Williams v. Correct Care Solutions, Inc. et al

Filing 38

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 23 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Sommers, Jeffrey A. Beard, John Wetzel, Steven Glunt, Debra Younkin. Signed by Honorable Robert D. Mariani on 8/8/17. (jam)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Civil No. 3:16-cv-1259

CALVIN WILLIAMS,

(Judge Mariani)

Plaintiff

v.
CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, INC.,
et al.,
Defendants

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Calvin Williams ("Williams"), an inmate who, at all relevant times, was
housed at the State Correctional Institution at Houtzdale, Pennsylvania ("SCI-Houtzdale"),
and the State Correctional Institution at Waymart, Pennsylvania ("SCI-Waymart"), initiated
the above-captioned civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Named as
Defendants are Sommers, Glunt, Younkin, Beard, Wetzel, (collectively, "Corrections
Defendants"), Dr. Khatri, Dr. Naji, and Correct Care Solutions, Inc. (Id.). Presently pending
before the Court is a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
by Corrections Defendants. (Doc. 23). Despite requesting an extension of time to file a
brief in opposition to Corrections Defendants' motion, Williams failed to oppose the motion.
(Docs. 33, 34). Consequently, the motion is deemed unopposed and ripe for disposition.
See LR. 7.6 ("Any party opposing any motion ... shall file a brief in opposition ... [or] shall
be deemed not to oppose such motion"). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

grant the motion to dismiss.
I.

Motion to Dismiss Standard of Review
A complaint must be dismissed under FED. R. C1v. P. 12(b)(6), if it does not allege

"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell At/. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The plaintiff must
aver "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).
"Though a complaint 'does not need detailed factual allegations, ... a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."' DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Prop.

Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words,
"[~actual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."

Covington v. Int'/ Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A court "take[s] as true all the factual
allegations in the Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those
facts, but ... disregard[s] legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Ethypharm S.A. France v.

Abbott Laboratories, 707 F.3d 223, 231, n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).

2

Twombly and Iqbal require [a district court] to take the following three steps to
determine the sufficiency of a complaint: First, the court must take note of the
elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should
identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.
Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).

"[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the
pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). This "plausibility" determination will be a "context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
However, even "if a complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court
must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or
futile." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).
[E]ven when plaintiff does not seek leave to amend his complaint after a
defendant moves to dismiss it, unless the district court finds that amendment
would be inequitable or futile, the court must inform the plaintiff that he or she
has leave to amend the complaint within a set period of time.
Id.
II.

Allegations of the Complaint

Williams alleges that during his incarceration at SCI-Houtzdale, in September 2011,
he was improperly prescribed medication that caused his vision to deteriorate. (Doc. 1, 1f1f
3

17, 40). In September 2011, he "awoke feeling extremely fatally ill", with "burning,
throbbing" eyes, hives, nausea, disorientation, and difficulty walking. (Id.

at~

21). Williams

was immediately treated in the medical department, where he was assessed by "the
medical staff' and prescribed moisturizing eye drops. (Id.

at~

22). He claims that his

condition failed to improve and he was sent to an outside hospital on September 3, 2011.
(Id.

at~

26). Once at the hospital, he was allegedly diagnosed with Stevens-Johnson

syndrome. (Id.

at~

28). He claims that a doctor at the outside hospital informed him that

he was allergic to the medication given at the prison, which caused the vision issues. (Id.).
Williams returned to SCI-Houtzdale on September 7, 2011. (Id.

at~

30). He was placed in

the prison infirmary for three weeks, and was prescribed eye drops, ointment for his hives,
intravenous fluids, and "some kind of oral tablets." (Id.).
Williams alleges that Corrections Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs before and after his treatment at the outside hospital. (Doc. 1,

,m 65, 69,

73). He claims that Corrections Defendants were negligent in the care they provided, they
conspired to subject Williams to improper medical care, discriminated against him because
of his age, violated his rights t equal protection and due process, and Corrections
Defendants' actions were in retaliation for Williams' complaints about not receiving
adequate medical care. (Id.

at~~ 79-82,

95-96, 98-99).

4

Ill.

Discussion
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code offers private citizens a cause of

action for violations of federal law by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress ....

Id.; see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95
F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To state a claim under§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege "the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must
show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state
law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

A.

