Nunez et al v. Wolf et al

Filing 91

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiffs motion to compel, (Doc. 81 ), and a motion to determine sufficiency of responses to requests for admissions. (Doc. 74 ) are DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on March 7, 2022. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FERNANDO NUNEZ,

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Plaintiff
v.
TOM WOLF, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 3:15-CV-1573
(Judge Wilson)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This case comes before us for resolution of two discovery motions: a motion
to compel, (Doc. 81), and a motion to determine sufficiency of responses to requests
for admissions. (Doc. 74). By way of background, Nunez is an adherent to Islam and
claims that his religion rights are being violated under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) in three ways. First, he alleges that the
Department’s policy prohibiting conjugal visits violates his Islamic beliefs.
Specifically, he avers that he was permitted to marry in 2013, but was not permitted
to consummate his marriage in accordance with his religious beliefs. (Doc. 34 at ¶¶
8-9). He also seeks ongoing conjugal visits and other forms of intimacy as
understood in Islamic practice to include “light talk, love expressions, touching,
caressing, kissing and fondling.” (Doc. 34 at ¶ 11). Second, Plaintiff seeks to be able

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to engage in group prayer in the visiting room with his visitors. (Doc. 34 at ¶ 68).
Third, he seeks a circumcision for religious reasons. (Doc. 34 at ¶¶ 90-95).
In the course of this prolonged litigation, Nunez propounded a series of
requests for admission upon the defendants. Included among these requests were
requests to verify various written prison policies, requests for admission that spanned
beyond the tenure of some prison officials, requests for admissions relating to
aspects of Nunez’s prior institutional history, and requests that sought to identify
where security cameras may be located. The defendants responded to these requests,
but in some instances declined to provide security-related information and in other
instances simply informed Nunez that various written prison policies were available
for his inspection. Nunez also propounded some additional discovery requests
following the expiration of the discovery deadline in this case. The defendants
declined to respond to this untimely discovery, which they regarded as largely
redundant of prior discovery requests.
It is against this backdrop that Nunez has filed his various discovery motions.
These motions are fully briefed and are, therefore, ripe for resolution. Upon
consideration of the parties’ positions, for the reasons set forth below, we will DENY
these discovery motions.

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II.

Discussion
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery are matters consigned to the

court’s discretion and judgment. A court’s decisions regarding the conduct of
discovery will be disturbed only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion.
Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This far-reaching
discretion also extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on discovery
matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs.
Nat’l Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J. 1997). When a magistrate judge’s decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . ., “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United
States, 943 F. Supp. 501, 502 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). Under the standard, a
magistrate judge’s discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and
is reversible only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic
Commc’ns and Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J. 1996); see also
Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45
(N.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under
abuse of discretion standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v.
Mr. Gold, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that a
magistrate judge’s resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial
deference and should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 2735702, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2010).
The exercise of this discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles.
At the outset, Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally defines

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the scope of discovery permitted in a civil action, prescribes certain limits to that
discovery and provides as follows:
(b) Discovery Scope and Limits.
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope
of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the
issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties'
relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be
admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
Thus, our discretion is limited in a number of significant ways by the scope
of Rule 26 itself, which provides for discovery of only “nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Accordingly, “[t]he Court’s discretion in
ruling on discovery issues is, therefore, restricted to valid claims of relevance and
privilege.” Robinson v. Folino, No. 14-227, 2016 WL 4678340, at *2 (citing Jackson
v. Beard, No. 11-1431, 2014 WL 3868228, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2014) (“Although
the scope of relevance in discovery is far broader than that allowed for evidentiary
purposes, it is not without its limits. . . . Courts will not permit discovery where a
request is made in bad faith, unduly burdensome, irrelevant to the general subject
matter of the action, or relates to confidential or privileged information”)).

