Everett v. Lawrence

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry). Signed by Honorable Edwin M. Kosik on 9/9/2015. (emksec, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
________________________________
TERESA EVERETT,
:
Plaintiff,
:
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-2128
:
v.
:
(Judge Kosik)
:
JOSEPH C. LAWRENCE,
:
Defendant.
:
________________________________
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) of Defendant, Joseph C.
Lawrence. For the reasons which follow, the Motion to Dismiss will be granted in part
and denied in part.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Teresa Everett, filed a Complaint in the instant action on November 6,
2014. In the Complaint, Plaintiff claims that Defendant, Joseph C. Lawrence, a
Borough of Lehighton Police Officer, violated her rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1983, through an Illegal Arrest (Count I), Excessive Usage of Force (Count II), and
Constitutional Right to Trial (Count III).
On December 1, 2014, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7), and on
December 15, 2014, a Brief in Support thereof (Doc. 8). On December 26, 2014,
Plaintiff filed a Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9). On
January 9, 2015, Defendant filed a Reply Brief (Doc. 10).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the
dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
court must “accept as true all [factual] allegations in the complaint and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.” Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2007)(quoting Evancho v.
Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005)). Although the court is generally limited in
its review to the facts contained in the complaint, it “may also consider matters of
public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the
record of the case.” Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380,
1384 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1994); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d
1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide “the
defendant notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Phillips
v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint in the
face of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must conduct a three-step inquiry. See
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). In the first step,
“the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’” Id.
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal
elements of a claim should be separated; well-pleaded facts must be accepted as
true, while mere legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id.; see also Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the well-pleaded
factual allegations have been isolated, the court must determine whether they are
sufficient to show a “plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (requiring plaintiffs to allege
facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level”). A claim “has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

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draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

DISCUSSION
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on or about June 18, 2014, Defendant,
Officer Lawrence, responded to a disturbance call at Plaintiff’s residence, but upon
his arrival, he observed a peaceful and harmonious environment. Defendant asked
Plaintiff for identification without entering the house and while standing on the porch.
Plaintiff handed her photo identification to Defendant through an open door. As
Plaintiff was handing Defendant her identification through the door, Defendant
grabbed Plaintiff by the arm, pulled her outside of the residence and tackled her onto
the ground. In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant had no probable cause to
arrest Plaintiff and that the arrest was illegal in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s conduct involved
excessive use of force directed against Plaintiff’s person in violation of the Fourth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Count III of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges
that after the incident of June 18, 2014, Defendant filed a Summary Offense of
Disorderly Conduct against Plaintiff and that Plaintiff plead Not Guilty to the charge.
Thereafter, Plaintiff was contacted by the Chief of Police and advised to meet with
Defendant. Defendant appeared at Plaintiff’s residence and threatened her with
additional charges unless she pleaded guilty. After conferring with counsel, Plaintiff
changed her plea to Guilty to get the benefit of Double Jeopardy. Plaintiff alleges
that the threat by Defendant to increase the charges violated Plaintiff’s right to Due
Process protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, her right to “ascertain” of counsel
and right to trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues that he is shielded from liability
based on his entitlement to qualified immunity. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that
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Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity in that Defendant’s conduct clearly
violated the law and that the law was clearly established when the alleged violation
occurred.
Qualified immunity protects government officials who are performing
discretionary functions by shielding these officials “from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “In addition, and particularly in § 1983 cases involving alleged
violations of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the
inquiry is whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct
was lawful, in light of the clearly established law and the information in the officer’s
possession.” Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 826 (3rd Cir. 1997). In considering
whether qualified immunity applies, a court may perform a two-step sequence1
announced by the Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S, 194, 200 (2001). A
court must first decide whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff make out a violation
of a constitutional right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If a violation has occurred, then
the court must decide whether the right was clearly established. Id.
The main thrust of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights violations concerns an illegal
arrest and the use of excessive force against her. An excessive force claim is
construed as an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment as applied to
section 1983 claims. To state this claim, a plaintiff is required to show that a seizure
occurred and that the seizure was unreasonable. Ansell v. Ross Twp., 419 Fed.
Appx. 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2011). A seizure that triggers the Fourth Amendment’s
protections “occurs only when government actors have, ‘by means of physical force

1

Overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (Relaxed the two step
process by no longer requiring courts to determine the prongs in sequential order. While this two step
process is no longer mandatory, it is often appropriate and beneficial.).

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or show of authority...in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’” Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, n. 10 (1989) citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n. 16
(1968). Deciding whether a particular seizure is reasonable requires “a careful
balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id.
(internal citations omitted). Three factors relevant to this balancing test include (1)
the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat
to the safety of the officers or others; and (3) whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has also
provided additional relevant considerations when deciding whether excessive force
was used, including “the duration of the action, whether the action takes place in the
context of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be armed, and the
number of persons with whom the police officer must contend at one time.” Sharrar
v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997). Accepting as true all factual allegations
in the Complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn, and viewing them
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the arrest and use of force by Defendant on the
day in question may be found to be excessive under the objective standards of
reasonableness. As such, Defendant cannot be granted qualified immunity on these
grounds. Accordingly, we find that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity at
this stage2.
Defendant also argues that Count I (illegal arrest) and Count II (excessive use
of force) should be dismissed since Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action against
Defendant. As we indicated above, in ruling on a Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we must accept as true, all factual allegations in the Complaint, and
all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, and view them in the light

2

We note that many of the cases cited by Defendant were resolved at the summary judgment

stage.

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most favorable to Plaintiff. In doing so in the instant action, we find that the
Complaint sets forth a plausible claim for relief. Thus, we will deny Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Count I and Count II.
Defendant also argues that Count III of the Complaint should be dismissed.
Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a Sixth Amendment
claim against the Defendant. Plaintiff has failed to oppose Defendant’s arguments
as to Count III. Moreover, we agree with Defendant’s arguments that Plaintiff has
failed to set forth a claim for denial of her right to ascertain counsel or for denial of a
right to trial. Accordingly, we will grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count III of the
Complaint.
Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages should be
dismissed. In accepting the facts set forth in the Complaint as true, we do not
believe there is a sufficient record to address the issue of punitive damages at this
time. Accordingly, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss will be denied.

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