Murphy v. McLane Eastern, Inc. et al
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 9 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM. t/d/b/a McLane PA, McLane Eastern, Inc. Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 2/28/17. (sm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTONIO MURPHY,
Plaintiff
:
No. 3:16cv1055
:
:
(Judge Munley)
v.
:
:
McLANE EASTERN, INC. and
:
McLANE/EASTERN, INC.
:
t/d/b/a McLANE PA,
:
Defendants
:
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Antonio Murphy (hereinafter “plaintiff”) asserts Defendants
McLane Eastern, Inc. and McLane Eastern, Inc.’s t/d/b/a McLane PA
(collectively “defendants”) decision to terminate his employment violated
federal and state anti-discrimination statutes and the Family and Medical
Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2619, 2631-2654 and 5 U.S.C. § 63816387 (hereinafter “the FMLA”). Before the court for disposition is
defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FMLA claim pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. For the reasons explained below, we will grant in
part and deny in part defendants’ motion.
Background
The instant discrimination lawsuit arose from plaintiff’s employment
with defendants. Plaintiff, an African American male suffering from
demyelinating disease,1 severe vertigo, and an inoperable brain tumor,
worked full-time at defendants’ Jessup, Pennsylvania location from
November 2012 until September 2014. (Doc. 1, Compl. (hereinafter
“Compl.”) ¶¶ 21, 23, 26, 32-33, 71). Plaintiff picked products off various
conveyor belts and packaged them into shipping totes. (Id. ¶¶ 24-25).
Prior to his termination, plaintiff received satisfactory performance
appraisals and had no performance-related write-ups or discipline issues.
(Id. ¶¶ 27-28).
In July 2014, plaintiff passed out at work. (Id. ¶ 29). An ambulance
arrived and transported plaintiff to the hospital. (Id.) As a result of this
medical event, plaintiff requested FMLA leave. (Id. ¶ 47). Defendants
approved plaintiff’s medical leave request. (Id. ¶ 48). Thereafter, in
August 2014, plaintiff used one day of medical leave.2 (Id. ¶ 48).
1
The Mayo Clinic defines demyelinating disease as, “any condition
that results in damage to the protective covering (myelin sheath) that
surrounds nerve fibers in your brain and spinal cord. . . . Multiple sclerosis
is the most common demyelinating disease of the central nervous system
and no cure exists for any demyelinating disease.” See
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/multiple-sclerosis/expert-an
swers/demyelinating-disease/faq-20058521 (last accessed Feb. 28,
2017).
2
Plaintiff asserts he requested two days of medical leave. (Compl.
¶ 30). Plaintiff, however, used only one day of FMLA leave because
defendants assign employees “ducks” for unscheduled time off. (Id. ¶ 31).
2
On September 18, 2014, plaintiff fell behind at his assembly line
station, causing his line to back up. (Id. ¶ 52). Two of defendants’
employees assisted plaintiff, including co-worker Lisa Murphy. (Id. ¶ 53).
After completing a tote, Lisa Murphy “stormed off”. (Id. ¶ 59). The
defendants then called plaintiff into the human resource manager’s office.
(Id. ¶ 60). The human resource manager stated that a female employee
alleged plaintiff touched her in an inappropriate manner. (Id. ¶ 61).
Plaintiff adamantly denied this allegation. (Id.) The defendants
immediately sent plaintiff home and terminated his employment on
September 22, 2014. (Id. ¶ 71).
In response to his termination, plaintiff filed a four-count complaint.
(Doc. 1). Count I alleges a racial discrimination claim under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Id. ¶¶ 94-103).
Count II states a disability discrimination claim pursuant to the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (Id. ¶¶ 104-18). Count III
avers racial and disability discrimination claims under the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act, 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 951, et seq. (Id. ¶¶ 119-34).
Two (2) or more “ducks” may result in adverse employment or corrective
actions. (Id.) As discussed in detail infra, plaintiff failed to explicitly allege
he received ducks for his unscheduled time off.
