Graham-Smith et al v. Wilkes-Barre Police Department et al

Filing 43

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 34 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Alan Gribble, City of Wilkes-Barre Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 4/18/17. (sm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DELILAH GRAHAM-SMITH and
RODNEY G. SMITH, her husband,
Plaintiffs

:
No. 3:14cv2159
:
:
(Judge Munley)
:
v.
:
:
CITY OF WILKES-BARRE and
:
ALAN GRIBBLE, in his individual
:
capacity,
:
Defendants
:
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
MEMORANDUM
Before the court for disposition is Defendants City of Wilkes-Barre
and police officer Alan Gribble’s (collectively “the city defendants”) motion
for summary judgment. (Doc. 34). For the following reasons, the court will
grant the motion.
Background
On November 12, 2012, a motorist ran a red light in downtown
Wilkes-Barre and struck Plaintiff Delilah Graham-Smith’s (hereinafter
“plaintiff”) automobile. (Doc. 35, Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts
(hereinafter “SOF”) ¶¶ 17, 19).1 Shortly after the accident, the Wilkes-Barre
Fire Department and Defendant Alan Gribble, a City of Wilkes-Barre police
1

We cite to the city defendants’ SOF (Doc. 35) for statements which
plaintiff generally agrees with in her response (Doc. 41, Pl.’s Resp.
(hereinafter “Pl.’s Resp.”).

officer (hereinafter “Officer Gribble”), arrived at the scene. (SOF ¶¶ 23-24).
At some point, plaintiff walked across the street to Luzerne Bank. (SOF
¶ 27). Officer Gribble learned that plaintiff left the accident scene, and
soon arrived at Luzerne Bank as well. (SOF ¶¶ 29, 35).
At Luzerne Bank, Officer Gribble ordered plaintiff to return to the
accident scene. (SOF ¶ 37). Plaintiff, however, wrapped her legs around a
chair and refused to leave. (SOF ¶¶ 49-50). To remove plaintiff from the
chair, Officer Gribble grabbed plaintiff’s thumb and pulled it back in
accordance with the Wilkes-Barre Police Department’s Use of Force Policy.
(SOF ¶ 51). At that point, plaintiff removed her fingers and her hand from
the arm of the chair. (SOF ¶ 53). Plaintiff, however, remained noncompliant and refused to stand up. (SOF ¶ 54). Officer Gribble, therefore,
lifted plaintiff from the chair. (SOF ¶ 54). He then placed plaintiff’s hands
behind her back and handcuffed her. (SOF ¶¶ 55-56).
After handcuffing plaintiff, Officer Gribble led plaintiff from the bank to
the accident scene.2 (SOF ¶ 64). He placed plaintiff in the backseat of a
police cruiser and, shortly thereafter, drove her to the Wilkes-Barre General

2

The parties dispute how Officer Gribble escorted plaintiff from the bank to
the accident scene. The city defendants contend that Officer Gribble
“walked” plaintiff out of the bank. (SOF ¶ 64). Plaintiff, however, avers that
Officer Gribble “ran her out of the bank by pushing and pulling on the
handcuffs.” (Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 64).
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Hospital for a mental health evaluation. (SOF ¶¶ 65, 69). At the hospital,
Officer Gribble involuntarily committed plaintiff to hospital personnel
pursuant to section 302 of Pennsylvania’s Mental Health Procedures Act,
50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7302 (“section 302”). (SOF ¶ 71).
Based upon the November 2012 incident, plaintiff filed a nine-count
complaint on November 10, 2014, against the city defendants, the WilkesBarre Police Department, and Wilkes-Barre police chief Gerard E.
Dessoye. (Doc. 1, Compl.). On May 19, 2015, the court dismissed
Defendants Wilkes-Barre Police Department and Dessoye, as well as
Officer Gribble in his official capacity. (Doc. 16). Additionally, plaintiff has
conceded to withdraw her state law claims. (Doc. 42, Pl.’s Br. in Opp. at
11-12). Thus, remaining in this case are the following 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(hereinafter “section 1983”) claims: Count II, unlawful seizure, false
imprisonment, and excessive force claims against Officer Gribble in his
individual capacity; and Count III, a municipal liability claim against the City
of Wilkes-Barre.
On November 15, 2016, the city defendants moved for summary
judgment on all claims. (Doc. 34). The parties briefed their respective
positions and the matter is ripe for disposition.

