Houdeshel v. Colvin
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION (Order to follow as separate docket entry). Signed by Honorable Matthew W. Brann on 9/29/17. (lg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TRAKIA HOUDESHEL,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,1
Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration
Defendant.
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No. 3:16-CV-01481
(Judge Brann)
(Magistrate Judge Saporito)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
September 29, 2017
Plaintiff, Trakia Houdeshel, filed a complaint on July 19, 2016, naming as
Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, then Acting Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration.2 Because the Plaintiff Houdeshel (“Plaintiff”) sought judicial
review of the Commissioner’s (“Commissioner”) final decision, this matter was
referred to United States Magistrate Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr., for the
preparation and recommended disposition under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and
1
2
The Complaint (ECF No. 1) correctly named Carolyn W. Colvin as Defendant, as she was
the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration at the time it was filed. As of
January 23, 2017, however, Nancy A. Berryhill is the Acting Commissioner of Social
Security.
See ECF No. 1. As mentioned in the previous footnote, Carolyn Colvin was Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration at the time Plaintiff’s Complaint was
filed. Now, however, Nancy A. Berryhill is the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Nancy A. Berryhill shall
be substituted for Carolyn W. Colvin as the defendant in this suit.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). Because I write only for the parties, I will
conserve judicial resources and not rehash Magistrate Judge Saporito’s Report and
Recommendation. Accordingly, the facts as stated in the Report and
Recommendation shall be incorporated into this Memorandum Opinion.
Magistrate Judge Saporito’s comprehensive disposition of August 4, 2017,
ECF No. 14, recommended that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed, and that
Plaintiff’s request to be awarded benefits be denied.3 Plaintiff subsequently filed
objections to Magistrate Judge Saporito’s Report and Recommendation, which
shall be discussed below.4
Despite Plaintiff’s objections, the Court finds the Report and
Recommendation thorough and persuasive; it is adopted in full.
I.
LAW
a. Standard of Review
When considering a social security appeal, the Court has plenary review of
all legal issues decided by the Commissioner.5 However, my review of the
Commissioner’s findings of fact pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is to determine
whether those findings are supported by “substantial evidence.”6 The factual
findings of the Commissioner, “if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
3
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5
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See ECF No. 14.
See ECF No. 15.
See Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 2007); Johnson v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008).
Poulos, 474 F.3d at 91.
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conclusive. . . .”7 “Substantial evidence does not mean a large or considerable
amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”8 Substantial evidence has been
described as more than a mere scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance.9
“It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.”10 The United State Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has stated:
[O]ur decisions make clear that determination of the existence vel non
of substantial evidence is not merely a quantitative exercise. A single
piece of evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the
[Commissioner] ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by
countervailing evidence. Nor is evidence substantial if it is
overwhelmed by other evidence—particularly certain types of
evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians)—or if it really
constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion.11
Therefore, a court reviewing the decision of the Commissioner must scrutinize the
record as a whole.12
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12
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Johnson, 529 F.3d at 200 (quoting Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999))
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988).
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900,
901 (3d Cir. 1995)) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal
citations omitted)).
Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110,
114 (3d Cir. 1983); Gilliland v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 1986)).
Id. (citing Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981)).
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b. Objections to a Report and Recommendation
Upon designation, a magistrate judge may “conduct hearings, including
evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact
and recommendations.”13 Once filed, this Report and Recommendation is
disseminated to the parties in the case who then have the opportunity to file written
objections.14 When such objections are filed timely, the District Court must
conduct a de novo review of those portions of the report to which objections are
made.15 Although the standard of review for objections is de novo, the extent of
review lies within the discretion of the District Court, and the Court may otherwise
rely on the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems
proper.16
For portions of the Report and Recommendation to which no objection is
made, the Court should, as a matter of good practice, “satisfy itself that there is no
clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.”17
Regardless of whether timely objections are made by a party, the District Court
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28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011)
Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F.Supp.2d 496, 499 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (citing United States v. Raddatz,
447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), advisory committee notes; see also Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply
Intern., Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 469 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Henderson v. Carlson, 812
F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1987) (explaining that judges should give some review to every
Report and Recommendation)).
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may accept, not accept, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.18
II.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Saporito’s Report and Recommendation
on three grounds: (1) the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in finding
Plaintiff’s multiple impairments as “non-severe”;19 (2) the ALJ weighed the
medical opinion evidence improperly;20 and (3) the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was
not credible was not supported by substantial evidence.21 I shall discuss each of
these claims, in turn.
First, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to include Plaintiff’s mild
limitations in social functioning and concentration, persistence or pace in finding
Plaintiff’s residual functioning capacity (“RFC”).22 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
was required to consider these mental impairments regardless of their severity
because “non-severe impairment[s] can put a disproportionately greater strain on a
person who concurrently is suffering from a more severe affliction.”23 Plaintiff
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28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Local Rule 72.31.
See ECF No. 15 at 1.
See id. at 3.
See id. at 4.
See ECF No. 15 at 2.
Id.
