Collins v. DeRose et al

Filing 38

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Since Plaintiff has not submitted a Rule 1042.3 certificate of merit or otherwise indicated that he has retained an expert witness, it is appropriate for this court to dismiss his pendent state law claim of medical malpractice/negligence claims against PrimeCare without prejudice. See Osorio v. United States, 2007 WL 2008498 *2 (W.D. Pa. July 5, 2007); see also Henderson v. Pollack,2008 WL 282372 *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan 31, 2008)(Caldwell, J.)(citing Hartman v. Low Security Correctional Institution, Allenwood, 2005 WL 1259950 * 3 (M.D. Pa. May 27, 2005)(Muir, J.).Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 2/8/16. (cc)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA MATTHEW A. COLLINS, Plaintiff CIVIL NO. 3 : CV -14- 2425 v. DOMMINICK L. DEROSE, ET AL., FILED •.1\. 'TO (Judge Conaboy) Defendants . 0 B 2016 -- MEMORANDUM Background Matthew A . Collins (Plaintiff), an inmate presently confined at the Forest State Correctional Institution, Marienville, Pennsylvania (SCI -Forest) , initiated this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. previously ordered . Service of the Complaint was Named as Defendants are Plaintiff's prior place of in carceration , the Dauphin County Prison, the prison's Medical Department, and its Warden Dominick DeRose. According to the Complaint and attached exhibits, on the morning of August 24, 2014, while on a work detail the Plaintiff slipped and fell on a "wet and saturated" floor in an upstairs shower area of the Dauphin County Prison. Doc. 1, p. 3. Collins indicates that there were no wet floor signs near the site and the area was unlit at the time of his fall. As a result of his mishap, Plaintiff allegedly injured his back, lower back, and tail bone. 1 ~ Collins acknowledges that prison medical staff were notified and responded within ten minutes. He was helped off the floor and son's medi was taken to the department but was allegedly not provided with any treatment. In response to Plaintiff's continued complaints of lower back pain, an x-ray was ordered and performed on August 26, 2014. cribed Naprosyn He was also r pain. Thereafter, Collins was transferred to a state correctional facility where he is allegedly been scribed a cane and pain medication. The Complaint also udes a claim that although Collins has undergone diabetes ison, he was deni testing at the "diabetic me previously prescribed cation for 6 month[s]." Id. at p. 4. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for pain, suffering, negligence, and emotional stress. Presently pending is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant PrimeCare Medical, Inc. identified in t Doc. 20. ("PrimeCare") which is erroneously Complaint as being Defendant Medical Department. 1 Plaintiff has opposed motion. See Doc. 23. Discussion Standard of Review Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) provides for the dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6), the court must "accept as true all factual legations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can 1. PrimeCare is a pr e corporation which has been contracted by the Dauphin County Prison to provide health care for its inmates. 2 be drawn therefrom, and ew them in t the plaintiff." light most favorable to 489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005)). A plaintiff must present facts that, if true, demonstrate a plausible ri to relief. See R. . P. 8 (a) (stating that the complaint should include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This requirement "calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery 11 reveal evidence of" the necessary elements of the plaintiff's cause of action. "more than an unadorned, the Id. at 556. A complaint must contain fendant unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 , 678 (2009). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice." conclusions must be supported by factual all Legal ions and the complaint must state a plausible claim for relief. See . at 679. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculat level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, at 555. The reviewing court must determine whether t complaint "contain[sj either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory." . at 5 County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 ; see also (3d Cir. 2008) (in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege in his complaint "enough facts to se a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessa 3 element[sj" of a particular cause of action). Additionally, be construed liberally, QKQ se pleadings are to 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Personal Involvement PrimeCare's initial argument is that against it are improperly "premised upon 21, p. 9. Plaintiff's c1a carious liability." The moving Defendant adds that t Doc. Complaint does not raise any averments showing that it had any policies or customs which res ed in del rate indifference. A plaintiff, in order to state an actionable ci two essential elements: claim, must pI (1) that 1 rights conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of law, (2) that said conduct depri the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, United States. 