Linko v. MDA Capital, Inc. et al

Filing 26

OPINION AND ORDER - 1. The above-captioned action is DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TOPROSECUTE. 2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the case.Signed by Honorable Robert D. Mariani on 6/17/15. (jfg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALLISON LlNKO,

Plaintiff,

v.

3:14·CV·01331
(JUDGE MARIANI)

MDA CAPITAL, INC.
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
The background of this Order is as follows. On July 10, 2014, the abovecaptioned action came before this Court upon removal from the Court of Common
Pleas of Lackawanna County. (See Notice of Removal, Doc. 1.) The Defendant filed
a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim on July 17. (See Mot. to Dismiss,
Doc. 5.) During the Case Management Conference, the Plaintiff requested Oral
Argument on Defendant's pending Motion to Dismiss, which was ultimately
scheduled for February 26,2015. (See Order, Jan. 26, 2015, Doc. 17.) However, on
the morning of February 26, the Plaintiff withdrew her request for Oral Argument due
to a perceived likelihood of impending snow. (See PI.'s Mot. to Withdraw Request for
Oral Argument, Doc. 19, at ~ 4.) The Court granted the Motion to Withdraw the
Request for Oral Argument and stated that Defendant's pending Motion to Dismiss
would be decided on the briefs alone. (See Order, Feb. 26, 2015, Doc. 20.)

Upon review of the written briefs, the Court granted Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint for Failure to State a Claim on March 6, 2015. (See
Mem. Op., Doc. 22, at 8.) Plaintiff was given fourteen days-or until March 20,
2015-to file an amended complaint. (See Order, Mar. 6, 2015, Doc. 23, at 1f 3.) But
Plaintiff never submitted an amended complaint, which prompted this Court, on April
9, 2015, to issue another Order giving Plaintiff an additional fourteen days-or until
April 23, 2015-to show cause why her action should not be dismissed for failure to
prosecute. (See Order, Apr. 9, 2015, Doc. 24.)
Yet again, Plaintiff never responded to the Court's Show Cause Order.
Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution, the Court gave her one final
opportunity, on May 1, 2015, to show cause why her case should not be dismissed
for failure to prosecute. (See Order, May 1,2015, Doc. 25, at 1.) Plaintiff was further
put on notice that afailure to respond to this 'final order within seven days-or until
May 8, 2015-would result in the dismissal of her cause of action. (See id. at 2.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (b) allows for the dismissal of an action for
failure to prosecute. Unless stated otherwise, "a dismissal under this subdivision ...
operates as an adjudication on the merits." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
District Courts in the Third Circuit are required to balance six factors in
determining whether to grant such a dismissal with prejudice. These factors are:
(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to
the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and

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respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether
conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5)
effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails
analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of
claim or defense.

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Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863,868 (3d Cir. 1984).
Notwithstanding the fact "that dismissals with prejudice ... are drastic
sanctions," id. at 867, the Court finds that each of the six Poulis factors warrants
dismissal here. Nor is this conclusion altered by the fact that this Court has no way of
knowing to what extent the failures to respond to Court Orders are attributable to Ms.
Linko herself or to her retained attorney. Even if we assume that the misconduct is
entirely the fault of Linko's attorney, the Supreme Court has previously noted that
"there is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of [a party's] claim
because of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the
client." Link v. Wabash RR Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 1390,8 L. Ed.
2d 734 (1962). That is because Ms. Linko "voluntarily chose this attorney as [her]
representative in the action, and [she] cannot now avoid the consequences of the
acts or omissions of this freely selected agent." Id. at 633-34, 82 S. Ct. at 1390.
When we accept these principles, it becomes clear that Plaintiff is entirely
responsible for failing to respond to Court orders, which warrants dismissal under the
first Poulis factor. She or her attorney disregarded every Court Order filed since
March 2015: i.e., the March 6,2015 Order giving her fourteen days to file an

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amended complaint, as well as the April 9 and May 1Show Cause Orders. Plaintiffs
failure to comply with these multiple orders is clearly prejudicial to the adversary

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given that the Motion to Dismiss was decided in March and that the case has been
unable to advance since then due to Plaintiffs nonresponsiveness. Therefore, Poulis
factor (2) is satisfied as well.
Indeed, time limits imposed by the Court serve the important purpose of

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expediting the process of litigation. If compliance is not feasible, a timely request for
an extension should be made to the court. By ignoring the Court-imposed time limits,
Plaintiffs actions constitute a history of dilatoriness, which satisfies Poulis factor (3).
Furthermore, the Court can only conclude that this conduct was "willful," in that the
Plaintiff was given multiple opportunities to take action, yet failed to do so for an
extended period of time. Thus, Poulis factor (4) is clearly satisfied.
The Court also concludes that sanctions other than dismissal would not be
effective. For a period of over two months, Plaintiff was given every opportunity to
amend her complaint to avoid dismissal. She has nonetheless ignored every Court
Order directing her to amend her complaint or to show cause. Thus, Poulis factor (5)
is also satisfied.
This leaves the last factor to be addressed, the meritoriousness of Plaintiffs
claim. The Court dismissed the Plaintiffs original complaint with leave to amend to
"raise her right to relief above the speculative level" and instructed her to "allege

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facts that demonstrate how she in particular is entitled to relief, instead of relying on
the vague and opaque generalities, legal conclusions, and speculations that her
current Complaint puts forward." (See Doc. 22 at 8.) The Plaintiff cannot now assert
that her claim is meritorious when the only Complaint this Court has ever read was
so utterly deficient under Rule 12(b)(6) that it was dismissed for consisting only of
speculation and misguided legal conclusions unsupported by any facts.
In balancing the six Poulis factors, it is clear that all factors weigh heavily in
favor of the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. The Court, therefore, is
left with no choice but to dismiss it pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (b).
AND NOW, THIS 18TH DAY OF JUNE, 2015, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
THAT:

1. The above-captioned action is DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO

PROSECUTE.

2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the case.

Robert D. Mariani
United States District Judge

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