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argues that in failing to include these mental impairments, the ALJ lacked
substantial evidence in his step two findings.24
Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, the Magistrate Judge here found that the
ALJ considered Plaintiff’s mental impairments in addition to her severe
impairments in assessing her RFC.25 Reviewing the record, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff’s mental impairments did not require accommodations, as “she attributed
her functional loss to physical symptoms and medication side effects, rather than
mental disorders.”26 Moreover, Plaintiff’s mental impairments of depression and
anxiety only required conservative management and minor medication.27 When
seen by a medical provider, Plaintiff “was consistently described as stable with
treatment.”28
Plaintiff also fails to note that step two of the sequential evaluation process
is a threshold test: the ALJ need only determine the existence of a severe
impairment to proceed to the step three.29 At step two, the ALJ correctly found that
Plaintiff had a severe impairment – morbid obesity and a degenerative disorder of
the spine with sciatica – and then proceeded to step three in the sequential
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29
See ECF No. 15, at 3.
See ECF No. 14, at 15.
ECF No. 14, at 16.
See ECF No. 14, at 17.
Id.
See Kunselman v. Berryhill, Civ. No. 3:16-CV-00747, slip op. at *6 (M.D. Pa. June 20,
2017).
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evaluation.30 Plaintiff incorrectly conflates step two with step four, which is when
an ALJ determines a plaintiff’s RFC.
Unlike in Plummer v. Apfel,31 where the ALJ did not give proper
consideration to the claimant’s alleged mental impairments, the ALJ here clearly
considered Plaintiff’s mental impairments and their limitations on her daily
activities.32 Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression did
not inhibit her from acting as a single parent to her young child, maintaining
personal care, completing light household chores, preparing meals, handling
money and managing household finances, socializing with others, and using public
transportation.33 Furthermore, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had not been
hospitalized for her depression or anxiety.34 I, therefore, find that the ALJ properly
considered Plaintiff’s mental impairments and that the ALJ’s decision was based
on substantial evidence.
Next, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly accorded “great weight” to
Nurse Albright’s opinion while according little weight to the opinions of Dr. Malys
30
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32
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34
See ECF No. 14, at 15.
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 433 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that the ALJ did not properly
consider all of the claimant’s mental impairments).
See ECF No. 14, at 16.
See id.
See Clark v. Social Sec. Admin., 33 Fed.Appx. 643, 645-46 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that
claimant’s lack of hospitalization for his depression provided further evidence that his
depression was not severe).
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and Dr. Hutchison.35 Plaintiff argues that Dr. Hutchison’s treatment notes from
2014 contain “numerous clinical and objective findings” and that these notes
demonstrate “that her medical conditions have worsened” since Nurse Albright
saw her in 2012.36
Contrary to Plaintiff’s second contention, the ALJ properly accorded little
weight to the opinions of Dr. Malys and Dr. Hutchison because their opinions were
not supported by objective medical evidence in their respective treatment notes.37
The ALJ found that Dr. Malys’s medical opinion did not support Plaintiff in that
Dr. Malys’s treatment notes lacked documentation of significant objective deficits
from examinations.38 With respect to Dr. Hutchison’s opinion, the ALJ noted that
Dr. Hutchison’s test results of Plaintiff failed to show anything “remarkable,” and
that none of the test results were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s ability to perform a
‘“limited’ range of light work.”39
In the final analysis, the ALJ accorded greater weight to the opinion of
Nurse Albright, who stated that no reason existed as to why Plaintiff could not
work.40 The ALJ noted that Nurse Albright commented that Plaintiff had held a job
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ECF No. 15, at 3.
Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff points out that Nurse Albright gave her opinion in September 2012 while
Dr. Malys offered her opinion in April 2013, and Dr. Hutchison in September 2014.
See ECF No. 14, at 19-20.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id.
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on and off for years, and that she was “quite upset” to hear that she was
employable.41
When, as here, “there is a conflict between the opinions of medical experts,
the ALJ may choose whom to credit but cannot reject evidence for no reason or for
the wrong reason, and must give some reason for discounting the evidence [he]
rejects.”42 Similar to the ALJ in Dority v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., who accorded no
weight to two doctors opinions because they “were not supported by and consistent
with the medical records,”43 here the ALJ accorded little weight to the opinions of
Drs. Malys and Hutchison because they were not supported by their treatment
notes.44 While Plaintiff argues that her conditions have worsened since Nurse
Albright’s opinion was rendered, the ALJ nevertheless did not find anything in the
treatment notes of either Dr. Malys or Dr. Hutchison to contradict Nurse Albright’s
conclusion that Plaintiff could perform a “limited range of light work.”45
Accordingly, substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ in according greater
weight to Nurse Albright’s opinion as opposed to that of Dr. Malys and Dr.
Hutchison.
41
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43
44
45
ECF No. 14, at 20.
Dority v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 621 Fed.Appx. 728, 731 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Id. at 731.
ECF No. 14, at 20.
Id.; see Dority, 621 Fed.Appx. at 730 (explaining that the reviewing court “may not re-weigh
the evidence or impose [its] own factual determinations).
