Gonzalez v. Wentzel et al

Filing 47

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Pursuant to the above discussion, Plaintiff' s allegations at best set f orth a claim o f negligence against Doctor Moclock. However, allegations which sounds in negligence cannot be pursued under § 1983 under Durmer.Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 2/10/16. (cc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GABRIEL GONZALEZ,
Plaintiff
CIVIL NO.

v.

3:CV-15-184

(Judge Conaboy)

JOHN WENTZEL, ET AL.,
Defendants

MEMORANDUM

Background
Gabriel Gonzalez (Plaintiff), an inmate

sently confined

at the State Correctional Institution, Coal Townsh
(SCI-Coal Twp.),

initiated

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

,

Penns

vania

s pro se civil rights action pursuant

Named as Defendants are Secretary John Wetzel

of the Pennsylvania departement of Corrections

(DOC),

Superintendent Vincent Mooney and Doctor Mi

I Moclock of SCI-

Coal Twp.
According to the
"multiple

rsely worded Compla

eli

Plaintiff has

ic care issues" and pain which are not being

"properly addressed" by the SCI-Coal Twp. Medi
IV.

,

staff.

Doc. 1,

was previously determined to

Gonzalez adds that although

Ie for a handicapped cell in 2012, SCI-Coal

. RN

Supervisor Yackiel, a non-defendant improperly denied his request
grounds that

for such continued placement on

1

is not

'I[

handicapped.

The Compla

and attached exhibits generally

that the Defendants have

concl

ghts as well as

olated his constitutional

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

Gonzalez seeks injunctive relief including placement in a
handicapped accessible cell and eva
Presently pendi
di

ion by an outside physician.

is Defendant Doctor Moclock's motion to

ss or in the alternative for entry of summary judgment.
motion has

Doc. 23.

opposed.

Doc. 27.

Discussion
Motion to Dismiss

Defendant Moclock's pending dispositive motion is suppo
by evidentiary mater

Is outside the pleadi

Civil Procedure l2(d) provides

s.

1 Rule of

part as follows:

If, on a motion under Rule
(b) (6) or
(c), matters outside the p
ding are
ented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion must be treated as one
for summary judgment under Rule 56. All
part s must be given reasonable
opportunity to present all the material
is
rtinent to
motion.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (d).
s Court will not exclude the evidentiary materials
accompanyi

Defendant Moclock's motion.

Thus, the motion will be

treated as solely seeking summary judgment.
States, 306 Fed. Appx. 716, 718

(3d

dismiss has been framed alternat

See Latham v. United

r. 2009) (when a mot

to

ly as a motion for summary

judgment such as in the present case, the alternative filing "is

1.
Plaintiff acknowledges that due to a
ck condition, he has
been designated for lower bunk, lower tier placement.
2

sufficient to place the parties on notice
might be

summary judgment

.")

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper if "the

eadings, the

scovery

and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
P. 56(c);

Fed. R. Civ.

Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 231-32 (3d

Cir. 2001).

A factual di

e is "material" if it might af

outcome of the suit under the applicable law.
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

A

"genuine" only if there is a sufficient
would allow a reasonable
non-moving party.
as to the

Anderson v. Liberty

ctual dispute is
dentiary basis that

ct-finder to return a verdict

Id. at 248.

stence of a

the

r the

The court must resolve all doubts
ne issue of material fact in favor of

the non-moving party.

, 260 F.3d at 232; see

Reeder v.

Sybron Transition Corp., 142 F.R.D. 607, 609 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
Unsubstant

arguments made in brie

are not cons

red

evidence of asserted facts.

984

F.2d 1359, 1370 (3d Cir. 1993).
Once the moving
evidence to support the
moving

there is an absence of

ims of the non-moving party, t

non­

y may not simply sit back and rest on the allegations in

its complaint.
(1986).

rty has shown t

See

, 477 U.S. 317, 324

Instead, it must "go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own

affidavits, or by the
admissions on file, des

sitions, answers to interrogatories, and
specific

3

s showing

there is

a genuine issue for trial."

(internal quotations omitted); see

Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (citations omitted).

Summary

judgment should be granted where a party "fails to make a showing
sufficient to es

ish the

stence of an element essent

1 to

that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at
trial."

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.