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Jurisdiction
As this case is brought pursuant to section 1983 for a violation of
plaintiff’s constitutional rights, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). We have
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367.
Standard of Review
Granting summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Knabe v. Boury, 114 F.3d 407, 410 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing FED. R. CIV. P.
56(c)). “[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be
no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must
examine the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
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motion. Int’l Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 898 F.2d 946, 949
(3d Cir. 1990). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the
nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A fact is material when it
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. Where
the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the party moving
for summary judgment may meet its burden by establishing that the
evidentiary materials of record, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be
insufficient to carry the nonmovant’s burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies its
burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must go beyond its
pleadings, and designate specific facts by the use of affidavits, depositions,
admissions, or answers to interrogatories demonstrating that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
Discussion
The city defendants move for summary judgment on plaintiff’s
remaining section 1983 claims. Section 1983 does not, by its own terms,
create substantive rights; rather, it provides remedies for deprivations of
rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal law. Kneipp v.

5

Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). Section 1983 states, in
pertinent part,
Every person who, under the color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizens of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to establish a claim under section 1983, two
criteria must be met. First, the conduct complained of must have been
committed by a person acting under color of state law. Kaucher v. Cty. of
Bucks, 455 F.3d 418 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999)). Second, the conduct must deprive
the plaintiff of rights secured under the Constitution or federal
law. Id. (citing Am. Mfrs., 526 U.S. at 49-50). The city defendants
challenge only the second criterion, first with respect to Officer Gribble, and
second with respect to the City of Wilkes-Barre. We address the city
defendants’ arguments in turn.
I. Count II, Fourth Amendment Claims Against Officer Gribble
The city defendants first seek summary judgment on Count II,
plaintiff’s section 1983 unlawful seizure, false imprisonment, and excessive
force claims against Officer Gribble in his individual capacity, arguing that
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Gribble’s conduct failed to deprive plaintiff of her constitutional rights. We
address each claim individually.
A. Unlawful Seizure
The city defendants first move for summary judgment on plaintiff’s
section 1983 unlawful seizure claim against Officer Gribble. The Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures,”
except “upon probable cause[.]” U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. A Fourth
Amendment seizure occurs “when [an] officer, by means of physical force
or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.”
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). “[A] person has been ‘seized’
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave.” California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.
621, 627-28 (1991). This “reasonable person” standard “allows the police
to determine in advance whether the conduct contemplated will implicate
the Fourth Amendment.” Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574
(1988). Furthermore, it “ensures that the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection does not vary with the state of mind of the particular individual
being approached.” Id.
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Probable cause to seize or arrest “exists if there is a fair probability
that the person committed the crime at issue.” Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ.,
834 F.3d 457, 467 (3d Cir. 2016) (citations, internal quotation marks, and
internal brackets omitted). Stated differently, “‘probable cause to arrest
exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s
knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to
believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be
arrested.’” Id. (quoting Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d
Cir. 1995). This standard “‘does not require that officers correctly resolve
conflicting evidence or that their determinations of credibility, were, in
retrospect, accurate.’” Id. (quoting Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d 595,
603 (3d Cir. 2005)).
Here, the undisputed evidence establishes that Officer Gribble had
probable cause to seize plaintiff. Specifically, after plaintiff’s automobile
accident, plaintiff walked across the street to Luzerne Bank. (SOF ¶ 27).
Officer Gribble learned that plaintiff left the accident scene, and soon
arrived at Luzerne Bank as well. (SOF ¶¶ 29, 35). At Luzerne Bank,
Officer Gribble ordered plaintiff to return to the accident scene. (SOF ¶ 37).
Plaintiff, however, wrapped her legs around a chair and refused to leave.
(SOF ¶¶ 49-50). Plaintiff remained noncompliant throughout the exchange
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and refused to stand up. (SOF ¶ 54). Officer Gribble, therefore, lifted
plaintiff from the chair. (SOF ¶ 54). He then placed plaintiff’s hands behind
her back and handcuffed her. (SOF ¶¶ 55-56). After handcuffing plaintiff,
Officer Gribble led plaintiff from the bank to the accident scene.3 (SOF
¶ 64). He placed plaintiff in the backseat of a police cruiser and, shortly
thereafter, drove her to the Wilkes-Barre General Hospital for a mental
health evaluation. (SOF ¶¶ 65, 69).
Confronted with these undisputed facts, plaintiff argues that, in her
mind, Officer Gribble did not seize her for leaving the accident scene.
Rather, she contends that Officer Gribble seized her for one reason—to
drive her to the hospital for a mental health evaluation. Thus, according to
plaintiff, a disputed issue of material fact exists as to whether Office Gribble
seized plaintiff for leaving the accident scene or to drive her to the hospital.
Plaintiff cites no authority for this proposition, and the court’s research
has uncovered none. Indeed, Supreme Court precedent regarding
unlawful seizures compels the opposite conclusion. As previously stated,
the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonable person” standard “ensures that the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection does not vary with the state of mind
of the particular individual being approached.” Chesternut, 486 U.S. at
3

