Yisrael v. State Police et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 17 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Luzerne County Corrections Facility, Luzerne County Sheriff Dept.Signed by Honorable Malachy E Mannion on 3/21/17. (bs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ELEAZAR YISRAEL,

:

Plaintiff,

:

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-572
(JUDGE MANNION)
v.

:

STATE POLICE, et al.,

:

Defendants

:
MEMORANDUM

I.

Background
Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, housed in the Luzerne County Correctional

Facility, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, filed the above captioned civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. (Doc. 1). The named Defendants are the
Pennsylvania State Police, the Luzerne County Sheriff’s Department and the
Medical Director of the Luzerne County Correctional Facility. Plaintiff
challenges ongoing state criminal proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas
for Luzerne County, as well as the alleged mishandling of Plaintiff by the
Luzerne County Sheriff’s Department, while transporting him from the
courtroom, and Plaintiff’s alleged injuries and inadequate medical care as a
result. The required filing fee has been paid.
By Memorandum and Order dated June 13, 2016, the Court conducted
an initial screening of Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)1
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Section 1915(e)(2) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides:
(continued...)

and 28 U.S.C. §1915A,2 and dismissed, without prejudice, the Pennsylvania
State Police and Plaintiff’s claims regarding his ongoing state criminal
proceedings from the complaint. (Docs. 6, 7).
Currently pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint, filed on behalf of Defendants Luzerne County Sheriff’s Department
and the Medical Directory of the Luzerne County Correctional Facility. (Doc.
17). The unopposed motion is ripe for disposition. For the following reasons,
the Court will grant the motion, in part, as noted below.

II.

Allegations in Complaint
Plaintiff alleges that officers of the Pennsylvania State Police were

“instrumental in the illegal search and seizure of the residence of 33 W. 10th

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(...continued)
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion
thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines
that (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the
action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.

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Title 28 U.S.C. §1915A requires a district court to screen any complaint
brought by a prisoner who seeks relief from a government employee for
purposes of determining whether, inter alia, the complaint fails to present a
viable cause of action. This initial screening is to de done as soon as
practicable and need not await service of process. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a).
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St. and the unlawful arrest and false imprisonment of Plaintiff against his will
as a Sovereign Authority.” (Doc. 1).
He further claims that officers of the Luzerne County Sheriffs
Department “did physically abuse [him] when removing him from courtroom
a number of (2) times by banging his body off of walls and doorframe and
carrying him by the shackles placed on his feet, resulting in nerve damage
and wounds/cuts as a result of their treatment.” Id.
Finally, Plaintiff states that “Correct Care Solutions failed to provide
adequate health care and proper assessment of conditions in a prompt
manner and going no further than an ectocardiogram (sic) which showed
results of a failing heart and responding to a medical grievance nearly a
month after serious conditions were reported.” Id. In support of this allegation,
Plaintiff attaches an Inmate Medical Grievance Form to his complaint, in
which Plaintiff lists several medical complaints, including losing control of his
bladder, sleep apnea and increased breathing. Id. Although the Grievance
Form is dated November 16, 2015, it is noted as “received 12/11/15" and
responded to that same date with the designation “brought down to medical
for immediate assessment.” Id.
On April 4, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant action in which he requests
“full compensation for [the] number of days imprisoned and detained; full
compensation for each incident forced to be subjected to involving court
proceedings; reimbursement of loss of investments and/or fund Children
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College & Community Campus Project for 13 years or pay its equivalent which
is 7.2 million over the course of 3 years in thirds; reimburse or employ
contractors for damage done to address of 33 W.10th St. home; furnish a
protection from abuse against Pennsylvania State Police in its totality; and
compensation for pain and suffering during incarceration for the death of
loved ones whose funerals [he] could not attend, anxiety and trauma set forth
therein.” Id.

III.