"'Such af

rmat

evidence

regardless of whether it is direct or circumstantial - must
amount to more than a scintilla, but may amount to less
evaluation of the court) than a preponderance.'"
at 232

(in the
, 260 F.3d

(quoting Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458,

460 61 (3d Cir. 1989}).
ADA

The Moving Defendant's initial argument contends that t

re

is no basis for liability because individuals cannot be held liable
under Title II of the ADA.

See Doc. 24, p. 4.

As previously

noted, the Complaint seeks partial relief under the ADA on the
basis that Plaintiff was denied adequate care and accommodations
for his chronic back and pain issues.
Plaintiff's opposing brief (Doc. 27) does not spe

fically

address Defendant Moclock's contention that a viable ADA claim has
not been set forth in the Complaint.

Accordingly, this summary

judgment argument will be deemed unopposed
tIe II of the ADA provides that "no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to

4

discrimination by such entity."

42 U.S.C. § 12132.2

The ADA seeks

"to assure even handed treatment and the opportunity for

[disabled]

individuals to participate in and benefit from programs [receiving
financial assistance]. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442
P.C. v. McLaughlin,

U.S. 397 (1979).3 .
r. 1990).

913 F.2d 1033, 1041 (2d

An ADA claim requires applicant to show that challenged
scriminatory animus based upon alleged

action resulted from
disability.

See Brown v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections,

290 Fed. Appx. 463, 467

(3d Cir. 2008).

re is no argument that Gonzalez has failed to
sufficiently demonstrate that
ADA.

is disabled for purposes of the

It has also been recognized that the provisions of t

ADA

are applicable to prisoners confined in state correctional
institutions.

See

Pa. Dept. of Corrections v.

Yeskey, 524 U.S.

206 (1998).
Doctor Moclock, relying on Williams v. Hayman, 657 F.Supp.2d
488, 502 (D.N.J. 2008) and similar decisions, contends that Title
II of

ADA does not authorize suits against government officers

in their individual capacities.
2.
The regulations implement
the ADA define a "quali
individual with a di
lity" as:
"An individual with a
sability who, with
or without reasonable modifications to
rules, policies or practices,
. meets
the essential eligibility requirements for
the.
. participation in programs or
activities provided by a public entity."
28 C.F.R.

§

35.104

ed

(1993).

3.
The "evenhanded treatment" requirement does not, however,
impose an af rmative obligation on public entities to expand
sabled individuals receive the
existing programs but only that
same treatment as those who are not disabled.
5

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Ci

in

296 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2002)
suggested in dicta
and II of the ADA."

"individuals are not liable under Titles I
See

Koslow v. Commonwealth of Pa., 302

F.3d 161, 178 (3d Cir. 2002).

Other courts within this circuit

have reached similar conclusions.

