Coley v. Mahally

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable Malachy E Mannion on 4/9/18. (ao)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RASHAN D. COLEY
Petitioner

:
:
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-2328

v.

:
(Judge Mannion)

LAWRENCE MUHALLY, et al.,
:
Respondents
MEMORANDUM
:
Rashan D. Coley, an inmate presently confined at the State Correctional
Institution, Dallas, Pennsylvania (SCI-Dallas), filed this pro se habeas corpus
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. (Doc. 1, petition). He attacks a conviction
imposed by the Court of Common Pleas for Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania.
Id. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the petition.

I.

Background
The following background has been extracted from the Pennsylvania

Superior Court’s December 16, 2011 Memorandum Opinion affirming the trial
court’s judgment. (Doc. 14-8, Commonwealth v. Coley, No. 589 MDA 2011,
Superior Court Opinion at pp. 1-3).
On December 15, 2009, following a jury trial, Appellant was found
guilty of possession with intent to deliver heroin. The charge arose
on June 2, 2008, when Pennsylvania State Trooper T.J. Horan
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stopped a vehicle in which Appellant was a passenger, and after
securing a search warrant for the vehicle, discovered 4,529 bags of
heroin.
On March 31, 2010, Appellant was sentenced to seven to fourteen
years’ incarceration. No post-sentence motions were filed.
Appellant’s counsel filed a notice of appeal on May 3, 2010. A panel
of this Court subsequently quashed the appeal as untimely filed.
Commonwealth v. Coley, No. 765 MDA 2010 (Judgment Order) (Pa.
Super. filed December 7, 2010).
On February 3, 2011, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a timely direct
appeal and requesting reinstatement of his appeal rights nunc pro
tunc. On February 17, 2011, the PCRA court reinstated Appellant’s
direct appeal rights. This timely appeal followed. Thereafter the trial
court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925 (b) statement.
Appellant complied and the trial court has filed an opinion in
response.
On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our
consideration:
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that there was
reasonable suspicion to effectuate a motor vehicle stop
of the vehicle in which Appellant was riding.
2. Whether the trial court erred in determining that all of
the evidence seized subsequent to the motor vehicle
stop was seized legally.
3. Whether the trial court committed an abuse of
discretion in failing to grant a mistrial after it
acknowledged that prejudice existed as a result of a
misstatement by the Commonwealth during closing
argument which could not be corrected by a cautionary
instruction.

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4. Whether the trial court committed an error of law, in
not suppressing the evidence recovered after the canine
sniff since the officer was unable to articulate reasonable
grounds for believing that drugs may be present in the
vehicle which would warrant a canine sniff search.
Id. On December 16, 2011, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the
Petitioner’s conviction. Id.
Petitioner filed a timely allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, in which he raised the following issues:
1. Whether the Superior Court erred in affirming the suppression
court’s decision which found reasonable suspicion existed for the
traffic stop when the applicable standard for such stops, as
recognized in the Superior Court’s opinion, is probable cause.
2. Whether the Superior Court lowered the standard for determining
what constitutes probable cause for a violation of the Motor Vehicle
Code by referencing facts which amount to reasonable suspicion
instead of the applicable probable cause standard.
(Doc. 14-4 at 3). On June 5, 2012, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the
petition for allowance. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Coley, CP-35-CR001318-2009, Criminal Docket.
On June 29, 2012, Petitioner filed a timely petition under Pennsylvania’s
Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541, et seq. (“PCRA”). (Doc. No.
14-5, PCRA petition). Petitioner raised the following issues of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel:

