McKnight v. Kerestes et al
Filing
22
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)It appears that this matter arguably includes claims which were included in McKnights PCRA action which was still pending before the Pennsylvania state courts when this action was initiated. Since the Pennsylvania state court had not completed their review of Petitioners PCRA claims prior to the filing of this petition, any federal habeas corpus claims raised by the PCRA action are subject to dismissal as being prematurely filed. Moreover, s ince it appears that this action may include arguments raised on both direct appeal and during PCRA proceedings, Petitioners pending action is a petition which likewise cannot be entertained by this Court. An appropriate Order will enter.Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 6/13/17. (cc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM F. MCKNIGHT,
Petitioner
:
:
:
v.
:
CIVIL NO. 3:CV-15-2099
:
:
(Judge Conaboy)
WARDEN KERESTES,
:
Respondent
:
___________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM
Background
William F. McKnight initiated this pro se petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 while confined at the
Mahanoy State Correctional Institution, Frackville, Pennsylvania
(SCI-Mahanoy).1 Service of the petition was previously ordered.
Petitioner entered a guilty plea on March 27, 2014 to a charge
of making/selling/repairing an offensive weapon in the Wayne
County, Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas.2
McKnight was
sentenced that same day to an eighteen (18) to forty-two (42) month
term of imprisonment.
1
Petitioner has notified the Court that he has completed
service of his sentence and has been released from confinement.
See Doc. 21.
2
While a state pre-trial detainee, McKnight filed two habeas
corpus petitions with this Court, McKnight v. Bishop, Civil No.
3:14-CV-574 & McKnight v. Bishop, Civil No. 3:14-CV-603 which were
dismissed without prejudice as being prematurely filed under
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1981)(“principles of federalism and
comity require district courts to abstain from enjoining pending
state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances").
1
Petitioner filed a direct appeal which was denied by the
Pennsylvania Superior Court on October 6, 2014.
further review.
He did not seek
McKnight states that he thereafter filed a habeas
corpus petition with the sentencing court on February 24, 2014.3
His petition asserted claims of newly discovered evidence,
ineffective assistance of counsel, and falsification of police
documents.
The Petitioner asserts that no action was taken on his
petition by the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas.
McKnight claims entitlement to federal habeas corpus relief on
the grounds that the state trial court acted improperly by refusing
to provide him with an evidentiary hearing on his habeas corpus
petition.
See Doc. 1, ¶ 12.
He adds that his court appointed
attorney failed to pursue the matter which would have shown that he
could not have been in possession of a firearm and that he was the
subject of a falsified search warrant.
Petitioner further contends
that the state’s court failure to take action also denied him his
right to file an appeal.
Petitioner has also provided the Court with a copy of a
Superior Court Order dated March 21, 2016 denying his appeal for
3
It appears that this action was initiated pursuant to
Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) See 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 9541 et seq. The PCRA “permits motions for postconviction collateral relief for allegations of error, including
ineffective assistance of counsel, unlawfully induced guilty pleas,
improper obstruction of rights to appeal by Commonwealth officials,
and violation of constitutional provisions." Hankins v. Fulcomer,
941 F.2d 246, 251 (3d Cir. 1991).
2
failure to file a brief.
See Doc. 16.
McKnight claims that he
never filed or authorized any such appeal.
See id.
According to the Respondent Petitioner filed both a direct
appeal and a PCRA action, both of which were denied by the trial
court.
The PCRA action is described as raising claims including
the issue of whether McKnight knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waived his right to counsel.
See Doc. 11, ¶ 5.
Respondent adds that the Superior Court remanded the matter to the
trial court for an on the record determination as to whether
Petitioner made a proper waiver of his right to counsel.
A hearing
on that matter was scheduled by the trial court for January, 2016.
The appeal of the PCRA action was pending before the Superior Court
at the time this matter was filed.
Discussion
McKnight claims entitlement to federal habeas corpus relief on
the grounds that the state trial court acted improperly by refusing
to provide him with an evidentiary hearing on his state habeas
corpus petition.
See Doc. 1, ¶ 12.
As noted earlier, it appears
that the state habeas corpus hearing was actually a PCRA
proceeding.
Based upon information provided by the parties, after the
November, 2015 filing of this action, the Petitioner was provided
with a PCRA hearing by the state trial court in January, 2016.
Thereafter, his PCRA appeal was dismissed by the Superior Court on
3
March 21, 2016.
Mootness
The case or controversy requirement of Article III, § 2 of the
United States Constitution subsists through all stages of federal
judicial proceedings.
Parties must continue to have a “‘personal
stake in the outcome' of the lawsuit."
Lewis v. Continental Bank
Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S.
395, 401 (1975).
In other words, throughout the course of the
action, the aggrieved party must suffer or be threatened with
actual injury caused by the defendant.
Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477.
The adjudicatory power of a federal court depends upon "the
continuing existence of a live and acute controversy."
Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (emphasis in original).
"The
rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must be extant
at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is
filed."
Id. at n.10 (citations omitted).
"Past exposure to
illegal conduct is insufficient to sustain a present case or
controversy ... if unaccompanied by continuing, present adverse
effects."
Rosenberg v. Meese, 622 F. Supp. 1451, 1462 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974));
see also Gaeta v. Gerlinski, Civil No.3:CV-02-465, slip op. at p. 2
(M.D. Pa. May 17, 2002) (Vanaskie, C.J.).
Since Petitioner was afforded a hearing before the trial court
after the filing of this action, under the principles set forth in
4
Steffel, his claim of improperly being denied such a hearing is
subject to dismissal as moot since it no longer presents an
existing case or controversy.
Exhaustion
Federal courts generally refrain from considering the merits
of a habeas corpus claim by a state prisoner unless the applicant
has complied with the exhaustion requirement set out at 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1)(A).
This provision requires that the state courts must
be given a fair opportunity to review allegations of constitutional
error before a litigant seeks relief in federal court.
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).
See
Title 28 United States
Code Section 2254(b)(1) provides that an application for a writ of
habeas corpus filed on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless the
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State; or there is an absence of available state corrective
process; or there are existing circumstances which render the state
process ineffective.
formality.
The exhaustion requirement is not a mere
It serves the interests of comity between the federal
and state systems, by allowing the state an initial opportunity to
determine and correct any violations of a prisoner’s federal
rights.
The United States Supreme Court, noting that a total
exhaustion rule "does not unreasonably impair the prisoner's right
5
to relief," has recognized that if a habeas corpus petition
containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims is presented, then
the entire petition must be dismissed.
509, 522 (1982).
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
A petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating
that he has satisfied the exhaustion requirement.
See
Lines v.
Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 2000).
It appears that this matter arguably includes claims which
were included in McKnight’s PCRA action which was still pending
before the Pennsylvania state courts when this action was
initiated.
Since the Pennsylvania state court had not completed
their review of Petitioner’s PCRA claims prior to the filing of
this petition, any federal habeas corpus claims raised by the PCRA
action are subject to dismissal as being prematurely filed.
Moreover, since it appears that this action may include arguments
raised on both direct appeal and during PCRA proceedings,
Petitioner’s pending action is a petition which likewise cannot be
entertained by this Court.
An appropriate Order will enter.
S/Richard P. Conaboy
RICHARD P. CONABOY
United States District Judge
DATED: JUNE 13, 2017
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?