Motion to Dismiss
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for “failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Under Rule 12(b)(6), we must
“accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v.
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). While a complaint
need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim,” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2), and detailed factual allegations are not required, Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a complaint must plead “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft
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v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[L]abels
and conclusions” are not enough, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and a court “is
not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Id. (quoted case omitted).
In resolving the motion to dismiss, we thus “conduct a two-part
analysis.” Fowler, supra, 578 F.3d at 210. First, we separate the factual
elements from the legal elements and disregard the legal conclusions. Id. at
210-11. Second, we “determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief”. Id. at 211
(quoted case omitted).
In addition, because Plaintiff complains about “prison conditions,” the
screening provisions of 42 U.S.C. §1997e apply, as do the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1915(e), given that he was granted in forma pauperis
status to pursue this suit. The court’s obligation to dismiss a complaint under
the PLRA screening provisions for complaints that fail to state a claim is not
excused even after defendants have filed a motion to dismiss. See, e.g.,
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2000). Hence, if there is
a ground for dismissal which was not relied upon by a defendant in a motion
to dismiss, the court may nonetheless sua sponte rest its dismissal upon such
ground pursuant to the screening provisions of the PLRA. See Lopez; Dare
v. U.S., Civil No. 06-115E, 2007 WL 1811198, at *4 (W.D. Pa. June 21, 2007),
aff’d, 264 Fed App’x. 183 (3d Cir. 2008).
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IV.

Discussion
A. Eighth Amendment Medical Claim
In order to establish an Eighth Amendment medical claim, a plaintiff

must show “(i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison
officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden
Cty. Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). See also Rouse
v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A serious medical need is one
that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one that is
so obvious that a layperson would recognize the need for a doctor’s attention.
Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d
326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). In addition, “if unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain results as a consequence of denial or delay in the provision of adequate
medical care, the medical need is of the serious nature contemplated by the
eighth amendment.” Id.
A prison official acts with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious
medical needs when he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994). Thus, a complaint that a physician or a medical department “has been
negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid
claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment...” Estelle v.
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Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). For instance, a “medical decision not to
order an X-ray, or like measures, does not represent cruel and unusual
punishment. At most it is medical malpractice.” Id., 429 U.S. at 107. “[A]s long
as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate
a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903
F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990). Further, a doctor’s disagreement with the
professional judgment of another doctor is not actionable under the Eighth
Amendment. See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990). In
sum, negligence, unsuccessful medical treatment, or medical malpractice
does not give rise to a §1983 cause of action, and an inmate’s disagreement
with medical treatment is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. See
Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993).
Further, a prison administrator cannot be found deliberately indifferent
under the Eighth Amendment because he or she fails to respond to the
medical complaints of an inmate being treated by a prison physician, or
because, as non-physicians, they defer to the medical judgment of the
inmate’s treating physicians. Id., 991 F.2d at 69. If, however, non-medical
prison personnel had “a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison
doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner,” liability
may be imposed. Spruill, 372 F.3d 236.
A mere difference of opinion between the prison’s medical staff and the
inmate regarding the diagnosis or treatment which the inmate receives does
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not support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. Farmer v. Carlson, 685
F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (M.D. Pa. 1988). See McCracken v. Jones, 562 F.2d 22,
24 (10th Cir. 1977); Smart v. Villar, 547 F.2d 112, 113 (10th Cir. 1976).
Additionally, if there is a dispute over the adequacy of the received
treatment, courts have consistently been reluctant to second guess the
medical judgment of the attending physician. Little v. Lycoming County, 912
F. Supp. 809, 815 (M.D. Pa.), aff’d, 101 F.3d 691 (3d Cir. 1996). The key
question is whether the defendant has provided the plaintiff with some type
of treatment, regardless of whether it is what the plaintiff desires. Farmer v.
Carlson, 685 F. Supp. at 1339.
The