Lack of Personal Involvement

Corrections Defendants argue that Williams fails to state a claim against them
because they lack personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. (Doc. 24, pp. 10-12). The
Court finds merit in this argument.
Individual liability can be imposed under section 1983 only if the state actor played
an "affirmative part" in the alleged misconduct and "cannot be predicated solely on the

5

operation of respondeat superior." Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005)
(quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998)). "A defendant in a civil
rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. . . . Personal
involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge
and acquiescence." Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08; see a/so Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976); Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2003). Such allegations, however, must
be made with appropriate particularity in that a complaint must allege the particulars of
conduct, time, place, and person responsible. Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354; Rode, 845 F.2d at
1207-08. Alleging a mere hypothesis that an individual defendant had personal knowledge
or involvement in depriving the plaintiff of his rights is insufficient to establish personal
involvement. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208.
A thorough review of the complaint reveals that there are no allegations against
Corrections Defendants Beard and Wetzel. Williams simply lists Beard and Wetzel as
Defendants, but fails to mention them in the body of the complaint. Consequently, the
complaint against Corrections Defendants Beard and Wetzel is subject to dismissal. To the
extent that Williams attempts to hold Corrections Defendants Beard and Wetzel liable based
on their supervisory roles, this ground of respondeat superior liability has been squarely
rejected by the courts. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Accordingly, any claims against
Corrections Defendants Beard and Wetzel based on a respondeat superior theory of liability

6

will likewise be dismissed.
Regarding Corrections Defendants Sommers, Glunt, and Younkin, the complaint
broadly alleges that Williams received inadequate medical care while housed at
SCI-Houtzdale. (Doc. 1, 1f1f 21-52). Williams sets forth claims of products liability, violation
of constitutional rights, and negligence. However, Williams fails to indicate any product in
relation to the products liability claim, fails to indicate the involvement of each individual
Defendant, and fails to indicate the role each Defendant played in the alleged violation of his
constitutional rights.
Williams generally alleges that, "Defendants at SCI Waymart were aware of all the
above stated [medical issues], yet con[]tinued to do nothing to correct or make the above
wrongs done plaintiff any better." (Doc. 1, 1f 54). He then sets forth boilerplate allegations
of "[r]etaliations, medical indifference, inadequate medical care, cruel and unusual
punishments, atrocious lapses in the provision of medical care, inadequate and
unconstitutional denials of proper medical care, etc.", and "[i]ncompetent, unqualified,
cheap, [and] untrained ... medical care." (Id. at 1f1f 57, 59). These broad based assertions
fail to lay out the personal involvement of each Corrections Defendant, and fail to specify
which claims apply to which Defendant. These failures are fatal to Williams' claims against
Corrections Defendants and they are entitled to dismissal on this ground.

7

B.

Eighth Amendment Claim 1

"The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment proscribes
'punishments which are incompatible with the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."' Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 417
(3d Cir. 2000) (footnote omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S.Ct. 285,
50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when: (1) the
prisoner suffers an objectively, sufficiently serious deprivation; and (2) the prison official
acts with deliberate indifference to the prisoner's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); Fortune v. Hamberger, 379 Fed.
Appx. 116, 122 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating, "an inmate [is required] to show that 'he is
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,' and that prison
officials demonstrated a 'deliberate indifference' to his health or safety"). Under the first
element, a "prison official's act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To establish deliberate
indifference under the second element, the prison official must: (1) know of and disregard
an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; (2) be aware of facts from which an inference

1

Because Williams sets forth the same allegations to establish both Fifth and Eighth
Amendment claims, and because the Eighth Amendment "is specifically concerned with the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions, [and] serves as the primary source of substantive
protection to convicted prisoners," the more-specific-provision rule of the Eighth Amendment forecloses
Williams' Fifth Amendment claim as a matter of law. Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249,
260-61 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)).
8

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists; and (3) draw the inference. Id.
at 837. The subjective element "entails something more than mere negligence." Id. at 835.
In order to establish an Eighth Amendment medical claim, a plaintiff "must show (i) a
serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate
indifference to that need." Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir.
2003) (citing Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)). A serious medical need
is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so
obvious that a lay person would recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention."

Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). In
addition, "if unnecessary and wanton inftiction of pain results as a consequence of denial or
delay in the provision of adequate medical care, the medical need is of the serious nature
contemplated by the eighth amendment." Id. (citation omitted).
Williams alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when Corrections
Defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by providing inadequate
medical care at SCI-Houtzdale and SCI-Waymart. (Doc. 1, ~ 73). It is clear that Williams
received medical care during the relevant time period. To the extent that Williams is not
satisfied with the medical treatment and medications, such allegations, at best, demonstrate
his disagreement with medical care. Williams acknowledges that he received medical
treatment and "numerous" medications at SCI-Houtzdale, though he purportedly suffered an

9

allergic reaction to one medication. (Doc. 1, ~ 16). The medical staff provided Williams with
several medications to treat his self-reported complaints, to wit, Remeron, Tegretol, Elavil,
and Elavil Amitriptyline. (Id. at

,m 16-17). When Williams reported feeling ill in September

2011, he was immediately taken to the medical department, assessed by the medical staff
and prescribed eye drops. (Id.

at~

21-22). He claims that his condition failed to improve

and he was sent to an outside hospital on September 3, 2011. (Id. at 1f 26). Upon his
return to SCI-Houtzdale on September 7, 2011, Williams was placed in the prison infirmary
for three weeks, and was prescribed eye drops, ointment for his hives, intravenous fluids,
and oral tablets. (Id. at 1f 30). The medical staff clearly did not refuse to provide medical
care or medication.
Moreover, for purposes of Eighth Amendment medical claims, non-medical
correctional staff may not be "considered deliberately indifferent simply because they failed
to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by
the prison doctor." Durmer v. O'Carro/I, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993). The rationale for
this rule has been aptly explained by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
as follows:
If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts ... , a non-medical prison
official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable
hands. This follows naturally from the division of labor within a prison.
Inmate health and safety is promoted by dividing responsibility for various
aspects of inmate life among guards, administrators, physicians, and so on.
Holding a non-medical prison official liable in a case where a prisoner was
10

under a physician's care would strain this division of labor. Moreover, under
such a regime, non-medical officials could even have a perverse incentive not
to delegate treatment responsibility to the very physicians most likely to be
able to help prisoners, for fear of vicarious liability. Accordingly, we conclude
that, absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or
their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical
prison official ... will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter
requirement of deliberate indifference.

Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). Courts have repeatedly held that, absent
some reason to believe that prison medical staff are mistreating prisoners, non-medical
corrections staff who refer inmate medical complaints to physicians may not be held
personally liable for medically-based Eighth Amendment claims. See, e.g., id. at 236-37
(citing Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69); Garvey v. Martinez, No. 08-2217, 2010 WL 569852, at *6-7
(M.D. Pa. 2010); Hodge v. United States, No. 06-1622, 2007 WL 2571938, at *5-6 (M.D. Pa.
2007). A claim of a constitutional deprivation cannot be premised merely on the fact that
the named defendant was the prison warden, or a prison supervisor, when the incidents set
forth in the complaint occurred. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
Applying these constitutional benchmarks, it is apparent that, with respect to John
Sommers (Superintendent of SCI-Waymart), Steven Glunt (Superintendent at SCIHoutzdale), Debra Younkin (Corrections Health Care Administrator at SCI-Houtzdale),
Jeffrey Beard (former Secretary of the Department), and John Wetzel (current Secretary of
the Department), non-medical Defendants, Williams' complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Accordingly, Williams' Eighth Amendment claims against the
11

Corrections Defendants will be dismissed.

C.

Professional Liability Claim

Corrections Defendants Sommers, Glunt, and Younkin move to dismiss any pendent
state law professional liability claim against them, arguing that Williams has failed to comply
with the requirements of state law in lodging this claim. (Doc. 24, p. 15). Specifically,
Corrections Defendants Sommers, Glunt, and Younkin claim that Williams has failed to
comply with Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3 ("Rule 1042 .3"), by not filing a
valid certificate of merit with this professional liability claim. (Id.).
Rule 1042.3 provides, in pertinent part:
In any action based upon an allegation that a licensed professional deviated
from an acceptable professional standard, the attorney for the plaintiff, or the
plaintiff if not represented, shall file with the complaint or within sixty days
after the filing of the complaint, a certificate of merit signed by the attorney or
party that either
(1) an appropriate licensed professional has supplied a written
statement that there exists a reasonable probability that the
care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment,
practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside
acceptable professional standards and that such conduct was a
cause in bringing about the harm, or
(2) the claim that the defendant deviated from an acceptable
professional standard is based solely on allegations that other
licensed professionals for whom this defendant is responsible
deviated from an acceptable professional standard, or
(3) expert testimony of an appropriate licensed professional is
unnecessary for prosecution of the claim.
12