3
Count IV asserts interference and retaliation claims pursuant to the FMLA.
(Id. ¶¶ 135-57). On August 15, 2016, defendants filed a motion to dismiss
Count IV–plaintiff’s FMLA interference and retaliation claims. (Doc. 9).
The parties then briefed the issues, bringing this matter to its present
procedural posture.
Jurisdiction
The court has federal question jurisdiction over this FMLA action.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.”); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(a)(3), (4) (granting district courts
jurisdiction over civil actions brought to redress deprivations of
constitutional or statutory rights by way of damages or equitable relief).
We have supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Legal Standard
The defendants filed their motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court tests the
sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations when considering a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion. All well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be viewed as
4
true and in the light most favorable to the non-movant to determine
whether, “‘under any reasonable reading of the pleadings, the plaintiff may
be entitled to relief.’” Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 665-66
(3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Estate of Bailey by Oare v. Cty. of York, 768 F.2d
503, 506 (3d Cir. 1985)). The plaintiff must describe “‘enough facts to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’
[each] necessary element” of the claims alleged in the complaint. Phillips
v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). Moreover, the plaintiff must
allege facts that “justify moving the case beyond the pleadings to the next
stage of litigation.” Id. at 234-35. In evaluating the sufficiency of a
complaint, the court may also consider “matters of public record, orders,
exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the record of the
case.” Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384
n.2 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The court need not accept legal
conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. See Curay-Cramer v.
Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.
1997)).
5
Discussion
Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s FMLA claim. The FMLA
entitles “employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the
birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent
who has a serious health condition.” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2). “Eligible
employees are entitled to ‘12 workweeks of leave during any twelve-month
period.’” Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 300
(3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)).
The FMLA contains two relatively distinct provisions prohibiting
employers from: (1) interfering with an employee’s exercise of their right to
take reasonable leave for medical reasons; and (2) discriminating or
retaliating against an employee who exercises this right. 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615(a); see also Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 301 (explaining that under
the FMLA, employers may not interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise
of or attempt to exercise FMLA rights, and employers may not discharge
or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing
any practice made unlawful) (internal quotations omitted); Callison v. City
of Phila., 430 F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2005) (same). Stated differently,
interference claims derive from the denial of some benefit or protection
6
afforded by the FMLA, whereas retaliation actions pertain to whether an
employer used an employee’s FMLA leave as a negative factor in its
decision to terminate her employment. Capps v. Mondelez Global, LLC,
–F.3d–, 2017 WL 393237, at *5, 9 (3d Cir. Jan 30, 2017).
In the instant matter, plaintiff asserts both an FMLA interference
claim and an FMLA retaliation claim, which we will address in seriatim.
I. FMLA Interference
Plaintiff first asserts an FMLA interference claim, requiring plaintiff to
establish: (1) he was an eligible employee under the FMLA; (2) the
defendants were an employer subject to the FMLA’s requirements; (3) he
was entitled to FMLA leave; (4) he provided notice to the defendants of his
intention to take FMLA leave; and (5) he was denied benefits to which he
was entitled under the FMLA. Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 191-92 (3d
Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). “Also, ‘[b]ecause the FMLA [interference
claim] is not about discrimination, a McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis3 is not required.’” Id. at 192 (quoting Sommer v. The Vanguard
Grp., 461 F.3d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 2006)).
In the instant matter, defendants only contest the fifth element–the
3
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
7
defendants denied plaintiff FMLA benefits, arguing they did not withhold
any FMLA benefits from plaintiff. Plaintiff contends the defendants did
indeed interfere with his right to take unfettered FMLA leave. Specifically,
the defendants administered him “ducks” for taking two unscheduled
absences arising from his July 2014 emergency treatment. After a careful
review, the court agrees with defendants.
