Gressens v. Ashland Foundry & Machine Works, Inc. et al
Filing
36
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 23 27 MOTIONS to Dismiss /Summary Judgment Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 3/9/17. (sm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GREGORY GRESSENS,
Plaintiff
:
No. 3:16cv1089
:
:
(Judge Munley)
v.
:
:
ASHLAND FOUNDRY & MACHINE
:
WORKS, INC.; UNITED STEEL,
:
PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER, :
MANUFACTURING, ENERGY,
:
ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE :
WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, :
AFL-CIO-CLC; and UNITED STEEL
:
WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL
:
UNION 14372,
:
Defendants
:
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Gregory Gressens (hereinafter “plaintiff”) claims Defendant
Ashland Foundry & Machine Works, Inc.’s (hereinafter “Ashland Foundry”)
improperly terminated his employment under Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (hereinafter “LMRA”). Plaintiff further alleges
Defendants United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy,
Allied Industrial and Service Worker’s International Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, and
United Steel Workers of America Local Union 14372’s (collectively “Union”)
decision to abandon plaintiff’s grievance breached the Union’s duty of fair
representation under his Collective Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter “CBA”)
and the LMRA. Before the court for disposition are Ashland Foundry and the
Union’s motions to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint. For the reasons that
follow, the court will deny these motions.
Background
The instant employment action arose from plaintiff’s employment with
Ashland Foundry. Plaintiff worked full-time at Ashland Foundry, and the Union
served as plaintiff’s collective bargaining representative.1 (Doc. 18, Am. Compl.
(hereinafter “Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 1-3, 8-9).
In early January 2016, plaintiff allegedly tested positive for
amphetamines/methamphetamines. (Id. ¶ 11). Plaintiff claims this was his first
positive drug test. (Id. ¶ 20). Plaintiff avers his positive result arose from taking
a prescription for Adderall. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13). Plaintiff provided Ashland Foundry
with proof of his prescription for Adderall. (Id. ¶ 14). Ashland Foundry,
however, terminated plaintiff’s employment on January 9, 2016. (Id. ¶ 15).
Plaintiff grieved Ashland Foundry’s decision to terminate his employment.
(Id. ¶ 22). Plaintiff argued his purported positive test resulted from a valid
1
As a Union employee, the CBA covering 7/29/2012 to 7/28/2017
governed the terms of plaintiff’s employment. (Am. Compl. ¶ 10; Doc. 18-1,
CBA dated 7/29/2012 to 7/28/2017 (hereinafter “Ashland CBA”)).
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prescription. 2 (Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 19). Alternatively, plaintiff claimed that even if his
positive test did not result from a valid prescription, Ashland Foundry improperly
terminated his employment. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the 2003 Drug
Policy, which plaintiff asserts covered his positive drug test, prohibited Ashland
Foundry from terminating a first time offender’s employment. (Id. ¶¶ 16-21).
On February 1, 2016, the Union and Ashland Foundry denied plaintiff’s
grievance. (Id. ¶ 23). The Union also informed plaintiff that it would not
represent plaintiff any further, and the Union would not arbitrate plaintiff’s
grievance. (Id.) Plaintiff attempted to arbitrate his grievance without the Union.
(Id.) The Union, however, opposed plaintiff’s attempt and refused to allow the
grievance to proceed to arbitration. (Id.)
In response to Ashland Foundry terminating his employment and the
Union’s failure to fully grieve his termination, plaintiff filed a complaint on June 8,
2016, and an amended complaint on September 22, 2016. Plaintiff’s two-count
amended complaint avers the following claims: Count I, breach of contract claim
2
Relevant to the instant matter, the CBA noted that the 2003 Drug Policy
(hereinafter “2003 Drug Policy”) was in effect at the time Ashland Foundry
terminated plaintiff’s employment. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18). The 2003 Drug Policy
prohibited Ashland Foundry from terminating the employment of first time
offenders. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21). The Drug 2003 Policy also stated that a positive test
for a controlled substance would not be considered a violation of the policy if the
positive test arose from an employee’s prescription medications. (Id. ¶ 19).
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pertaining to the CBA against Ashland Foundry; and Count II, breach of fair duty
of representation claim pursuant to the LMRA against the Union. Ashland
Foundry filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative a motion for summary
judgment, pertaining to Count I on October 27, 2016. (Doc. 23). The Union
filed a motion to dismiss Count II on October 28, 2016. (Doc. 27). The parties
have briefed the issues, bringing the case to the present procedural posture.
Jurisdiction
As plaintiff brings suit pursuant to Section 301 of the LMRA, we have
federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States.”).
Standard of Review
Ashland Foundry and the Union filed motions to dismiss plaintiff’s
amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The
court tests the sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations when considering a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion. All well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be
viewed as true and in the light most favorable to the non-movant to determine
whether, “‘under any reasonable reading of the pleadings, the plaintiff may be
entitled to relief.’” Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 665-66 (3d Cir.
