Bossi v. Bank of America et al

Filing 29

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry). Signed by Honorable Edwin M. Kosik on 11/3/2015. (emksec, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
____________________________________
:
ASHLEY BOSSI,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
BANK OF AMERICA,
:
GEORGE GASTON,
:
GEORGE HERNANDEZ and
:
SARAH PIERCE
:
:
Defendants.
:
____________________________________:

Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-02301
(Judge Kosik)

MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Deposition of Corporate Designee of
Bank of America and/or Motion to Strike Objections to Defendants’ Objections to Plaintiff’s
Deposition Notice (Doc. 23). The parties fully briefed the motion, and it is ripe for disposition.
Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states,
In its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent a public or private
corporation, a partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity and
must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination. The named
organization must then designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents,
or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf; and it may set out the
matters on which each person designated will testify . . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
Plaintiff presents several issues in her motion. First, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Bank
of America failed to prepare Sarah Pierce as a corporate designee, since Pierce was unable to
speak to some areas in the notice. Plaintiff argues that Sarah Pierce, Vice President in the
Human Resources Department, should have been prepared to testify as to all areas in the Notice.

Defendants’ Counsel informed Plaintiff’s Counsel that Sarah Pierce was “incompetent” to testify
as to matters surrounding the termination, disciplinary action, and warnings involving Plaintiff,
but that Pierce was competent to testify as to the remaining areas. Defendants’ Counsel
identified Defendant George Hernandez as the appropriate person to answer questions
concerning the areas Pierce was incompetent to testify about.
We first note that Defendants agree to stipulate that Sarah Pierce and George Hernandez
were deposed as corporate designees under Rule 30(b)(6), and that their testimony binds Bank of
America. A corporate defendant may designate more than one person to address the areas of the
Notice of Deposition, since the most qualified person may not be able to speak to all areas. Bank
of America did this, in informing Plaintiff that George Hernandez would be able to speak to the
areas that Pierce was incompetent to testify about. We therefore find that Bank of America met
its duty to prepare its corporate designee, Sarah Pierce.
Plaintiff next argues that Hernandez’s deposition is inadequate to serve as a Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition, since Plaintiff did not notice Hernandez as a corporate designee, and at the time of
the deposition, Hernandez was speaking as a party, not as a corporate designee. Plaintiff further
argues that Hernandez was not a managing agent, appropriate to be named as a corporate
designee, since Hernandez testified that he consistently consulted Advice and Counsel, and
therefore lacks the decision-making discretion and unsupervised authority to testify as a
managing agent and bind the corporate defendant. Rule 30(b)(6) allows an organization to
“designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf.” Since Bank of America has agreed
that Hernandez was acting as a corporate designee, and that his testimony binds it, we find that
Hernandez’s deposition was adequate under Rule 30(b)(6), as there is no showing that Bank of
America did not meet its duty to prepare its corporate designee.
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As a result of Sarah Pierce being incompetent to speak to matters concerning termination,
disciplinary action, and warnings, Plaintiff sent Bank of America a Notice of Deposition to
depose an unnamed corporate designee (Doc. 23-3, Pl.’s Mot. to Compel Ex. C.) In this Notice
of Deposition to an unnamed corporate designee, Plaintiff included additional areas for
deposition that were not included in the first notice. These additional areas included any and all
medical information concerning Plaintiff. (Id.) Defendants objected to this Notice of Deposition
because it was duplicative, irrelevant, and vague.

(Doc. 23-4, Pl.’s Mot. to Compel Ex. D.)

Defendants objected to Plaintiff seeking information concerning Plaintiff’s medical information
and adjustment of metrics due to medical conditions, because it is irrelevant. Defendants argue
that Plaintiff never claimed that she was denied an accommodation in retaliation for any
complaints. We agree with Defendants, and find that this information is irrelevant to the present
claim.
Therefore, we will deny Plaintiff’s motion. An appropriate order will follow.

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