Collins v. DeRose et al
Filing
38
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Since Plaintiff has not submitted a Rule 1042.3 certificate of merit or otherwise indicated that he has retained an expert witness, it is appropriate for this court to dismiss his pendent state law claim of medical malpractice/negligence claims against PrimeCare without prejudice. See Osorio v. United States, 2007 WL 2008498 *2 (W.D. Pa. July 5, 2007); see also Henderson v. Pollack,2008 WL 282372 *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan 31, 2008)(Caldwell, J.)(citing Hartman v. Low Security Correctional Institution, Allenwood, 2005 WL 1259950 * 3 (M.D. Pa. May 27, 2005)(Muir, J.).Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 2/8/16. (cc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MATTHEW A. COLLINS,
Plaintiff
CIVIL NO. 3 : CV -14- 2425
v.
DOMMINICK L. DEROSE, ET AL.,
FILED
•.1\. 'TO
(Judge Conaboy)
Defendants
. 0 B 2016
-- MEMORANDUM
Background
Matthew A . Collins
(Plaintiff), an inmate presently confined
at the Forest State Correctional Institution, Marienville,
Pennsylvania (SCI -Forest) , initiated this pro se civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
previously ordered .
Service of the Complaint was
Named as Defendants are Plaintiff's prior
place of in carceration , the Dauphin County Prison, the prison's
Medical Department, and its Warden Dominick DeRose.
According to the Complaint and attached exhibits, on the
morning of August 24, 2014, while on a work detail the Plaintiff
slipped and fell on a "wet and saturated" floor in an upstairs
shower area of the Dauphin County Prison.
Doc. 1, p.
3.
Collins
indicates that there were no wet floor signs near the site and the
area was unlit at the time of his fall. As a result of his mishap,
Plaintiff allegedly injured his back, lower back, and tail bone.
1
~
Collins acknowledges that prison medical staff were notified
and responded within ten minutes.
He was helped off the floor and
son's medi
was taken to the
department but was allegedly not
provided with any treatment.
In response to Plaintiff's continued complaints of lower
back pain, an x-ray was ordered and performed on August 26, 2014.
cribed Naprosyn
He was also
r pain.
Thereafter, Collins was
transferred to a state correctional facility where he is allegedly
been
scribed a cane and pain medication.
The Complaint also
udes a claim that although Collins has undergone diabetes
ison, he was deni
testing at the
"diabetic me
previously prescribed
cation for 6 month[s]."
Id. at p. 4.
Plaintiff
seeks compensatory damages for pain, suffering, negligence, and
emotional stress.
Presently pending is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant
PrimeCare Medical, Inc.
identified in t
Doc. 20.
("PrimeCare") which is erroneously
Complaint as being Defendant Medical Department. 1
Plaintiff has opposed
motion.
See Doc. 23.
Discussion
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) provides for the
dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b) (6), the court must "accept as true all factual
legations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can
1.
PrimeCare is a pr
e corporation which has been contracted by
the Dauphin County Prison to provide health care for its inmates.
2
be drawn therefrom, and
ew them in t
the plaintiff."
light most favorable to
489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir.
2007) (quoting
423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005)).
A plaintiff must present facts that, if true, demonstrate a
plausible ri
to relief.
See
R.
. P. 8 (a) (stating that
the complaint should include "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"); Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
This requirement
"calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery
11 reveal evidence of" the necessary elements of the
plaintiff's cause of action.
"more than an unadorned, the
Id. at 556.
A complaint must contain
fendant unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 , 678
(2009).
"Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice."
conclusions must be supported by factual all
Legal
ions and the
complaint must state a plausible claim for relief.
See
. at 679.
"Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculat
level, on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)."
Twombly, at 555.
The reviewing court must determine whether t
complaint "contain[sj either direct or inferential allegations
respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery
under some viable legal theory."
. at 5
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234
; see also
(3d Cir. 2008) (in order to
survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege in his
complaint "enough facts to
se a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of the necessa
3
element[sj" of a
particular cause of action).
Additionally,
be construed liberally,
QKQ
se pleadings are to
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
Personal Involvement
PrimeCare's initial argument is that
against it are improperly "premised upon
21, p. 9.
Plaintiff's c1a
carious liability."
The moving Defendant adds that t
Doc.
Complaint does not
raise any averments showing that it had any policies or customs
which res
ed in del
rate indifference.
A plaintiff, in order to state an actionable ci
two essential elements:
claim, must pI
(1)
that
1 rights
conduct
complained of was committed by a person acting under color of law,
(2) that said conduct depri
the plaintiff of a right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the
Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628,
United States.
638
(3d Cir. 1995); Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135,
1141 42
(3d Cir. 1990).
Furthermore, federal civil rights claims brought under
1983 cannot
premised on a theory of respondeat superior.