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1. That, at the suppression hearing, counsel failed to challenge the
Commonwealth’s failure to provide certification for the canine used
in the sniff search and for his handler.
2. That, at the suppression hearing, counsel failed to challenge the
Commonwealth’s failure to offer evidence to support its allegation
that the dashboard camera was inoperable.
3. That counsel failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
where the Commonwealth failed to establish actual or constructive
possession.
(Doc. No. 14-5 at 4).
On April 30, 2013, the PCRA Court filed a Memorandum and Notice of
Intent to Dismiss Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907.
(Doc. 14-9, Memorandum and Notice Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
Procedure 907). The PCRA court denied Petitioner’s first two claims because the
Superior Court had already upheld the suppression court’s ruling. Id. The court
denied the third claim on its merits. Id.
On January 2, 2013, Coley filed a notice of appeal to the Pennsylvania
Superior Court. (Doc.14-6). He raised the following issues for review:
1. Whether the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Petitioner had actual or constructive possession of a
controlled substance.
2. Whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to
investigate, research, obtain, and present valuable information.
Id.
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By Memorandum Opinion dated April 30, 2014, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court declined to review the first claim because, as a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence, it is not cognizable in a PCRA petition. (Doc. 14-10, Superior
Court Opinion). The second claim was one of the alleged ineffectiveness of
counsel and was divided into three subclaims. The first was that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to interview or obtain a statement from the owner of the
vehicle. Id. The Court found this claim waived because it was not raised in the
PCRA petition. Id. Petitioner’s next subclaim was that counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the admission of testimony regarding the canine sniff on the
basis that neither the officer nor the police dog had the requisite certifications.
As to this claim, the Superior Court found that the claim was factually incorrect
as both the officer and the police dog did have proper certifications. Id.
Therefore, the underlying claim lacked arguable merit and trial counsel had no
basis to object to the admission of the officer’s testimony. Id.
Finally, Petitioner claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
request the preclusion of Trooper Horan’s testimony regarding the vehicle stop
on the basis that the Trooper’s MVR dashboard camera was not operational and
did not record the traffic stop. As to this claim, the Court found that Trooper
Horan’s testimony regarding the traffic stop was clearly admissible without the

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admission of a contemporaneous audio/video recording. Id. The Superior Court
found that, therefore, counsel had no reasonable basis to object to the admission
of Trooper Horan’s testimony based upon the absence of an audio/video
recording of the stop. Id. No further appeal was filed.
On December 8, 2014, Coley filed the instant petition for writ of habeas
corpus in which he raises the following challenges to his conviction and
sentence:
1.

Due to trial counsel’s deficient performance, Petitioner
was denied a full, fair, and adequate adjudication of guilt
or innocence at his suppression hearing of whether the
vehicle in which he was a passenger violated the Motor
Vehicle Code.

2.

The Common Pleas Court was unreasonable in its
application of law when it affirmed the traffic stop of the
vehicle in which the Petitioner was a passenger.
Petitioner questions whether the court’s action was
constitutionally sound.

(Doc. 1, petition).

II.

Standards of Review
A habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 is the proper

mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the “fact or duration” of his confinement.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-499 (1973). “[I]t is not the province of

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a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law
questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-8 (1991). Rather, federal habeas
review is restricted to claims based “on the ground that [petitioner] is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§2254(a); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-8 (1991); see also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S.
37, 41 (1984); Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104 (3d Cir. 1997).
A. Exhaustion
It is well-established that a federal court may not entertain the merits of a
petition for writ of habeas corpus unless available state court remedies have
been exhausted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,
842 (1999).1 Because the exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state
courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before
those claims are presented to the federal courts, state prisoners must invoke one
complete round of the state’s established appellate review process. Id. at 845.
The habeas corpus petitioner shoulders the burden of establishing

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Exhaustion is excused if “there is an absence of available State corrective
process[,] or ... circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the applicant.” Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 163 (3d Cir.
2000), quoting 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(B)(i) and (ii). Hence, “exhaustion is not
required if there is inordinate delay in state procedures, id. at 250, or if state
officials have obstructed the petitioner's attempts to obtain state remedies.” Id.
at 163, citing Mayberry v. Petsock, 821 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1987).
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exhaustion of state court remedies. Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir.
2000), citing Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d. Cir. 1997). The
threshold inquiry in the exhaustion analysis is whether the claims asserted in the
habeas corpus petition have been “fairly presented” to the state courts. Picard
v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). “All claims that a petitioner in state custody
attempts to present to a federal court for habeas review must have been fairly
presented to each level of the state courts.” Lines, 208 F.3d at 159. See also
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004)(holding that “to provide the State with the
necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly present’ his claim in each
appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of
discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the
claim.”).
Respondents concede that Petitioner has exhausted state court remedies.
B. Merits
Section 2254(d) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides, in pertinent
part, that an application for a writ of habeas corpus premised on a claim
previously adjudicated on the merits in state court shall not be granted unless:
(1) [the decision] was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or

