FLOYD v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al
Filing
29
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable Malachy E Mannion on 8/15/16. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment #1, # 2 Attachment #2)(ga)
2008 WL 2219304
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
D. Delaware.
Marquis MASON, Plaintiff,
v.
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, Jill Walters, Medical
Committee, and Cpt. Berggrun, Defendants.
Civ. Action No. 08–129–GMS.
|
May 28, 2008.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Marquis Mason, Wilmington, DE, pro se.
MEMORANDUM
GREGORY M. SLEET, Chief District Judge.
*1 The plaintiff, Marquis Mason (“Mason”), an inmate at the
Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, (“HRYCI”),
Wilmington, Delaware, filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. (D.I.2.) He appears pro se and was granted
permission to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915. (D.I.5.) The court now proceeds to review and
screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and §
1915A.
I. BACKGROUND
Mason sets forth a litany of complaints.1 He alleges that the
conditions at HRYCI are unsanitary and unsafe, juveniles are
housed with adults, he is housed with a sex offender and child
offender which endangers his welfare. He alleges that he was
sent to “the hole” for disciplinary reasons, the time has
expired, but he is denied general population housing. He is
only allowed out of his cell once every forty-eight to
sixty-three hours for exercise. He is being denied education
or schooling, medical care, he has inadequate access to the
library, and that the mail system is inadequate.
According to Mason, the foregoing acts took place under the
authority of defendant Jill Walters (“Walters”). Finally, he
alleges that all of these events demonstrate intentional
retaliation against him by the defendants Walters, Cpt.
Berggrun (“Berggrun”), the Education Committee, and the
Medical Committee.2
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a litigant proceeds in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915
provides for dismissal under certain circumstances. When a
prisoner seeks redress from a government defendant in a civil
action, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A provides for screening of the
complaint by the court. Both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and
§ 1915A(b)(1) provide that the court may dismiss a
complaint, at any time, if the action is frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief. An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
325 (1989).
In performing its screening function under § 1915(e)(2)(B),
the court applies the standard applicable to a motion to
dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Fullman v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., No. 4:07CV–000079, 2007 WL
257617 (M.D.Pa. Jan. 25, 2007) (citing Weiss v. Cooley, 230
F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir.2000). The court must accept all
factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the
light most favorable to plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). A complaint must contain
“ ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant
fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.’ “ Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127
S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. A complaint does not need
detailed factual allegations, however, “a plaintiff's obligation
to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 1965
(citations omitted). The “[f]actual allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all of the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (citations omitted).
*2 Mason is required to make a “showing” rather than a
blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief. Phillips v. County
of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir.2008). “[W]ithout
some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot
satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only “fair
notice,” but also the “grounds” on which the claim rests. Id.
(citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 n. 3). Therefore, “ ‘stating
... a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest’ the required element.” Id. at 235
© 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
1
(quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 n. 3). “This ‘does not
impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,’ but
instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the
necessary element.” Id. at 234. Because Mason proceeds pro
se, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint,
“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007)
(citations omitted).
of confinement to which [a] prisoner is subjected is within the
sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of
the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself
subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial
oversight.’ “ Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983)
(quoting Montanye v.. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976)). It
has thus been determined that the transfer of a prisoner from
one classification is unprotected by “ ‘the Due Process Clause
in and of itself,’ “ even though the change in status involves
a significant modification in conditions of confinement.
Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468 (citation omitted); Moody v. Daggett,
429 U.S. 78 (1976).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Deficient Pleading
Initially, the court notes that the complaint contains a blanket
assertion of entitlement to relief. Moreover, the complaint is
deficiently pled. A civil rights complaint must state the
conduct, time, place, and persons responsible for the alleged
civil rights violations. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353
(3d Cir.2005) (citing Boykins v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist.,
621 F.2d 75, 80 (3d Cir.1980); Hall v. Pennsylvania State
Police, 570 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir.1978)). Additionally, when
bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some
person has deprived him of a federal right, and that the person
who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). While the complaint
contains general allegations, it does not provide sufficient
facts to apprise the defendants of their alleged actions. For
this reason alone, the court will dismiss the complaint.
