W.K. et al v. Pittston Area School Disrtict
Filing
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MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 18 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Pittston Area School Disrtict. Signed by Honorable Malachy E Mannion on 4/10/17. (bs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
W.K. and M.G.,
:
:
Plaintiffs
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-0352
:
v
:
PITTSTON AREA SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendant
(JUDGE MANNION)
:
:
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the court is the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ amended complaint in part. (Doc. 18). Upon review, the defendant’s
motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
By way of relevant background, the plaintiffs filed the instant action on
February 26, 2016. (Doc. 1). On July 20, 2016, the court issued an order
granting the plaintiffs’ request for leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc.
16). The plaintiffs’ amended complaint was filed the same day. (Doc. 17). On
July 26, 2016, the defendant filed the pending motion to dismiss, (Doc. 18),
along with a brief in support thereof, (Doc. 19). The plaintiffs filed an opposing
brief on July 27, 2016. (Doc. 20). On August 2, 2016, the defendant filed a
reply brief. (Doc. 21).
The defendant’s motion to dismiss is brought, in part, pursuant to the
provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Specifically, the defendant argues that the
plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to certain
requested relief. “A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the
jurisdiction of the court to address the merits of the plaintiff’s complaint.” Vieth
v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 537 (M.D. Pa. 2002). The failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is a jurisdictional issue and the appropriate
device to raise this issue is a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). See
Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2014).
A Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal is not a judgment on the merits, but only a
determination that the court lacks the authority to hear the case. Swope v.
Central York Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp. 2d 592, 599 (M.D. Pa. 2011). Because
the district court is a court of limited jurisdiction, the burden of establishing
jurisdiction always rests upon the party asserting it. See Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life. Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
An attack on the court’s jurisdiction may be either “facial” or “factual”
and the “distinction determines how the pleading must be reviewed.”
Constitution Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir.
2014). A facial attack tests the sufficiency of the pleadings, while a factual
attack challenges whether a plaintiff’s claims fail to comport factually with
jurisdictional prerequisites. Id. at 358; see also S.D. v. Haddon Heights Bd.
of Educ., 833 F.3d 389, 394 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2016). If the defendant brings a
factual attack, the district court may look outside the pleadings to ascertain
facts needed to determine whether jurisdiction exists. Id.
Reviewing a facial attack, a district court must accept the allegations
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stated in a plaintiff’s complaint and review “only whether the allegations on the
face of the complaint, taken as true, allege facts sufficient to invoke the
jurisdiction of the district court.” Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d
181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus, a facial
attack calls for a district court to apply the same standard of review it would
use in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), i.e., construing
the alleged facts in favor of the nonmoving party. This is in marked contrast
to the standard of review applicable to a factual attack, in which a court may
weigh and ‘consider evidence outside the pleadings.’” Aichele, 757 F.3d at
358 (quoting Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir.
2000)) (internal citation omitted). An attack on jurisdiction based on a failure
to exhaust remedies that is filed prior to answering the complaint is usually,
“by definition, a facial attack” on the pleadings unless the defendant has
offered factual averments in support of its motion. Haddon Heights, 833 F.3d
at 394 n. 5.
The defendant’s motion to dismiss is also brought, in part, pursuant to
the provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). This rule provides for the dismissal of
a complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no
claim has been stated, Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir.
2005), and dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting all of the facts alleged
in the complaint as true, the plaintiff has failed to plead “enough facts to state
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a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (abrogating “no set of facts”
language found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The facts
alleged must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. This requirement “calls for
enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of” necessary elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Id.
Furthermore, in order to satisfy federal pleading requirements, the plaintiff
must “provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief,” which “requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231
(3d Cir. 2008) (brackets and quotations marks omitted) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the
complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. See Sands v.
McCormick, 502 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider
“undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attaches as an exhibit
to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached]
documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d
1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged
in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not
physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l
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Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the
court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to
dismiss. See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250,
1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
Generally, the court should grant leave to amend a complaint before
dismissing it as merely deficient. See, e.g., Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote
Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007); Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213
F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000). “Dismissal without leave to amend is justified
only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility.” Alston v.
Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).
