DeVaugh v. United States Department of Justice et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)The Department of Justice is not a properly named Defendant. Second, DeVaughs present allegations clearly challenge the validity of the duration of his ongoing confinement and as such are more app ropriate for federal habeas corpus review and not properly asserted in a civil rights action. See Thibodeau v. Watts, 2006 WL 89213 *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2006). Third, Plaintiffs requests for compensatory and punitive damages are premature under He ck. Since Plaintiffs civil rights complaint is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory," it will be dismissed, without prejudice, as legally frivolous. Wilson, 878 F.2d at 774. Plaintiff, if he so chooses, may reassert his present claims in a properly filed § 2241 action. An appropriate Order will enter.Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 10/20/14. (cc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RICHARD DEVAUGH,1

:
:
Plaintiff
:
CIVIL NO. 3:CV-14-1833
:
v.
:
:
(Judge Conaboy)
:
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ET AL.,
:
:
Defendants
:
___________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM
Background
Richard DeVaugh, an inmate presently confined at the Canaan
United States Penitentiary, Waymart, Pennsylvania (USP-Canaan),
initiated this pro se civil rights action “pursuant 42 U.S.C. §
1983 Bivens.”2

Doc. 1, p. 1.

Plaintiff has also filed a request

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

See Doc. 6.

Named as Defendants are the United States Department of
Justice and the following USP-Canaan officials: Case Manager
Pikulski; Unit Manager Gubbiotti; Records Office Supervisor

1

The Plaintiff’s name is at times listed as being DeVaughn.

2

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens stands for the proposition
that "a citizen suffering a compensable injury to a
constitutionally protected interest could invoke the general
federal question jurisdiction of the district court to obtain an
award of monetary damages against the responsible federal
official." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978).
1

Trently; and Records Office Assistant/Case Manager Coordinator
Hugar.

According to the Complaint and accompanying exhibits, on

October 22, 2013, Plaintiff informed Case Manager Pikulski that the
Defendant needed to contact the United States Parole Commission
(Parole Commission) regarding a parole warrant/detainer before
Plaintiff’s new criminal sentence expired.
During a January 22, 2014 meeting, Devaugh allegedly asked
Pikulski about the parole warrant and was informed that the
Defendant was going to “put a package together” and send it to the
Parole Commission.

See

Doc. 1, p. 2.

In early March, 2014,

Plaintiff again purportedly spoke with Pikulski and the Defendant
told the inmate to meet with him with the following week so that a
parole package could be prepared and sent to the Parole Commission.
Devaugh asserts that he showed Pikulski a “detainer action letter’
that he received on March 3, 2013 and which “explained that the
Parole Commission should be notified sixty days prior to the
expired date of the new sentence.” Id.

According to the Complaint,

the parties had a disagreement as to what action needed to be
taken.
The Complaint next asserts that Plaintiff sent a copy of the
aforementioned detainer letter to Inmate Systems Manager Trently
during March, 2014 and was informed by that Defendant that he would
be scheduled to be seen by Parole Commission.

The Plaintiff also

contends that he subsequently discussed the matter with Defendants
Hugar and Pikulski and was told that the prison’s records office
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had the responsibility of sending the required letter to the Parole
Commission.

Despite all those efforts, Plaintiff maintians that

“the detainer action letter was never processed.”

Id. at pp.2-3.

DeVaugh states that two months after his new sentence expired
on April 30, 2014, he refused to sign a parole application because
the time for the parole violation charge was up.

He concludes that

due to the actions and non-action of the USP-Canaan Defendants his
continued detention is unlawful and excessive.

The Complaint seeks

punitive and compensatory damages as well as injunctive relief.
Discussion
When considering a complaint accompanied by a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis, a district court may rule that process
should not issue if the complaint is malicious, presents an
indisputably meritless legal theory, or is predicated on clearly
baseless factual contentions.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

327-28 (1989), Douris v. Middleton Township, 293 Fed. Appx. 130,
132 (3d Cir. 2008).

Indisputably meritless legal theories are

those "in which either it is readily apparent that the plaintiff's
complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or that the defendants are
clearly entitled to immunity from suit ... ."