allegations

in

Plaintiff’s

complaint,

and

his

supporting

documentation, clearly demonstrate that Plaintiff received medical attention,
and that the attention Plaintiff received lacks the requisite deliberate
indifference to support a Section 1983 claim. Plaintiff was immediately seen
by medical personnel the day his medical grievance form was received.
At best, Plaintiff’s complaint demonstrates his disagreement with the
type and timeliness of the treatment rendered. Though he may have wished
to have been seen and diagnosed earlier, his disagreement with the course
of action that they took based on the symptoms he presented, is not enough
to state a §1983 claim. Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1109 (3d Cir.1989)
(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06 (in the medical context, an inadvertent
failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute an
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unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the
conscience of mankind)). This is particularly so in light of the fact that there
are no allegations in the complaint that any of the Defendants intentionally
withheld medical treatment from Plaintiff in order to inflict pain or harm upon
Plaintiff. Farmer; Rouse. Thus, the allegations in the Plaintiff’s complaint
amount to nothing more than Plaintiff’s subjective disagreement with the
treatment decisions and medical judgment of the medical staff at the prison.
At most, the allegations in the complaint only rise to the level of mere
negligence. As simple negligence can not serve as a predicate to liability
under §1983, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), Plaintiff’s civil rights
complaint fails to articulate an arguable claim. See White, 897 F.2d at 108110.
Even holding Plaintiff’s complaint to the less stringent pleading
standards of pro se plaintiffs, the allegations do not sufficiently allege
deliberate indifference. Plaintiff does not suggest that the institution’s medical
staff were aware that there was an excessive risk to his health or safety but
wantonly refused to provide him medical care. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218,
236 n. 12 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that while a pro se complaint should be read
liberally, an inmate plaintiff must still allege that defendant was aware of the
risk and intentionally disregarded it). Thus, the allegations in the Plaintiff’s
complaint amount to nothing more than Plaintiff’s subjective disagreement
with the treatment decisions and medical judgment of the medical staff at the
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prison. At most, the allegations in the complaint only rise to the level of mere
negligence. As simple negligence can not serve as a predicate to liability
under §1983, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), Plaintiff’s civil rights
complaint fails to articulate an arguable claim. See White, 897 F.2d at 108110.
Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff believes that he has been
misdiagnosed, mere misdiagnosis or negligent treatment is not actionable as
an Eighth Amendment claim because medical malpractice is not a
constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Indeed, prison authorities are
accorded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners.
Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67. Once again, “mere disagreements over medical
judgment” do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. White,
897 F.2d at 110.
B.

Luzerne County Sheriff’s Department3

Section 1915(e)(2) states, in pertinent part, “the court shall dismiss the
case at any time if the court determines that (B) the action ... (ii) fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted ...” 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The
applicable standard of review is the same as the standard for a 12(b)(6)

3

Although named as a Defendant in Plaintiff’s action, and identified in
the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Defendants make no argument in their
brief in support with respect to the Sheriff’s Department, and instead, move
to dismiss Luzerne County, not a named Defendant, based on the same legal
argument. (See Doc. 20 at 13-14).
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motion. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2002). A
complaint that does not establish entitlement to relief under any reasonable
interpretation is properly dismissed without leave to amend. Id. at 106.
In order to prevail on a §1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that: (1)
the alleged wrongful conduct was committed by a person acting under color
of state law, and (2) the conduct deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Nicini v. Morra, 212
F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000); Schiazza v. Zoning Hearing Bd, 168 F.Supp.2d
361, 372 (M.D. Pa. 2001).
The claim against the Luzerne County Sheriff’s Department must be
dismissed as it is not a local government unit that can be sued under §1983
pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
690-91 (1978) (municipal liability attaches only “when execution of a
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury” complained of). In Section 1983 actions, a police department cannot
be sued because it is merely an administrative arm of the local municipality,
and is not a separate judicial entity. See DeBellis v. Kulp, 166 F.Supp.2d 255,
264 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (collecting cases and stating that police departments
cannot be sued in §1983 because it is “merely an administrative arm of the
local municipality, and is not a separate judicial entity.”). See also
Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d 20, 25 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1997)
11

(treating municipality and its police department as a single entity for purposes
of §1983 liability).
Before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, the Court must grant the Plaintiff leave to amend his
complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v.
Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3rd Cir. 2002). Since it is clear
from Plaintiff’s complaint, and supporting documentation, that Plaintiff
received adequate medical treatment as soon as the medical department
became aware of his request for treatment, and merely disagrees with the
treatment he received during this time, the Court finds that amendment on
these claims would be futile.
However, out of an abundance of caution, the Court will permit the
Plaintiff to file an amended complaint with respect to his excessive use of
force claim. Because Plaintiff has failed to specifically identify a named
member of the Luzerne County Sheriff’s Department as a Defendant, it
appears that the Plaintiff, in an amended complaint, would be required to
better describe any personal involvement in the alleged misdeed. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15. It is necessary and important to allow the Plaintiff to amend
his complaint so that the issues raised in this litigation may be decided fully
on their merits. See Weaver v. Wilcox, 650 F.2d 22, 27-28 (3d Cir. 1981);
Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1275-76 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
846 (1970).
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V.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claim, filed on behalf of Defendant, Medical Director of the Luzerne
County Correctional Facility, will be granted. Defendant, Prison Medical Staff,
is also entitled to dismissal pursuant to of 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff will be
afforded an opportunity to file an amended complaint with respect to alleged
excessive use of force by members of the Luzerne County Sheriff’s
Department. An appropriate order shall issue.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
DATE: March 21, 2017
O:\Mannion\shared\MEMORANDA - DJ\CIVIL MEMORANDA\2016 MEMORANDA\16-0572-02.wpd

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