Lyons v. Salem Township et al
Filing
16
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 8 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Salem Township.Signed by Honorable Malachy E Mannion on 7/31/17. (bs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
:
JAMES LYONS,
:
Plaintiff
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-1513
:
v.
(JUDGE MANNION)
:
SALEM TOWNSHIP and
FRED WESTOVER,
:
Defendants
:
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the court is a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint
brought pursuant to the provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) by defendant
Salem Township (“Township”). (Doc. 8). The Township seeks dismissal of all
the claims in the complaint brought against it by the plaintiff, James Lyons.
(Doc. 1). For the reasons that follow, the Township’s motion to dismiss will be
GRANTED and the plaintiff’s complaint dismissed, as to Salem Township
only, without prejudice, in order to allow the plaintiff to file an amended
complaint if he so chooses.
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 22, 2016, the plaintiff, James Lyons, brought this civil rights suit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 against defendants Fred Westover, an officer
with the Salem Township Police Department, and Salem Township itself on
a theory that the Township failed to effectively train defendant Westover.
(Doc. 1). In Count I of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges a violation of his
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Constitution of the United
States. In Count II, the plaintiff alleges he was falsely arrested as a result of
the defendants’ conduct. In Count III, the plaintiff alleges the defendants
falsely imprisoned him.
On August 26, 2016, the Township filed the pending motion to dismiss
the plaintiff’s complaint, (Doc. 8), along with a brief in support thereof, (Doc.
9). On October 10, 2016, the plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the motion
to dismiss. (Doc. 11).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The defendant’s motion to dismiss is brought pursuant to the provisions
of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). This rule provides for the dismissal of a complaint,
in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has
been stated, Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005), and
dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting all of the facts alleged in the
complaint as true, the plaintiff has failed to plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (abrogating “no set of facts” language
found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The facts alleged must
2
be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. This requirement “calls for enough fact[s]
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
[necessary elements]” of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Id. Furthermore, in
order to satisfy federal pleading requirements, the plaintiff must “provide the
grounds of his entitlement to relief,” which “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)
(brackets and quotations marks omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
127 S. Ct. at 1964-65).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the
complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v.
McCormick, 502 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider
undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attaches as an exhibit
to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached]
documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d
1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged
in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not
physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the
court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to
3
dismiss. See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250,
1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
Generally, the court should grant leave to amend a complaint before
dismissing it as merely deficient. See, e.g., Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote
Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007); Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213
F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000). “Dismissal without leave to amend is justified
only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility.” Alston v.
Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).
III.
DISCUSSION
The allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint, which are accepted as true
for purposes of the instant motion, provide that, on or near July 22, 2014, a
call concerning a potential rape that occurred on July 21, 2014, came in to
Officer Fred Westover of the Salem Township Police Department, whereby
he was dispatched to investigate further. (Doc. 1, at ¶15). Defendant
Westover was informed that the victim had been raped by the plaintiff. (Id.).
Upon arriving at the alleged victim’s house to investigate, defendant Westover
questioned the alleged victim, whom he had known to be mentally challenged
and to have a low I.Q., and she told him she had been raped by the plaintiff.
(Id. ¶¶16-17). Defendant Westover subsequently took the alleged victim to the
4
Berwick Hospital to complete a rape kit, but after the kit was completed,
defendant Westover removed the kit from the hospital and never published
its results, which still remain unknown. (Id. ¶¶18-19).
The plaintiff was subsequently arrested, processed, and incarcerated
in the Luzerne County Correctional Facility for forty days, where he was
allegedly threatened and harassed by other inmates in the facility.
Additionally, the plaintiff allegedly suffered physical injuries during his time at
the prison. (Id. ¶20).
In October 2014, the plaintiff attended his preliminary hearing, where the
alleged victim stated she had no recollection of talking to the police, stated
that she did not wish to proceed with the prosecution, stated that she wanted
to drop all charges, and stated that she was not afraid of the plaintiff. (Id. ¶2125). Significantly, the alleged victim also stated that the plaintiff never did
anything to her that she did not like. (Id. ¶27). At the hearing, the
Commonwealth never reported or used the results of the rape kit taken at the
hospital, nor did they present any evidence of bruising or other injuries on the
victim or physical evidence to show the alleged victim had been raped. (Id.
¶¶28-29). Therefore, the charges against the plaintiff were dismissed.
In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that defendant Westover had no
probable cause or corroborating evidence to lawfully arrest him for the sexual
assault of the alleged victim. More specifically, in Count I, the plaintiff alleges
5
that the arrest under these circumstances amounted to an unreasonable
seizure and detention, in violation of both his Fourth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Further, in Count II and Count III, the plaintiff
alleges state law claims of false arrest and false imprisonment, respectively.
Count I of the complaint is brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983, which
provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” “causes to be subjected, any
citizen” to the deprivation of his or her constitutional rights, may be liable to
that person in a civil action to redress the deprivation. While the individual
defendant has filed an answer (Doc. 7) denying the allegations, the plaintiff
is also suing the Township, a municipality and subdivision of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, for the actions of defendant Westover, who
for all times relevant to these proceedings was the agent and representative
of the Salem Township Police Department. The question before the court is
whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the Township is municipally
liable to plaintiff for defendant Westover’s conduct under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
The Township, in its brief in support of its motion to dismiss, argues that
the plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege facts necessary to show that it should be
municipally liable for the actions of defendant Westover. Specifically, the
Township argues that the plaintiff has not shown that the municipality had a
policy or custom, shown through a pattern of similar constitutional violations,
6
of failing to effectively train its officers in collecting evidence and establishing
probable cause against a suspect. Further, the Township argues that the
plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that the municipality acted, through its
policy or custom, with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of
others.