***
(d) The court, upon good cause shown, shall extend the time for filing a
certificate of merit for a period not to exceed sixty days. A motion to extend
the time for filing a certificate of merit must be filed by the thirtieth day after
the filing of a notice of intention to enter judgment of non pros on a
professional liability claim under Rule 1042.6(a) or on or before the expiration
of the extended time where a court has granted a motion to extend the time to
file a certificate of merit, whichever is greater. The filing of a motion to extend
tolls the time period within which a certificate of merit must be filed until the
court rules upon the motion.

PA. R. CIV. P. 1042.3(a), (d). The purpose of the required certificate of merit is to "assure
that malpractice claims for which there is no expert support will be terminated at an early
stage in the proceedings." Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 2000).
Rule 1042.3(a) applies to both prose and represented plaintiffs and constitutes a
rule of substantive state law with which plaintiffs in federal court must comply. See

Iwanejko v. Cohen &Grigsby, P. C., 249 F. App'x 938, 944 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that
district courts must "appl[y] Rule 1042.3 as substantive state law"); Paige v. Holtzapple,
2009 WL 2588849, *3 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Iwanejko, 249 F. App'x at 944); Fernandez v.

Dep't of Justice, No. 3:07-cv-1080, slip op. at 10 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 2008) (recognizing that
the plaintiffs pro se status "is not a viable basis upon which to excuse compliance with Rule
1042.3 or the requirement of com[i]ng forth with expert medical testimony"). Failure to file a
certificate of merit under Rule 1042.3(a) or a motion for an extension under Rule 1042.3(d)
is fatal unless the plaintiff demonstrates that his failure to comply is justified by a
13

"reasonable excuse." Perez v. Griffin, 304 F. App'x 72, 74 (3d Cir. 2008); see a/so Walsh v.

Consol. Design &Eng'g, Inc., 2007 WL 2844829, *5 (E.D. Pa. 2007) ("Rule 1042.3 is
subject to equitable considerations and a party who fails to timely file a certificate of merit
may be relieved from the requirement where the defaulting party provides a reasonable
explanation or legitimate excuse.").
In the instant case, Williams has not provided the Court with a certificate of merit
required by Rule 1042.3, nor has he requested an extension of time in which to do so.
Further, Williams has failed to present a reasonable explanation or legitimate excuse for
noncompliance with the COM requirement. As a result, any professional liability claim
against Corrections Defendants Sommers, Glunt, and Younkin will be dismissed.
D.

Negligence Claim

To demonstrate a prima facie case of negligence under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff
must show that: (1) the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant
breached that duty; (3) there is a causal connection between the breach and the resulting
injury; and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual loss or damage. See Krentz v. Consolidated Rail

Corp., 589 Pa. 576, 910 A.2d 20, 27 (Pa. 2006).
In a conclusory fashion, Williams alleges that Defendants were negligent. (Doc. 1, ~
99). The complaint sets forth absolutely no facts establishing that any Corrections
Defendants exhibited negligence, were involved in any medical decisions, or breached a

14

standard of care. Consequently, Corrections Defendants' motion to dismiss any claim of
negligence will be dismissed.

E.

Americans with Disabilities Act Claim

Corrections Defendants also seek dismissal with respect to Williams' claim under the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The ADA defines
"public entity" as: "(A) any State or local government; (8) any department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and (C)
the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority (as defined in
section 24102(4) of Title 49)." Id.§ 12131(1). State prisons "fall squarely within" the ADA's
definition of "public entity." Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998).
However, the plain language of§ 12132 applies only to public entities, not individuals.

Yeskey v. Commonwealth, 76 F. Supp. 2d 572, 575 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that
individuals are not liable under Title II because it prohibits discrimination in programs of a
"public entity" or discrimination "by any such entity" and "public entity" is not defined in Title
II to include individuals). Thus, the ADA damages claims against the Corrections
Defendants in their individual capacities will be dismissed. However, the ADA claims

15

against the Corrections Defendants in their official capacities remain. Koslow v.

