Njos v. United States Of America et al

Filing 69

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 63 MOTION for Default Judgment filed by Scott Njos. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on September 24, 2015. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SCOTT NJOS,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.

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CIVIL NO. 3:14-CV-1960
(Judge Kosik)

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM ORDER1
Scott Njos is a federal inmate housed at the United States Penitentiary,
Lewisburg, where he is currently serving an 170-month sentence following his
conviction on bank robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, escape, and assault on a federal
officer charges. While in federal custody, Njos has amassed an extensive disciplinary
history, having been cited on dozens of occasions with prison rules infractions, many
of which involved violent or disruptive behavior by Njos in an institutional setting.
This history of recidivism and on-going institutional misconduct led to the

The parties are advised that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the district court
has orally referred the above-captioned case to the undersigned for pre-trial
management, resolution of non-dispositive motions, and preparation of reports and
recommendations on potentially dispositive matters.
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reassignment of Njos to the Special Management Unit of the United States
Penitentiary, Lewisburg, where the plaintiff currently resides.
Njos is also a prolific litigator in federal court.2 Much of this litigation
involves Njos’ recurring complaint regarding the medical care and treatment which
he receives at the Lewisburg Penitentiary. The instant case is but one example of this
growing body of litigation brought by Njos.
In this case, Njos has sued the United States, the Federal Bureau of Prison, ten
individual prison mental health providers,3 and four non-medical prison supervisory
officials.4 In his complaint Njos alleges that the defendants violated his constitutional
rights, and acted negligently, by not providing him with individual out of cell
psychological care. According to Njos, he is now entitled to select the manner of his
care because he claims to have been raped by another inmate at a different institution

See e.g., Njos v. Bledsoe, 3:12-CV-243; Njos v. Bledsoe, 3:12-CV-476;
Njos v. Thomas, 3:13-CV-2721; Njos v. Thomas, 3:13-CV-2816; Njos v. Thomas,
3:14-CV-766; Njos v. Bureau of Prisons, 3:12-CV-1251; Njos v. Kane, 3:12-CV1252; Njos v. Carney, 3:12-CV-1375; Njos v. United States, 3:15-CV-1960; Njos
v. Thomas, 3:14-CV-875.
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These defendants include Dr. Mink, Dr. Contri, Dr. Howson, Dr. Cannon,
Dr. Edinger, Clinical Director Pigos, Psychologists Karper, Sage and Ramirez, and
Physician Assistant Fasciara.
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These defendants include Warden Bledsoe, Warden Ebbert, Regional
Director Norwood and Harrell Watts.
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on October 3, 2010, and, therefore, should be provided individual therapy in a private
setting as a result of that incident. Remarkably, Njos persists in this claim even after
he acknowledged that he “bec[a]me slightly obsessed with thoughts of torturing,
raping or killing uncaring psychology services staff,” (Doc. 32., ¶25.), and shared
these murderous thoughts with prison psychology staff “question[ing] the
psychologists inquiring if it was okay for him to have inappropriate thoughts of
killing, torturing and raping staff in revenge for their mistreatment.” (Id., ¶29.)
We have filed reports and recommendations which recommend that Njos’
claims be dismissed, and that his proposed amended complaint be rejected as
procedurally inappropriate, substantively without merit and futile. Njos, however,
now seeks either a default judgment or a contempt citation based upon an alleged
failure by the government to further respond to some of his allegations and pleadings.
(Doc. 63.)
We will deny this motion. Default judgments are governed by Rule 55 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 55 a default judgment may only be
entered when the party against whom the default judgment is sought was served and
“has failed to plead or otherwise respond” Rule 55(a), F.R.Civ.P., and a “default
judgment [cannot be] entered when there has been no proper service of the complaint
. . . .” Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 756 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir. 1985).
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Furthermore, in ruling upon requests relating to default judgments it is well-settled
that these decisions are:
[L]eft primarily to the discretion of the district court. Tozer v. Charles
A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 244 (3d Cir.1951). We recognize,
however, that this court does not favor entry of defaults or default
judgments. We require doubtful cases to be resolved in favor of the
party moving to [deny or] set aside the default judgment “so that cases
may be decided on their merits.” Id. at 245. See also Gross v. Stereo
Component Systems, Inc., 700 F.2d 120, 122 (3d Cir.1983); Feliciano
v. Reliant Tooling Company, Ltd., 691 F.2d 653, 656 (3d Cir.1982);
Farnese v. Bagnasco, 687 F.2d 761, 764 (3d Cir.1982). Nevertheless,
we do not [deny or] set aside the entry of default and default judgment
unless we determine that the district court abused its discretion. We
require the district court to consider the following factors in exercising
its discretion . . . : (1) whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced; (2)
whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; (3) whether the default
was the result of the defendant's culpable conduct. Gross v. Stereo
Component Systems, Inc., 700 F.2d at 122; Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling
Company, Ltd., 691 F.2d at 656; Farnese v. Bagnasco, 687 F.2d at 764.
United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d 192, 194-95 (3d Cir. 1984)
In this case, we find that all of these discretionary factors favor denial of entry
of default judgment against these defendants at this time. At the outset, allowing this
matter to be resolved on its merits is a cardinal guiding principle in our legal system,
and one which causes courts to view default judgments with disfavor. This principle
applies with particular force here, since the plaintiff’s claims appear to lack legal
merit. Furthermore, the plaintiff is not unfairly prejudiced by denying a default
judgment at this stage of the litigation since he can pursue this matter later, if any of
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his legal claims survive. However, entry of default would be highly prejudicial to
those defendants against whom Njos seeks this default judgment, and those
defendants have not engaged in any culpable conduct which makes entry of default
appropriate.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s motion for entry of
default, is DENIED. (Doc.63.)
So ordered this 24th day of September 2015.

S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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