1988) (quoting Estate of Bailey by Oare v. Cty. of York, 768 F.2d 503, 506 (3d
4
Cir. 1985)). The plaintiff must describe “‘enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ [each] necessary element” of
the claims alleged in the complaint. Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(2007)). Moreover, the plaintiff must allege facts that “justify moving the case
beyond the pleadings to the next stage of litigation.” Id. at 234-35. In
evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint the court may also consider “matters of
public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in
the record of the case.” Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d
1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The court does not have to
accept legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. See Curay-Cramer
v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)).
Discussion
Ashland Foundry and the Union move to dismiss plaintiff’s LMRA claims,
arguing plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Plaintiff’s amended complaint asserts a “hybrid” claim under Section
301 of the LMRA, which authorizes “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry
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affecting commerce . . . or between any such labor organizations . . . .” 29
U.S.C. § 185(a).
A “hybrid” section 301 action “is one in which a union member sues his or
her employer for breaching its contractual obligations under the collective
bargaining agreement and the union for breaching its duty of fair
representation.” Beidleman v. Stroh Brewery Co., 182 F. 3d 225, 236 (citing
DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983)). “To
prevail against either the company or the Union, . . . [employee-plaintiffs] must
not only show that [the employer’s action] was contrary to the contract but must
also carry the burden of demonstrating a breach of duty by the Union.”
Delcostello, 462 U.S. at 165 (citation omitted). Here, Ashland Foundry seeks to
dismiss plaintiff’s breach of contract claim and the Union moves to dismiss
plaintiff’s breach of fair duty of representation claim. We will discuss these
claims in seriatim.
I. Breach of Contract
Ashland Foundry first seeks to dismiss plaintiff’s breach of contract claim,
arguing plaintiff’s verified drug test for methamphetamine arising from a workrelated accident justified the termination of plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff
contends that his prescription for Adderall caused a false positive test result,
and therefore, Ashland Foundry improperly terminated his employment.
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Alternatively, plaintiff asserts the 2003 Drug Policy, which plaintiff avers was in
effect at the time of his alleged positive drug test, provided that a first time
offender’s employment could not be terminated. After a careful review, the
court finds that plaintiff has properly pled a breach of contract claim against
Ashland Foundry.
Under Pennsylvania law, parties must allege the following three elements
to adequately state a breach of contract claim: “(1) the existence of a contract,
including its essential terms; (2) a breach of duty imposed by the contract; and
(3) resultant damages.” Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 225 (3d Cir.
2003) (citing CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Cutillo, 723 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1999)).
In the instant matter, Ashland Foundry and the Union operated under a
CBA, detailing the terms of plaintiff’s employment. (Am. Compl ¶¶ 9-10). The
CBA noted that the 2003 Drug Policy was in effect at the time Ashland Foundry
terminated plaintiff’s employment. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18). The 2003 Policy prohibited
Ashland Foundry from terminating the employment of first time offenders. (Id.
¶¶ 20-21). The 2003 Policy also stated that a positive test for a controlled
substance would not be considered a violation of the policy if the positive test
arose from an employee’s prescription medications. (Id. ¶ 19).
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Plaintiff allegedly tested positive for amphetamines/methamphetamines in
early January 2016. (Id. ¶ 11). Plaintiff claims this was his first positive drug
test pursuant to the 2003 Policy, and asserts that his positive result arose from
taking a prescription for Adderall. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 20). Plaintiff provided Ashland
Foundry with proof of his prescription for Adderall. (Id. ¶ 14). Ashland Foundry,
however, terminated plaintiff’s employment on January 9, 2016. (Id. ¶ 15).
Confronted with plaintiff’s allegations, Ashland Foundry presents matters
outside the pleadings and requests the court convert the instant motion to
dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(d) allows for courts to decide motions to dismiss as summary judgment
motions. The federal rules specifically provide as follows:
If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule
56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all
the material that is pertinent to the motion.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).
Where, as here, a party requests the court consider matters outside of the
pleading, the issue of whether to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgement is a matter entrusted to the discretion of the court.
Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463 n.11 (3d Cir. 1992); Imhoff v. Temas,
67 F. Supp. 3d 700, 705 (W.D. Pa. 2014). Despite this discretion, the court is
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nonetheless precluded from converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56
motion when it finds that there exists a genuine issue of material fact. See
Kamens v. Summit Stainless, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (citing
Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 894, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)).
Furthermore, when a District Court decides to convert a motion to dismiss
into a motion for summary judgment, the court must provide the parties
“reasonable opportunity” to present all material evidence relevant to a summary
judgment motion. Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 824 F.3d 353, 361 (3d Cir. 2016).
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “notice must be ‘ambiguous’
and must ‘fairly apprise[]’ the parties that the court intends to convert the
motion.” In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 288 (3d
Cir. 1999). Stated differently, the Third Circuit has recommended that District
Courts “provide express notice when they intend to convert a motion to dismiss”
because it “is easy to give and removes ambiguities.” Id. at 288 n.11.
