Brown v. Mace-Liebson et al

Filing 106

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry). Signed by Honorable Edwin M. Kosik on 9/29/2016. (emksec, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GREGORY BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
ELLEN MACE-LIEBSON, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL NO. 3:14-CV-623
(Judge Kosik)

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Gregory Brown (“Brown”) is currently confined at the Federal
Correctional Institute (“FCI”) at Hazelton, West Virginia. The matter proceeds on an
amended Bivens1 complaint filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and only one
Defendant, Ellen Mace-Liebson, remains following the filing of Defendants’ motion
to dismiss. (Docs. 69, 70.) Brown claims Defendant was deliberately indifferent to
his serious medical needs while housed at the FCI- Schuylkill, Pennsylvania.
Pending is Plaintiff’s renewed motion to compel discovery (Doc. 85). For the reasons

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens stands for the proposition that “a citizen
suffering a compensable injury to a constitutionally protected interest
could invoke the general federal-question jurisdiction of the district courts to obtain
an award of monetary damages against the responsible federal official.” Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978).
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that follow, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I.

Background
The defendants named in this matter were FCI-Schuylkill employees Ellen

Mace-Liebson, Clinical Director and Cynthia Entzel, Associate Warden. Brown
alleges that he was weight-lifting on July 2, 2013, when he experienced pain in his
lower left back and was unable to straighten his left leg. With the assistance of a
cane, he walked to Health Services where he complained of back pain, a burning
sensation in his left shin and problems with his knee. Brown sought medical
attention, but claims he was not examined and told to purchase medication at the
commissary. He states he had no money.
On July 8, 2013, Brown again reported to sick call with the same complaints
and difficulty walking. He reported to sick call the following day with the same
complaints, along with swelling and muscle spasms in his thigh area. (Doc. 15 at 3.)
On this occasion, a physician’s assistant (“PA”)thought Brown’s problem was “disk
related” and “affecting his nerves.” (Id.) Brown again returned to sick call on July
19, 2013, still complaining of lower left back pain and numbness/swelling in his left
shin area. He requested to be seen by Defendant Dr. Mace-Liebson and have an exam
scheduled. He did not wish to be seen by a PA. Rather, he requested to be placed on
the call-out list. (Id. at 4.)
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On July 23, 2013, Brown returned to sick call for the fifth time. He filled out a
form indicating he was triaged multiple times already, but was never given a
diagnosis. He requested that an evaluation be performed by Defendant MaceLiebson. On July 29, 2013, Brown hand-delivered an Inmate Request to Defendant
Entzel seeking intervention. Defendant Mace-Liebson responded thereto, and
informed Brown he had been triaged on three (3) occasions, and evaluated on a fourth
(4th) occasion, and that he had not completed his work-up or the expected course of
treatment. He was also informed that a further evaluation was not required at that
time, and that he was to complete the course of evaluation with his assigned provider.
(Id.)
Brown went to sick call again on July 30, 2013. On the sick call form, he listed
the same complaints, but also stated he had a swollen knee and extreme discomfort in
his left hip and thigh area. (Id. at 5.) Again, he requested to be seen by a physician.
A PA responded in writing stating that Brown had been referred for an x-ray and
diagnostic studies, and had been educated with respect to exam findings, including
diagnosis, prognosis, treatment and follow-up. He was also informed that he would
be seen by a PA at a future call-out. (Id. at 5.)
The first week of August, Brown approached Defendant Entzel asking if Entzel
was aware of Mace-Liebson’s response to his inmate request directed to Entzel.
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Brown told Entzel that Mace-Liebson was either misinformed or deliberately
misrepresenting the events. Brown also told Entzel that he had not yet been
evaluated, and only received clinical encounters. Brown admits that he was given an
x-ray on August 6, 2013.
On August 16, 2013, Brown submitted a request to Entzel documenting his
conversation with him on August 3, 2013. In particular, Brown said he approached
Entzel outside the Chow Hall, and asked Entzel if he made any inquiries on Brown’s
behalf regarding the continued refusal to schedule him for an examination by
Defendant Mace-Liebson for the problems he was enduring. According to Brown,
Entzel said he emailed Mace-Liebson and was looking into it, but that Mace-Liebson
was away. In light of the foregoing, Brown asked why was he scheduled to be seen
by a PA on August 16, 2013.
On August 16, 2013, Brown was scheduled to see his assigned primary care
provider - a PA. Brown informed the PA that he thought he had a herniated disk and
damage to his sciatica nerve, and therefore wanted to be seen by Mace-Liebson. The
PA said he would submit the request, but told Brown to purchase Capsaicin Cream
from the commissary. Another x-ray was performed at some later point. Brown
alleges he was scheduled to be seen by Mace-Liebson on September 3, 2013, but
Mace-Liebson was not at work that day. He was subsequently evaluated by Mace4