Commonwealth of Pennylsvania, 302 F.3d 161, 179 (3d Cir. 2002).
To establish an ADA claim, the plaintiff must establish that (1) he has a disability; (2)
he was otherwise qualified to participate in the service, programs, or activity of the public
entity; and (3) he was denied the benefits of the service, program, or activity or was
otherwise subject to discrimination because of his disability. Chambers ex rel. Chambers v.

Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia Bd of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 189 (3d Cir. 2009). Under Title II of
the ADA, "[t]he term 'qualified individual with a disability' means an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the
removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of
auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of
services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." Id. at§
12132(2). Further, the ADA defines a "disability" as (1) "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such [an] individual;" (2) "a record
of such an impairment," or (3) "being regarded as having such an impairment." Id. at§
12102(1)(A)-(c). The ADA provides that the term "disability" is to be liberally construed "in
favor of broad coverage" "to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of [the] Act." Id. at
§ 12102(4).
Corrections Defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal of the ADA claim

16

against them because Williams does not have a disability and he was not denied medical
care but, rather, he received treatment for his allergic reaction. (Doc. 24, p. 17).
Corrections Defendants further argue that Williams was not discriminated against or denied
the opportunity to participate in any services or programs because of a disability. (Id.).
Assuming arguendo that Williams has a disability, the Corrections Defendants are
nevertheless entitled to dismissal of the ADA claims against them. Williams has failed to
establish that he was discriminated against or denied services, programs, or activities
because of any disability. To the extent that Williams claims that he was denied medical
treatment for his purported disability, such a claim fails under the ADA. See Iseley v. Beard,
220 F. App'x 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2006) ("Iseley does not claim that he was excluded from any
program on the basis of his disability. Rather, he claims that he was denied medical
treatment for his disabilities, which is not encompassed by the ADA's prohibitions.").
Consequently, Corrections Defendants' motion to dismiss the ADA claim against them in
their official capacities will be granted.
F.

Fourteenth Amendment Claim

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state
may not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," which is
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)

17

(citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). To state an equal protection claim, a
plaintiff must allege that: (1) he or she was a member of a protected class, (2) he or she
was treated differently from similarly situated persons outside of his or her protected class,
and (3) the resultant discrimination was purposeful or intentional rather than incidental.

Tillman, 221 F.3d at 423-24.
An equal protection claim can also be brought by a "class of one," a plaintiff alleging
that he has been "intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that
there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment." Viii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528
U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Williams, 343 F.3d at 221; see also Jean-Pierre v. Bureau of Prisons,
497 F. App'x 164, 168 (3d Cir. 2012). If a distinction between persons does not implicate a
suspect or quasi-suspect class, state action will be upheld if it is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. See Tillman, 221 F.3d at 423.
Williams does not state that he is a member of a protected class. Indeed, prisoners
are not a protected class of individuals. See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 317
(3d Cir. 2001) (stating that prisoners are not a suspect class). Therefore, Williams' claim
survives only if he has properly stated a violation of his equal protection rights under a
class-of-one theory. To survive under the class-of-one theory, Williams must establish that
he has been treated differently from similarly situated inmates, that the defendants did so
intentionally, and that this difference in treatment bears no rational relation to any legitimate

18

penological interest. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 243. When alleging the existence of similarly
situated individuals, plaintiffs "cannot use allegations ... that amount to nothing more than
'conclusory, boilerplate language' to show that he may be entitled to relief," and "bald
assertion[s] that other[s] ... were treated in a dissimilar manner" will not survive dismissal.
Young v. New Sewickley Twp., 160 F. App'x 263, 266 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Evancho, 423

F.3d at 354-55); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561 (requiring more than a "wholly
conclusory statement of claim" to survive a motion to dismiss). Instead, plaintiffs must
identify similarly situated individuals and allege "occasions or circumstances" of differential
treatment. Young, 160 F. App'x at 266; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (requiring a
plaintiff to plead a set of facts consistent with legal allegations in complaint to survive
dismissal).
Williams claims that defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by not
providing him adequate medical care. (Doc. 1, ~ 98). Williams has failed to present any
evidence from which it can be concluded that the Corrections Defendants engaged in
intentional or purposeful discrimination or that he was treated differently than similarly
situated persons on the basis of his age, race, nationality or gender. He has not
established that the purported conduct was intentional, discriminatory treatment directed at
just him. Instead, he presents conclusory statements that the Corrections Defendants had
a "longstanding rule of abusing the Plaintiff ... [which] appear to be intentional." (Id.).

