Wynn-Turner v. Doll et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Since Wynn-Turners civil rights complaint is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory," it will be dismissed, without prejudice, as legally frivolous. Wilson, 878 F.2d at 774. An appropriate Order will enter.Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 4/5/16. (cc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EVANS A. WYNN-TURNER,

:
:
Plaintiff
:
CIVIL NO. 3:CV-16-511
:
v.
:
:
(Judge Conaboy)
:
CLAIR DOLL, ET AL.,
:
:
Defendants
:
___________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM
Background
Evans A. Wynn-Turner, an inmate presently confined at the York
County Prison, York, Pennsylvania, initiated this pro se civil
rights action.

Named as Defendants are the following York County

Prison officials: Deputy Warden Clair Doll; Grievance Coordinator
Brittney O’Brien; Property Supervisor/Officer Jeff Kunkle; Prison
Board Solicitor Donald L. Reihart; and Shift Supervisor Lieutenant
John Doe; and two John Doe intake correctional officers.
Accompanying the Complaint is a request for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis.

See Doc. 2.

According to the Complaint, the Plaintiff entered the York
County Prison on April 28, 2015.

During the admission process

Correctional Officer John Doe # 1 allegedly “openly admired” a set
of 2 carat diamond earrings which were in the possession of Wynn-

1

Turner.

Doc. 1, ¶ 8.

Plaintiff contends that he was not provided

with a personal property inventory sheet by correctional staff
during the intake procedure.
On July 25, 2015, Plaintiff purportedly attempted to have the
earrings sent home.

An unidentified correctional officer informed

that the earrings could not be located and had probably been
stolen.

See id., ¶ 16.

Wynn-Turner filed an institutional

grievance regarding his alleged loss of property with Defendant
O’Brien which was denied.

Administrative appeals of the denial

were subsequently denied by Defendants Doll and Reihart.

The

Complaint maintained that Doll and O’Brien lied because their
written denials falsely indicated that Plaintiff had signed a
property inventory sheet upon his admission into the prison.1

The

Complaint seeks injunctive and declaratory relief as well as
nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages.

1

Exhibits attached to the Complaint indicate that the
initial response by Defendant O’Brien to Plaintiff’s administrative
grievance concerning the alleged missing earrings stated that the
inmate had signed a personal property sheet upon being admitted
into the York County Prison which did not list his possession of
earrings.
A response by Defendant Doll to an administrative appeal filed
by Wynn-Turner stated that there was no property sheet but
nonetheless denied relief because there was no evidence showing
that Plaintiff arrived at the prison with earrings. Following a
further appeal Solicitor Reihart, a further investigation was
ordered. Thereafter, according to a March 2, 2016 response by
Reihart, it was discovered that the prison did have a personal
property sheet signed by Plaintiff which indicated that the inmate
did not have any jewelry when he entered the prison. See Doc. 1,
Exhibit B, p. 11.
2

Discussion
Standard of Review
When considering a complaint accompanied by a motion to proceed
in forma pauperis, a district court may rule that process should not
issue if the complaint is malicious, presents an indisputably
meritless legal theory, or is predicated on clearly baseless factual
contentions.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989),

Douris v. Middleton Township, 293 Fed. Appx. 130, 132 (3d Cir.
2008).

Indisputably meritless legal theories are those "in which

either it is readily apparent that the plaintiff's complaint lacks
an arguable basis in law or that the defendants are clearly entitled
to immunity from suit ... ."

Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 (3d

Cir. 1990) (quoting Sultenfuss v. Snow, 894 F.2d 1277, 1278 (11th
Cir. 1990)).
Personal Involvement
With respect to the claims against Deputy Warden Doll,
Grievance Coordinator O’Brien, Property Supervisor Kunkle and Prison
Solicitor Reihart,

civil rights claims cannot be premised on a

theory of respondeat superior.
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).

Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d

Rather, each named defendant must be

shown, via the complaint's allegations, to have been personally
involved in the events or occurrences which underlie a claim.

See

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison
Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976).

As explained in Rode:

A defendant in a civil rights action must have
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personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. . . .
[P]ersonal involvement can be shown through
allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of
participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence,
however, must be made with appropriate particularity.
Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
Prisoners also have no constitutionally protected right to a
grievance procedure.

See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor

Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 137-38 (1977)(Burger, C.J., concurring)
(“I do not suggest that the [grievance] procedures are
constitutionally mandated.”); Speight v. Sims, No. 08-2038, 2008 WL
2600723 at *1 (3d. Cir. Jun 30, 2008)(citing Massey v. Helman, 259
F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001)(“[T]he existence of a prison grievance
procedure confers no liberty interest on a prisoner.”)
While prisoners do have a constitutional right to seek redress
of their grievances from the government, that right is the right of
access to the courts which is not compromised by the failure of
prison officials to address an inmate’s grievance.

