Wyatt v. Malisko et al

Filing 129

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 116 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence Pertaining to Claims That Were Dismissed or Withdrawn filed by Butts. IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED the motion, in part. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on May 17, 2021. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TARIQ WYATT,
Plaintiff
v.
C.O. MALISKO, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 3:16-CV-1438

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I.

Factual Background

This case is currently scheduled for a non-jury trial before the undersigned
relating to the plaintiff’s sole surviving claim, a First Amendment retaliation claim
based on the alleged denial of access to legal papers and placement in an unsanitary
psychiatric observation cell. The remaining Defendant, Lt. Butts of the Department
of Corrections (“Department” or “DOC”), has filed a motion in limine to exclude
evidence pertaining to claims that have been previously dismissed or withdrawn.
(Doc. 116). The plaintiff has responded to this motion, (Doc. 122), conceding that
certain claims have been dismissed, but noting that brief testimony regarding these
matters may still be relevant to the retaliation claim, to questions of administrative
exhaustion, and further asserting that the need for a pre-trial ruling on a motion in

limine is reduced here, where we will be conducting a non-jury trial. We agree that
the non-jury trial of this case reduces the urgency and necessity of pre-trial
evidentiary rulings like those sought here since:
[A]ny concern about juror confusion is obviated, and the Court is wellpositioned to make judgments regarding the admissibility of evidence
within the context of the trial itself. Indeed, although courts will rule
on motions in limine in advance of bench trials in appropriate cases,
Velez v. Reading Health System, 2016 WL 9776079 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24,
2016), they often will find it unnecessary to do so because the concerns
over prejudice or confusion to a jury are absent. See 9 Charles A.
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil 3d §
2411 (3d ed. 2008); see also United States v. Brown, 2017 WL 219521
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2017) (noting that concerns over the potential for
prejudice from improper evidence “are minimal in bench trials ...
rulings on motions in limine are less important.”); Alan L. Frank Law
Assocs., P.C. v. OOO RM Invest, 2016 WL 9348064 (S.D. Fla. Nov.
30, 2016).
Buhler Versatile Inc. v. GVM, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-00217, 2018 WL 6062307, at *5
(M.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2018). Nonetheless, understanding the value of some guidance
from the court on these evidentiary issues we provide the following further guidance:
As discussed below, we will GRANT this motion in limine in part and DENY the
motion, in part. Specifically, we will deny this motion to the extent that it seeks
wholesale exclusion of this evidence, but will grant the motion, in part, and require
the plaintiff to make specific offers of proof as to the relevance of evidence relating
to previously dismissed claims during the course of the non-jury trial prior to
admitting any such evidence.

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II.

Discussion
A. Motions in Limine—Guiding Principles

The Court is vested with broad inherent authority to manage its cases, which
carries with it the discretion and authority to rule on motions in limine prior to trial.
See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984); In re Japanese Elec. Prods.
Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 260 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.,
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (the court
exercises its discretion to rule in limine on evidentiary issues “in appropriate cases”).
Courts may exercise this discretion in order to exclude unfairly prejudicial,
confusing, cumulative, or irrelevant evidence. United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d
812, 815 (3d Cir. 1988). Courts may also do so in order to “narrow the evidentiary
issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions.” Bradley v.
Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
However, courts should be careful before doing so.
In considering motions in limine that call upon the Court to engage in
preliminary evidentiary rulings under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, we
begin by recognizing that these “evidentiary rulings [on motions in limine] are
subject to the trial judge’s discretion and are therefore reviewed only for abuse of
discretion . . . . Additionally, application of the balancing test under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 will not be disturbed unless it is ‘arbitrary and irrational.’ ” Abrams v.
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Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see
Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 161 (3d Cir. 1994) (reviewing in
limine rulings for abuse of discretion). One of the key guiding principles governing
the exercise of this discretion is reflected in the philosophy that shapes the rules of
evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence can aptly be characterized as evidentiary
rules of inclusion, which are designed to broadly permit fact-finders to consider
pertinent factual information while searching for the truth. Adopting this broad view
of relevance, it has been held that
Under [Rule] 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” [Therefore] “[i]t follows that evidence is irrelevant only
when it has no tendency to prove the fact. Thus the rule, while giving
judges great freedom to admit evidence, diminishes substantially their
authority to exclude evidence as irrelevant.”
Frank v. Cnty. of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620, 626 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing Spain v.
Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 452 (3d Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted)). Rule 402 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, in turn, provides that all “[r]elevant evidence will be
admissible unless the rules of evidence provide to the contrary.” United States v.
Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 745 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
This principle is then tempered by Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
which sets legal grounds for exclusion of some evidence, stating that:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
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of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
These broad principles also shape and define the scope of this Court’s
discretion in addressing motions in limine like those filed here, which invite us pretrial to rule that evidence relating to claims that have been dismissed should be
excluded at trial. Reasoning that evidence regarding dismissed claims that have
failed as a matter of law typically has little relevance, courts have often excluded
evidence of dismissed claims from trial. See, e.g., Branch v. Brennan, No. 2:17-CV00777, 2019 WL 3892850, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2019); Brown v. Johnson &
Johnson, No. CV 12-4929, 2015 WL 12834346, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2015);
Moore v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., No. CV 021734, 2005 WL 8165154, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2005); Devine v. Pittsburgh Bd.
of Pub. Educ., No. 2:13-CV-220, 2015 WL 7301149, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18,
2015). However, those courts that have excluded this evidence often have done so
without prejudice to the plaintiff presenting some specific and narrowly-tailored
offer of proof as to the relevance and admissibility of particular evidence. Id.
Guided by these principles, we turn to consideration of the instant motion in
limine. In this case, the plaintiff argues that some evidence concerning these
previously dismissed claims is still relevant to his sole remaining claim, a First
Amendment retaliation claim. The plaintiff also asserts that this evidence may be
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relevant to questions of administrative exhaustion, and provide essential context to
the plaintiff’s remaining legal claims. Accordingly, consistent with caselaw
governing the exercise of discretion in this field, this motion in limine will be denied
to the extent that it seeks wholesale exclusion of this evidence, but we will require
the plaintiff to make specific offers of proof as to the relevance of evidence relating
to previously dismissed claims during the course of the non-jury trial.
By adopting this course, we avoid the concerns that justify motions in limine,
excluding unfairly prejudicial, confusing, cumulative or irrelevant evidence,
Romano, 849 F.2d at 815, and “narrow[ing] the evidentiary issues for trial and to
eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions.” Bradley, 913 F.2d at 1069 (citation
omitted). Yet following this course does not absolutely preclude the plaintiff from
presenting specific evidence if he can first demonstrate its relevance through an offer
of proof.
An appropriate order follows.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: May 17, 2021

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TARIQ WYATT,

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Plaintiff
v.
C.O. MALISKO, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 3:16-CV-1438

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of May 2021, in accordance with the accompanying
Memorandum, upon consideration of the defendant’s motion in limine (Doc. 116),
which seeks exclusion of evidence relating to any previously dismissed claims in
this lawsuit, IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED
the motion, in part. Specifically, we will deny this motion to the extent that it seeks
wholesale exclusion of this evidence, but will grant the motion, in part, and require
the plaintiff to make specific offers of proof as to the relevance of evidence relating
to previously dismissed claims during the course of the non-jury trial.

S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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