As previously stated, the parties dispute how Officer Gribble escorted
plaintiff from the bank to the accident scene. See supra note 2.
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574. Thus, plaintiff’s state of mind regarding the reason why Officer
Gribble seized her is irrelevant.
Based upon these undisputed facts, Officer Gribble had probable
cause to seize plaintiff for leaving the accident scene and repeated
noncompliance. Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, no sufficient evidentiary basis exists upon which a reasonable jury
could find in her favor. Therefore, the court will grant the city defendants’
motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s section 1983 unlawful seizure
claim against Officer Gribble.
B. False Imprisonment
The city defendants next move for summary judgment on plaintiff’s
section 1983 false imprisonment claim against Officer Gribble. “To state a
claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that she was
detained; and (2) that the detention was unlawful.” James v. City of WilkesBarre, 700 F.3d 675, 682-83 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384, 389 (2007)). A section 1983 false imprisonment claim based on
an arrest made without probable cause “is grounded in the Fourth
Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable seizures.” Id. at 683 (citing
Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir.1995)). An arrest
based on probable cause, however, cannot “become the source of a claim
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for false imprisonment.” Id. (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 14344 (1979)).
Here, having previously concluded that the undisputed evidence
establishes that Officer Gribble had probable cause to seize plaintiff, we
must also conclude that he had probable cause to arrest plaintiff.
Specifically, Officer Gribble had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for leaving
the accident scene and repeated noncompliance. Even viewing the record
in the light most favorable to plaintiff, no sufficient evidentiary basis exists
upon which a reasonable jury could find in her favor. Therefore, the court
will grant the city defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s
section 1983 false imprisonment claim against Officer Gribble.
C. Excessive Force
The city defendants next move for summary judgment on plaintiff’s
section 1983 excessive force claim against Officer Gribble. To prevail on a
Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, “a plaintiff must show that a
‘seizure’ occurred and that it was unreasonable under the circumstances.”
Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 182-83 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Brower
v. Cty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989)). Here, the city defendants
challenge only the second criterion.

