Hockenberry v. Harry

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM Thus, this Court finds that its Memorandum of October 21,2014 is not troubled by manifest errors of law or fact and Petitioner has not presented anything new, which if previously presented, might have affected this Court's decision. Consequently, the motion for reconsideration will be denied. A separate Order follows.Signed by Honorable Robert D. Mariani on 11/5/14. (jfg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PATRICK J. HOCKENBERRY,

Petitioner,
Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-1881

v.
(Judge Mariani)
LAUREL HARRY, et a/.,
Respondents.

MEMORANDUM
On September 15, 2014, Petitioner, Patrick Hockenberry, an inmate currently
confined at the State Correctional Institute at Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, filed a pro se petition
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). He challenges ongoing
state criminal proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County,
Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). On October 21, 2014, the habeas petition was dismissed. (Docs.
2, 3). On October 23, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 4).
For the following reasons, the motion will be denied.

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A motion for reconsideration is a device of limited utility," Bartel/i v. Fedak, 2006

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29697, *4 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (Kosik, J.). It may be used only to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered precedent or evidence.

Harasco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171
(1986); Sibio v. Borough of Dunmore, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35380, *4 (M.D. Pa. 2007)

(Caputo, J.). A motion for reconsideration may also be appropriate in instances where the

court has misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues
presented to the court, or has made an error not of reasoning, but of apprehension. See
Rohrbach v. AT&T Nassau Metals Corp., 902 F. Supp. 523, 527 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (Vanaskie,
J.), vacated in part on other grounds on reconsideration, 915 F. Supp. 712 (M.D. Pa. 1996).
"Federal district courts should grant such motions sparingly because of their strong interest
in finality of judgment." Bartelli, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *4, citing Continental Casualty Co.
v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F. Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995). "In order to prevail, a
party seeking reconsideration must demonstrate one of the following: (1) an intervening
change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available
previously; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest
injustice." Rinaldi v. Sniezek, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46547, *2 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (Rambo, J.)
(citing Max's Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)).
A motion for reconsideration is not to be used as a vehicle for the losing party to
rehash arguments already disposed of or as an attempt to relitigate a point of disagreement
between the court and the litigant. See Turner v. Apker, 133 Fed. Appx. 849, 850 (3d Cir.
2005); Sibio, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 35383. "Such motions are therefore not appropriate
if the movant intends only that the court hear new arguments or supporting facts."
Dougherty v. Farmers New Century Insurance Company, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26058, *6
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(M.D. Pa. 2007) (Nealon, J.) (citing Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241,1243 (10th

Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 828 (1992)).

II.