In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs allege that W.K., a student
who resides within the bounds of the Pittston Area School District, has
disabilities which impact his life and render him eligible for special education
services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, (“IDEA”), 20
U.S.C. §1401, et seq. On May 1, 2014, W.K.’s mother, M.G., filed a special
education due process hearing complaint against the School District alleging
that the School District violated federal statutes by failing to adequately
develop educational evaluations and special education programs for W.K.’s
specific needs. On June 20, 2014, M.G. entered into a special education
settlement agreement with the School District to resolve the complaint. This
settlement resulted from a resolution session held under 20 U.S.C.
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§1415(f)(1)(b).
The plaintiffs allege that the settlement agreement required the School
District to establish a fund for compensatory education services in the amount
of $20,000 to be used for, inter alia, “special education instruction, remedial
and enrichment services provided by certified teachers or in licensed facilities
or programs as indicated by the Student’s needs.” On August 31, 2015, M.G.
requested that tuition be paid for W.K. to attend Holy Cross, a private school.
On September 1, 2015, the School District rejected M.G.’s request to access
W.K.’s compensatory education fund because the School District believed
that “private school tuition for a non-special education placement is not a
reimbursable item.” Throughout the Fall of 2015, it was repeatedly requested
that the School District reconsider its position, which the School District
refused to do.
On December 9, 2015, the School District’s counsel was provided with
a list of approximately thirteen accommodations that W.K. was receiving at
Holy Cross based upon his disability. Despite receiving this additional
information, the School District continued to reject M.G.’s request for tuition
payments out of the compensatory education fund/special education
settlement agreement. The School District provided notice or information
regarding the subsequent refusal to pay tuition to Holy Cross from the
compensatory education fund/special education settlement.
Based upon the above allegations, the plaintiffs have brought the instant
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action which contains five counts: Count I - Discrimination - Failure to Provide
Services through Settlement Agreement (Discrimination Based on Deliberate
Indifference under Section 504); Count II - Breach of Special Education
Settlement Agreement (IDEA); Count III - Discrimination - ADA; Count IV Procedural Due Process Violation - Fourteenth Amendment - Section 1983;
and Count V - Demand for Attorney’s Fees (IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(B);
RA, 29 U.S.C. §794(a); ADA, 42 U.S.C. §12133; 42 U.S.C. §1988). By way
of the pending motion, the defendant has moved to dismiss Counts I, III, and
IV of the amended complaint.
The defendant initially argues in its motion to dismiss that the plaintiffs’
discrimination claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, (“Section
504”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, (“ADA”), must be dismissed
because the plaintiff is seeking to enforce a contractual right, which is not a
benefit or opportunity provided to any other student.
Section 504 and ADA claims are subject to the same analysis and thus
may be addressed at the same time. See Weidow v. Scranton Sch. Dist., 460
Fed.Appx. 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Because Congress has directed [that the
ADA] be interpreted in a manner consistent with [the Rehabilitation Act], we
will consider [Plaintiff’s] claims under those statutes together.”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted) (first two alterations in original); Chambers
ex rel Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 189 (3d
Cir. 2009) (noting that because the same standards govern both
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Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims, the court “may address both claims in the
same breath”).
Section 504 bars all federally funded entities from discriminating on the
basis of disability, providing in relevant part, as follows:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.
29 U.S.C. §794(a) (2002).
Title II of the ADA provides:
[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services programs, or activities of a public entity,
or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.
42 U.S.C. §12132.
With limited exceptions, the same legal principles govern ADA
and RA claims. To prove a claim under either the ADA or RA,
Plaintiffs must show that: (1) they are handicapped or disabled as
defined under the statutes; (2) they are otherwise qualified to
participate in the program at issue; and (3) they were precluded
from participating in a program or receiving a service or benefit
because of their disability.
CG v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Chambers
ex rel. Chambers, 587 F.3d at 189).
Where, as in this case, a plaintiff seeks compensatory damages on a
Section 504 or ADA claim, the plaintiff must also prove that the discrimination
or denial of benefits at issue was intentional, or at least that the defendant
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exhibited deliberate indifference to the underlying discrimination. Shadie v.
Hazleton Area Sch. Dist., 580 Fed.Appx. 67, 70 (3d Cir. 2014).
In this case, the court agrees that the plaintiffs’ Section 504 and ADA
claims should be dismissed. To this extent, under either statute, the plaintiffs
must establish that W.K. was discriminated against because of his disability.