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The reasonableness test is whether, “under the totality of the
circumstances, ‘the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of
the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their
underlying intent or motivations.’” Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776 (3d
Cir. 2004) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)). As the
Supreme Court has explained,
[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight . . . .
The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance
for the fact that police officers are often forced to make
split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of
force that is necessary in a particular situation.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. “‘[R]easonableness under the Fourth
Amendment should frequently remain a question for the jury[.]’” Kopec,
361 F.3d at 777 (quoting Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 290 (3d Cir.
1999)). In handcuff cases, however, “summary judgment for an officer . . .
is appropriate where, ‘after resolving all factual disputes in favor of the
plaintiff, . . . the officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable under the
circumstances.’” Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Kopec, 361 F.3d at 777).
In the instant matter, plaintiff argues that Officer Gribble handcuffed
her wrists unreasonably tight, and that such unreasonableness constitutes
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excessive force. We disagree for two reasons. First, plaintiff has failed to
adduce evidence sufficient to demonstrate that Officer Gribble used
excessive force. Second, the undisputed evidence actually demonstrates
the opposite, namely that Officer Gribble’s use of force was objectively
reasonable under the circumstances.
First, plaintiff has failed to adduce evidence sufficient to demonstrate
that Officer Gribble used excessive force. Specifically, the undisputed
evidence establishes that plaintiff repeatedly complained to Officer Gribble
to loosen the handcuffs. (SOF, Ex. 1, Dep. of Pl. (hereinafter “Pl.’s Dep.”)
at 63; SOF, Ex. 2, Dep. of Alan Gribble (hereinafter “Gribble Dep.”) at 102).
Plaintiff testified that the handcuffs “were cutting her wrists” and that she
“was becoming more breathless[.]” (Pl.’s Dep. at 63). She has not,
however, adduced any testimony, other than her own, or discernible
physical evidence indicating such obvious signs of pain.4

4

Plaintiff relies on three photographs of her wrists, purportedly taken on
November 13, 2012, as physical evidence of injury. (Pl.’s Resp., Ex. 2,
Photographs of Pl.’s Wrists at 1-3). The photographs, however, are dark,
ambiguous, and ultimately incomprehensible. Furthermore, plaintiff
provides no support, medical or otherwise, for the proposition that any wrist
markings potentially indicated in the photographs are evidence of force
beyond that which a reasonable arresting officer would use. Thus, we do
not consider the photographs discernible physical evidence indicating an
obvious sign of pain.
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Likewise, plaintiff cites no medical evidence establishing a hand or
wrist injury that may have been caused by unreasonably tight handcuffs.
Plaintiff does cite the report of Dr. Francis J. Collini, who noted that plaintiff
“was handcuffed by police” and “since then has pain and numbness in both
hands and wrists[.]” (Pl.’s Resp., Ex. 6, Med. Report of Dr. Francis J.
Collini at 1). Plaintiff’s complaints within the report, however, are
subjective. In the report, Dr. Collini “ordered an EMG for the presence of
CTS or ulnar compression neuropathy.” (Id.) While he assessed plaintiff
as having Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, he made no finding regarding the
cause of her subjective complaints. (Id.) Moreover, plaintiff has produced
neither the actual EMG ordered by Dr. Collini nor an assessment of such.
In Kopec, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the
alleged tightness of the plaintiff’s handcuffs, if credited by a jury, could
establish excessive force. 361 F.3d at 777. There, the plaintiff repeatedly
complained of extreme pain to the arresting officer, fell to the ground, and
began to faint. Id. at 777. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged permanent
nerve damage in one wrist, for which a surgeon treated him for over one
year. Id. at 774. Thus, the plaintiff asserted facts that, if proven, would
establish a violation of his constitutional rights. Id. at 777.