Liebson on September 16, 2013. He received chiropractic realignment and an order
allowing his mattress to be placed on the floor. (Id. at 7.)
Brown emailed an Inmate Request to Mace-Liebson on October 22, 2013,
restating his problems, seeking a cure and requesting an MRI. (Id.) He admits to
having chiropractic measures performed by Mace-Liebson on September 16, 2013,
and being told that over-the-counter medications might help the pain. On October 30,
2013, Mace-Liebson responded telling Brown to take the matter up with his provider
through sick call. Brown sent back a message stating that he thought Mace-Liebson,
as Clinical Director, was the appropriate person to treat him since he had a continuing
problem. (Doc. 15 at 8.) On November 7, 2013, Mace-Liebson sent Brown a
message stating that Brown’s sick call provider would refer him if necessary.
Approximately a week later, Brown went to sick call for the seventh time and
listed his problems. The PA, via institutional mail, told him he would be scheduled
for an appointment with him, and that his next appointment with Defendant MaceLiebson was in December. On November 21, 2013, Brown was evaluated by the PA
and prescribed prednisone. (Id.)
On December 23, 2013, Brown again sent Defendant Entzel an Inmate to Staff
Request seeking his intervention to have Defendant Mace-Liebson order him an MRI.
(Id. at 9.) The following day, Entzel responded telling Brown that an MRI would not
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be scheduled, since Brown failed to stop weightlifting and exercising as advised. On
this same date, Brown replied to Entzel that Defendant Mace-Liebson misinformed
him, that he had not gone against the advice he was given, and that the MRI was
needed. (Id. at 9.) Brown believed Mace-Liebson may had been retaliating against
him for filing grievances about his medical needs. He again requested that the matter
be investigated.2
On January 24, 2014, Brown again went to sick call and said he had been there
on at least seven (7) occasions since July 2, 2013, with the same complaints. He
complained of pain and suffering without medication and continuous attempts to have
Mace-Liebson schedule an MRI. According to Brown, the x-rays reveal damage to
his L-4 and L-5 lumbar region, and that he was suffering from sciatic nerve disorder.
Yet, despite seven (7) sick call visits and two (2) requests to Entzel, Defendants failed
to act to relieve his pain and suffering. (Id. at 10.) As such, he maintains that
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Brown seeks
compensatory, punitive and injunctive relief.
On March 15, 2016, the court construed a motion to dismiss and for summary
judgment as only a motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss was granted in part and
Although Brown mentions the word “retaliation,” he asserts no facts in
support of a retaliation claim and does not allege retaliation as a ground in
the amended complaint. As such, retaliation will not be addressed in this case.
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denied in part. (Docs. 69, 70.) The motion was granted with respect to Defendant
Entzel, and she was terminated from this action in that the court found that Entzel was
only operating in her supervisory capacity as the Associate Warden. The motion to
dismiss was denied with respect to the claims set forth against Defendant MaceLiebson and a discovery period of three (3) months was imposed.3 Any motion for
summary judgment was to be filed within thirty (30) days from the close of discovery.
On June 14, 2016, Plaintiff’s motion seeking reconsideration of the court’s
March 15, 2016 decision was denied. In addition, Plaintiff’s motion to enlarge the
discovery period was granted, and Defendant’s motion to enlarge the time until June
22, 2016 to respond to amended requests for the production of documents, was also
granted. (Doc. 78.) Discovery was enlarged until August 19, 2016, and any
dispositive motions were to be filed by September 19, 2016. (Id.) On June 27, 2016,
Defendant’s nunc pro tunc request to enlarge the time within which she had to
respond to Plaintiff’s amended requests for production of documents, was granted,
and Defendant was afforded until July 8, 2016 to respond to the requests. (Doc. 80.)
The following day, Plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time within which
On September 3, 2015, prior to the time Defendants filed the motion to
dismiss and motion for summary judgment, discovery in this action was stayed and
Plaintiff’s discovery motions were denied without prejudice to renewal of the motion
to compel, upon resolution of Defendants’ motion to dismiss and for summary
judgment. (Doc. 54.)
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to file a motion to compel discovery. (Doc. 81.) On July 7, 2016, Plaintiff filed a
motion for order compelling discovery (Doc. 82). In the motion, he sought responses
by Defendant to renewed written interrogatories submitted to Defendant on April 7,
2016. Prior to any supporting brief being filed by Plaintiff, the court issued an order
on July 8, 2016, denying Plaintiff’s motion for extension as moot, and denying his
motion to compel without prejudice. (Doc. 83.) The motion was denied without
prejudice in that Defendant had been granted an enlargement of time within which to
submit discovery responses, and Plaintiff was able to file a later motion to compel if
he had objections to the responses provided.
On July 21, 2016, the pending renewed motion to compel discovery was filed
by Plaintiff. (Doc. 85.) The motion is before the court for review and is ripe. Also,
since the filing of this motion, Defendant has been granted leave to depose Plaintiff.
(Doc. 93.) In addition, Plaintiff’s request for counsel has been denied (Doc. 96), and
discovery has been enlarged until October 18, 2016, with any dispositive motions due
to be filed by November 17, 2016.
II.