DISCUSSION

A review of this Court's October 21,2014 Memorandum dismissing the habeas
petition reveals that the following was concluded:
Abstention "is ajudicially created doctrine under which afederal court
will decline to exercise its jurisdiction so that a state court or state agency will
have the opportunity to decide the matters at issue." Heritage Farms, Inc. v.
Solebury Twp., 671 F.2d 743, 746 (3d Cir. 1982). In Younger v. Harris, the
United States Supreme Court "established a principle of abstention when
federal adjudication would disrupt an ongoing state criminal proceeding." Yi
Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199,202 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing Younger,401 U.S.
37 (1971)). Younger abstention "is premised on the notion of comity, a
principle of deference and 'proper respect' for state governmental functions in
our federal system." Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County,
Pa., ~59 F.2d 1227, 1234 (3d Cir. 1992). Comity concerns are especially
heightened when the ongoing state governmental function is a criminal
proceeding. Id. The specific elements that warrant abstention are that "(1)
there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state
proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings
afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims." Schall v. Joyce, 885
F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989).
Exceptions to the Younger doctrine exist where irreparable injury is
"both great and immediate," where the state law is "flagrantly and patently
violative of express constitutional prohibitions," or where there is a showing of
"bad faith, harassment, or ... other unusual circumstance that would call for
equitable relief." Younger, 401 U.S. at 46,53-54. The exceptions are to be
narrowly construed. Hall v. Pennsylvania, 2012 WL 5987142, *2 (M.D. Pa.
2012) (citing Loftus v. Township of Lawrence Park, 764 F. Supp. 354, 357
(W.O. Pa. 1991)).
Additionally, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that Younger
abstention is warranted when a criminal defendant is pursuing post-conviction
relief. Peay v. Massiah-Jackson, 133 Fed. Appx. 31 (3d Cir. 2005). The
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Court in Peay stated, "[t]o the extent that D[Appellant] sought an injunction to
force the PCRA courts to allow him to proceed pro se or to bar a pending
state criminal proceeding, Younger and its progeny barred such relief. Peay,
133 Fed. Appx. at *32-33. See also Ridge v. Campbell, 984 F. Supp. 2d 364
(M.D. Pa. 2013) (Younger abstention was warranted where defendant's
petition for post-conviction relief was pending in state court, and defendant's
requested relief would interfere with those proceedings).
In the present matter, it is clear that the Younger requirements are
met. First, Petitioner's PCRA petitions filed in the Clearfield County Court of
Common Pleas are still pending. Second, the state proceedings implicate the
important state interest of enforcing its criminal laws. Third, the PCRA
proceedings provide Petitioner an adequate opportunity to raise his issues in
the state forum. This Court may assume that the state procedures will afford
Petitioner an adequate remedy. See Keirn v. Hyatt, 44 F.3d 415, 420 (6th
Cir. 1995) (citing Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1(1987)) ("Initially,
we must presume that the state courts are able to protect the interests of the
federal plaintiff."). Further, Petitioner has failed to show that he falls within
any of the narrow exceptions to the Younger doctrine.
Petitioner is asking this Court to exercise authority over the state court
to order it to adjudicate his pending PCRA petitions and to provide him with
transcripts and discovery. Petitioner's requested remedies will interfere with
pending state proceedings. See Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 882 (3d
Cir.1994) ("A federal court will only consider Younger abstention when the
requested relief would constitute federal interference in state judicial or quasi­
judiCial proceedings"). Accordingly, it is appropriate to abstain from
entertaining the petition out of deference to the state judicial process. See
Peay, 133 Fed. Appx. 31; Ridge, 984 F. Supp. 2d 364. See also Ellis v.
Mondel/o, 2005 WL 1703194, *3 (D. N.J. 2005) ("assuming the criminal action
is still pending in a state trial or appellate court, review of the state court
proceedings would be barred; adistrict court cannot interfere in a pending
state criminal action in order to consider issues that a plaintiff can raise
there.").
II

(Doc. 2, pp. 4-7).
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration fails to demonstrate that there has been an
intervening change in the law, that there is newly discovered evidence, or that there has
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been a clear error of law or manifest injustice committed.

In the motion for reconsideration, Petitioner again claims that the PCRA court has
not addressed his PCRA petitions. (Doc. 4, p. 3). Petitioner, "asks for a reconsideration not
for said issues contained in his petition, but reconsideration regarding the issues of the trial
court[']s failure to provide transcripts to Petitioner, the court[']s failure to act on the first
PCRA and the second PCRA petition." (Doc. 4, p. 3). Petitioner is again asking this Court
to exercise authority over the state court to order it to adjudicate his pending PCRA petitions
and to provide him with transcripts and discovery. Petitioner requests that this Court "enter
an order compelling Clearfield County Court to act on either PCRA petition and further to
provide Petitioner with all transcripts of any proceedings." (Doc. 4, p. 4). Petitioner's
requested remedies will interfere with pending state proceedings. See Marks, 19 F.3d 873.
As this Court previously determined, it is appropriate to abstain from entertaining the
petition out of deference to the state judicial process. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig.,
685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982) ("We will not interfere with a trial court's control of its
docket except upon the clearest showing that the procedures have resulted in actual and
substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant."); In re Bey, 490 Fed. Appx. 455 (3d Cir.
2012).
Moreover, Petitioner's claims of delay andl or error by the PCRA court are not
cognizable on federal habeas review. See Abu-Jamal V. Horn, 520 F.3d 272, 297 (3d

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Cir.2008) ("[A]lIeged errors in collateral proceedings are not a proper basis for habeas
relief."), judgment vacated on other grounds by, Beard v. Abu-Jamal, 558 U.S. 1143 (2010).
Rather, habeas relief can be granted only based upon the proceedings that actually resulted
in Petitioner's conviction, not upon circumstances that occurred during the state
post-conviction proceedings. See Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir.
1998). Therefore, claims premised upon delay or other problems encountered while
seeking state collateral relief are inappropriate grounds for granting habeas review. See id.
Thus, this Court finds that its Memorandum of October 21,2014 is not troubled by
manifest errors of law or fact and Petitioner has not presented anything new, which if
previously presented, might have affected this Court's decision. Consequently, the motion
for reconsideration will be denied.
Aseparate Order follows.

Date: November

f('

,2014

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