Carroll v. Comprehensive Women's Health Services
Filing
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MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 15 MOTION to Amend/Correct. Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 1/18/17. (sm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KATHRYN CARROLL,
:
No. 3:16cv1509
Plaintiff
:
:
(Judge Munley)
v.
:
:
COMPREHENSIVE WOMEN’S
:
HEALTH SERVICES,
:
Defendant
:
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
MEMORANDUM
This employment discrimination matter arises from Defendant
Comprehensive Women’s Health Services’s decision to terminate Plaintiff
Kathryn Carroll’s employment one day after she requested medical leave
for genetic cancer testing and two days after requesting leave for a cancer
related surgery. Plaintiff claims the defendant terminated her employment
in contravention of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Pennsylvania’s
Human Relations Act, and the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination
Act.
Before the court for disposition is plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a
second amended complaint to add David Krewson, M.D. and Robert
Zimmerman, M.D. (collectively “Doctors Krewson and Zimmerman”) as
individual defendants under plaintiff’s state law PHRA claim. Because we
find that plaintiff named Doctors Krewson and Zimmerman in her
administrative grievances with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (hereinafter “EEOC”), the court will grant plaintiff’s motion.
Background
The instant employment discrimination action arises from Plaintiff
Kathryn Carroll’s (hereinafter “plaintiff”) employment with Defendant
Comprehensive Women’s Health Services (hereinafter “defendant” or
“CWHS”). Plaintiff worked in defendant’s medical records department
from November 2000 until her termination on February 6, 2013. (Doc. 9,
Am. Compl. (hereinafter “Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 21, 26-27).
While employed with the defendant in 2011, plaintiff received a
breast cancer diagnosis and requested approximately three weeks of
medical leave to receive treatment. (Id. ¶¶ 13-15). Plaintiff requested,
and the defendant granted, an additional three weeks in 2012 to receive
breast cancer treatment. (Id. ¶ 16). On January 31, 2013, plaintiff again
requested one day of medical leave to receive genetic testing to verify
whether plaintiff carried a cancer gene. (Id. ¶ 17). Plaintiff also requested
a week off in March 2013 for surgery to prophylactically remove her
ovaries. (Id. ¶ 19).
On February 5, 2013, plaintiff went for genetic testing. (Id. ¶ 20).
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Upon plaintiff’s return to work the next day, plaintiff’s supervisor stated
that she could not locate a patient’s chart. (Id. ¶ 21). Plaintiff responded
that she did not work the previous day and did not know the location of the
missing chart. (Id. ¶ 22). Shortly thereafter, plaintiff’s supervisor located
the missing chart and, according to plaintiff, “proceeded to verbally
reprimand plaintiff for her attitude about the missing chart.” (Id. ¶ 23).
A few hours later, plainitff’s supervisor met with Doctors Krewson
and Zimmerman. (Id. ¶ 25). At the conclusion of this meeting, these
individuals called plainitff into a conference and terminated her
employment. (Id. ¶ 26). Plaintiff’s supervisor immediately escorted
plaintiff out of the building and directed her not to say anything to the staff.
(Id. ¶ 29).
In response to her termination, plaintiff filed a complaint and a first
amended complaint. The first amended complaint asserts three claims.
Count I avers the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff because of
her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101, et seq. (hereinafter “ADA”). (Id. ¶¶ 36-44). Count II states a
disability discrimination claim against the defendant under Pennsylvania’s
Human Relations Act, 43 PA. STAT. § 951, et seq. (hereinafter “PHRA”).
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(Id. ¶¶ 45-48). Count III asserts a claim under the Genetic Information
Non-Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff, et seq. (hereinafter “GINA”).
On November 21, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to file a
second amended complaint. (Doc. 15). Plaintiff seeks to name Doctors
Krewson and Zimmerman as individual defendants under Count
II–plaintiff’s state law PHRA claim. The parties briefed the issues, bringing
the case to the present procedural posture.
Jurisdiction
As this case is brought pursuant to the ADA and GINA for unlawful
employment discrimination, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). The court
has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Discussion
Plaintiff seeks leave to file a second amended complaint to include
Doctors Krewson and Zimmerman as individual defendants under her
state law PHRA claim. Plaintiff asserts these individuals, as owners of
Defendant CWHS, made the decision, or aided and abetted in making the
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decision, to terminate her employment. The defendant argues plaintiff
failed to administratively exhaust her remedies pertaining to any claim
against these doctors, and therefore, plaintiff’s proposed amendment is
futile. After a careful review, the court agrees with the plaintiff and will
allow her to file a second amendment complaint naming Doctors Krewson
and Zimmerman as individual defendants in Count II–plaintiff’s PHRA
disability discrimination claim.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that when a responsive
pleading has been filed, a “party may amend its pleading only with the
opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” FED. R. CIV. P.
15(a)(2). Rule 15 counsels courts to “freely give leave [to amend a
complaint] when justice so requires.” Id. Nonetheless, a district court may
deny leave to amend a complaint if the amendment has been unduly
delayed, would unduly prejudice the nonmoving party, or would be futile.
Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 879 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The burden is on the
nonmoving party to show that there are grounds for denying leave to
amend. Chancellor v. Pottsgrove Sch. Dist., 501 F. Supp. 2d 695, 700
(E.D. Pa. 2007).
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In the instant matter, the defendant only opposes plaintiff’s motion
on the ground that her amendment is futile. Specifically, the defendant
argues that plaintiff’s proposed amendment cannot withstand a motion to
dismiss, and is therefore futile, because she failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies with the EEOC and PHRA regarding her aiding
and abetting claim against Doctors Krewson and Zimmerman. See
Massarsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 125 (3d Cir. 1983)
(stating that a proposed amendment would be futile if such amendment
would not withstand a motion to dismiss).
It is well-settled that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
threshold issue for discrimination claims. Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291,
1295 n.3 (3d Cir. 1996). Reviewing the purpose of the exhaustion
requirement, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained that “[t]he
congressional policy underlying this framework was to resolve
discrimination claims administratively through cooperation and voluntary
compliance in an informal, noncoercive manner.” Burgh v. Borough
Council of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2001).
Unlike Title VII, the PHRA provides for individual liability in cases
where a person aids and abets discriminatory acts. Under the PHRA, it is
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unlawful for “any person . . . to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the
doing of any act declared by this section to be an unlawful discriminatory
practice.” 43 PA. STAT. § 955(e). To fully exhaust plaintiff’s proposed
aiding and abetting claim against Doctors Krewson and Zimmerman,
plaintiff must have specifically named these defendants as persons
alleged to have committed acts of discrimination in her administrative
complaint. 43 PA. STAT. § 959. (emphasis added).
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has recognized an
exception to this general rule requiring a party to specifically name an
individual defendant in their administrative complaint. Specifically, a
plaintiff may seek to add a previously unnamed party “when the unnamed
party received notice and when there is a shared commonality with the
named party.” Schafer v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. of the Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh,
Pa., 903 F.2d 243, 252 (3d Cir. 1990). Thus, the court must determine
whether Doctors Krewson and Zimmerman were named in plaintiff’s
administrative complaint as persons alleged to have committed acts of
discrimination. If plaintiff failed to specifically name these individuals,
plaintiff must establish that these individuals received notice of plaintiff’s
allegations and share a commonality with a named party.
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Here, plaintiff specifically named Doctors Krewson and Zimmerman
in her administrative complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (hereinafter “EEOC”), thereby satisfying the PHRA’s notice
requirement. Plaintiff’s EEOC questionnaire lists Doctors Zimmerman and
Krewson as defendant’s owner. (Doc. 22-1, Ex. A, Pl.’s EEOC
Questionnaire at 2-3). Moreover, plaintiff’s EEOC charge states Doctors
Krewson and Zimmerman were responsible for her discharge, stating that
the defendant “eventually called [plaintiff] into a conference room where
the two Doctors of the practice and Office Manager had been in and was
informed that I was being terminated effective immediately.” (Doc. 22-1,
Ex. A, Pl.’s EEOC Charge of Discrimination as 7). Thus, plaintiff’s EEOC
documents demonstrate that Doctors Krewson and Zimmerman are
named parties, thereby satisfying the PHRA’s notice requirements.
Having determined that plaintiff adequately named Doctors Krewson
and Zimmerman in the body of her administrative complaint, it is
unnecessary to determine whether this case falls into the exception,
discussed in the parties’ briefs, that allows a judicial action against an
unnamed party “when the unnamed party received notice [of the
administrative complaint] and when there is a shared commonality of
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interest with the named party.” Schafer, 903 F.2d at 252. Logically, this
exception only applies when the party was not named at all, either in the
caption or the body of the administrative complaint.
In any event, if this exception to the naming requirement did apply,
we would reach the same conclusion. Specifically, plaintiff satisfied the
dual prongs of establishing that: (1) the unnamed party received notice of
the administrative complaint and (2) the unnamed party shares a
commonality of interest with the named party. As previously stated,
Doctors Krewson and Zimmerman received notice of plaintiff’s charges as
named individuals in plaintiff’s complaint. Furthermore, Doctors Krewson
and Zimmerman share a commonality of interest with the defendant as its
owners. Accordingly, if the court were to determine that Doctors Krewson
and Zimmerman were not officially named respondents in plaintiff’s
administrative complaint, the court would, nonetheless, find that the
exception applies allowing plaintiff to bring a PHRA aiding and abetting
claim against Doctors Krewson and Zimmerman.
In short, the defendant failed to establish grounds for the court to
deny plaintiff’s request to file a second amended complaint. As such, the
court will grant plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended
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complaint adding Doctors Krewson and Zimmerman as individual
defendants under plaintiff’s state law PHRA claim under the theory that
these defendants made the decision, or aided and abetted in making the
decision, to terminate plaintiff’s employment.
Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, the court will grant plaintiff’s motion
for leave to file a second amended complaint. An appropriate order
follows.
Date: 01/18/2016
s/ James M. Munley
JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY
United States District Court
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