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Therefore, at the outset, it is clear that Rule 26's definition of that which can
be obtained through discovery reaches any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party’s claim or defense, and valid claims of relevance and privilege still cabin
and restrict the court’s discretion in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the
scope of discovery permitted by Rule 26 embraces all relevant information, a
concept which is not confined to admissible evidence but is also defined in the
following terms: “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible
in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Rather, Rule 26 states that
“[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant
to any party's claim or defense.” This concept of relevance is tempered, however, by
principles of proportionality. Thus, we are now enjoined to also consider whether
the specific discovery sought is “proportional to the needs of the case, considering
the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the
parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance
of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Thus, it
has been said that the amended rule ‘restores the proportionality factors to their
original place in defining the scope of discovery.’” Fassett v. Sears Holdings Corp.,
319 F.R.D. 143, 150 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (quoting Wertz v. GEA Heat Exchangers Inc.,
No. 1:14-CV-1991, 2015 WL 8959408, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2015)).
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A party moving to compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving the
relevance of the requested information. Morrison v. Philadelphia Housing
Auth., 203 F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Once that initial burden is met, “the
party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevance by
demonstrating that the requested discovery, (1) does not come within the broad
scope of relevance as defined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b) (1), or (2) is of such marginal
relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the
ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure.” In re Urethane Antitrust
Litigation, 261 F.R.D. 570, 573 (D. Kan. 2009).
Several other considerations guide us in addressing this discovery dispute.
First:
[I]n a prison setting, inmate requests for information relating to security
procedures can raise significant institutional safety concerns, and
implicate a legitimate governmental privilege, a governmental privilege
which acknowledges a governmental needs to confidentiality of certain
data but recognizes that courts must balance the confidentiality of
governmental files against the rights of a civil rights litigant by
considering:
the extent to which disclosure will thwart governmental
processes by discouraging citizens from giving the
government information; (2) the impact upon persons who
have given information of having their identities
disclosed; (3) the degree to which governmental selfevaluation and consequent program improvement will be
chilled by disclosure; (4) whether the information sought
is factual data or evaluative summary; (5) whether the
party seeking the discovery is an actual or potential
defendant in any criminal proceeding either pending or
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reasonably likely to follow from the incident in question;
(6) whether the police investigation has been completed;
(7) whether any intradepartmental disciplinary
proceedings have arisen or may arise from the
investigation; (8) whether the plaintiff's suit is nonfrivolous and brought in good faith; (9) whether the
information sought is available through other discovery or
from other sources; and (10) the importance of the
information sought to the plaintiffs case.
Wheeler v. Corbett, No. 3:11-CV-92, 2015 WL 4952172, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 19,
2015) (citations omitted).
In addition:
When considering discovery disputes like the instant dispute relating
to requests for admissions, the court-and the litigants-must remain
mindful of the limited purpose served by this particular discovery tool.
The purpose of Rule 36(a) is to narrow the issues for trial
to those which are genuinely contested. See Webb v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431, 436
(E.D.Pa.1978); United States v. Watchmakers of
Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 197, 201
(S.D.N.Y.1959). Where, as here, issues in dispute
are requested to be admitted, a denial is a perfectly
reasonable response. Furthermore, the use of only the
word “denied” is often sufficient under the rule. See,
e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Brummel, 112 F.R.D. 77,
81–82 n. 2 (D.Colo.1986); Kleckner v. Glover Trucking
Corp., 103 F.R.D. 553, 557 (M.D.Pa.1984). “Regardless
of the subject matter of the Rule 36 request, the statement
of the fact itself should be in simple and concise terms in
order that it can be denied or admitted with an absolute
minimum of explanation or qualification.” Havenfield
Corp. v. H & R Block, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 93, 96
(W.D.Mo.1973). “A request for an admission, except in a
most unusual circumstance, should be such that it could be
answered yes, no, the answerer does not know, or a very
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simple direct explanation given as to why he cannot
answer, such as in the case of privilege.” Johnstone v.
Cronlund, 25 F.R.D. 42, 46 (E.D.Pa.1960). “Rule 36
should not be used unless the statement of fact sought to
be admitted is phrased so that it can be admitted or denied
without explanation.” Id. at 45
Wheeler, 2015 WL 4952172, at *4 (quoting United Coal Companies v. Powell
Const. Co., 839 F.2d 958, 967–68 (3d Cir.1988)).
Finally,

we

note

that

“where

a

party

has

submitted

an

untimely discovery request, the court can, and in the exercise of its discretion often
should, refuse to compel compliance with that request.” Muniz v. Price, No. 3:10CV-345, 2010 WL 4537037, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2010); see, e.g., Maslanka v.
Johnson & Johnson, 305 F.App'x 848 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of pro
se litigant motion to compel where discovery demands were untimely); Oriakhi v.
United States, 165 F.App'x 991 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); Bull v. United States, 143
F.App'x 468 (3d Cir. 2005) (same).
With these legal guideposts in mind, we turn to consideration of Moore’s
various discovery requests.
At the outset, we conclude that Nunez is not entitled to compel responses to
untimely discovery since he propounded these requests after the discovery deadline
had run without first securing an extension of that deadline. Muniz, 2010 WL
4537037, at *2.

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In addition, given the nature of Nunez’s claims, which relate to religious and
conjugal rights, we conclude that prison officials have appropriately declined to
disclose sensitive security features at the prison and Nunez may not compel them to
do so.
Finally, taking into account the narrow purpose served by requests for
admissions, we find that those responses to Nunez’s somewhat prolix requests
which merely referred Nunez to various written prison policies, provided admissions
limited to the parties’ tenure within the Department of Corrections, and declined to
make admissions regarding aspects of Nunez’s prior institutional history that were
unknown by the responding party were appropriate responses to these particular
requests. Therefore, further supplementation of these requests is not necessary.
Having reached these conclusions, the plaintiff’s motion to compel, (Doc. 81),
and a motion to determine sufficiency of responses to requests for admissions, (Doc.
74), will be denied.
An appropriate order follows.

DATED: March 7, 2022.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FERNANDO NUNEZ,

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Plaintiff
v.
TOM WOLF, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 3:15-CV-1573
(Judge Wilson)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

ORDER
AND NOW, this 7th day of March 2022, in accordance with the accompanying
Memorandum, IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion to compel, (Doc. 81),
and a motion to determine sufficiency of responses to requests for admissions. (Doc.
74) are DENIED.
/s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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