845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
named defendant must be shown, via
§
Rode v.
Rather, each
complaint's allegations, to
have been personally involved in the events or occurrences which
underlie a claim.
v.
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) i Hampton
Holmesburq Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976).
explained in Rode:
A defendant in a civil rights action must have
personal involvement
the alleged wrongs.
[PJersonal involvement can be shown
through allegations of personal direction or
of actual knowledge and acquiescence.
legations of participation or actual
4
As
knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be
made with appropriate particularity.
II~~~'
845 F.2d at 1207.
In order to establish a viable
§
1983 claim against a
private corporate entity such as PrimeCare, it must be asserted that
said defendant had a policy, practice, or custom which caused injury
2009 WL 890683 * 2 (E.D.
to the plaintiff. See
Pa. March 31, 2009)
(a private health care provider can only be
liable under § 1983 if claim rests upon some policy, practice or
Riddick v. Modery, 250 Fed. Appx. 482, 483-84
custom); see
(3d
Cir. 2007); Carpenter v. Kloptoski, 2010 WL 891825 * 8 (M.D. Pa.
March 10, 2010)
(§
1983 claim against
ivate medical se
ce solely
on the basis that it was responsible for providing health care is
subject to dismissal) .
In Natale v. Camden Cty. Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d
575, 582
(3d Cir. 2003), the Third
rcu
Court of Appeals
addressed a delayed treatment claim by a diabetic pre-trial detainee
who entered confinement with a medical direct
must have insulin while incarcerated.
stating that he
The Court
Appeals stat
liability could exist against an entity such as PrimeCare if it
"turned a blind eye to an obviously inadequate practice."
Natale,
318 F. 3d at 584
Based upon a careful review of the Comp
int, Collins makes
no assertion that PrimeCare enacted any policy, custom, or practice
which resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights.
the Complaint concedes that Plaintiff received an x
medication following
Second,
and pain
s fall and also underwent testing for his
diabetes. Unlike Natale there is no basis for a claim that PrimeCare
5
failed to create a policy to provide
injured or diabetic prisoners.
the necessary treatment of
Rather, this case concerns a
prisoner's claim that there was failure to adequately treat an
injury and his diabetes but the Complaint does not point to any
policy or practice that caused that failure.
Stankowski v.
487 F. Supp.2d 543, 554-555 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
As such, there
is no discernible basis for liability against PrimeCare.
Accordingly, PrimeCare's request for entry of dismissal will
be granted.
Carpenter v. Kloptoski, 2010 WL 891825 * 8 (M.D.
Pa. March 10, 2010) (§ 1983 claim against private medical service
solely on the basis that
was responsible for providing health
care is subject to dismissal).
Deliberate Indifference
PrimeCare alternatively argues that Plaintiff's claim of
constitutionally insufficient medical care following his mishap is
insufficient.
Doc. 21, p. 9.
Specifically,
is asserted that the there is no basis for
a discernible claim because Collins acknowledges that he was
provided with medical assistance within minutes following his
11
which eventually included the taking of an x ray and administration
of pain medication.
The Defendant adds that since Plaintiff admits
that he was given a finger stick blood glucose test and was able to
get by without diabetes medication for the duration of his six month
stay in the Dauphin County Prison the alleged denial of an
!unidentified purportedly previously prescribed medication did not
constitute deliberate indifference.
See id. at pp. 9-10.
2. Plaintiff's opposing brief lists three medications, Metformin
(continued ... )
6
The Eighth Amendment "requires
son officials to provide
basic medical treatment to those whom it
182 F.3d 192, 197 (
Gamble,
429 U.S. 97
(1976)).
s incarcerated."
Cir. 1999)
(citing Estelle v.
In order to establish an Eighth
cal claim, an inmate must allege acts or omissions by
Amendment
prison officials sufficiently harmful to ev
indif
Rouse
deliberate
rence to a serious medical
372
F.3d 218, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2004); Natale v. Camden Cty. Correctional
318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
In the context of
medical care, the relevant inquiry is whether the
deliberately
aintiff's s
fendant was:
(1)
fferent (the subjective component) to (2) the
ous medical
(the object
component) .
Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d
Cir. 1987) i West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1979).
A serious medical need is "one that has been diagnos
by a
physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a
lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a
attention."
Mines v. Levi, 2009 WL 839011 *7
2009) (quoting Colburn, 946 F.2d at 1023)
Inmates, 834 F.2d at 347.
(E.n. Pa. March 26,
i
"[IJf unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain results as a cons
of
r's
quate medical care, the
of denial or delay in the provision
cal need is of the serious nature
contemplated by the Eighth Amendment." Young v. Kazmerski, 266 Fed.
Appx. 191, 193 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst.
n~~~~'
igent conduct that leads to
834 F.2d at 347). Mere
2.
