Hopkins v. Luzerne County District Attorney's Office et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Since Hopkins Complaint is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory," his pending claims will be dismissed, without prejudice, as legally frivolous. Wilson, 878 F.2d at 774. An appropriate Order will enter.Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 4/6/15. (cc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KENTLIN HOPKINS,

:
:
Plaintiff
:
:
v.
:
CIVIL NO. 3:CV-15-515
:
LUZERNE CO. DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S :
(Judge Conaboy)
OFFICE, ET AL.,
:
:
Defendants
:
_________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM
Background
Kentlin Hopkins (Plaintiff), an inmate presently confined at
the Luzerne County Correctional Facility, Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania, initiated this pro se civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Plaintiff has also submitted an in forma

pauperis application.1
Named as Defendants are the Luzerne County District
Attorney’s Office and the Luzerne County Correctional Facility.
Plaintiff states that on Tuesday, March 10, 2015 he was made aware
that the Luzerne County District Attorney had placed his life in
danger .

See Doc. 1, ¶ IV(1).

The Complaint vaguely alleges that

two known street gang members were allegedly “given paperwork”
listing Plaintiff’s name and describing him as being a possible

1. Hopkins completed this Court's form application to proceed in
forma pauperis and authorization to have funds deducted from his
prison account. The Court then issued an Administrative Order
directing the Warden at his present place of confinement to
commence deducting the full filing fee from Plaintiff's prison
trust fund account.
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witness in a criminal case against those two gang members.
(2).

Id. at

As a result of that purported conduct, Plaintiff claims that

his safety has been put at risk.
set forth in the Complaint.

There are no other allegations

Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages.
Discussion

28 U.S.C. § 1915 imposes obligations on prisoners who file
civil actions in federal court and wish to proceed in forma
pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, e.g., that the full filing fee
ultimately must be paid (at least in a non-habeas suit)

§

1915(e)(2)provides:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion
thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines
that (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B)
the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.
When considering a complaint accompanied by a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis, a district court may rule that process
should not be issued if the complaint is malicious, presents an
indisputably meritless legal theory, or is predicated on clearly
baseless factual contentions.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

327-28 (1989); Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir.
1989).

Indisputably meritless legal theories are those "in which

either it is readily apparent that the plaintiff's complaint lacks
an arguable basis in law or that the defendants are clearly
entitled to immunity from suit ... ."

Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d

192, 194 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Sultenfuss v. Snow, 894 F.2d 1277,
1278 (11th Cir. 1990)).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
added that "the plain meaning of 'frivolous' authorizes the
dismissal of in forma pauperis claims that . . . are of little or
no weight, value, or importance, not worthy of serious
consideration, or trivial."
1080, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995).

Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d
It also has been determined that "the

frivolousness determination is a discretionary one," and trial
courts "are in the best position" to determine when an indigent
litigant's complaint is appropriate for summary dismissal.

Denton

v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
Luzerne County Correctional Facility
Courts have repeatedly recognized that a prison or
correctional facility is not a person for purposes of civil rights
liability.

See Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir.

1973); Philogene v. Adams County Prison, Civ. No. 97-0043, slip op.
at p. 4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 1997) (Rambo, C.J.); Sponsler v. Berks
County Prison, Civ. A. 95-1136, 1995 WL 92370, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
28, 1995).

Pursuant to the above standards, the Luzerne County

Correctional facility

is clearly not a person and therefore not

subject to civil rights liability.

See Thompkins v. Doe, No. 99-

3941, slip op. at 3 (3d Cir. March 16, 2000).
It is also noted that there are no factual allegations set
forth in the Complaint whatsoever that any prison official engaged
in any conduct which violated the Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights.

There is also no claim by Plaintiff that his

constitutional rights were violated as the result of any policy,
custom or practice of the Luzerne County Correctional Facility.

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See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91
(1978).
District Attorney’s Office
A plaintiff, in order to state an actionable civil rights
claim, must plead two essential elements:

(1) that the conduct

complained of was committed by a person acting under color of

law,

and (2) that said conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.

Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638

(3d Cir. 1995); Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 114142 (3d Cir. 1990).
Claims brought under § 1983 cannot be premised on a theory
of respondeat superior.
(3d Cir. 1988).

Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207

Rather, each named defendant must be shown, via

the complaint's allegations, to have been personally involved in
the events or occurrences which underlie a claim.

See Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials,
546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976).