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(2) [the decision] was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. §2254(d). To establish that the decision was contrary to federal law
“it is not sufficient for the petitioner to show merely that his interpretation of
Supreme Court precedent is more plausible than the state court’s; rather, the
petitioner must demonstrate that Supreme Court precedent requires the contrary
outcome.” Matteo v. Superintendent, 171 F.3d 877, 888 (3d Cir. 1999). Similarly,
a federal court will only find a state court decision to be an unreasonable
application of federal law if the decision, “evaluated objectively and on the merits,
resulted in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified under existing
Supreme Court precedent.” Id.
Further, under 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1), a federal court is required to
presume that a state court’s findings of fact are correct. A petitioner may only
rebut this presumption with clear and convincing evidence of the state court’s
error. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 341 (2003) (stating that the clear and
convincing standard in §2254(e)(1) applies to factual issues, whereas the
unreasonable application standard of §2254(d)(2) applies to factual decisions)
Matteo, 171 F.3d at 888; Thomas v. Varner, 428 F.3d 492, 497-98 (3d Cir. 2005).
This presumption of correctness applies to both explicit and implicit findings of

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fact. Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 2000). Consequently, a
habeas petitioner “must clear a high hurdle before a federal court will set aside
any of the state court’s factual findings.” Mastracchio v. Vose, 274 F.3d 590,
597-98 (1st Cir. 2001).
Like the “unreasonable application” prong of paragraph (1), a factual
determination should be adjudged “unreasonable” under paragraph (2) only if the
court finds that a rational jurist could not reach the same finding on the basis of
the evidence in the record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Porter v. Horn, 276 F. Supp
2d 278, 296 (E.D. Pa. 2003); see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107-08
(9th Cir. 2000); cf. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979). “This provision
essentially requires the district court to step into the shoes of an appellate
tribunal, examining the record below to ascertain whether sufficient evidence
existed to support the findings of fact material to the conviction.” Breighner v.
Chesney, 301 F. Supp 2d 354, 364 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(2)
and (f)2). Mere disagreement with an inferential leap or credibility judgment of the
state court is insufficient to permit relief. Porter, 276 F. Supp 2d at 296; see also