638 (3d Cir. 1995); Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1141 42 (3d Cir. 1990). Furthermore, federal civil rights claims brought under 1983 cannot premised on a theory of respondeat superior. 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). named defendant must be shown, via § Rode v. Rather, each complaint's allegations, to have been personally involved in the events or occurrences which underlie a claim. v. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) i Hampton Holmesburq Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976). explained in Rode: A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement the alleged wrongs. [PJersonal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. legations of participation or actual 4 As knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity. II~~~' 845 F.2d at 1207. In order to establish a viable § 1983 claim against a private corporate entity such as PrimeCare, it must be asserted that said defendant had a policy, practice, or custom which caused injury 2009 WL 890683 * 2 (E.D. to the plaintiff. See Pa. March 31, 2009) (a private health care provider can only be liable under § 1983 if claim rests upon some policy, practice or Riddick v. Modery, 250 Fed. Appx. 482, 483-84 custom); see (3d Cir. 2007); Carpenter v. Kloptoski, 2010 WL 891825 * 8 (M.D. Pa. March 10, 2010) (§ 1983 claim against ivate medical se ce solely on the basis that it was responsible for providing health care is subject to dismissal) . In Natale v. Camden Cty. Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003), the Third rcu Court of Appeals addressed a delayed treatment claim by a diabetic pre-trial detainee who entered confinement with a medical direct must have insulin while incarcerated. stating that he The Court Appeals stat liability could exist against an entity such as PrimeCare if it "turned a blind eye to an obviously inadequate practice." Natale, 318 F. 3d at 584 Based upon a careful review of the Comp int, Collins makes no assertion that PrimeCare enacted any policy, custom, or practice which resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights. the Complaint concedes that Plaintiff received an x medication following Second, and pain s fall and also underwent testing for his diabetes. Unlike Natale there is no basis for a claim that PrimeCare 5 failed to create a policy to provide injured or diabetic prisoners. the necessary treatment of Rather, this case concerns a prisoner's claim that there was failure to adequately treat an injury and his diabetes but the Complaint does not point to any policy or practice that caused that failure. Stankowski v. 487 F. Supp.2d 543, 554-555 (M.D. Pa. 2007). As such, there is no discernible basis for liability against PrimeCare. Accordingly, PrimeCare's request for entry of dismissal will be granted. Carpenter v. Kloptoski, 2010 WL 891825 * 8 (M.D. Pa. March 10, 2010) (§ 1983 claim against private medical service solely on the basis that was responsible for providing health care is subject to dismissal). Deliberate Indifference PrimeCare alternatively argues that Plaintiff's claim of constitutionally insufficient medical care following his mishap is insufficient. Doc. 21, p. 9. Specifically, is asserted that the there is no basis for a discernible claim because Collins acknowledges that he was provided with medical assistance within minutes following his 11 which eventually included the taking of an x ray and administration of pain medication. The Defendant adds that since Plaintiff admits that he was given a finger stick blood glucose test and was able to get by without diabetes medication for the duration of his six month stay in the Dauphin County Prison the alleged denial of an !unidentified purportedly previously prescribed medication did not constitute deliberate indifference. See id. at pp. 9-10. 2. Plaintiff's opposing brief lists three medications, Metformin (continued ... ) 6 The Eighth Amendment "requires son officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it 182 F.3d 192, 197 ( Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). s incarcerated." Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. In order to establish an Eighth cal claim, an inmate must allege acts or omissions by Amendment prison officials sufficiently harmful to ev indif Rouse deliberate rence to a serious medical 372 F.3d 218, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2004); Natale v. Camden Cty. Correctional 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). In the context of medical care, the relevant inquiry is whether the deliberately aintiff's s fendant was: (1) fferent (the subjective component) to (2) the ous medical (the object component) . Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987) i West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1979). A serious medical need is "one that has been diagnos by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a attention." Mines v. Levi, 2009 WL 839011 *7 2009) (quoting Colburn, 946 F.2d at 1023) Inmates, 834 F.2d at 347. (E.n. Pa. March 26, i "[IJf unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain results as a cons of r's quate medical care, the of denial or delay in the provision cal need is of the serious nature contemplated by the Eighth Amendment." Young v. Kazmerski, 266 Fed. Appx. 191, 193 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. n~~~~' igent conduct that leads to 834 F.2d at 347). Mere 2. ( ... continued) (a type 2 diabetes medication), Hetz, and 2. 7 irin. Doc. 23, p. serious injury of a prisoner does not expose an individual to liability under § 1983. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986) . with respect to serious medical ne requirement, this Court is satisfied that Plaintiff's allegation of having diabetes satisfies the serious medical need standard at this stage in the proceedings. However, it is questionable as to whether the pain Collins purportedly suffered as a result of his sl medical need. to the level of a ser 3 with respect to the subjective liberate indifference the proper analysis component of and fall rises r del rate indifference is whether a prison official "acted or failed to act de e his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm." II~~~~~~~~~' physician "has condition the 511 U.S. 825, 841 (1994). A complaint that a negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical s not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under ghth Amendment [as] cal malpractice does not come a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." 429 U.S. at 106. When a prisoner has actually been provided wi medical treatment, one cannot always conclude that, if such treatment was inadequate, it was no more than mere negligence. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993). Durmer v. It is true, however, that if inadequate treatment results simply from an error in me judgment, re is no constitutional where a failure or lation. See cal However, lay in providing prescribed treatment is 3. The Plaintiff's opposing brief states that he suffe for two Doc. 23, p. 2 8 in pain rate and motivated by del cal factors, a constitut claim may be presented. See 553, 555 (3d Cir. 2008) (\\del necessa 289 Fed. e indifference is proven if medical treatment is de for non-medical reasons."}. ration of Plaintiff's Based upon a liberal cons tions, the subjective aIle I rate indifference component has n met with respect to De not PrimeCare. Allegations of treatment are medical rna ct r constitutional tri Collins was given t ctice claims, and do not s. ly appropriate diagnostic testing in s, x-rayed for an aIle e to his medical re nal k and given a finger stick blood glucose test when he indicated had diabetes. S PIa tiff's claims as stated to represent his disa by individual unidentifi r at with determinations/assessments members of the prison cal staff/PrimeCare employees after the completion of diagnostic testing, there is no discern e basis for a claim of i PrimeCare. fference against De I rate Certificate of Merit The moving De ndant also contends that Plaintiff's pendent state law claims of medi ligence should be di ssed because he failed to file the required certificate of me Doc. 21, p. 10. Rule 1042.3 requires a person who brings a aim of medical malpractice/negligence to file an appropriate certificate of merit e sixty (60) days therea r with the complaint or wi e 1042.3 certificate must certi 9 that either: (1) an er. The riate licensed professional has s exists areas ied a written statement that there le probability that the conduct which is the subject of the complaint fell outside acceptable professional standards and was a cause in bringing about the harm; (2) the claim of deviation by defendant from an acceptable professional st is based solely upon all ions that other licensed professionals is respons for whom standard; profess rd e deviated from an accept e (3) expert testimony of an appropriate ssional is unnecessary. licensed Courts within this circuit have re zed that Rule 1042.3 is substantive law and should be applied by federal courts sitting In divers Schwalm v. Allstate Boliler & Construction, 2005 WL 1322740 *1 (M.D. Pa. May 17, 2005) (Caputo, J.); Scaramuzza v. Sciolla, 345 F. Supp.2d 508, 509 10 (E.D. Pa. 2004). Plaintiff's rceration or In addit se status is not a viable basis upon which to excuse compl with Rule 1042.3 or the requirement of coming forth with expert cal testimony. See Perez v. Griffin, 2008 WL 2383072 *3 (M.D. Pa. June 9, 2008) (Rule 1042.3 applies to rcerated and Q£Q se plaintiffs and constitutes a rule of substant state law to which plaintiffs in federal court must comply) . S of merit or Plaintiff has not submitted a Rule 1042.3 certificate rwise indicated that he has retained an witness, it is appropr e for this court to dismiss his pendent state law claim of medical malpractice/negligence cla PrimeCare without prejudice. 2008498 *2 rt inst See Osorio v. United States, 2007 WL (W.D. Pa. July 5, 2007); see 10 Henderson v. Pollack, 2008 WL 282372 *4 (M.D. Fa. Jan 31, 2008) (Caldwell, J.) ( ting Hartman v. Low Security Correctional Institution, Allenwood, 2005 WL 1259950 * 3 (M.D. Fa. May 27, 2005) (Muir, States DATED: FEBRUARY cbtcf 2016 11 J.).

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