Motion to Compel Standard
It is well-settled that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 establishes a liberal

discovery policy. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).
Generally, courts afford considerable latitude in discovery in order to ensure that
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litigation proceeds with “the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before
trial.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). All relevant material is
discoverable unless an applicable evidentiary privilege is asserted. Pearson v. Miller,
211 F.3d 57, 65 (3d Cir. 2000).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 allows a party who has received evasive or
incomplete discovery responses to seek a court order compelling additional disclosure
or discovery. “The party seeking the order to compel must demonstrate the relevance
of the information sought. The burden then shifts to the opposing party, who must
demonstrate in specific terms why a discovery request does not fall within the broad
scope of discovery or is otherwise privileged or improper.” Option One Mortgage
Corp. v. Fitzgerald, No. 3:07-CV-1877, 2009 WL 648986 at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11,
2009).
III.

Discussion
In his renewed motion to compel, Plaintiff seeks the answers to a “renewed” set

of written interrogatories sent to Defendant Mace-Liebson after the court’s ruling on
the motion to dismiss, as well as the answers to a request for the production of
documents that was served on and answered by Defendant, then later modified by
Plaintiff. (Doc. 88, Pl.’s Sup. Br., at 2.) Plaintiff states that the request for
production of documents was sent on or about March 28, 2016, and that the renewed
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set of interrogatories were sent on or about April 7, 2016. (Id.) Plaintiff attaches to
his brief a copy of his first request for the production of documents and both his first
and second sets of interrogatory questions. He also attaches Defendant’s responses to
his first set of interrogatory questions and his first request for the production of
documents. Also included is Defendant’s letter stating that the answers will not be
provided to the second set of interrogatory questions in that answers are being
submitted to the first 25 questions propounded to Defendant. (Doc. 88-1at 1-49.)
Plaintiff also attaches a letter he wrote to defense counsel on May 2, 2016,
acknowledging Defendant’s refusal to answer the renewed interrogatory questions,
and claiming that Defendant’s position is contrary to the court’s order denying
without prejudice Plaintiff’s original motions for discovery. (Id. at 35.) Plaintiff
claims that Defendant must respond to his new interrogatory question. He also argues
that he cannot obtain the medical records that he seeks in his Request for the
Production of Documents in that he cannot access his records. Health Services,
according to Plaintiff, will not allow it. (Id.) Following this letter, Plaintiff sent
modifications to his Request for the Production of Documents to defense counsel on
May 5, 2016. (Id. at 37-39.) Plaintiff has attached Defendant’s response thereto. (Id.
at 40-49.)