Roman v. Jeffes, 904

F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Sultenfuss v. Snow, 894 F.2d
1277, 1278 (11th Cir. 1990)).
Department of Justice
One of the Defendants named in the Complaint is the United
States Department of Justice.

It is well settled that the United
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States and other governmental entities are not persons and
therefore not proper defendants in a federal civil rights action.
Accardi v. United States, 435 F. 2d 1239, 1241 (3d Cir. 1970); see
also Hindes v. F.D.I.C., 137 F.3d 148, 159 (3d Cir. 1998);
Figueroa-Garay v. Muncipality of Rio Grande, 364 F. Supp.2d 117,
128 (D. P. R.

2005).

In Hindes, supra, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that a federal agency is not a “person” subject to § 1983
liability, whether or not it is in an alleged conspiracy with state
actors.

Hindes, 137 F.3d at 158.

Similarly, in Shannon v. U.S.

Parole Commission, 1998 WL 557584 *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 1998), the
district court stated that “Bivens claims may not be maintained
against federal agencies.”

See also Duarte v. Bureau of Prisons,

1995 WL 708427 *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 3, 1995)(the BOP “is not a proper
defendant in a Bivens action.”).

Based on an application of the

above standards, the Department of Justice is not properly named
defendant and therefore entitled to entry of dismissal.
Habeas Corpus
Inmates may not use civil rights actions to challenge the fact
or duration of their confinement or to seek earlier or speedier
release.

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1975).

The United

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has similarly
recognized that civil rights claims seeking release from
confinement sounded in habeas corpus.

See Georgevich v. Strauss,

772 F.2d 1078, 1086 (3d Cir. 1985). Habeas corpus review under 28
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U.S.C. § 2241 “allows a federal prisoner to challenge the
‘execution’ of his sentence.”

Woodall v. Federal Bureau of

Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005).

Review is available

“where the deprivation of rights is such that it necessarily
impacts the fact or length of detention.”

Leamer v. Fauver, 288

F.3d 532, 540 (3d Cir. 2002).
The United States Supreme Court in Edwards v. Balisok, 520
U.S. 641, 646 (1997), similarly concluded that a civil rights claim
for declaratory relief “based on allegations ... that necessarily
imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, is not cognizable”
in a civil rights action.

Id. at 646.

Based on the reasoning

announced in Georgevich and Edwards, Plaintiff’s present claim of
illegal, excessive confinement is not properly raised in a civil
rights complaint.

Accordingly, it will be dismissed without

prejudice to any right DeVaugh may have to pursue said challenge
via a federal habeas corpus petition.
Heck
Finally, in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme
Court ruled that a constitutional cause of action for damages does
not accrue "for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whole
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid," until
the plaintiff proves that the "conviction or sentence has been
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
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or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus."

Id. at 486-87.

As previously noted, DeVaugh seeks an award of compensatory
and punitive damages based on his contention that the actions and
non-actions of the Defendants have subjected him to an excessive,
unlawful incarceration since April 30, 2014.

Based on the nature

of Plaintiff’s allegations, a finding in his favor would imply the
invalidity of that portion of his ongoing federal confinement.
There is no indication that DeVaugh has successfully challenged
either the issuance of the underlying federal parole detainer or
the length of his ongoing incarceration.
Pursuant to Heck, DeVaugh’s action to the extent that it seeks
an award of monetary damages on the basis of illegal confinement is
premature because he cannot maintain a cause of action for an
unlawful conviction or an excessive imprisonment until the basis
for the conviction and imprisonment is overturned.
Conclusion
The Department of Justice is not a properly named Defendant.
Second, DeVaugh’s present allegations clearly challenge the
validity of the duration of his ongoing confinement and as such are
more appropriate for federal habeas corpus review and not properly
asserted in a civil rights action.

See Thibodeau v. Watts, 2006 WL

89213 *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2006).

Third, Plaintiff’s requests for

compensatory and punitive damages are premature under Heck.
Since Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint is "based on an
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indisputably meritless legal theory," it will be dismissed, without
prejudice, as legally frivolous.

Wilson, 878 F.2d at 774.

Plaintiff, if he so chooses, may reassert his present claims in a
properly filed § 2241 action.

An appropriate Order will enter.

S/Richard P. Conaboy
RICHARD P. CONABOY
United States District Judge
DATED: OCTOBER 20, 2014

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