Solomon v. United States of America

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry). Signed by Honorable Edwin M. Kosik on 5/25/2016. (emksec, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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Petitioner,
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v.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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Respondent.
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JELANI SOLOMON,

Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-1323
(Judge Kosik)

MEMORANDUM
Petitioner, Jelani Solomon, an inmate currently confined at the United States
Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, filed pro se, this petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1). Solomon contends that the payments required by the
Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”) conflict with the
sentencing court’s order regarding restitution payments. (Id.) On August 13, 2015, Solomon
filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 7), which was subsequently denied by the
Magistrate Judge Martcin C. Carlson (Doc. 10). Then, on November 9, 2015, the Magistrate
Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that Solomon’s Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied. (Doc. 12). Solomon filed Objections to the R&R (Doc.
13), and Respondents filed a Response to Petitioner’s Objections (Doc. 14). For the reasons
that follow, we will adopt the R&R.
Background
In the instant Petition for Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Solomon contends
that the minimum quarterly payment requirement for the IFRP of $25.00, conflicts with the
sentencing court’s order, which states, in pertinent part, “Payments are initially to be made
through [Solomon’s] participation in the United State Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial
Responsibility Program, through which fifty (50%) percent of defendant’s prison salary shall
be applied toward the payment of restitution.” (Doc. 8). Respondent counters that not only is
the IFRP constitutional, but that Solomon’s participation in the same does not contradict the

sentencing court’s order. (Doc. 8).
Standard of Review
When objections are filed to an R&R of a Magistrate Judge, we must make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); see also Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1106 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989). In doing so, we
may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by
the Magistrate Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Local Rule 72.31. Although our review is de
novo, we are permitted to rely upon the Magistrate Judge’s proposed recommendations to the
extent we, in the exercise of sound discretion, deem proper. See United States v. Raddatz,
447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980); see also Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 (3d Cir. 1984). For the
portions not objected to, the usual practice of the district court is to give “reasoned
consideration” to a magistrate judge’s report prior to adopting it. Henderson v. Carlson, 812
F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1987).
Discussion
Habeas corpus petitions brought under § 2241 are subject to summary dismissal
pursuant to Rule 4 (“Preliminary Consideration by the Judge”) of the Rules Governing Section
2254 Cases in the United States District Court.1 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Federal habeas corpus
relief is limited to inquiries into the “legality of detention.” Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532,
540 (3d Cir. 2002); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). The petitioner must attack the
“validity of the continued conviction or the fact or length of the sentence.” Id. at 542. 28
U.S.C. § 2241 “confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is
challenging not the validity but the execution of his sentence.” Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d
480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001).

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While subdivision (a) of Rule 1 addresses applications brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, subdivision (b)
provides that rules may be applied in § 2241 actions at the discretion of the United States District Court. This Court
has long found Rule 4 applicable to habeas proceedings brought under § 2241, e.g., Health v. Bell, 448 F.Supp. 416,
417 (M.D. Pa. 1977); Patton v. Fenton, 491 F. Supp. 156, 158-59 (M.D. Pa. 1979); Francis v. U.S., 2009 WL
1010522 (M.D. Pa. 2009), and there is no sound reason not to apply Rule 4 in this case.