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A.

Interrogatories

Prior to the court’s issuance of the Memorandum and Order addressing
Defendants’ motion to dismiss and for summary judgment as only a motion to
dismiss, and issuing a time frame within which to complete discovery, (Docs. 69, 70),
the Magistrate Judge issued a memorandum opinion on September 3, 2015, staying
discovery. Plaintiff’s motion to compel was denied without prejudice to Plaintiff’s
refiling of his motion following a decision on the potentially dispositive motion and if
discovery thereafter ensued and Defendant(s) failed to respond thereto. (Doc. 54.)
As such, the interrogatories originally submitted to Defendants were not required to
be answered at that time, and Plaintiff’s motion to compel was denied without
prejudice.
Presently before the court is Plaintiff’s argument that a second set of 25
questions he propounded on Defendant Mace-Liebson following the court’s ruling on
the motion to dismiss should take the place of the first set of interrogatories sent prior
to the ruling. According to Plaintiff, the second set of questions are his “renewed”
discovery. However, Defendant Mace-Liebson has answered the first set of questions
and refuses to answer the second set, claiming that Plaintiff has exceeded the
permissible number of interrogatory questions and is not allowed to do so without
having sought leave.
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In reviewing the docket, the following is clear. Plaintiff did initially submit
interrogatory questions in this matter. (Doc. 39.) Defendants responsibility to answer
these questions was stayed/deferred until the potentially dispositive motion was
decided by the court. After the motion was ruled on as a motion to dismiss, and
Defendant Entzel was dismissed from this action, Defendant Mace-Liebson provided
responses to the interrogatory questions initially served by Plaintiff. Although, in the
meantime, Plaintiff had served Defendant Mace-Liebson with a second set of
questions, more elaborate than the first set. Plaintiff renewed the initial motion to
compel, which sought responses to the first set of questions. (Doc. 85.) The second
set of questions submitted were not the “renewed” first set. For the most part, they
were completely different and much more elaborate. Moreover, Plaintiff never
initially sought to compel responses to the second set of questions, and more
importantly, never sought leave to submit the second set. Defendant Mace-Liebson
has answered the first set. Plaintiff does not get the benefit of submitting a second set
of questions. Moreover, Plaintiff’s proclamation that he does not intend to use any of
the responses provided by Defendant to the first set of questions is without
consequence. (Id. at 35.) He already received and reviewed the answers.
In reviewing the responses given by Defendant to Plaintiff’s interrogatory
questions, they have all been properly responded or objected thereto, and the court
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will not direct any further answers by Defendant. (Doc. 88-1 at 21-31.) For example,
some questions are completely answered by Defendant, and therefore require no
further response. Further, although some questions are objected to, Defendant goes
on to provide the answer anyway. Other questions, such as the name of Defendant’s
spouse and information pertaining to Defendant’s employment prior to the Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) is irrelevant to the instant action. Plaintiff has provided no
explanation how this information is relevant to his claims and why it is needed.
Further, although Plaintiff delves into the subject of any complaints filed against
Defendant while employed with the BOP by inmates, and Defendant objects on the
basis of relevancy, Defendant does inform Plaintiff that any complaints filed were
found to be frivolous. (Id. at 25.) Some of the questions posed by Plaintiff require no
answer, as Defendant informs Plaintiff. Moreover, any request by Plaintiff for
specific financial information from Defendant at this time is not only private, but
premature. While Plaintiff may be seeking monetary damages from Plaintiff, there is
no indication at this juncture that he will ultimately be successful and obtain a
judgment against Defendant Mace-Liebson.
B.