To do so, the plaintiffs must establish that he was either deprived of a benefit
or opportunity provided to non-disabled students or that he was deprived of
a benefit or opportunity provided to a group of students with some other
category of disability. The gravamen of the plaintiffs’ complaint, however, is
that the defendant breached the parties’ settlement agreement by failing to
provide the plaintiffs access to the compensatory funds provided for under the
agreement in order to pay for W.K.’s tuition at Holy Cross. The right to the
compensatory funds is created by the agreement itself and is specific only to
the plaintiff. Because this right is not a benefit conferred upon any other
student, whether non-disabled or disabled under another category, the
plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As
such, the defendant’s motion to dismiss will be granted on this basis.
Next, the defendant argues that the plaintiffs’ procedural due process
claim in Count IV of the complaint must be dismissed because the plaintiffs
have failed to identify any “property interest” of which they were allegedly
deprived. The defendant argues that the settlement agreement creates only
a contractual right to the compensatory education funds and that there is
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nothing in the agreement which establishes a property interest or an
entitlement to due process before the School District can reject a request for
reimbursement pursuant to the agreement.
Count IV of the plaintiff’s complaint is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1983, which provides a private right of action as against:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws . . .
42 U.S.C. §1983. This statute does not create substantive rights but instead
“provides only remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the
Constitution or federal laws.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir.
1996).
To state a viable claim under §1983, a plaintiff “must allege the violation
of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must
show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
color of state law.” Lomax v. U.S. Senate Armed Forces Service Committee,
454 Fed.Appx. 93, 95 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988)).
In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs allege that W.K. was deprived
of a property interest when the School District refused to pay for Holy Cross
under the compensatory education fund and special education settlement.
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The plaintiffs allege that the School District did so without due process. To the
extent that the plaintiffs are claiming payments under the settlement
agreement constitute their property interest, the court agrees that Count IV of
the amended complaint should be dismissed. Even if the plaintiffs have a right
to payments for tuition at Holy Cross, the failure of the School District to
provide those payments would constitute only a breach of the settlement
agreement and would not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Community Country Day School v. Erie School District, 618 Fed.Appx. 89, 93
(3d Cir. 2015) (finding parents of students enrolled in private school did not
have property interest in tuition reimbursement from school district, and
district’s refusal to pay tuition thus did not violate parents’ due process rights,
even if district’s failure to continue payments constituted breach of settlement
agreement). Thus the defendant’s motion to dismiss will be granted on this
basis as well.
As one form of relief, the plaintiffs request “[j]udgment for damages
pertaining to educational and emotional harm associated with the District’s
refusal to pay for previously established services”. The defendant argues that
this request for damages should be dismissed pursuant Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)
because the court lacks jurisdiction based upon the plaintiffs’ failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
In light of the above rulings, the plaintiffs have two claims which remain:
a breach of special education settlement agreement claim (Count II) and a
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claim for attorney’s fees (Count V). The defendant does not challenge the
court’s jurisdiction over either of these claims, but only argues that the
plaintiffs should have exhausted one of the forms of relief requested with
respect to the breach claim. As discussed above, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is
appropriate where the court lacks jurisdiction to decide the merits of a claim.
The court finds that it has jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ remaining claims,
including the breach claim which, at this stage of the proceedings, it does not
appear that the plaintiffs were required to exhaust prior to bringing the instant
action. See, e.g., F.H. ex rel. Hall v. Memphis City Schools, 764 F.3d 638,
644-45 (6th Cir. 2014) (a breach of a settlement agreement claim brought
pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §1415(f)(1)(B)(iii) need not be exhausted prior to filing
suit in federal court). Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they
request with respect to that claim is a separate matter to be decided.
However, because the court has jurisdiction over the claim itself, the
defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) will be denied
in this respect.
Finally, the defendant argues that the plaintiff’s complaint should also
be dismissed to the extent that they request as a form of relief that the court
issue an order to place any monetary award into a third-party special needs
trust and further order the defendant to pay for any costs and fees associated
with the trust. Again, should the court determine that the plaintiffs’ breach
claim has any merit, it will then determine what relief is appropriate. Until then,
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the defendant’s motion to dismiss will be denied on this basis.
An appropriate order shall issue.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
Date: April 10, 2017
O:\Mannion\shared\MEMORANDA - DJ\CIVIL MEMORANDA\2016 MEMORANDA\16-0352-01.wpd
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