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The IFRP has been recognized as constitutional. See Pinet v. Grondoslky, 345 F.
App’x 826, 829, n.3d (3d Cir. 2009). However, challenges to the IFRP’s payment schedule
concerns the execution of sentence, and are, therefore “correctly framed as § 2241 claims
brought in the district where the sentence is being carried out.” McGee v. Martinez, 627 F.3d
933, 936 (3d Cir. 2010) citing Matheny v. Morrison, 307 F.3d 709, 711-12 (8th Cir. 2002).
The IFRP allows prisoners to meet their financial responsibilities by contracting for a payment
schedule with BOP staff. Failure to participate in the program or make agreed upon payments
can affect an inmate’s eligibility for participation in various BOP programs, as well as being
placed on IFRP refusal status.
Solomon’s only objection to the R&R is whether BOP’s implementation of the IFRP,
with respect to the payment terms imposed on him, conflict with the sentencing court’s order.
The sentencing court’s order provides that “[p]ayments are initially to be made through
[Solomon’s] participation in the United State Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial
Responsibility Program, through which fifty (50%) percent of defendant’s prison salary shall
be applied toward the payment of restitution.” (Doc. 8). Solomon contends that the IFRP’s
minimum $25.00 quarterly payment violates this order because there could be a point in time
that the $25.00 quarterly payments are greater than 50% of his prison salary.
Respondent counters that Solomon’s claim fails for “two independent reasons.” (Doc.
8). First, Respondent notes that Solomon has earned over $750.00 in prison salary; thus,
pursuant to the sentencing order, Solomon owes 50%, or at least $375.00, towards restitution.
Therefore, the IFRP’s $25.00 quarterly payment plainly does not exceed the “limit” placed on
Solomon’s restitution payments. (Id.).
Respondent advances its second argument that even assuming a $25.00 quarterly
payment could result in Solomon paying more than 50% of his prison salary, the quarterly
payment is permissible because the sentencing court “explicitly requires that Solomon
participate in the IFRP.” (Id.). Even more, the $25.00 quarterly payment minimum was the

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standard payment in place at the time of the sentencing judge’s order. (Id.). While we find
Respondent’s argument to be persuasive and consistent with the sentencing judge’s order, we
need not reach that determination here as Solomon’s claim is not ripe for judicial adjudication.
Ripeness is “peculiarly a question of timing. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The
rationale behind this doctrine “is to prevent the courts, through premature adjudications, from
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements” premised on “contingent future events that
may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr.
Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985). “Our role is neither to issue advisory opinions nor
to declare rights in hypothetical cases, but to adjudicate live cases or controversies consistent
with the powers granted the judiciary in Article III of the Constitution.” Id.
Solomon’s current challenge is that the IFRP’s $25.00 quarterly payment violates the
sentencing judge’s order because Solomon argues that there could be a point in the future that
the IFRP’s $25.00 quarterly payments might amount to a number greater than 50% of his
prison salary. This challenge is not ripe because it is premised on an event that has not
happened, and, indeed, may never happen. The Court notes that this is currently not the case
as Solomon has earned over $750.00 in prison salary; therefore, 50% of his prison salary
would total $375.00. The IFRP’s minimum quarterly payments of $25.00 is well within the
50% benchmark. Because Solomon’s challenge is anchored in a future event that may not
occur, it is not ripe for review.
However, even assuming Solomon’s claim was ripe for review, his claim is unavailing.
Rather, Respondent’s arguments are persuasive. Specifically, it is reasonable to infer that the
sentencing judge contemplated the IFRP’s $25.00 standard minimum payment when
sentencing Solomon. The $25.00 minimum standard existed when Solomon was sentenced
and the sentencing judge explicitly provides that Solomon participate in the IFRP. Even more,
a review of the record shows that the IFRP’s $25.00 minimum payment does not exceed the
50% “limit” placed on Solomon’s restitution payments. Solomon has earned over $750.00 in

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prison salary. To be sure, Solomon’s placement in the IFRP with the $25.00 quarterly
minimum payment results in a restitution payment total of $100.00, well under $375.00 which
represents 50% of Solomon’s prison salary.
Furthermore, Respondent’s argument that “[t]aken together, the sentencing court’s
instructions that Solomon participate in the IFRP and that he pay 50% of his prison income
indicates that Solomon must at least pay the IFRP minimum [$25.00] ... but that he only pay
more than the minimum if he has not paid more than 50% of his prison salary” is a consistent
reading of the sentencing judge’s order. (Doc. 8).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will adopt the Magistrate Judge’s R&R and
deny Solomon’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Court has given reasoned
consideration to the portions of the Report to which there are no objections, and we agree with
the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations. An appropriate order is attached.

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