As explained in Rode:

A defendant in a civil rights action must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. . .
. [P]ersonal involvement can be shown through
allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of
participation or actual knowledge and
acquiescence, however, must be made with
appropriate particularity.
Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
A municipal body or other local governmental unit, not part
of a state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, is a "person" subject
to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91

(“Congress did intend municipalities and other local government
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units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.”)
“Local governing bodies, like every other § 1983 'person,' by the
very terms of the statute, may be sued for constitutional
deprivations visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though
such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's
official decisionmaking channels.”

Id.

See also Board of County

Comm'rs of Bryan County, OK v. Brown, 520 U.S. 398, 403-07 (1997);
Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 196-97 (3d Cir. 1990); Illiano v.
Clay Township, 892 F. Supp. 117, 121 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
However, it has been repeatedly held that a municipality may
not be subjected to § 1983 liability on a theory of respondeat
superior.

Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 403; City of Canton v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 47879 (1986); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89
F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895
F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990).

Rather, "... a plaintiff seeking

to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 [is required] to
identify a municipal 'policy' or 'custom' that caused the
plaintiff's injury."
at 971.

Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 403; Beck, 89 F.3d

In Bryan County, the United States Supreme Court

elaborated on the showing required for municipal liability under §
1983, stating:
. . . [I]t is not enough for a § 1983
plaintiff merely to identify conduct
properly attributable to the municipality.
The plaintiff must also demonstrate that
through its deliberate conduct, the
municipality was the 'moving force' behind
the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff
must show that the municipal action was
taken with the requisite degree of
culpability and must demonstrate a direct
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causal link between the municipal action
and the deprivation of federal rights.
Id. at 404; see Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir.
1996).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
held that a municipality can be held liable under § 1983 "only when
'execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury.'"

Andrews, 895

F.2d at 1480 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).2
A review of the present complaint establishes that Hopkins
has not set forth any claim that his constitutional rights were
violated as the result of any Luzerne County District Attorney’s
Office policy or custom.

Consequently, the District Attorney’s

Office, which is clearly a local government unit, is also entitled
to entry of summary dismissal.

2.
There are two ways in which a governmental policy or custom is
established:
Policy is made when a 'decisionmaker
possess[ing] final authority to establish
municipal policy with respect to the
action' issues an official proclamation,
policy, or edict. Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481, 106 S. Ct.
1292, 1299, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1986). A
course of conduct is considered to be a
'custom' when, though not authorized by
law, 'such practices of state officials
[are] so permanent and well settled' as to
virtually constitute law. Monell, 436
U.S. at 690, 98 S. Ct. at 2035 (quoting
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
167-68, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1613-14, 26 L. Ed.
2d 142 (1970)). Accord Anela v. City of
Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1063, 1067 (3d Cir.
1986).

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It is additionally noted that although no individual
employee of the District Attorney’s Office is named as a defendant
in this matter, there is no assertion that the alleged improper
release of personal information was undertaken by a employee of the
District Attorney’s Office as part of that person’s administrative
or investigative duties.
It is a well-established principle of law that a state
prosecuting attorney is absolutely immune from liability for damage
under § 1983 for acts such as the initiation of the prosecution and
presentation of the state's case which are intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the criminal process.

Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976); Urrutia v. Harrisburg County
Police Dep't, 91 F.3d 451, 462 (3d Cir. 1996).

However, only

qualified immunity is available to prosecutors with regard to
allegations based on their administrative and/or investigative
duties.

See Hawk v. Brosha, 590 F. Supp. 337, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1984).

Emotional Injury
Finally, Plaintiff is not entitled to recover compensatory
damages for mental anguish or emotional injury.

42 U.S.C. §

1997e(e) provides that “[n]o federal civil action may be brought by
a prisoner confined in a jail, prison or other correctional
facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury."

In Allah v. Al-

Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247,250 (3d Cir. 2000), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized that where a plaintiff
fails to allege actual injury, Section 1997e(e) bars recovery of
compensatory damages.

However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals

added that an inmate alleging a violation of his constitutional
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rights may still pursue the action to recover nominal and/or
punitive damages even in the absence of compensable harm.
Under the standards announced in Allah, Plaintiff’s request
for monetary relief to the extent that it seeks compensatory
damages for emotional and mental injuries for violation of his
constitutional rights is barred by Section 1997e(e).
Conclusion
Since Hopkins’ Complaint is "based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory," his pending claims will be dismissed,
without prejudice, as legally frivolous.

Wilson, 878 F.2d at 774.

An appropriate Order will enter.

S/Richard P. Conaboy____
RICHARD P. CONABOY
United States District Judge

DATED: APRIL 6, 2015

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