( ... continued)
(a type 2 diabetes medication), Hetz, and
2.
7
irin.
Doc. 23, p.
serious injury of a prisoner does not expose an individual to
liability under
§
1983.
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48
(1986) .
with respect to
serious medical ne
requirement, this
Court is satisfied that Plaintiff's allegation of having diabetes
satisfies the serious medical need standard at this stage in the
proceedings.
However, it is questionable as to whether the pain
Collins purportedly suffered as a result of his sl
medical need.
to the level of a ser
3
with respect to the subjective
liberate indifference
the proper analysis
component of
and fall rises
r del
rate
indifference is whether a prison official "acted or failed to act
de
e his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm."
II~~~~~~~~~'
physician "has
condition
the
511 U.S. 825, 841 (1994).
A complaint that a
negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical
s not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under
ghth Amendment [as]
cal malpractice does not
come a
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner."
429 U.S. at 106.
When a prisoner has actually been provided wi
medical
treatment, one cannot always conclude that, if such treatment was
inadequate, it was no more than mere negligence.
O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993).
Durmer v.
It is true, however,
that if inadequate treatment results simply from an error in me
judgment,
re is no constitutional
where a failure or
lation.
See
cal
However,
lay in providing prescribed treatment is
3. The Plaintiff's opposing brief states that he suffe
for two
Doc. 23, p. 2
8
in pain
rate and motivated by
del
cal factors, a constitut
claim may be presented.
See
553, 555 (3d Cir. 2008)
(\\del
necessa
289 Fed.
e indifference is proven if
medical treatment is de
for non-medical reasons."}.
ration of Plaintiff's
Based upon a liberal cons
tions, the subjective
aIle
I
rate indifference component has
n met with respect to De
not
PrimeCare. Allegations of
treatment are medical rna
ct
r constitutional
tri
Collins was given t
ctice claims, and do not
s.
ly appropriate diagnostic testing in
s, x-rayed for an aIle
e to his medical
re
nal
k
and given a finger stick blood glucose test when he indicated
had diabetes.
S
PIa
tiff's claims as stated
to represent his disa
by individual unidentifi
r at
with determinations/assessments
members of the prison
cal
staff/PrimeCare employees after the completion of diagnostic
testing, there is no discern
e basis for a claim of
i
PrimeCare.
fference against De
I
rate
Certificate of Merit
The moving De
ndant also contends that Plaintiff's pendent
state law claims of medi
ligence should be di
ssed because
he failed to file the required certificate of me
Doc. 21,
p. 10.
Rule 1042.3 requires a person who brings a
aim of medical
malpractice/negligence to file an appropriate certificate of merit
e
sixty (60) days therea
r with the complaint or wi
e 1042.3 certificate must certi
9
that either:
(1)
an
er.
The
riate
licensed professional has s
exists areas
ied a written statement that there
le probability that the conduct which is the
subject of the complaint fell outside acceptable professional
standards and was a cause in bringing about the harm;
(2) the claim
of deviation by defendant from an acceptable professional st
is based solely upon all
ions that other licensed professionals
is respons
for whom
standard;
profess
rd
e deviated from an accept
e
(3) expert testimony of an appropriate
ssional is unnecessary.
licensed
Courts within this circuit have re
zed that Rule 1042.3
is substantive law and should be applied by federal courts sitting
In
divers
Schwalm v. Allstate Boliler & Construction, 2005 WL
1322740 *1 (M.D. Pa. May 17, 2005) (Caputo, J.); Scaramuzza v.
Sciolla, 345 F. Supp.2d 508, 509 10 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
Plaintiff's
rceration or
In addit
se status is not a viable basis
upon which to excuse compl
with Rule 1042.3 or the requirement
of coming forth with expert
cal testimony.
See Perez v.
Griffin, 2008 WL 2383072 *3 (M.D. Pa. June 9, 2008) (Rule 1042.3
applies to
rcerated and Q£Q se plaintiffs and constitutes a rule
of substant
state law to which plaintiffs in federal court must
comply) .
S
of merit or
Plaintiff has not submitted a Rule 1042.3 certificate
rwise indicated that he has retained an
witness, it is appropr
e for this court to dismiss his pendent
state law claim of medical malpractice/negligence cla
PrimeCare without prejudice.
2008498 *2
rt
inst
See Osorio v. United States, 2007 WL
(W.D. Pa. July 5, 2007); see
10
Henderson v. Pollack,
2008 WL 282372 *4
(M.D.
Fa.
Jan 31, 2008) (Caldwell,
J.) (
ting
Hartman v. Low Security Correctional Institution, Allenwood, 2005 WL
1259950 * 3 (M.D.
Fa. May 27,
2005) (Muir,
States
DATED:
FEBRUARY
cbtcf
2016
11
J.).
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?