19

Williams has failed to allege that he has been treated differently than similarly situated
inmates. Consequently, Corrections Defendants' motion to dismiss the Equal Protection
claim will be granted.
G.

Retaliation Claim

The First Amendment offers protection for a wide variety of expressive activities.
See U.S. CONST. amend I. These rights are lessened, but not extinguished in the prison
context, where legitimate penological interests must be considered in assessing the
constitutionality of official conduct. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
Retaliation for expressive activities can infringe upon an individual's rights under the First
Amendment. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2000). To prevail on a
retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he was
engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that he suffered an "adverse action" by
government officials; and (3) that there is "a causal link between the exercise of his
constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him." Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d
330 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Allah, 229 F.3d at 225).
Williams asserts that Corrections Defendants retaliated against him for continually
requesting adequate medical treatment. Inmates are entitled to adequate medical
treatment. Thus, the first prong of Rauser, i.e., that the plaintiff be engaged in a
constitutionally protected activity, has been satisfied.

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Once it is determined that the inmate was engaged in protected conduct, he must
demonstrate that he has suffered some adverse action at the hands of prison officials. See

Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333 (citing Allah, 229 F.3d at 225). To show an "adverse action," the
plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants' actions were "sufficient to deter a person of
ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights." Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 208 F.
Supp. 2d 520, 535 (E.D. Pa. 2002), quoting Allah, 229 F.3d at 225. Although not entirely
clear in the complaint, Williams seemingly asserts that he suffered adverse action in the
form of inadequate medical care. (Doc. 1, ~ 98). Thus, Williams has satisfied the second

Rauser prong.
In analyzing the third element, the Court must determine whether there is a causal
connection between the exercise of the constitutional right and the adverse action. The
plaintiff must show that the protected activity was a substantial motivating factor in the state
actor's decision to take the adverse action. This "motivation" factor may be established by
alleging a chronology of events from which retaliation plausibly may be inferred. Tighe v.

Wall, 100 F.3d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1996); Goff v. Burton, 91 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1996); Pride v.
Peters, 72 F.3d 132 (Table) (7th Cir. 1995). It is plaintiffs burden to prove that defendants
were motivated by retaliation. Hannon v. Speck, No. 87-3212, 1988 WL 131367, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 6, 1988) ("In bringing a § 1983 action alleging such retaliation, an inmate faces a
substantial burden in attempting to prove that the actual motivating factor ... was as he

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alleged.") {internal quotes and citation omitted), aff'd, 888 F.2d 1380 {3d Cir. 1989) (Table).
Where the prisoner seeks to establish this causal link based upon the temporal proximity
between the protected conduct and the alleged retaliatory act, "the timing of the alleged
retaliatory action must be unusually suggestive before a causal link will be inferred." Krouse

v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997); Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334; see
also Thomas v. Town of Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding that the
temporal proximity, nearly six months, is not unduly suggestive and does not sufficiently
establish any causal link). Although Williams claims that he requested medical care from
September 2011 through the present, he failed to indicate when the alleged adverse actions
took place. He has thus failed to establish any temporal proximity between the protected
activity and alleged retaliatory conduct. Given the lack of any unusually suggestive
temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory conduct,
Williams' retaliation claim fails as a matter of law and will be dismissed. Moreover, Williams
failed to allege that any of the Corrections Defendants were involved in the alleged
retaliatory acts. Instead, he generally states that the "Department of Corrections" has a
policy of retaliating against inmates, such as Williams. (Doc. 1, ~ 98). Williams failed to set
forth any plausible facts to support a claim that any of the individually named Corrections
Defendant denied him adequate medical care.

H.