Accordingly, the court will dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1). Mason,
however, will be given leave to amend his complaint as to the
conditions of confinement claim3, the medical needs claim4,
and the denial, delay and misplacement of mail claim5. As will
be discussed, all other claims are dismissed with prejudice.
B. Housing/Classification
Mason complains that even though he has served his
disciplinary time in “the hole” he has not been returned to
general population. Inmates have “no legitimate statutory or
constitutional entitlement” to any particular custodial
classification even if a new classification would cause that
inmate to suffer a “grievous loss.” Moody v. Daggett, 429
U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976).
*3 Moreover, neither Delaware law nor Delaware Department
of Correction regulations create a liberty interest in a
prisoner's classification within an institution. See Del.Code
Ann. tit. 11, § 6529(e). “ ‘As long as the conditions or degree
The court concludes that Mason's continued placement in
disciplinary segregation does not violate his due process
rights, and as a result, cannot be viewed as falling outside the
scope of “the sentence imposed upon him [or] otherwise
violative of the Constitution.” Mason cannot state a claim a
claim for violation of a liberty interest created by the Due
Process Clause or State law. His due process claim has no
arguable basis in law or in fact, and therefore, will be
dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
and § 1915A(b)(1).
C. Education
Mason contends he is being denied education and schooling.
Unfortunately for Mason, prisoners have no constitutional
right to an education. Canterino v. Wilson, 869 F.2d 948,
952–54 (6th Cir.1989); Risso v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527,
530–31 (9th Cir.1985); Garza v. Miller, 688 F.2d 480, 486
(7th Cir.1982); Longendorfer v. Roth, No. 92–2180, 1992
WL 95919, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 23, 1992). Therefore, the
court will dismiss the claim as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).
D. Law Library
Mason alleges he is receiving inadequate time in the library.
The court presumes he complains about law library time, even
though he refers, generally, to the library and not the law
library.
Prisoners must be allowed “adequate, effective and
meaningful” access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817, 822 (1977) (holding that prisons must give inmates
access to law libraries or direct legal assistance). A violation
of the First Amendment right of access to the courts is only
established where a litigant shows that he was actually injured
by the alleged denial of access. The actual injury requirement
is a constitutional prerequisite to suit. Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 351 (1996); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403,
415 (2002) (explaining that the constitutional right of access
© 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
2
is “ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff
cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court”). An
actual injury is shown only where a nonfrivolous, arguable
claim is lost. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415.
*4 Mason alleges that he does not receive adequate library
time, but gives no specifics. Moreover, he does not allege an
injury, as is required for denial of access to the courts.
Accordingly, the court will dismiss the claim as frivolous and
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).
E. Retaliation
Mason alleges that all his allegations demonstrate retaliation
against him by Walters and Berggrun. Proof of a retaliation
claim requires that Mason demonstrate (1) constitutionally
protected conduct; (2) an adverse action by prison officials “
‘sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from
exercising his [constitutional] rights,’ “ and (3) “a causal link
between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the
adverse action taken against.” Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d
523, 530 (3d Cir.2003) (citations omitted).
Even applying the retaliation standard and construing the
complaint liberally, Mason has failed to state a claim of
retaliation. Therefore, the court will dismiss the retaliation
claim against Walters and Berggrun pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).
F. Respondeat Superior
Mason alleges that the acts, as alleged, took place under
Walters' authority. It appears that she is named as a defendant
based upon her supervisory position. Liability in a § 1983
action cannot be predicated solely on the operation of
respondeat superior. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195,
1207 (3d Cir.1998) (citations omitted). A plaintiff may set
forth a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983 if he “(1)
identif[ies] the specific supervisory practice or procedure that
the supervisor failed to employ, and show[s] that (2) the
existing custom and practice without the identified, absent
custom or procedure created an unreasonable risk of the
ultimate injury, (3) the supervisor was aware that this
unreasonable risk existed, (4) the supervisor was indifferent
to the risk; and (5) the underling's violation resulted from the
supervisor's failure to employ that supervisory practice or
procedure.” Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216
(3d Cir.2001) (citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118
(3d Cir.1989)). It is not enough for a plaintiff to argue that the
alleged injury would not have occurred if the supervisor had
“done more.” Id. He must identify specific acts or omissions
of the supervisor that evidence deliberate indifference and
establish a link between the act or omission and the ultimate
injury. Id.