The fifth element of plaintiff’s interference claim requires him to
demonstrate that the defendants “illegitimately prevented him from
obtaining [FMLA] benefits.” Sarnowski v. Air Brooke Limousine, Inc., 510
F.3d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, plaintiff alleges that he passed out at
work in July 2014. (Compl. ¶ 29). Shortly thereafter, an ambulance
arrived and transported him to the hospital. (Id.) This medical event
caused plaintiff to use two (2) unscheduled days off. (Id. ¶ 30). According
to plaintiff, defendants assign employees “ducks” for unscheduled time off.
(Id. ¶ 31). Two (2) or more “ducks” may result in adverse employment or
corrective actions. (Id.)
Plaintiff, however, failed to explicitly aver that he received ducks for
these two unscheduled days off. Absent such an allegation, plaintiff’s
complaint fails to assert defendants illegitimately prevented him from
8
obtaining FMLA benefits–that is, the ability to take unscheduled time off
due to his July 2014 medical incident without receiving any adverse ducks
or other employment action. See Ross, 755 F.3d at 192 (“[W]e have
made it plain that, for an interference claim to be viable, the plaintiff must
show that FMLA benefits were actually withheld.”) (citation omitted). As
such, the court will dismiss Count IV without prejudice and provide plaintiff
an opportunity to properly allege all elements of his FMLA interference
claim.
II. FMLA Retaliation
Plaintiff also asserts an FMLA retaliation claim, requiring him to
assert that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity under the FMLA; (2) he
experienced an adverse employment action following the protected
activity; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action. Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494,
500 (3d Cir. 1997). Here, defendants’ motion to dismiss only attacks the
third element–the existence of a causal link between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action.
“To demonstrate a causal connection, a plaintiff generally must
establish ‘either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between
9
the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of
antagonism, coupled with timing[,] to establish a causal link.’” Budhun v.
Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 258 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting
Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir.
2007)); see also Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 196 (3d Cir.
2015) (noting that causation may be established by suggestive timing or
other circumstantial evidence that supports the inference of retaliation).
“Whether a causal link exists ‘must be considered with a careful eye to the
specific facts and circumstances encountered.’” Id. (quoting Farrell v.
Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000)). The Third
Circuit has also emphasized that:
it is causation, not temporal proximity itself, that is an
element of plaintiff’s prima facie case, and temporal
proximity merely provides an evidentiary basis from which
an inference can be drawn. . . . When there may be valid
reasons why the adverse employment action was not taken
immediately, the absence of immediacy between the cause
and effect does not disprove causation.
Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1997).
Regarding temporal proximity, the Third Circuit has held that an
adverse employment action occurring within ten (10) days from the date of
the protected action is unduly suggestive. See, e.g., Shellenberger v.
Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 189 (3d Cir. 2003) (ten days deemed
10
unduly suggestive); Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 307 (determining that
termination less than a week after the plaintiff invoked her right to FMLA
leave established causation); Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d
Cir. 1989) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant when plaintiff
was fired two days after his employer received notice of his EEOC
complaint).
The Third Circuit, however, has noted that a temporal proximity
greater than ten (10) days requires supplementary evidence of retaliatory
motive. See LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217,
233 (3d Cir. 2007) (three months is not unusually suggestive); Williams v.
Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 760 (3d Cir, 2004) (two
months is not unusually suggestive); Thomas v. Town of Hammonton, 351
F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding temporal proximity not unduly
suggestive when three weeks had elapsed between protected activity and
adverse employment action); Farrell, 206 F.3d at 280 (finding that
temporal proximity greater than ten days requires supplementary evidence
of retaliatory motive).
Stated differently, where temporal proximity is not unduly
suggestive, the court must ascertain whether the evidence as a whole,
11
including evidence of intervening antagonism, nevertheless raises an
inference of discrimination. LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 232; see also Daniels,
776 F.3d at 196 (requiring courts assessing the causal connection
between the protected activity and adverse action to consider the
circumstances as a whole when plaintiff’s allegations may demonstrate an
absence of close temporal proximity); Krouse, 126 F.3d at 504 (“When
temporal proximity between protected activity and allegedly retaliatory
conduct is missing, courts may look to the intervening period for other
evidence of retaliatory animus.”). “Among the kinds of evidence that a
plaintiff can proffer are intervening antagonism or retaliatory animus,
inconsistencies in the employer’s articulated reasons for terminating the
employee, or any other evidence in the record sufficient to support the
inference of retaliatory animus.” LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 232-33.
