Walsh v. American Water et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry). Signed by Honorable Edwin M. Kosik on 7/29/2016. (emksec, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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AMERICAN WATER, et al.
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Defendants.
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JOHN R. WALSH, III,

Civil Action No. 3:16-CV-1495
(Judge Kosik)

MEMORANDUM
Before the court for disposition is a civil action filed by pro se Plaintiff, John R.
Walsh, III. Upon review of the complaint (Doc. 1), we will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint (Doc. 1) on July 21, 2016, against
American Water and the Pennsylvania Utility Commission. It appears that Plaintiff attempts
to have this Court “nationalize[]” American Water and direct the military of the United States
to provide “oversight of this very precious commodity.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 3). Plaintiff avers that it
has become his “quest or anointing to bring about a sound economic plan for the future of the
Planet Earth to ensure future generation[s] their Opportunity for their ‘Pursuit of Happiness.’ ”
(Doc. 1, ¶ 11). Plaintiff opines that his “plan is working quite nicely up to this point and will
get better with each passing day if everyone does their job, including this Honorable Court for
it is within [our] jurisdiction to ensure this gets accomplished....” (Doc. 1, ¶ 11). Further,
Plaintiff seeks to recover ten billion dollars in damages.
This matter is now before the Court pursuant to its statutory obligation under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to screen the complaint and dismiss the same if it is frivolous or fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court may review an in forma pauperis complaint
prior to service and “shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action
... (i) is frivolous or malicious [or] (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). An action is “frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis
in either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Factual allegations are
“clearly baseless” if they are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional,” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328,
or where “the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). “[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate
when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not
there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Id. at 33.
28 U.S.C. § 1915's failure to state a claim standard mirrors Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the dismissal of a complaint for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6).
In determining the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has documented the evolving nature of pleading practice in federal court,
stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in
recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell
Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 644 (2007) continuing with our
opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d
Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), pleading standards
have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more
heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than
the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading must set forth a
claim for relief, which contains a short and plain statement of the claim, showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief. The complaint must provide the defendant with fair notice of the

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claim. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The issue in a motion to
dismiss is whether the plaintiff should be entitled to offer evidence to support the claim, not
whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F. 3d
224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (the Rule 8 pleading standard “simply calls for enough facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.”); Nami
v. Fauver, 82 F. 3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996).
The onus is on the plaintiff to provide a well-drafted complaint that alleges factual
support for its claims. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does
not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in
original and internal citations omitted). The court need not accept unsupported inferences,
Cal. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004), nor
legal conclusions cast as factual allegations, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Legal conclusions
without factual support are not entitled to the assumption of truth. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 677-679 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not” satisfy the requirements of Rule 8).
Once the court winnows the conclusory allegations from those allegations supported
by fact, which it accepts as true, the court must engage in a common sense review of the claim
to determine whether it is plausible. This is a context-specific task, for which the court should
be guided by its judicial experience. The court must dismiss the complaint if it fails to allege
enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A “claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Lastly, a pro se complaint is held
to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be

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dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations, if they can be categorized as such, are
frivolous because they are wholly incredible and delusional. To be sure, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to fulfill the request of Plaintiff; that is, to provide an order nationalizing the
American Water Company, directing the United States Military to provide oversight of the
same, and then ordering the dismantling of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.
Moreover, Plaintiff falls far short of stating any claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff does not provide any factual allegations to support any legal grounds for liability
against the named Defendants.1 This Court cannot even discern any legal grounds set forth in
Plaintiff’s Complaint. Beyond a doubt, there are no facially plausibile claims pleaded by
Plaintiff
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will Dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1). An
appropriate order follows.

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The Court notes that Plaintiff recites the names of alleged causes of actions in the caption of his
complaint, such as “False Claims” and “RICO,” without any further explanation or development of facts or
elements to support such causes of actions. Such claims must be dismissed since Plaintiff fails to even provide
threadbare recitals of the elements of any of the recited causes of action. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-679 (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not” satisfy the
requirements of Rule 8).

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