In order for a supervisory public official to be held liable for
a subordinate's constitutional tort, the official must either be
the “moving force [behind] the constitutional violation” or
exhibit “deliberate indifference to the plight of the person
deprived.” Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d
Cir.1989) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389
(1989)). There is nothing in the complaint to indicate that
Walters was the “driving force [behind]” Mason's alleged
constitutional violation. Moreover, the complaint does not
indicate that Wallace was aware of Mason's allegations and
remained “deliberately indifferent” to his plight. Sample v.
Diecks, 885 F.2d at 1118. Accordingly, the claim against
Walters i:s dismissed inasmuch as it has no arguable basis in
law or in fact pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and §
1915A(b)(1).
G. Persons
*5 Mason names as defendants the Education Department and
the Medical Committee. To state a viable § 1983 claim, a
plaintiff must allege facts showing a deprivation of a
constitutional right, privilege or immunity by a person acting
under color of state law See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 330 (1986). The claims against the Education
Department and the Medical Committee are barred by Will v.
Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69
(1989), which holds that neither states nor state officials sued
in their official capacities for money damages are “persons”
within the meaning of § 1983. See Evancho v. Fisher, 423
F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir.2005).
Additionally, the Education Department and the Medical
Committee are immune from suit. “Absent a state's consent,
the Eleventh Amendment bars a civil rights suit in federal
court that names the state as a defendant.” Laskaris v.
Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir.1981) (citing Alabama
v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978)). The State has not waived its
immunity from suit in federal court, and although Congress
can abrogate a state's sovereign immunity, it did not do so
through the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Brooks–McCollum v. Delaware, 213 Fed. Appx. 92, 94 (3d
Cir.2007) (citations omitted). Hence, as an agency of the State
of Delaware, the HYRCI, including its Education Department
and Medical Committee, is entitled to immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. See e.g. Evans v. Ford, C.A. No.
03–868–KAJ, 2004 WL 2009362, *4 (D.Del. Aug. 25, 2004)
(dismissing claim against DOC, because DOC is state agency
and DOC did not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity).
© 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
3
The Education Department and the Medical Committee are
not persons within the meaning of § 1983, and also they are
immune from suit. As a result, the claims against them lack an
arguable basis in law or in fact and they are dismissed as
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and §
1915A(b)(1).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons the court finds that the complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Therefore, the court will dismiss the complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(l). Mason will be
given leave to amend the complaint only as to the medical
needs claim, the conditions of confinement claim, and the
mail claim. An appropriate order will be entered.
ORDER
At Wilmington this 25th day of May, 2008, for the reasons set
forth in the Memorandum issued this date
1. The complaint is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).
2. Mason is given leave to amend the complaint only as to the
medical needs claim, the conditions of confinement claim,
and the delay or denial of mail claim. The amended complaint
shall be filed within thirty days from the date of this order.
Mason is placed on notice that the copies of the amended
complaint submitted to the court must be identical. If an
amended complaint is not filed within the time allowed, then
the case will be closed.
All Citations
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2008 WL 2219304
Footnotes
1
Mason submitted two different versions of his complaint. The court reviewed both versions in screening the case.
2
Cpt. Berggrun was inadvertently omitted as a defendant in the court's docket.
© 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
4
3
A condition of confinement violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is so reprehensible as to be deemed inhumane under
contemporary standards or such that it deprives an inmate of minimal civilized measure of the necessities of life. See Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wilson v. Setter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). When an Eighth Amendment claim is brought against
a prison official it must meet two requirements: (1) the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the
prison official must have been deliberately indifferent to the inmate's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)
4
The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment requires that prison officials provide inmates with
adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–105 (1976). In order to set forth a cognizable claim, an inmate must
allege (i) a serious medical need and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104; Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir.1999). A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he
knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and fails to take reasonable steps to avoid the harm. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A prison official may manifest deliberate indifference by “intentionally denying or delaying access to
medical care.”Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104–05.
5
“In the First Amendment context, ... a prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights [of freedom of speech and association]
that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (evaluating constitutionality of limiting one channel of communication with those outside of
prison through review of adequacy of alternative channels of communication). See also Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989)
(evaluating regulations governing receipt of subscription publications by federal prison inmates).
End of Document
© 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
© 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?