PITTMAN v. CORBETT et al
Filing
51
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Accordingly, Corizon is entitled to entry of dismissal. See Carpenter v. Kloptoski, 2010 WL 891825 * 8 (M.D. Pa. March 10, 2010)(§ 1983 claim against PHS solely on the basis that it was respo nsible for providing health care is subject to dismissal). Pursuant to the above discussion, Defendant Corizons motion to dismiss will be granted. An appropriate Order will enter. re 30 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Corizon (Prison) Health Services Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 9/5/17. (cc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GABRIEL PITTMAN,
:
:
Plaintiff
:
:
CIVIL NO. 3:CV-14-598
:
v.
:
(Judge Conaboy)
:
TOM CORBETT, ET AL.,
:
:
Defendants
:
___________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM
Background
Gabriel Pittman (Plaintiff), an inmate presently confined at
the State Correctional Institution, Houtzdale, Pennsylvania (SCIHoutzdale) initiated this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.
By Memorandum and Order dated February
27, 2014, the Eastern District granted Pittman’s request for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis, dismissed some of his claims and
Defendants, and transferred his surviving claims relating to his
prior confinement at the State Correctional Institution, Dallas,
Pennsylvania (SCI-Dallas) to this Court.
Thereafter, by Order dated April 11, 2014, a second action
filed by Plaintiff, Pittman v. Corbett, et al.,Civil No. 3:CV-14567,which
was intended to be a proposed amended complaint was
consolidated into this matter.
See Doc. 11.
However, the
Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint was not accepted and he was
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granted leave to file and serve a proper amended complaint.1
id.
See
Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint (Doc. 13)
which was accepted by the Court.
Presently pending is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant
Corizon Healthcare Inc. (“Corizon”).
See Doc. 30.
The opposed
motion is ripe for consideration.
With respect to the Moving Defendant, the Amended Complaint
states that Pittman has been diagnosed with a skin disorder,
“steatocystoma multiplex which has riddled his body with
innumerable sebaceous cysts and many keloids” which cause moderate
pain when they become infected or irritated.
Doc. 13, ¶ 11.
Plaintiff asserts that Corizon was contracted to provide medical
services to the SCI-Dallas inmate population during the relevant
time period.
Pittman acknowledges that he has been provided treatment for
his condition which has included periodic steroid injections,
excision and draining of cysts, and consultation with a
dermatologist.
However, he contends Doctor Stanish, a Corizon
employee improperly halted the steroid injections and that other
previously prescribed care has not been provided by the SCI-Dallas
medical staff.
Plaintiff vaguely asserts that the lack of
treatment was the result of an unconstitutional Corizon policy
and/or custom.
See id. at ¶ 19.
The Amended Complaint adds that
these alleged denials of medical care transpired between 2012-13.
1. The proposed Amended Complaint includes claims and Defendants
which were previously dismissed by the Eastern District’s February
27, 2014 Memorandum and Order
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Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive
damages.
Discussion
The Moving Defendant does not dispute that it contracted
with the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) to provide
medical care to the SCI-Dallas inmate population or that Pittman
suffers from steatocystoma multiplex, which they describe as being
an uncommon benign disorder which typically manifests as multiple
asymptomatic intradermal cysts.
See Doc. 31, p. 2.
However
Corizon claims entitlement to entry of dismissal because the facts
alleged in the Amended Complaint do not identify “any particular
policy or program” which purportedly violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.
Doc. 31, p. 7.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the
dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept as true all factual
allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can
be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.”
Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir.
2007)(quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005)).
A plaintiff must present facts that, if true, demonstrate a
plausible right to relief.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(stating that
the complaint should include “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
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This requirement
“calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of” the necessary elements of the
plaintiff’s cause of action.
Id. at 556.
A complaint must contain “more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Legal conclusions must be
supported by factual allegations and the complaint must state a
plausible claim for relief.
See id. at 679.
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
Twombly, at 555.
The reviewing court must determine whether the
complaint “contain[s] either direct or inferential allegations
respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery
under some viable legal theory.”
Id. at 562; see also Phillips v.
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008)(in order to
survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege in his
complaint “enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s]” of a
particular cause of action).
Additionally, pro se pleadings are to
be construed liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
Corporate Liability
The Eighth Amendment “requires prison officials to provide
basic medical treatment to those whom it has incarcerated.”