14

Conversely, in Gilles, the Third Circuit determined that the alleged
tightness of the plaintiff’s handcuffs did not constitute excessive force, as
he expressed no obvious, visible indicators of pain, nor did he seek or
receive medical treatment thereafter. 427 F.3d at 207-08. There, the
plaintiff’s alleged complaint that the handcuffs were too tight, absent any
other sign of physical pain, failed to establish a violation of his constitutional
rights. Id. at 208.
Here, we find the instant matter analogous to Gilles, 427 F.3d 197.
Other than her own complaints that the handcuffs were too tight, plaintiff
expressed no obvious, visible indicators of pain, such as falling to the
ground or fainting. Moreover, she has produced no evidence of permanent
injury to, or consistent medical treatment of, her hands or wrists. While not
all section 1983 excessive force claims involving handcuffs will demand
facts identical to those in Kopec, 361 F.3d 772, plaintiff’s claim here
demands more than her own complaints. Kopec did “not intend to open the
floodgates to a torrent of handcuff claims.” 361 F.3d at 777. Thus, we find
that plaintiff has failed to adduce evidence sufficient to demonstrate that
Officer Gribble used excessive force.
Second, the undisputed evidence establishes that Officer Gribble’s
use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.
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Specifically, plaintiff committed a potential crime when she left the accident
scene and walked across the street to Luzerne Bank. At Luzerne Bank,
she repeatedly refused Officer Gribble’s orders, and actively resisted his
attempts to escort her to the accident scene. Although plaintiff complained
about the tightness of the handcuffs, her complaints are unsubstantiated.
Furthermore, Officer Gribble testified that, in response to plaintiff’s
complaints, he applied the “pinky test,” an exercise where he placed his
pinky finger in between the handcuffs and plaintiff’s wrists to ensure
enough room. (Gribble Dep. at 102). He also testified that he performed
the pinky test on plaintiff “a couple of times.” (Id. at 102-03).
Additionally, the parties agree that a police officer should file a 302
petition if the officer has grounds to believe that a person is danger to
herself or another. (SOF ¶ 46). Officer Gribble did just that when he
involuntarily committed plaintiff to the Wilkes-Barre General Hospital
personnel pursuant to section 302.
As previously stated, “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody
allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make splitsecond judgments . . . about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. As a result of plaintiff
leaving the accident scene and her repeated noncompliance, this particular
16

situation clearly required some use of force. The parties do not dispute the
method of such force, handcuffs. Rather, they dispute Officer Gribble’s
reasonableness in applying such force.
Here, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that plaintiff committed
a potential crime when she left the accident scene, that she repeatedly
refused Officer Gribble’s orders, and that she actively resisted his attempts
to escort her to the accident scene. The evidence further establishes that
Officer Gribble involuntarily committed plaintiff to the Wilkes-Barre General
Hospital personnel pursuant to section 302. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396
(explaining that proper application of the reasonableness test requires
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each case, including the
crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and whether she is actively resisting arrest
or attempting to evade arrest by flight). The court recognizes that the
reasonableness test “is not capable of precise definition or mechanical
application.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). Plaintiff’s inability
to adduce evidence sufficient to countervail the aforementioned undisputed
facts, however, fails to influence the “calculus of reasonableness” in her
favor. Thus, Officer Gribble’s use of force was objectively reasonable
under the circumstances.
17

Based upon these undisputed facts, Officer Gribble did not use
excessive force. Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, no sufficient evidentiary basis exists upon which a reasonable jury
could find in her favor. Therefore, the court will grant the city defendants’
motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s section 1983 excessive force
claim against Officer Gribble.
II. Qualified Immunity
In the alternative, the city defendants argue that the doctrine of
qualified immunity shields Officer Gribble from liability under section 1983.
“Qualified immunity shields government actors from suit ‘insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Zaloga v. Borough of
Moosic, 841 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Thus, we ask: (1) whether the facts alleged by
the plaintiff show the violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the
law was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Kelly v. Borough of
Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 201 (2001)).
We have previously concluded that plaintiff has failed to adduce
evidence sufficient to establish a violation of constitutional rights. Thus, the
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court will grant the city defendants’ motion for summary judgment with
respect to qualified immunity.
III. Count III, Fourteenth Amendment Claim Against the City of
Wilkes-Barre
Next, the city defendants seek summary judgment on Count III,
plaintiff’s section 1983 municipal liability claim against the City of WilkesBarre. It is well-established that there can be no “award of damages
against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers
when in fact . . . the officer inflicted no constitutional harm.” City of Los
Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam); Mulholland v.
Gov’t Cty. of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 238 n.15 (3d Cir. 2016) (citations
omitted); Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 245 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citations omitted). Having previously concluded that Officer Gribble
inflicted no constitutional harm upon plaintiff, plaintiff’s section 1983
municipal liability claim against the City of Wilkes-Barre fails as a matter of
law. The city defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to this
claim will thus be granted.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant the city defendants’

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motion for summary judgment. An appropriate order follows.

Date: April 18, 2017

s/ James M. Munley
JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY
United States District Court

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