To support the conversion of its motion to dismiss to a motion for
summary judgment, Ashland Foundry seeks admission of three categories of
evidence. First, Ashland Foundry moves for the admission of a 2009 Drug
Policy (hereinafter “2009 Drug Policy”), and argues this policy, not the 2003
Drug Policy, covered any disciplinary action arising from plaintiff’s positive drug
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test.3 Second, Ashland Foundry seeks to submit documentary testimony to
demonstrate that plaintiff’s prescription for Adderall would not have resulted in
plaintiff testing positive for methamphetamine. Third, Ashland Foundry provides
plaintiff’s disciplinary history, contending that the termination of plaintiff’s
employment arose from a progressive discipline scheme.
The court, however, will not consider, and expressly precludes, Ashland
Foundry’s affidavits and evidence submitted to support its motion for summary
judgment. Much of Ashland Foundry’s evidence presents clear issues of
material fact. For example, plaintiff asserts the 2003 Drug Policy covered
plaintiff’s positive drug test. The 2003 Drug Policy expressly precluded Ashland
Foundry from terminating a first time offender. Ashland Foundry argues the
exact opposite—the 2009 Drug Policy covered plaintiff’s employment, which
allowed Ashland Foundry to terminate plaintiff’s employment after his failed drug
test. Additionally, medical expert testimony will likely be needed to ascertain
whether Adderall caused plaintiff’s positive drug test. Finally, the parties may
address plaintiff’s progressive discipline history, if any, during discovery. In
3
Under the 2009 Drug Policy, Ashland Foundry reserved the right to
immediately terminate an individual’s employment based on a positive drug test
when that employee was involved in a work accident where an individual was
harmed. (Doc. 18-2, Ex. B, 2009 Drug Policy dated 12/12/09 at 6). Thus,
according to Ashland Foundry, the 2009 Drug Policy permitted it to terminate
plaintiff’s employment.
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short, myriad issues of material fact preclude converting Ashland Foundry’s
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.
To the extent that Ashland Foundry’s arguments and extrinsic evidence
rely on facts not contained in the complaint, the court will not consider them in
deciding the motion to dismiss. Rather, at this initial stage of litigation, viewing
plaintiff’s allegations as true, the court determines that plaintiff has sufficiently
alleged a breach of contract claim against Ashland Foundry.
II. Breach of fair representation
The Union next moves to dismiss plaintiff’s breach of fair representation
claim. To properly plead a claim against the Union for breach of the duty of fair
representation, the plaintiff must sufficiently aver that the Union’s conduct
toward that member was “‘arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.’” Masy v.
N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 790 F.2d 322, 328 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967)). After a careful review, the court finds
that plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the Union’s failure to properly grieve
plaintiff’s termination was arbitrary.
“A union’s conduct can be classified as arbitrary only when it is irrational,
when it is without a rational basis or explanation.” Marquez v. Screen Actors
Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 46 (1998) (citing Air Line Pilots v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65,
78-81 (1991)). Moreover, with respect to an alleged grievance against an
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employer, “‘a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process
it in perfunctory fashion.’” Riley v. Letter Carriers Local No. 380, 668 F.2d 224,
228 (3d Cir. 1981) (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191). The plaintiff must
demonstrate more than “mere ineptitude or negligence” on the part of the union,
and “the fact that trained counsel would have avoided the error or pursued a
different strategy is not enough.” Riley, 668 F.2d at 228 (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Finally, a union’s foremost duty to advocate on behalf of its
members is tempered by “an obligation . . . to act fairly under the collective
bargaining agreement and not to assert or press grievances which it believes in
good faith do not warrant such action.” Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429
F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1970).
Here, plaintiff’s allegations may demonstrate that the Union arbitrarily
ignored his grievance or processed it in a perfunctory fashion. As previously
stated, Ashland Foundry suspended, and then terminated plaintiff’s
employment, in early January 2016, alleging plaintiff violated Ashland Foundry’s
Drug and Alcohol Policy. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 15). Immediately after the
termination of his employment, plaintiff filed a grievance with the Union. (Id.
¶ 22).
On February 1, 2016, the Union and Ashland Foundry denied plaintiff’s
grievance. (Id. ¶ 23). The Union also informed plaintiff that it would not
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represent plaintiff any further, and the Union would not arbitrate plaintiff’s
grievance. (Id.) Plaintiff attempted to arbitrate his grievance without the Union.
(Id.) The Union, however, opposed plaintiff’s attempt and refused to allow the
grievance to proceed to arbitration. (Id.) In short, plaintiff avers the Union failed
to properly grieve his termination when the Union possessed evidence
indicating that plaintiff had not violated either the 2003 Drug Policy or the 2009
Drug Policy.
At this stage in the litigation, absent the benefit of a fully developed factual
record, and viewing plaintiff’s allegations as true, the court will allow this claim
against the Union to proceed. Thus, the court will deny the Union’s motion to
dismiss this claim.
Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, the court will deny Ashland Foundry and
the Union’s motions to dismiss plaintiff’s breach of contract and breach of fair
representation claims. An appropriate order follows.
Date:
03/09/2017
s/ James M. Munley
JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY
United States District Court
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