Request for Production of Documents

Plaintiff submitted a Request for the Production of Documents on Defendant
on or about March 28, 2016. (Doc. 88-1 at 1-3.) The filing contained twelve (12)
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separate requests by Plaintiff. Defendant responded thereto on or about April 27,
2016. (Id. at 4-10.) Defendant states that although she objected to some of the
requests, she attempted to provide the information to Plaintiff in the spirit of
cooperation, but did so with the understanding that all objections were maintained.
(Id. at 4.) After providing responses, Plaintiff modified his Requests, and Defendant
responded to the modifications. (Id. at 37-49.) The court will review the
requests/modifications and the responses thereto.
Request 1 originally asked for any and all electronically stored emails
created by any FCI-Schuylkill staff or any other employee or officials in response to
any grievance and/or inmate request, filed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s original request
included, as an example, Joe Rush, A.W. Entzel, Defendant Mace-Liebson, etc.
Defendant objected to the original request as overly broad in scope and time, and tells
Plaintiff to be specific in that Plaintiff has filed over 117 grievances since June 2,
2013, and not all of them concerned his instant claims. In modifying this request,
Plaintiff seeks emails between Joe Rush and Defendant Mace-Liebson during the
time period from July 8, 2013 through August 25, 2014, as they pertain to Plaintiff,
and emails between A.W. Entzel and Mace-Liebson during July 2013 through
September 2013, and December 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013, as they pertain
to Plaintiff. In response thereto, Defendant attaches an electronic copy submitted by
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Plaintiff to Entzel, as well as Mace-Liebson’s response. Defendant also attaches an
email dated January 14, 2014, from Mace-Liebson. Defendant informs Plaintiff that
no other documents that are currently available are responsive, and that to the extent
additional materials are discovered, Defendant will supplement her response. (Doc.
88-1 at 41.) This response is satisfactory. While Plaintiff questions what “currently
available” means and believes that other responsive emails exist, Defendant states
that they do not, and is under the ongoing responsibility to update her response if she
can access any responsive documents.
The court finds that Defendant has adequately responded to Requests 2, 6, 7, 8.
Defendant has either provided the responsive documents or stated that no responsive
documents exist.
With respect to the medical documents originally requested by Plaintiff,
Defendant initially objected to said requests, stating that Plaintiff was able to obtain
these documents himself from Health Services. Plaintiff claims that he is unable to
review this information on the computer in Health Services, and that it would take in
excess of 30 days to obtain his records. However, Defendant has since agreed to
provide Plaintiff with a copy of his medical record when it becomes available to

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agency counsel.4 As such, the answers to Requests 3 and 9 are satisfactory.
The court will next address Requests 4 and 5. In Request 4, Plaintiff originally
asked for any and all logs and documentation illustrating the calendar days when
Mace-Liebson was either out sick, on vacation, training or assigned to work at
another BOP facility other than FCI-Schuylkill, from July 2, 2013 through August 31,
2014. Defendant objected to this requests as overly broad and irrelevant because it
did not reflect the time period at issue in the complaint. The request was also
objected to in that it sought private information. In Request 5, Plaintiff sought any
and all previously submitted declarations/affidavits of Mace-Liebson, while an
employee of the BOP. This request was also objected to as being overly broad and
irrelevant. Defendant also stated that any declaration she gave would have been filed
in a separate lawsuit, and therefore was irrelevant to the instant claims.
In modifying Request 4, Plaintiff stated that the objection by Defendant to this