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“If the applicant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence adduced in such
State court proceeding to support the State court’s determination of a factual
issue made therein, the applicant, if able, shall produce that part of the record
pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such
determination.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(f).
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Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 408-09 (2000); Hurtado v. Tucker, 245 F.3d 7,
16 (1st Cir. 2001). Only when the finding lacks evidentiary support in the state
court record or is plainly controverted by evidence therein should the federal
habeas court overturn a state court’s factual determination. Porter, 276 F. Supp
2d at 296; see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09.
1.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), the United States
Supreme Court held that to prove a constitutional violation for ineffective
assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner must meet a two-pronged test. The
petitioner must show “that counsel's performance was deficient” and that “the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687; accord Deputy v.
Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1493 (3d Cir.1994).
To demonstrate deficient performance, a petitioner must show that
“counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; accord Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir.
2001). A reviewing court must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; accord Jermyn, 266 F.3d at 282; Berryman v.
Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1094 (3d Cir. 1996). If, under the circumstances,
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counsel's actions might be considered sound trial strategy, the presumption is
not rebutted, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, because “substantial deference is to
be accorded counsel's tactical decisions.” United States v. Wiener, 127 F.
Supp.2d 645, 648 (M.D. Pa. 2001). A decision supported by “reasonable
professional judgment does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See
Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987). It follows that counsel cannot be
deemed ineffective for pursuing a meritless claim. Hartey v. Vaughn, 186 F.3d
367, 372 (3d Cir. 1999).
A petitioner satisfies the second prong and shows prejudice when “there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694; accord Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348, 358 (3d Cir.1992) “Without
proof of both deficient performance and prejudice to the defense ... it could not
be said that the sentence or conviction resulted from a breakdown in the
adversary process that rendered the result of the proceeding unreliable, and the
sentence or conviction should stand.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695
(2002)(internal quotations and citation omitted). In assessing whether the result
of the proceeding might have been different, a reviewing court must consider the
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“totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695;
Jermyn, 266 F.3d at 283. However, “a court can choose to address the prejudice
prong before the ineffectiveness prong and reject an ineffectiveness claim solely
on the ground that the defendant was not prejudiced.” Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d
671, 678 (3d. Cir. 2006). “The object of an ineffective assistance claim is not to
grade counsel's performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffective
assistance claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect
will often be so, that course should be followed.” Id.
When the Pennsylvania state courts reviewed the claims raised by Coley,
Strickland’s familiar two-pronged test was the “clearly established federal law”
applicable to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Under Pennsylvania state
jurisprudence, a three-prong test is applied to ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, but is, in substance, identical to the Strickland test. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 565 Pa. 51, 771 A.2d 751, 757 (Pa. 2001). The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that Pennsylvania’s test for assessing
ineffective assistance of counsel claims is not contrary to Strickland. Jacobs v.
Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 107 n. 9 (3d Cir. 2005); Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 204
(3d Cir. 2000). Thus, under §2254(d)(1), the relevant inquiry in addressing an
ineffectiveness claim that has been adjudicated on the merits is whether the
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Pennsylvania state court decision involved an unreasonable application of
Strickland. Jacobs, 395 F.3d at 107 n. 9; Werts, 228 F.3d at 204.
Petitioner in this case advances no argument that the Superior Court
decision is contrary to existing United States Supreme Court precedent. In this
regard, Petitioner does not maintain that the ineffective assistance test applied
by the state court is inconsistent with the test established in Strickland and
developed in its progeny. Thus, Petitioner’s individual assertion of ineffective
assistance will be considered against this standard.
Petitioner claims that due to trial counsel’s deficient performance,
Petitioner was denied a full, fair, and adequate adjudication of guilt or innocence
at his suppression hearing of whether the vehicle in which he was a passenger
violated the Motor Vehicle Code.
In addressing this issue on appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found
as follows:
Finally, Coley argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he
failed to request that the trial court preclude Trooper Horan’s
testimony regarding the traffic stop of the vehicle on the basis that
Trooper Horan’s MVR dashboard camera was not operational and
did not record the traffic stop. Brief for Appellant at 23-24. According
to Coley, “[t]he lack of audio & video evidence to transcribe the
events as they took place[] left [Coley] at a significant disadvantage
in his defense.” Id. at 23 (parentheses omitted); see also id. at 24
(alleging that “Trooper [Horan] inadvertently violated [Coley’s] rights
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to due process [] and a fair trial.” (capitalization omitted)).
Although the MVR dashboard camera did not record the traffic stop,
