Williamson v. Garman et al
Filing
31
MEMORANDUM Based on the foregoing, Defendants' motion (Doc. 29) to dismiss will be granted. A separate order shall issue.Signed by Honorable Robert D. Mariani on 1/8/17. (jfg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SHARIF WILLIAMSON,
Civil No.3:15-cv-1797
Plaintiff
(Judge Mariani)
v.
SUPERINTENDENT GARMAN, et al.,
Defendants
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Sharif Williamson ("Plaintiff'), an inmate currently confined at the Rockview
State Correctional Institution, Bellefonte, Pennsylvania ("SCI-Rockview"), commenced this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). The matter is proceeding via an amended
complaint. (Doc. 28). Named as Defendants are the following employees of SCI-Rockview:
Mark Garman, Superintendent; Eric Tice, Deputy Superintendent for Facilities Management;
Nathan Lehman, Lieutenant; Jeff Rackovan, Corrections Superintendent's Assistant and
Facility Grievance Coordinator; and Officers Clark, Leidhecker, Myers, Phillips, Tubbs,
Weaver, and Intallura, (collectively, "Corrections Defendants"). (/d. at pp. 2-4).
Presently pending before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 29). Despite being directed to file a brief in
opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 27, 1f 4), Plaintiff failed to respond to the
motion and the time for responding has now passed. In the absence of any timely response
by Plaintiff, the motion is deemed ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the
Court will grant the motion to dismiss, and grant Plaintiff a final opportunity to amend his
complaint.
I.
Standard of Review
A complaint must be dismissed under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b}(6), if it does not allege
"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell At!. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The plaintiff must
aver "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).
'Though acomplaint 'does not need detailed factual allegations, ... a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Prop.
Inc., 672 F.3d 241,245 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words,
'l~actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."
Covington v. Int'I Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A court "take[s] as true all the factual
allegations in the Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those
facts, but ... disregard[s] legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Ethypharm S.A. France v.
2
Abbott Laboratories, 707 F.3d 223, 231, n.14 (3d Gir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
Twombly and Iqbal require [a district court] to take the following three steps to
determine the sufficiency of a complaint: First, the court mlJst take note of the elements a
plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.
Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Gir. 2013).
U[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not perrnit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the
pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). This "plausibility" determination will be a "context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
However, even "if a complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court
must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or
futile." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Gir. 2008).
[E]ven when plaintiff does not seek leave to amend his complaint after a
defendant moves to dismiss it, unless the district court finds that amendment
would be inequitable or futile, the court must inform the plaintiff that he or she
has leave to amend the complaint within a set period of time.
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Id.
II.
Allegations of the Amended Complaint1
Plaintiff alleges that on June 8, 2015, he was transferred to the restricted housing
unit ("RHU") at SCI-Rockview and subjected to a strip search. (Doc. 28, p. 4). Upon arrival
to the RHU, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lehman directed seven officers to place him on
the floor. (Id.). He claims that the officers cut off his clothes, placed their weight on his
body, and spread his buttocks apart. (Id.). Plaintiff assert that the officers used
unnecessary force, derived sexual pleasure from the strip search, the search was
conducted in an unprofessional and illegal manner, and belittled him. (Id. at p. 5). Plaintiff
further contends that Defendant Lehman did not comply with prison policy because he
never asked Plaintiff to comply with the strip search. (Id.).
III.
Discussion
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code offers private citizens a cause of
action for violations of federal law by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
1
The allegations of the amended complaint are strikingly similar to the allegations of the original
complaint. See (Docs. 1, 28).
4
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress....
Id.; see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95
F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege "the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must
show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state
law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
A.
Personal Involvement
Defendants Garman, Tice, Rackovan, and Lehman argue that Plaintiff fails to state a
claim against them because they lack personal involvement in the alleged wrongs, and
because Plaintiffs allegations against them are based solely on the doctrine of respondeat
superior. (Doc. 30, pp. 3-5).
Local government units and supervisors typically are not liable under Section 1983
solely on a theory of respondeat superior. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.
808,824 n.8 (1985); Monell v. Oep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (holding that
municipal liability attaches only "when execution of a government's policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury" complained oD. It is well-established that:
A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the
alleged wrongs.... [P]ersonal involvement can be shown through allegations
of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of
5
participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made
with appropriate particularity.
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
With respect to Defendants Garman, Tice, and Rackovan, a review of the amended
complaint confirms that other than being listed as Defendants there are no specific
assertions that they had any personal involvement in the purported violations of Plaintiffs
rights. See (Doc. 28). To state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a constitutional right by a person acting under color of state law. See
West, 487 U.S. at 48. "A defendant's conduct must have a close causal connection to
plaintiffs injury in order for § 1983 liability to attach." Charles v. Sabol, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 49680, *6 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980)).
"[E]ach named defendant must be shown, via the complaint's allegations, to have been
personally involved in the events or occurrences which underlie a claim." Cross v. Losinger,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22336, *4 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976)). There are
no allegations that Defendants Garman, Tice, and Rackovan were involved in the alleged
unconstitutional conduct. Therefore, the complaint against these Defendants will be
dismissed.