Since Defendant made this statement in July of 2016, the court assumes that
Plaintiff has now been provided with a copy of his medical record. While Plaintiff
contends in his reply brief that certain sick call requests are “missing,” it is assumed
by the court that the entire medical record, as it existed, was given to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff also alleges in his reply brief that some of his medical records have been
altered. He does not claim that Defendant did the “altering.” The court has no
evidence before it that the records were altered, and Plaintiff admits that if, in fact,
they were altered, it was by someone at FCI-Hazelton who is not a party to the instant
lawsuit. Most importantly, there is no evidence offered by Plaintiff that the
documents have actually been altered.
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request was unreasonable, since the daily assignment roster shows whether or not
Defendant was working at the institution. Plaintiff states he is not seeking
Defendant’s whereabouts, and only wants to know the dates when Defendant was not
in the institution. The requested time frame in the modified request is July 2, 2013
through July 25, 2014.
Defendant again objects to this request on the basis that no logs exist to
provide Plaintiff with the information he seeks. Only Defendant’s personnel file
would contain Defendant’s work schedule, and Defendant objects to releasing her
personnel file in that it contains sensitive information. Further, Defendant states that
the medical record she has agreed to produce would evidence all the dates when
Defendant or any other staff member treated Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff only seeks
this information to see whether Defendant was unavailable on certain dates to see him
as he was told by other staff members. Based on the forgoing, even with sensitive
information redacted, Defendant maintains that her personnel file is minimally
relevant, since the medical record documents when Plaintiff received medical
attention and by whom.
The court agrees that Plaintiff is clearly not entitled to Defendant’s personnel
file. This document contains sensitive information to which Plaintiff is not entitled
and which has no relevance. However, with that said, the court does think that it is
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relevant when Defendant was at the prison during the relevant time period. This, of
course, does not necessarily mean that Defendant should have seen Plaintiff, but it is
discoverable information. It really is not relevant where Defendant was on the days
she was not there. As such, if a separate roster does not exist that identifies when
Defendant was at the prison on the relevant days, then Defendant shall advise the
Plaintiff on what days during the relevant time period, she was present at FCISchuylkill. While Defendant thinks that it is irrelevant whether she was there or not,
as long as another member of the medical staff saw Plaintiff, this is not for Defendant
to decide. As such, Defendant shall respond to this request within fifteen (15) days.
In the modified requests, Plaintiff argues that Request 5 is permissible under
the discovery rules in that they permit matters that may not be admissible, but is
relevant, concerning issues of judgment and credibility. Defendant maintains her
objection to this request as overly broad and irrelevant to the claims in the instant
lawsuit, and states that Plaintiff fails to say why any declaration or affidavit not about
the instant subject matter is relevant. The court agrees, and Defendant will not be
directed to respond to this request.
In the original Request for the Production of Documents, Plaintiff had Request
10-12. He does not appear to modify these requests in that the modified requests
stop at Request 9. In Request 10, Plaintiff seeks any and all grievances, complaints or
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other documents received by prison staff concerning deliberate indifference,
negligence, mistreatment (verbal complaints) of inmates by Defendant Mace-Liebson,
and any memorandum, investigative files, or other documents created in response to
such complaints since January 1, 2005. Defendant objects to this request as
irrelevant, particularly in light of the numerous claims filed by inmates against
medical providers. Defendant also states that to the extent any records of such are
kept, she is without access, and that providing investigations into unconnected
incidents would jeopardize security and investigative procedures of the BOP.
Related to this request is Request 11, wherein Plaintiff seeks any and all
documentations filed by FCI-Schuylkill inmates from January 1, 2011, to the date of
Defendant’s response concerning the Heath Services Department. The same
objection is raised by Defendant.
With respect to the above requests, it is clear that for the most part, the
information sought by Plaintiff is irrelevant to the claims in this case. Plaintiff seeks
grievances and complaints filed by inmates against Defendant since January of 2005
in Request 10 - - this is clearly overbroad and irrelevant. Merely because an inmate
files a complaint or a grievance does not mean that Defendant committed the charged
conduct. What is relevant are any complaints or grievances filed by inmates alleging
the denial of medical care against Defendant during the relevant time period that
resulted in her discipline. If there are any such filings, Defendant should so advise
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Plaintiff as to the underlying charge and the discipline Defendant received. It would
appear, based upon Defendant’s response to a similar question asked in the
interrogatories, that any complaints filed by inmates against Defendant were found to
be frivolous. However, to the extent any documents responsive to this request exists,
as discussed by the court, Defendant shall produce them to Plaintiff within fifteen
(15) days.
With respect to Request 11, complaints and grievances filed by any inmate
against the Health Department are not relevant to the instant claims. What is relevant
is covered in Request 10, pertaining to the only remaining Defendant in this action
and to which the court has already spoken to.
In Request 12, Plaintiff seeks any and all documents, including but not limited
to, the delay and denial or misapplication of medical care procedures and policies
created by any FCI-Schuylkill employee from July 2013 to date of response.
Defendant objects to this request as irrelevant. Defendant cites the numerous medical
complaints filed by inmates, how most are found to be without merit, and how
Defendant does not have access to any such records. Clearly this request is overly
broad and all-encompassing. Defendant will not be required to respond to this
request in that it is mostly irrelevant and Defendant has stated that she does not have
access to any such records in any event.
An appropriate order follows.
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