Brown v. Mace-Liebson et al

Filing 54

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - Having stayed discovery for these reasons, we will DENY the plaintiffs discovery motions, (Docs. 39 and 44 .), without prejudice to renewal of the motion upon resolution of the pending motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment, and will GRANT the defendants motion to stay. (Doc. 42 .). Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on September 3, 2015. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GREGORY BROWN,
Plaintiff
v.
ELLEN MACE-LIEBSON, et al.,
Defendants

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Civil No. 3:14-CV-623
(Judge Kosik)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.

Statement of Facts and of the Case

The pro se plaintiff is a federal prisoner who has sued correctional staff
alleging a variety of Bivens claims. There is a potentially dispositive motion pending
in this case, a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment, (Doc.
29.), which could substantially effect the scope of this action. Notwithstanding this
motion, the plaintiff has filed several motions seeking discovery. (Docs. 39 and 44.)
These motions, in turn, inspired the defendants to file a motion for protective order,
seeking a stay of discovery until after this motion is resolved. (Doc.42.)
Presented with this constellation of pleadings, for the reasons set forth below,
the plaintiff’s motions for discovery (Docs. 39 and 44.) are DENIED and the
defendants’ motion to stay (Doc. 42.), is GRANTED.

II.

Discussion

Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant discovery
dispute. Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
“committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” DiGregorio v. First
Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the
scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the
Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus,
a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to compel
disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse
of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983).
This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on
discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
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judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and
Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. For example,
this broad discretion over discovery matters extends to decisions under Rule 26
relating to the issuance of protective orders limiting and regulating the timing of
discovery. Indeed, it is undisputed that: “ ‘[t]he grant and nature of [a protective
order] is singularly within the discretion of the district court and may be reversed only
on a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’ Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d
Cir.1973) (citation omitted).” Dove v. Atlantic Capital Corp., 963 F.2d 15, 19 (2d
Cir. 1992). One of these cardinal principles, governing the exercise of discretion in
this field, is that the district court may properly defer or delay discovery while it
considers a potentially dispositive pretrial motion, provided the district court
concludes that the pretrial motion does not, on its face, appear groundless. See, e.g.,
James v. York County Police Dep’t, 160 F.App’x 126, 136 (3d Cir. 2005); Nolan v.

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U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 973 F.2d 843,849 (10th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. New York Univ.
Sch. of Ed., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Briefly deferring discovery in such a case, while the court determines the
threshold issue of whether a complaint has sufficient merit to go forward, recognizes
a simple, fundamental truth: Parties who file motions which may present potentially
meritorious and complete legal defenses to civil actions should not be put to the time,
expense and burden of factual discovery until after these claimed legal defenses are
addressed by the court. In such instances, it is clearly established that:
“[A] stay of discovery is appropriate pending resolution of a potentially
dispositive motion where the motion ‘appear[s] to have substantial
grounds' or, stated another way, ‘do[es] not appear to be without
foundation in law.’ ” In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust
Litigation, 2002 WL 88278, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (quoting
Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp., 137 F.R.D. 209, 209-10
(S.D.N.Y.1991)) ( citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 203
F.R.D. 92, 2001 WL 396422, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2001); AntiMonopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1996 WL 101277, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
March 7, 1996)).
Johnson v. New York Univ. School of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Guided by these legal tenets we have concluded that discovery should be
stayed at this time. We note that the defendants have filed a potentially dispositive
motion in this case. The merits of these claims are currently being addressed by the
court, ensuring a very prompt resolution of this motion. In this setting, we have

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concluded, consistent with settled case law, that: “[A] stay of discovery is appropriate
pending resolution of a potentially dispositive motion where the motion ‘appear[s]
to have substantial grounds' or, stated another way, ‘do[es] not appear to be without
foundation in law.’ ” Johnson v. New York Univ. School of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433,
434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). We continue to adhere to this view that discovery should be
stayed in this case until this potentially dispositive motion is resolved.
III.

Order

Having stayed discovery for these reasons, we will DENY the plaintiff’s
discovery motions, (Docs. 39 and 44.), without prejudice to renewal of the motion
upon resolution of the pending motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary
judgment, and will GRANT the defendants’ motion to stay. (Doc. 42.).
So ordered this 3d day of September 2015.

S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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