Walsh v. Alejandro

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry). Signed by Honorable Edwin M. Kosik on 7/27/2016. (emksec, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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JUDGE NITZA QUINONES ALEJANDRO :
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Defendant.
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JOHN R. WALSH, III,

Civil Action No. 3:16-CV-1460
(Judge Kosik)

MEMORANDUM
Before the Court for disposition is another civil action filed by pro se Plaintiff, John R.
Walsh, III. Upon review of the complaint (Doc. 1), we will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint (Doc. 1) on July 18, 2016 against
Federal District Judge Nitza Quiñones Alejandro of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
seeking $100,000,000.00 Plaintiff’s complaint is nothing more than a nonsensical narrative,
which includes random theological observations, references to the Wizard of Oz, and
disjointed thoughts, with no coherent connection between paragraphs or discernable
allegations. For instance, Plaintiff alleges that “much like the wicked witch of the East ... in
the Wizard of Oz, [Plaintiff] is just the guy behind the curtain pulling some strings at [his]
Heavenly Father’s command.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 15). It is with the backdrop of these “allegations”
that we provide the following preliminary screening of the complaint.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court may review an in forma pauperis complaint
prior to service and “shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action
... (i) is frivolous or malicious [or] (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). An action is “frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis

in either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Factual allegations are
“clearly baseless” if they are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional,” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328,
or where “the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). “[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate
when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not
there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Id. at 33.
28 U.S.C. § 1915's failure to state a claim standard mirrors Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the dismissal of a complaint for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6).
In determining the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has documented the evolving nature of pleading practice in federal court,
stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in
recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell
Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 644 (2007) continuing with our
opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d
Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), pleading standards
have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more
heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than
the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading must set forth a
claim for relief, which contains a short and plain statement of the claim, showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief. The complaint must provide the defendant with fair notice of the
claim. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The issue in a motion to
dismiss is whether the plaintiff should be entitled to offer evidence to support the claim, not
whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F. 3d
224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (the Rule 8 pleading standard “simply calls for enough facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.”); Nami

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v. Fauver, 82 F. 3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996).
The onus is on the plaintiff to provide a well-drafted complaint that alleges factual
support for its claims. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does
not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in
original and internal citations omitted). The court need not accept unsupported inferences,
Cal. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004), nor
legal conclusions cast as factual allegations, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Legal conclusions
without factual support are not entitled to the assumption of truth. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 677-679 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not” satisfy the requirements of Rule 8).
Once the court winnows the conclusory allegations from those allegations supported
by fact, which it accepts as true, the court must engage in a common sense review of the claim
to determine whether it is plausible. This is a context-specific task, for which the court should
be guided by its judicial experience. The court must dismiss the complaint if it fails to allege
enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A “claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Lastly, a pro se complaint is held
to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be
dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations, if they can be categorized as such, are

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frivolous because they are wholly incredible and delusional. Additionally, Plaintiff falls far
short of stating any claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff does not provide any
factual allegations to support any legal grounds for liability against Judge Quiñones
Alejandro.1 This Court cannot even discern any legal grounds set forth in Plaintiff’s
Complaint. Beyond a doubt, there are no facially plausibile claims pleaded by Plaintiff.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1). An
appropriate order follows.

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Further, it is well settled that a “judicial officer in the performance of [her] duties has absolute immunity
from suit and will not be liable for [her] judicial acts. Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (per
curiam). Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff recites the names of alleged causes of actions in the caption of
his complaint, such as “obstruction of justice” and “RICO,” without any further explanation or development of
facts or elements to support such causes of actions. Such claims must be dismissed since Plaintiff fails to even
provide threadbare recitals of the elements of any of the recited causes of action. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-679
(Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not” satisfy
the requirements of Rule 8). Moreover, the criminal statutes Plaintiff recites to, do not create a private right of
action and therefore precludes Plaintiff from bringing such claims. See Rockefeller v. U.S. Court of Appeals Office,
for Tenth Circuit Judges, 248 F.Supp. 2d 17, 23 (D.D.C. 2003) (“[T]here is no private right of action under these
federal criminal statutes.”).

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