Trooper Horan’s testimony regarding the stop was clearly admissible
even without the admission fo a contemporaneous audio/video
recording of the stop. Accordingly, Coley’s ineffectiveness claim fails
because trial counsel had no reasonable basis to object to the
admission of Trooper Horan’s testimony regarding the traffic stop
based upon the absence of an audio/video recording of the stop.
(Doc. 14-10 at 6-7).
The Superior Court’s decision does not reflect an unreasonable application
of the Strickland test, nor is it an unreasonable application of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in state court.
Trooper Horan testified at the suppression hearing that he had observed
a black Chevrolet Cobalt traveling north on Route 81 which drove over the white
fog line on the right side of the road and almost hit a construction barrier. (Doc.
14-1, N.T., 10/6/09 Suppression Hearing, p. 17). He then observed the vehicle
shoot across the left side of the road on the fog line and drive onto the berm
almost onto the median. Id. at 17-18. Trooper Horan was concerned that the
vehicle was going to crash. Id. at 32. Once the vehicle cleared the construction
area, Trooper Horan initiated a traffic stop. Id. at 18.
Trooper Horan testified that as he approached the rear of the vehicle, there
were numerous air fresheners lined along the back of the car. Id. at 19. When
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Trooper Horan approached the passenger side of the vehicle, he observed two
male occupants. Id. He also observed several more air fresheners across the
dashboard and on the floor of the front of the vehicle. Id. at 19-20. Trooper Horan
advised Harper – the driver – that he was pulling him over because he was
“driving all over the place” to which Harper responded that he was falling asleep.
Id. at 20.
As found by the Superior Court, counsel did not err in failing to object to
Trooper Horan’s testimony, which was admissible despite the fact that there was
no audio or video evidence of the stop. The Court knows of no requirement that
testimony regarding a traffic stop must be accompanied by such evidence.
Accordingly, Coley cannot show either prong of Strickland as Coley’s trial
counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to Trooper Horan’s testimony, as
there was simply no strategic basis to do so, and Coley suffered no prejudice.
Therefore, Coley’s claim is without merit.
2. Trial Court Error
Petitioner next claims that the Common Pleas Court was unreasonable in
its application of law when it affirmed the traffic stop of the vehicle in which the
Petitioner was a passenger. Petitioner questions whether the court’s action was
constitutionally sound. Specifically, he challenges the trial court’s denial of his
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motion to suppress the traffic stop and all evidence resulting therefrom, arguing
that Trooper Horan lacked sufficient facts to support a reasonable suspicion that
a motor vehicle violation had been committed.
To the extent that Coley argues that there was no probable cause for his
arrest, such a claim must be dismissed. An illegal arrest provides no basis for
collateral attack on judgment obtained after notice and fair trial. Shack v.
Attorney General of State of Pennsylvania, 776 F.2d 1170, 1172 (3d Cir. 1985)
(citing U.S. v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980)). “[W]hen one ... is convicted of
a crime after notice and a fair trial, defects in the pretrial proceedings are not
ordinarily considered sufficiently ‘fundamental’ to justify collateral attack.” Id. In
addition, any Fourth Amendment claim Coley may be attempting to assert must
be denied. When a duly convicted state prisoner has had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim, the refusal of the state courts
to grant relief cannot provide a basis for federal habeas review. Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976); see also Cardwell v. Taylor, 461 U.S. 571 (1983) (per
curiam) (consideration of a claim that evidence admitted at trial was the fruit of
an illegal arrest could not be considered on a habeas corpus petition as long as
the state courts had afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate that claim). The
Third Circuit has held a “full and fair opportunity” means there must have been
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procedures by which a defendant could have litigated a Fourth Amendment
claim. See Hubbard v. Jeffes, 653 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 1981); Boyd v. Mintz,
631 F.2d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 1980).
The Petitioner was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim
in the Pennsylvania state courts. The legality of the search was challenged by
the Petitioner at the Pretrial Hearing. (See Doc. 14-1, Pretrial Hearing
Transcript). Coley then raised the issue on appeal to the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania, (See Doc. 14-8, Superior Court Opinion), and finally, on appeal
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. (See Doc. 14-4, Petition for Allowance of
Appeal). Thus, it is readily apparent that Coley has had a full opportunity to have
this claim reviewed, and as a result, federal review of this claim is foreclosed.

III.

Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2253(c), unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability (“COA”), an appeal may not be taken from a final order
in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §2254. A COA may issue only if the applicant
has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C.
§2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of
reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional
18

claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322
(2003). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds
without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should
issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484 (2000). Here, jurists of reason would not find the procedural disposition
of this case debatable. Accordingly, no COA will issue. A separate Order will be
issued.

IV.

Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the petition for writ of habeas corpus will be

DENIED. An appropriate order will follow.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
Dated: April 9, 2018
O:\Mannion\shared\MEMORANDA - DJ\CIVIL MEMORANDA\2014 MEMORANDA\14-2328-01.wpd

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