As to Defendant Lehman, the amended complaint alleges that Defendant Lehman
"order[ed] seven officers to put me down on the floor and they start[ed] cutting my cloth[es]
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off my body." (Doc. 28, p. 4,
~
15). The amended complaint further alleges that Defendant
Lehman never asked Plaintiff to comply with the strip search. (Id.). As noted supra,
personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence. Such allegations must be made with appropriate
particularity. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08. The allegations against Defendant Lehman are
sufficient to satisfy the personal involvement requirement standard of Rode, and are not
based solely on a theory of respondeat superior. Consequently, Plaintiff has alleged
sufficient personal involvement by Defendant Lehman such that the claims against him may
proceed. Because the Court is granting Plaintiff a final opportunity to amend his complaint,
any claims against Defendant Lehman must be re-alleged in the second amended
complaint, and must indicate Lehman's contemporaneous, personal knowledge and
acquiescence in the unconstitutional conduct.
B.
Strip Search
A prisoner's challenge to a strip search may be cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
through the Fourth or Eighth Amendments. See Seymour/Jones v. Spratts, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 193, *4 (E.D. Pa. 1990), citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979). To raise
a Fourth Amendment claim, the prisoner must allege that the strip search was
unreasonable. See Payton v. Vaughn, 798 F. Supp. 258, 261-62 (E.D. Pa. 1992). Where a
prisoner alleges that the strip search was conducted in a physically abusive manner, the
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Eighth Amendment applies. See Jordan v. Cicchi, 428 F. App'x 195, 199-200 (3d Cir. 2011)
(explaining that an excessive force claim arising from a strip search may proceed under
either the Fourth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment, but the latter is "the primary source
of protection after an individual's conviction"); Robinson v, Ricci, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
44011, *50 n.6 (D.N.J. 2012) (stating that, in addition to a possible Fourth Amendment
violation, the "Eighth Amendment may be implicated where the strip search or visual body
cavity search was conducted in a brutish and unreasonable manner").
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that prison officials may conduct visual
body cavity searches whenever an inmate enters and exits his cell in the RHU, if performed
in a reasonable manner. See Millhouse v. Arbasak, 373 F. App'x 135, 137 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citing Bel/, 441 U.S. at 559-60). "When a prisoner moves through restricted areas of a
correctional facility, it is not unreasonable for staff to check for contraband via visual body
cavity searches upon the prisoner's return." Jones v. Luzerne County Carr. Facility, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86430, *22-23 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Millhouse, 373 F. App'x 135).
Further, strip searches can be conducted by prison officials without probable cause. Jones,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86430 at *22 ("[I]nmates do not have a right 'to be free from strip
searches."), citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 558. Additionally, allegations that a strip search was
degrading or embarrassing also fail to state a constitutional violation. See Millhouse, 373 F.
App'x at 137 (body cavity strip "searches, even if embarrassing and humiliating, do not
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violate the constitution").
The amended complaint alleges that the strip search was conducted in an
unconstitutional and illegal manner. (Doc. 28, pp. 4-5). Plaintiff alleges that he was
subjected to a strip search when he was transferred to the RHU that involved unnecessary
steps, was degrading, and was contrary to prison policy. (Id.). He claims that corrections
officers placed him on the ground, cut off his clothes, and an officer spread his buttocks
during the strip search. (ld.). This Court concludes that because Plaintiff has alleged that
the strip search was unreasonable and involved unnecessary steps, he should be permitted
to further develop this claim for the Court to evaluate whether the strip search was justified.
Next, the Court will consider whether Plaintiffs allegations rise to the level of an
Eighth Amendment violation. In order for a prisoner to state an Eighth Amendment claim for
the excessive use of force by a prison official, he must establish that the force was not
applied in agood-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, but that it was maliciously and
sadistically used to cause harm. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,7 (1992). Under
Hudson, the absence of a serious injury to the inmate is relevant to this court's inquiry, but
does not end it. Id. However, "[t]he Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual'
punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimus uses of
physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort 'repugnant to the conscience of
mankind.'" Id. at 9-10 {quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)).
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The amended complaint alleges that Defendants conducted the strip search in an
abusive fashion and with excessive force. (Doc. 28, pp. 4-5). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts
that Defendants used "unnecessary force[] and got sexual pleasure from the strip search."
(Id. at p. 5,
~
15). He further alleges that "officers put they [sic] weight on me and touch[ed]
me in a sexually [sic] manner." (Id. at p. 6, ~ 19). In light of these allegations, Plaintiff will
be permitted an opportunity to amend his complaint to further develop these claims.
Plaintiff must specifically allege any actions the officers took that show the use of
unnecessary force. He must state specifically which officers placed their weight on him,
and the manner in which they applied their weight. Additionally, Plaintiff must specifically
allege any actions or statements made by the officers that reveal the officers "got sexual
pleasure from the strip search." (Id. at p. 5,
~
15). Plaintiff must state specifically which
officers touched him, what body part was touched, and the manner in which the officers
touched him. Plaintiff is reminded that if he wishes to hold any Defendant liable for his/her
conduct regarding the strip search, he must plead additional facts establishing that
Defendant's personal involvement.
IV.
Leave to Amend
When a complaint fails to present a prima facie case of liability, courts should
generally grant leave to amend before dismissing a complaint. See Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane
10
V.
Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d
Cir. 2000). Specifically, the Third Circuit has admonished that when a complaint is subject
to dismissal for failure to state a claim, courts should liberally grant leave to amend uunless
such an amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245 (citing Alston
v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004)). The federal rules allow for liberal
amendments in light of the uprinciple that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper
decision on the merits." Fornan v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (citations and internal
quotations omitted). For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff should be
afforded a final opportunity to amend his complaint.
V.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' motion (Doc. 29) to dismiss will be granted. A
separate order shall issue.
Dated: January
q
,2017
Robert D. M . .
United States District Judge
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