award dated
December 9, 2013 that required Defendants to pay Plaintiffs
$79,370.45 in compensatory damages along with reimbursement of fees
and expenses in the amount of $4,501.86 (Doc. 1-1, Ex. 1).
On January 10, 2014, some thirty two (32) days after the
arbitrator entered his award, Defendants moved, pursuant to Rule 50
of the AAA Commercial Rules Arbitration to modify and/or correct
the award.

(Doc. 7, Ex. 3).

By this motion, Defendants purport to

have “...raised basic issues regarding which claims were granted
and the formulation and basis for the award...”.

(Doc. 7 at 6).

Plaintiffs’ response to Defendant’s motion to modify the
arbitration award asserts that the motion was out of time and that,
because the parties did not bargain for a “reasoned award”, the
Defendants are simply not entitled to an explanation of the
rationale for the award.

(Doc. 7-4, ¶¶ 2 and 6-7).

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On January 22,

2014, Plaintiffs entered judgment on the Arbitration Award in the
Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas.

Defendants then removed

this action to this Court on February 6, 2014 on the basis that
diversity of citizenship exists among the parties and the
jurisdictional amount in controversy has been met pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1461.

(Doc. 1 at 1).

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss/Strike challenges the propriety
of Plaintiffs’ entry of judgment in the Schuylkill County Court of
Common Pleas as premature.

Defendant argues further that because

its motion to modify the award remained pending at the time
Plaintiff entered judgment, both the Schuylkill County Court of
Common Pleas and this Court lack jurisdiction to enforce the
arbitration award inasmuch as the arbitration was ongoing at the
time judgment was erroneously entered and the time for appeal has
not yet run.
II.

Legal Discussion.
The parties agree that the critical issue that needs to be

determined here is whether the underlying arbitration action was
final on the date Plaintiffs filed their judgment in the Schuylkill
County Court of Common Pleas.

Plaintiff points to Rule 50 of the

AAA Rules which requires that any motion to modify an arbitration
award be filed within twenty (20) days of the date the award is
made.

There can be no doubt in this instance that Defendants

failed to comply with the literal requirements of Rule 50.

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Plaintiffs view Defendants’ failure to comply with the time frame
specified by Rule 50 as an indication that the arbitration was
final as a matter of law.

(Doc. 22 at 2).

Yet, unwilling to

simply presume that the AAA considered the motion a nullity, this
Court’s Order of June 2, 2014 (Doc. 19) directed Defendants to
obtain documentation from the AAA regarding whether the arbitration
remained ongoing or was final.
On June 26, 2014, Defendant furnished the Court with a
Disposition For Application Of Modification Of Award (the
“Disposition”) from the arbitrator who had presided over the case.
(Doc. 21-1, Ex. A).

The Disposition states:

I, the undersigned arbitrator, having been
designated in accordance with the arbitration
agreement entered into between the above-named
parties and dated December 22, 2010, and having been
duly sworn, and having heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, and having previously
rendered an Award dated December 9, 2013 and
Respondent having filed an application for
modification dated January 10, 2014, and Claimant
having responded by letter dated January 16, 2014,
and Respondent having responded by letter January
16, 2014, and Claimant having responded by letter
dated January 22, 2014, due hereby, DECIDE AS

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FOLLOWS:
I see no rule that would justify my amending the
arbitration award.
In all other respects my Award dated December 9,
2013, is reaffirmed and remains in full force and
effect.
The parties, as might be expected, interpret this terse
communication in starkly different ways.

Plaintiff asserts: “the

Disposition makes it clear that the matter before the AAA was and
is final.”

(Doc. 22 at 2).

Plaintiff also asserts: “pursuant to

Rule 50 of the AAA Rules of Procedure the Defendants had twenty
(20) days to ask for a modification of the arbitration award.

It

is a fact that the Defendants failed to file such a request in a
timely fashion thereby ending the matter.”

Id.

The Defendants contend that the mere fact that the arbitrator
issued the Disposition is proof of the fact that the AAA considered
the arbitration to be active until the date of the Disposition,
June 16, 2014.

(Doc. 21, 1-2).

Defendants also contend that the

underlying contract requires that the arbitration be conducted in
accordance with the law of New York State and Plaintiff has not
disputed this proposition.

(Doc. 21, at 2, n.1).

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Having duly considered the parties competing interpretations

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New York law permits 90 days to appeal from an arbitration award. See New York Code
§ 7511(a).
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of the Disposition, the Court must conclude that the arbitration
proceedings did not become final until the Disposition was issued.
The arbitrator’s statement, while couched in oblique language, is
consistent with that of an individual giving active consideration
to a question.

He does not simply state that he is constrained

from considering the motion to modify the award due to Defendants’
temporal laxity.

Rather, he “sees no rule that would justify

amending the arbitration award.”

Had he intended to deny the

motion on timeliness grounds, he could certainly have cited Rule 50
and such a citation is conspicuous by its absence from the
Disposition.
The Court is also more inclined to credit the Defendants’
interpretation here because, as the Defendants have argued, Rule 42
of the AAA Rules of Commercial Procedure specifically provides:
“the AAA or the arbitrator may for good cause extend any period of
time established by these rules...”.

(Doc. 7-3, ¶ 9).

The

Defendants had made the arbitrator aware in their motion to modify
the award that their counsel’s child was undergoing a lengthy
hospitalization during a portion of the twenty (20) day period
prescribed by Rule 50.

(Id, ¶¶ 10-11).

A family crisis of this

magnitude could easily have been deemed “good cause” by the
arbitrator pursuant to Rule 42.

This, too, factors into the

Court’s conclusion that the arbitrator had actively considered
Defendants’ untimely motion.

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Finally, correspondence the parties received by email from
Karen D’Amico, a case manager with the AAA, acknowledged receipt of
Defendants’ motion to modify the award, requested the Plaintiffs to
comment on that motion, and indicated that the motion would be
forwarded to the arbitrator for consideration. (Emphasis added).
(Doc. 1-4 at 2-3).

Ms. D’Amico’s email provides additional support

for the proposition that the Disposition was not resolved on the
issue of Defendants’ failure to make its motion within the time
frame ordinarily prescribed by the rules and was still under active
consideration by the AAA until June 16, 2014.
III. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the
arbitration proceeding that gave rise to this matter was not
finally resolved until June 16, 2014.

The Court also finds that,

because the parties’ contract provided that the arbitration
agreement would be governed by New York law, the Defendant has
ninety (90) from June 16, 2014 to appeal the arbitrator’s ruling.
An Order consistent with these findings will be issued
simultaneously herewith.
BY THE COURT
S/Richard P. Conaboy
Honorable Richard P. Conaboy
United States District Court
Dated: August 11, 2014

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In light of the fact that the parties expressly bargained for a “non-reasoned award”, the
Court is quizzical as to how Defendants expect to benefit from an appeal. Still, the law makes
allowance for Defendants to pursue that option.
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