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Lastly, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly concluded she was not
credible as to the severity of her limitations.46 She argues five separate reasons to
support this contention.
First, Plaintiff argues that her complaints concerning her pain, contrary to
the ALJ’s findings, were not inconsistent with the record. Despite Plaintiff’s
argument here, she points to nothing in the record to buttress her claim that the
ALJ incorrectly discredited her testimony regarding her pain. I note that
“[a]llegations of pain and other subjective symptoms must be supported by
objective medical evidence.”47 Without objective medical evidence identifying the
intensity of her pain, Plaintiff’s pain remains a subjective symptom that cannot be
objectively quantified; it calls the credibility of her other claims into question.
Second, Plaintiff argues that Magistrate Judge Saporito failed to consider
SSR 96-7p, which she states prohibits an adjudicator from drawing “any inferences
about an individual’s symptoms from a failure to pursue regular medical treatment
without first considering any explanations.”48 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ had a
duty to inquire as to Plaintiff’s non-compliance with taking her medications before
making a determination based on her non-compliance.
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47
48
ECF No. 15, at 4.
Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999).
ECF No. 15, at 5.
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Plaintiff has neglected to include the full sentence of SSR 96-7p from which
she quotes. In full, SSR 96-7p requires:
[T]he adjudicator [not to] draw any inferences about an individual’s
symptoms and their functional effects from a failure to seek or pursue
regular medical treatment without first considering any explanations
that the individual may provide, or other information in the case
record, that may explain infrequent or irregular medical visits or
failure to seek treatment.49
Contrary to Plaintiff’s belief that the ALJ should have questioned Plaintiff as to
why she failed to consistently take her medications as prescribed, the ALJ,
alternatively, could review the record for such an explanation. When a claimant
fails to offer a “good reason” as to why she has inconsistently adhered to her
prescribed treatments and medication, an ALJ may deem the individual less
credible.50
As the ALJ found, Plaintiff offers no good reason why she failed to comply
with regularly taking her medications. The ALJ did not consider Plaintiff’s
noncompliance dispositive; rather, the ALJ properly considered such
noncompliance as a factor in evaluating Plaintiff’s credibility when looking at the
record as a whole.
Third, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly considered her daily
activities in the privacy of her home and found these activities to be inconsistent
49
50
SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *7 (June 2, 1996) (emphasis added).
Id.; see Vega v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 358 Fed.Appx. 372 (3d Cir. 2009).
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with her assertion that she cannot perform sustained work activities.51 Contrary to
Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ must only look to activities performed in public,
the ALJ properly considered all of Plaintiff’s daily activities in evaluating her
credibility. C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i) provides that Plaintiff’s daily activities are
relevant factors to be examined.52 In his credibility analysis, the ALJ properly
weighed Plaintiff acting as a single parent to her young child, managing her
personal care, completing light household chores, preparing daily meals, shopping,
and using public transportation.53 Based on the evidence presented, the ALJ found
that these activities belied the severity of the limitations that Plaintiff claims.
Fourth, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider that her pain
medications and muscle relaxers cause drowsiness and nausea.54 Despite this
contention, the ALJ properly found that nothing in the record suggests that
Plaintiff’s side effects were consistent. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff experiences
drowsiness after taking her migraine medication55 and combats nausea from some
of her HIV medications.56 The ALJ, however, found that none of Plaintiff’s
treating providers document consistent side effects that would impede Plaintiff’s
51
52
53
54
55
56
Id.
C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i).
ECF No. 14, at 16.
Id.
See ECF No. 14, at 5.
See id. at 5-6.
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ability to perform work.57 Moreover, the ALJ noted that Nurse Albright had
recommended to Plaintiff that she could mitigate these side effects by taking her
medications at night.58
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not conduct a proper pain analysis
when evaluating her credibility. Given that objective medical evidence did not
support her claims, Plaintiff contends the ALJ should have “investage[d] all
avenues presented that relate to pain.”59
Plaintiff’s final argument ignores each of the previous four credibility
findings by the ALJ. The ALJ properly conducted the two-step process required by
20 C.F.R. § 416.929. In conducting step two, the ALJ fully considered Plaintiff’s
daily activities; the location, duration frequency, and intensity of her pain or other
symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness,
and side effects of any medication she takes or has taken to alleviate her pain or
other symptoms; the treatment she receives for relief of pain or symptoms; and
other factors concerning her functional limitations and restrictions due to her pain
or other symptoms.60 Reviewing the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff, I find that the
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Id. at 23.
Id.
ECF No. 15, at 6.
C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i)-(vii); see Keys v. Colvin, Civ. No. 3:14-CV-191, 2015 WL
1275367, at *17 (M.D. Pa. March 19, 2015).
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ALJ properly conducted a full credibility analysis, and that his decision was based
on substantial evidence.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I find that the ALJ’s decision to deny Plaintiff
social security benefits is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, I find no
reason to disturb Magistrate Judge Saporito’s Report and Recommendation, which
shall be adopted in full.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
United States District Judge
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