In the instant matter, plaintiff’s allegations fail to establish a close
temporal proximity establishing a causal link between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action. Plaintiff requested FMLA
leave in July 2014. (Compl. ¶ 47). Shortly thereafter, the defendants
approved plaintiff’s FMLA leave. (Id. ¶ 48). Plaintiff used FMLA leave in
August 2014. (Id. ¶ 48). Defendants terminated plaintiff’s employment on
12
September 22, 2014. (Id. ¶ 71). Thus, even assuming plaintiff’s FMLA
leave occurred on August 31, 2014, at least eighteen (18) days passed
before his termination, which fails to establish an unduly suggestive
temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly
retaliatory action. Shellenberger, 318 F.3d at 189; Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d
at 307; Jalil, 873 F.2d at 708.
Having determined that the temporal proximity between the
protected activity and the adverse action is not unduly suggestive, we next
determine whether plaintiff’s allegations as a whole raise an inference of
discrimination. After a careful review, we find that plaintiff has satisfied his
burden regarding causation at this initial stage of litigation.
In August 2014, plaintiff requested multiple medical leave days
under the FMLA. (Compl. ¶¶ 30, 47-49). Plaintiff, however, limited his
leave to only one day in August 2014 because defendants wanted to “get
rid of” him. (Id. ¶¶ 50, 91). Specifically, plaintiff avers that defendants
previously terminated disabled employees or employees seeking FMLA
leave. (Id. ¶¶ 92-93). As such, plaintiff understood defendants’ unwritten
rule to be that defendants will terminate employees for taking approved
medical absences. (Id. ¶¶ 48-50).
13
Plaintiff also alleges that within a month of utilizing FMLA leave,
defendants manufactured a reason to terminate his employment. On
September 18, 2014, four days before his termination and within a month
of taking FMLA leave, plaintiff worked on the packaging line. (Id. ¶ 52).
Plaintiff fell behind and his line backed up. (Id.) Two employees arrived to
help plaintiff catch up. (Id. ¶¶ 53, 56). After helping plaintiff catch up, one
of the two employees, a female, stormed off. (Id. ¶ 59). Plaintiff did not
know why the female employee stormed off, and he continued to work on
his line. (Id.)
Subsequent to the female employee storming off, the defendants
called plaintiff into the human resource manager’s office. (Id. ¶ 60). The
human resource manager stated that a female employee alleged plaintiff
inappropriately touched her. (Id. ¶ 61). Plaintiff adamantly denied this
allegation. (Id.) The defendants immediately sent plaintiff home and
terminated his employment on September 22, 2014. (Id. ¶ 71).
Viewing plaintiff’s allegations as true, plaintiff has sufficiently pled a
causal connection between his protected activity and defendants’ decision
to terminate his employment. Defendants history of terminating
employees exercising their FMLA rights created an environment
14
conducive to employees foregoing or minimizing their FMLA leave.
Moreover, plaintiff asserts that he never inappropriately touched the
female employee on September 18, 2014, which raises a reasonable
inference that defendants’ reason for his termination is pretext to fire an
employee in retaliation for exercising his FMLA rights. Thus, the court will
deny defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim.
Conclusion
Based upon the above reasoning, the court will grant in part and
deny in part defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FMLA interference
and retaliation claims. The court will dismiss plaintiff’s FMLA interference
claim without prejudice and provide plaintiff fourteen (14) days to properly
allege all elements of his FMLA interference claim. The court will deny
defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim. An
appropriate order follows.
Date: 02/28/2017
s/ James M. Munley
JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY
United States District Court
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?