Rouse
v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v.
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Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
In order to establish an Eighth
Amendment medical claim, an inmate must allege acts or omissions by
prison officials sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need.
See Spruill v. Gillis, 372
F.3d 218, 235 - 36 (3d Cir. 2004); Natale v. Camden Cty.
Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir.
2003).
In the
context of medical care, the relevant inquiry is whether the
defendant was: (1) deliberately indifferent (the subjective
component) to (2) the plaintiff’s serious medical needs (the
objective component).
Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v.
Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987); West v. Keve, 571 F.2d
158, 161 (3d Cir. 1979).
A plaintiff, in order to state an actionable civil rights
claim, must plead two essential elements:
(1) that the conduct
complained of was committed by a person acting under color of law,
and (2) that said conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
See Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628,
638 (3d Cir. 1995); Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135,
1141-42 (3d Cir. 1990).
Furthermore, federal civil rights claims brought under §
1983 cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior.
v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
Rode
Rather, each
named defendant must be shown, via the complaint's allegations, to
have been personally involved in the events or occurrences which
underlie a claim.
See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Hampton
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v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976).
As
explained in Rode:
A defendant in a civil rights action must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. . .
. [P]ersonal involvement can be shown through
allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of
participation or actual knowledge and
acquiescence, however, must be made with
appropriate particularity.
Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
Based on the nature of Pittman’s allegations, it is apparent
that he may, at least in part, be attempting to establish liability
against Corizon on the basis of actions or decisions undertaken by
its employees on the SCI-Dallas medical staff.
Under the
standards developed in Rode, this Court agrees that any such
assertions by themselves are insufficient for purposes of
establishing liability under § 1983.
Rather, in order to establish a viable § 1983 claim against
a private corporate entity such as Corizon, it must be asserted
that said defendant had a policy, practice, or custom which caused
injury to the plaintiff. See Adonai-Adoni v. King, 2009 WL 890683 *
2 (E.D. Pa. March 31, 2009) (a private health care provider can
only be liable under § 1983 if claim rests upon some policy,
practice or custom); see also Riddick v. Modery, 250 Fed. Appx.
482, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2007).
In Natale v. Camden Cty. Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d
575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed a delayed treatment claim by a diabetic pre-trial
detainee who entered confinement with a medical directive stating
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that he must have insulin while incarcerated.
The Court of Appeals
stated liability could exist against an entity such as Corizon if
it “turned a blind eye to an obviously inadequate practice.”
Natale, 318 F. 3d at 584
The pro se Complaint includes a vague, speculative claim
that Plaintiff was denied previously prescribed treatment as the
result of
a Corizon policy, practice or custom.
custom, or practice is not described by Pittman.
The policy,
Moreover, the
Amended Complaint does not include any assertion of fact that could
support such a claim.
Second, the Amended Complaint concedes that Plaintiff has
been provided treatment for his condition which has included
periodic steroid injections, excision and draining of cysts, and
consultation with a dermatologist.
Unlike Natale there is no basis
for a claim that Corizon failed to create a policy to provide for
the necessary treatment required by Plaintiff.
Rather, this case
concerns a prisoner’s claim that there was failure to adequately
treat a condition but the Amended Complaint does not point to any
specific policy or practice that caused that failure.
See
Stankowski v. Farley, 487 F. Supp.2d 543, 554-555 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
As such, there is no discernible basis for liability against
Corizon.
It appears to this Court that Plaintiff’s dispute rests
with the individual medical professionals who were involved in his
treatment, and not wit hthe corporate entity for which they were
employed.
Accordingly, Corizon is entitled to entry of dismissal.
Carpenter v. Kloptoski, 2010 WL 891825 * 8 (M.D. Pa. March 10,
7
See
2010)(§ 1983 claim against PHS solely on the basis that it was
responsible for providing health care is subject to dismissal).
Pursuant to the above discussion, Defendant Corizon’s motion to
dismiss will be granted.
An appropriate Order will enter.2
S/Richard P. Conaboy ___
RICHARD P. CONABOY
United States District Judge
DATED: September 5, 2017
2. If Pittman can identify an actual Corizon policy, custom, or
practice he may file a motion for reconsideration within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Memorandum.
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