Conspiracy Claim

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In order to demonstrate a conspiracy, "a plaintiff must show that two or more
conspirators reached an agreement to deprive him or her of a constitutional right 'under
color of law."' Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir. 1993)
(quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress &Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)), abrogated on other

grounds by United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, Pa., 316 F.3d 392,
400 (3d Cir. 2003). "Bare conclusory allegations of 'conspiracy' or 'concerted action' will not
suffice to allege a conspiracy. The plaintiff must expressly allege an agreement or make
averments of communication, consultation, cooperation, or command from which such an
agreement can be inferred." Flanagan v. Shively, 783 F.Supp. 922, 928 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
The plaintiffs allegations of a conspiracy "must be supported by facts bearing out the
existence of the conspiracy and indicating its broad objectives and the role each Defendant
allegedly played in carrying out those objectives." Id. A plaintiff cannot rely on subjective
suspicions and unsupported speculation. Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1405 n. 16 (3d
Cir. 1991).
Williams has concluded that Corrections Defendants conspired to violate his rights,
yet he has failed to evidence any facts showing an agreement or plan formulated and
executed by the Corrections Defendants to achieve this conspiracy. See (Doc. 1). Williams
cannot rely on unsupported claims of conspiracy. In a conclusory fashion, the complaint
states that "with respect to all ... defendants, Pennsylvania employees or agents conduct
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toward Plaintiff, defendant's official custom, policy, practice of abusing this plaintiff, is well
documented and known since his inception into the medical system within, was (is) a
conspiracy." (Doc. 1, 1f 81). Without a factual showing which gives some substance to this
conspiracy claim, Williams' conspiracy claim amounts to nothing more than mere conjecture
and bare speculation. The law is clear that bare allegations of wrongdoing by a defendant,
without any substantiating proof of an unlawful agreement, are insufficient to sustain a
conspiracy claim. See Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1405 n.16 {3d Cir. 1991) (holding
that conspiracy claims which are based upon a pro se plaintiffs subjective suspicions and
unsupported speculation are properly dismissed under§ 1915(d)).
There are no averments in the complaint that reasonably suggest the presence of an
agreement or concerted activity between the Corrections Defendants. Williams appears to
assert that Corrections Defendants conspired to prevent him from receiving adequate
medical care. However, he has not alleged any facts showing any communication or
cooperation among any Corrections Defendants from which an agreement could be
inferred. The Court finds that Williams' "bare, conclusory allegations" are insufficient to
allege a conspiracy. See Hodge v. United States, 2009 WL 2843332, *11 (M.D. Pa. 2009)
(dismissing plaintiffs "broad" conspiracy claim because "he does not aver facts sufficient to
establish an agreement between the individual defendants to deprive plaintiff of his rights or
from which such an agreement could reasonably be inferred"). Moreover, because the

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underlying constitutional claims will be dismissed, the Court will likewise dismiss Williams'
claim for conspiracy to commit a constitutional violation. See Dykes v. Southeastern Pa.
Transp. Auth., 68 F.3d 1564, 1570 (3d Cir. 1995) (determining that it is not necessary to
reach the issue of conspiracy because plaintiff failed to allege cognizable violation of due
process rights); Samuel v. Clark, 1996 WL 448229, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (dismissing
conspiracy claim where underlying claims for fraud and discrimination were dismissed).
I.

Sovereign Immunity

Corrections Defendants also seek to dismiss Williams' state law tort claims on the
basis of sovereign immunity. (Doc. 24, pp. 22-23). State prison officials are immune from
suit for those actions within the scope of their duties, except in instances in which the
immunity has been specifically waived. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 2310. The
allegations of Williams' complaint do not fall under any one of the nine listed categories for
which immunity has been waived by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 2 See 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN§ 8522(b). As such, Corrections Defendants are entitled to immunity on
the state law tort claims and their motion will be granted in this regard.

IV.

Leave to Amend

2

The nine categories for which sovereign immunity will not apply are: (1) vehicle liability; (2)
medical professional liability; (3) care custody or control of personal property; (4) Commonwealth real
estate, highways and sidewalks; (5) potholes and other dangerous conditions; (6) care, custody, or control
of animals; (7) liquor store sales; (8) National Guard activities; and (9) toxoids and vaccines. See 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 8522(b).
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When a complaint fails to present a prima facie case of liability, district courts must
generally grant leave to amend before dismissing the complaint. See Grayson v. Mayview

State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d
Cir. 2000). Specifically, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has admonished that when a
complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, courts should liberally grant
leave to amend "unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips, 515
F.3d at 245 (citing Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004)). For the reasons set
forth above, and because Williams has failed to oppose the motion to dismiss, granting
leave to amend would be futile.
V.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Corrections Defendants' motion (Doc. 23) to dismiss will

be granted. A separate Order shall issue.

Date: August

.-rL, 2017

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