See Flick v.

Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991) (federal grievance
regulations providing for administrative remedy procedure do not
create liberty interest in access to that procedure).

Pursuant to

those decisions, any attempt by a prisoner to establish liability
against a correctional official based upon their handling of his
administrative grievances or complaints does not support a
constitutional claim.

See also Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 Fed.

Appx. 924, 925 (3d Cir. 2005)(involvement in post-incident grievance
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process not a basis for § 1983 liability); Pryor-El v. Kelly, 892 F.
Supp. 261, 275 (D. D.C. 1995) (because prison grievance procedure
does not confer any substantive constitutional rights upon prison
inmates, the prison officials' failure to comply with grievance
procedure is not actionable).
There are no facts alleged in the Complaint showing that
Defendants Doll, O’Brien, Kunkle and Reihart were personally
responsible for the purported loss of his earrings.

Based upon an

application of the standards announced in Rode and Hampton,
Plaintiff’s action to the extent that it seeks to establish
liability against Deputy Warden Doll, Grievance Coordinator O’Brien,
Property Supervisor Kunkle and Prison Solicitor Reihart solely based
upon their respective supervisory capacities within the York County
Prison cannot proceed.

Such respondeat superior type assertions are

simply insufficient for establishing civil rights liability.
Likewise, any attempt by Plaintiff to set forth a civil rights claim
against those officials based upon their responses to administrative
grievances and administrative appeals filed by the Plaintiff is
equally inadequate under Flick and Alexander.
Accordingly, dismissal will be granted in favor of Deputy
Warden Doll, Grievance Coordinator O’Brien, Property Supervisor
Kunkle and Prison Solicitor Reihart Defendant Young with respect to
any claims asserted them which are based upon either their
supervisory capacities within the York County Prison or their
handling of Plaintiff’s administrative grievance and resulting
5

appeals.
Personal Property
As discussed above, Plaintiff’s action seeks relief based upon
his contention staff at the York County Prison either intentionally
or inadvertently caused the loss of a set of diamond earrings which
were in his possession at the time he entered that correctional
facility.
It is well settled that a civil rights claim cannot be brought
to vindicate a prisoner’s right to property when the deprivation
occurs as a result of a tortious and unauthorized act and where an
adequate remedy exists to compensate those who have suffered
tortious loss.

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-544 (1981).

The United States Supreme Court extended Parratt to include
intentional deprivations of property, holding that where a prisoner
has an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any loss suffered to his
or her property, a claim under § 1983 is not available.

Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532-533 (1984).
Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff has adequately alleged that
there was an intentional seizure of his personal property, the
Plaintiff may not obtain relief via a civil rights action if he has
an adequate alternative remedy.
As acknowledged by the Complaint, Wynn-Turner Murray has sought
administrative relief regarding his purported loss of property via
the York County Prison’s multi-tiered administrative grievance
system.

Plaintiff can also file an action in Pennsylvania state
6

court regarding his deprivation of personal property claim.

Since

Plaintiff has adequate post deprivation remedies, his present civil
rights loss of personal property claim is subject to sua sponte
dismissal under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 .

See Mattis v.

Dohman, 260 Fed. Appx. 458, 461 (3d Cir. 2008).
State Law Claims
To the extent that Plaintiff wishes to pursue a state law
claim before this Court,2 federal courts have jurisdiction over
state claims which are related to the federal claims and result from
a common nucleus of operative facts.

See United Mine Workers v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 9
(1976).

Supplemental jurisdiction may be declined over a claim when

the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (1997).

When rendering a

determination regarding pendent jurisdiction district courts should
consider judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the
litigants.

New Rock Asset Partners v. Preferred Entity

Advancements, 101 F.3d 1492, 1505 (3d Cir. 1996)(citation omitted).
Once jurisdiction has been exercised over the state claim,
elimination of the federal claim does not deprive the court of
jurisdiction to adjudicate the pendent claim.

Id. (citing Lentino

v. Fringe Emp. Plans, Inc., 611 F. 2d 474, 479 (3d Cir. 1979)).
However, if a federal claim is dismissed prior to trial, the
district court should decline to decide the pendent state claims,

2

See Doc. 1, ¶ 34.
7

“unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and
fairness provide an affirmative justification for doing so.”
Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir.
1995).

Since this Court has dismissed the federal claims against

Defendants, jurisdiction will be declined with respect to any
pendent state law claims that Plaintiff wishes to pursue.

Of

course, this determination does not preclude Plaintiff from seeking
relief from the Pennsylvania state courts.
Conclusion
Since Wynn-Turner’s civil rights complaint is "based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory," it will be dismissed, without
prejudice, as legally frivolous.

Wilson, 878 F.2d at 774.

appropriate Order will enter.

S/Richard P. Conaboy
RICHARD P. CONABOY
United States District Judge
DATED: APRIL 5, 2016

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