Harris v. Tarrgot et al
Filing
31
MEMORANDUM A separate Order follows. Signed by Honorable Robert D. Mariani on 5/22/17. (jfg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTOINE HARRIS,
Plaintiff
Civil No. 3:16-cv-923
(Judge Mariani)
v.
IAN TARRGOT, et al.,
Defendants
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff, Antoine Harris, an inmate currently confined at the Benner Township State
Correctional Institution, in Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, initiated the instant action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Named as Defendants are Ian Taggart, Sergeant Bloomfield,
and CO Heiner. (/d. at p. 1). Plaintiff alleges that he informed Defendants Bloomfield and
Heiner that he had a medical condition and should be assigned to a bottom bunk on the
bottom tier. (ld. at pp. 1-2). Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed to move him to a bottom
bunk on the bottom tier and, as a result, he developed leg and ankle pain. (ld.).
Presently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs motion to appoint counsel. (Doc.
26). For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be denied without prejudice.
Although prisoners have no constitutional or statutory right to appointment of counsel
in a civil case, the Court has discretion Uto request an attorney to represent any person
unable to afford counsel." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 456
57 (3d Cir. 1997); Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002); Tabron v.
Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has stated that the appointment of counsel for an indigent litigant should be made
when circumstances indicate "the likelihood of substantial prejudice to him resulting, for
example, 'from his probable inability without such assistance to present the facts and legal
issues to the court in a complex but arguably meritorious case." Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741
F.2d 22, 26 (3d Cir. 1984).
By Memorandum and Order dated November 29, 2016, the Court previously denied
similar motions for appointment counsel filed by Plaintiff. See (Docs. 22, 23). That
Memorandum and Order also provided that if future proceedings demonstrated the need for
counsel, Plaintiffs motion would be reconsidered. (Doc. 22, pp. 3-4). Since the entry of the
November 29, 2016 Order, Plaintiff has continued to demonstrate a reasonable ability to
litigate this action pro se. Furthermore, his latest motion fails to set forth sufficient special
circumstances or factors which would warrant the appOintment of counsel. See Tabron V.
Grace, 6 F.3d 147,153,155-57 (3d Cir. 1993). Plaintiff again bases his motion on the
alleged complexity of the case, limited access to the law library, limited education, and
inability to afford counsel. (Doc. 26). Indeed, Plaintiffs present motion is nearly identical to
his previously filed motions. See (Docs. 5, 19,26).
Based on the foregoing, it does not appear that Plaintiff will suffer prejudice if forced
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to prosecute this case on his own. The Court's duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally,
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 147-48 (3d Cir. 1985),
coupled with Plaintiffs apparent ability to litigate this action, militate against the appointment
of counsel. Accordingly, the motion for appointment of counsel will be denied, however the
denial will be without prejudice. Therefore, in the event that future proceedings demonstrate
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the need for counsel, the matter may be reconsidered either sua sponte or upon motion of
Plaintiff.
Aseparate Order follows.
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Date: May ~~, 2017
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