See

~~~~~~~~~~~~~

University, 2014 WL 3974535 *4(D.Del Aug. 11, 2014) (individual
liability not available for ADA cIa

).

Based upon the standards

developed in Emerson and Issa, Defednant Moclock's request for
dismissal of

ADA claim will be granted.

Deliberate Indifference

s that there was deliberate indifference to

Plaintiff all

his medical needs, specifically t

he was improperly denied

eligibility for a handicapped cell.

Defendant Moclock asserts that

he

rst saw Plaintiff on Oct

23, 2014

that a decision to

remove Plaintiff from a handicapped cell

relocate him to a

bottom tier bottom bunk cell was made prior to said date.
24, p. 10.

See Doc.

In support of his contentions the Moving Defendant has

submitted copies of PIa

iff's relevant institut

records and a declaration under penalty of

1 medical

rjury.

Specifically, Moclock avers that that based upon his own
evaluation of the Plainti

and

results of di

stic testing

he made a determination that Gonzalez did not meet the criteria to
have an order for a permanent handicap cell."

Doc. 24 2,

Despite that conclusion, Doctor Moclock notes that
continued to rece

~

12.

aintiff has

prescribed pain medication, a cane and was

6

conditionally moved into a handicap cellon or about January 9,
2015.

4

Amendment "

The

ires prison offi

als to provide

cal treatment to those whom it has incarcerated."

basic

192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)

182 F.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97

(1976)).

(citing

In order to establi

an Eighth

Amendment medical claim, an inmate must allege acts or omissions by
prison

c

0

Is suf

ciently harmful to evidence del

rate

indifference to a serious medical need.

372

F.3d 218, 235 - 36 (3d Cir. 2004); Natale v. Camden Cty.
Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir.

2003).

context of

cal care, the relevant inquiry is whether

defendant was:

(1) del

In the

component) to (2)
objective component).

ely i

fferent

(the subjective

plaintiff's serious medical needs

(the

Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v.

Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987);

571 F. 2d

158, 161 (3d Cir. 1979).
A serious medical need is "one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious
necessity for a doctor's

lay person would easily recognize
attention."
2009) (quoting

a

Mines v. Levi, 2009 WL 839011 *7 (E.D. Pa. March 26,
946 F.2d at 1023);
834 F.2d at 347.

"[I]f

Monmouth Cty. Corr.
unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain results as a consequence of denial or delay in
the p

sion of adequate medical care, the medical need is of the

4.
Doctor Moclock acknowledges that if another inmate w h a more
ser
s medical need enters the prison, the potential exists for
Gonzalez to be removed from the handicapped accessible cell.
7

serious nature contemplated by the Eighth Amendment." Young v.
Kazmerski, 266 Fed. Appx. 191, 193 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Monmouth
Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates, 834 F.2d at 347).
It is undisputed that Plaintiff underwent a partial
discectomy in 2006 to correct a disc herniation.

Thereafter,

Gonzalez has continued to complain of pain and back spasms and has
been continuously been prescribed Methadone since 2005 and has also
been issued a cane and had a handicapped cell assignment from
December 2012 to August 12, 2014.

Based upon those considerations,

this Court is satisfied that the serious medical need requirement
has been satisfied at this juncture in the proceedings.
The Supreme Court has established that the proper analysis
for deliberate indifference is whether a prison of

cial "acted or

failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of
serious harm."

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841 (1994).

A

complaint that a physician or a medical department "has been
negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not
state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth
Amendment [as) medical malpractice does not become a constitutional
violation merely because the victim is a prisoner."
U.S. at 106.

Estelle, 429

When a prisoner has actually been provided with

medical treatment, one cannot always conclude that, if such
treatment was inadequate, it was no more than mere negli
Durmer v.

O'~arroll,

991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993).

See

It is true,

however, that if inadequate treatment results simply from an error
in medical judgment, there is no constitutional violation.

id.

However, where a failure or delay in providing prescribed treatment

8

is deliberate and motivated by non-medical factors, a
constitutional claim may be presented.

See id.;

Ordonez v. Yost,

289 Fed. Appx. 553, 555 (3d Cir. 2008) ("deliberate indifference is
proven if necessary medical treatment is delayed for non-medical
reasons.")
Moreover, a prisoner's disagreement with "evaluations and
opinions regarding him" are insufficient to set forth an actionable
constitutional claim.
1979).

Pain~

v. Baker, 595 F.2d 197, 201

(4 th Cir.

Accordingly, since the undisputed record shows that

Gonzalez has been provided with ongoing treatment (including x­
rays, MRI, back surgery, and pain medication) and that his claims
are solely premised upon his disagreement with a medical
determinations and evaluations that a handicapped cell was not
medically necessary in his case which was made by the Moving
Defendant, Doctor Rashida Laurence as well as other members of the
prison's medical staff, a viable deliberate indifference claim has
not been stated under Estelle.
This determination is bolstered by the fact that Plaintiff
has continued to be provided with pain medication; a lower tier,
bottom bunk designation; a cane; and not alleged that there was any
specific medical treatment which he should have received but was
denied for a non-medical reason or that any prescribed care was
improperly delayed.

Moreover, the record also shows that Doctor

Moclock advised the prison's Health Card Administrator that while
Plaintiff did not satisfy the criteria for handicapped cell
placement, the physician would not object if Plaintiff was placed
in a handicapped cell without a medical order provided that an
inmate with a more serious medical need was not displaced.

9

Finall y , the undisputed rec ord shows that because a handicap
ce ll was available Plaintiff has been transferred to a handicapped
cell without a medical order in January,
initiation of this action.

2015 shortly after the

As such, his request for such

injunctive relief would appear to be moot.
Pursuant to the above di scussion,

Plaintiff ' s allegations at

best set f orth a claim o f negligence against Doctor Moclock.
However,

allegations which sounds in negli g ence cannot be pursued

under § 1983 under Durmer.

CONABOY
United States District

DATED :

FEBRUARY

FIL=D
SCF.lNTO

~
(tJ , 2016

FE8 1 0 2016

ER

10

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