The plaintiff, in his brief in opposition to the Township’s motion to
dismiss, responds that under certain circumstances, a plaintiff need not
establish a pattern of similar constitutional violations, but rather can succeed
on a claim of municipal liability by showing that the lack of training was so
obviously and predictably going to result in constitutional violations that
deliberate indifference by the municipality can be inferred. The plaintiff argues
that, here, the municipality is aware that its officers are required, as a
recurring and frequent part of their job, to collect evidence, establish probable
cause, and subsequently arrest suspects, and that if probable cause is not
established before a suspect is arrested, the individual’s constitutional rights
will be obviously and predictably violated. Therefore, the plaintiff argues that
the failure to provide adequate training in this area constitutes deliberate
indifference on the part of the Township.
The leading case on the issue of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C.
§1983 is Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York. In
Monell, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress, in its promulgation of
7
42 U.S.C. §1983, intended to include municipalities and government bodies
under the term “persons” in §1983, thereby making these entities liable to
those whose constitutional rights they deprive. Monell v. New York City Dept.
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). The Supreme Court noted that,
while in most circumstances under §1983 the municipality or government
body will be liable for constitutional violations that arise from the entity’s
official policy, liability can also arise from constitutional violations resulting
from a governmental body’s custom, even though the custom was not formally
promulgated by the governmental body’s decision-makers as official policy.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. A practice constitutes a custom when it is “so
permanent and well settled” in the practices of the governmental body that it
becomes the equivalent of its official policy. Id. at 691. Further, the Supreme
Court noted that municipal liability under §1983 cannot be found solely on a
theory of respondeat superior, or simply because the governmental body
employed or supervised someone who committed a constitutional violation,
but rather, the governmental body must have caused the violation in some
way, either through official policy or custom. Id.
The Supreme Court in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati ruled that even a
single decision by an official decision-maker of the government represents
official government policy, and the municipality becomes liable for the
consequences of that decision regardless of whether it was meant to control
8
future behavior or actions, or whether it was a single, circumstance-based
decision. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986). As
stated by the court in Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, however, it is not
always necessary for the decision-makers to issue an official proclamation or
policy, but instead, municipal liability can, in the alternative, be shown through
evidence that the municipality acquiesced in the violation through a custom
or practice of the municipality so permanent and well-settled as to give it the
force of law. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480-81 (3d Cir.
1990).
A plaintiff can, in limited circumstances, successfully allege a municipal
policy or custom through a theory that the municipality failed to adequately
train its employees on how to avoid constitutional violations in a certain area,
but the municipality’s liability in these situations is “at most tenuous”. Connick
v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
822-23 (1985). In this circumstance, the plaintiff must show that the
municipality acted with deliberate indifference to the rights of the persons the
employees come into contact with. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388
(1989). Typically, in cases where the alleged municipal custom or policy is the
failure to adequately train its officers in some relevant area of law or practice,
deliberate indifference can only be established by a showing of a pattern of
constitutional violations due to the failure to train. Berg v. County of Allegheny,
9
219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d Cir. 2000). This is because a municipality usually
cannot act deliberately concerning a training program it is not aware is
deficient. Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. Through a pattern of similar violations, a
municipality becomes aware of inadequacies in its training program, and any
later violations stemming from the unchanged training program can rightfully
be said to be a result of deliberate indifference on the part of the municipality.
Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 407.
However, in Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County v.
Brown, the Supreme Court did note that in a narrow set of circumstances, it
may be possible to show deliberate indifference without such a pattern of
constitutional violations stemming from the municipality’s custom or policy, but
the bar in these cases is very high. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County,
520 U.S. at 409. The Court stated that there are some situations that are so
likely to cause constitutional violations from the failure to adequately train the
officers in how to handle those circumstances, that a single incident, not
necessarily repeated violations, can give way to municipal liability. Id. at 409.
The Supreme Court in Canton, explained that on a municipal liability
claim on a failure-to-train theory, deliberate indifference can be sufficiently
alleged by showing that “in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or
employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and [that] the
inadequacy [of the current training]” will predictably lead to the violation of
10
constitutional rights of those the officer comes into contact with. City of
Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). Therefore, without a
showing of a pattern of similar violations, the plaintiff must show a “a violation
of federal rights may be a highly predictable consequence of a failure to equip
law enforcement officers with specific tools to handle recurrent situations” and
there is a “likelihood of recurrence” that “could justify a finding that [the]
policymakers’ decision not to train an officer reflected deliberate indifference
to the obvious consequence” of that decision. Bd. of County Comm’rs of
Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 409.
In this case, there appears to be no question that the Township did not
have an official policy promulgated by its final decision-makers that authorized
the kind of constitutional violation alleged to have occurred here. Instead, the
plaintiff alleges that the Township had a custom of inadequately training its
officers in collecting evidence and establishing probable cause. The plaintiff
did not allege a pattern of similar constitutional violations by the Township,
which is usually necessary to establish a municipality’s custom. Nor has the
plaintiff sufficiently alleged the Township was deliberately indifferent to the
constitutional rights of those its officers came into contact with or presented
facts specifically to establish a custom. While the plaintiff elaborated on his
claims in his brief in opposition to the Township’s motion to dismiss, it is
well-settled that a plaintiff cannot amend a complaint through the filing of a
11
brief, or through arguments set forth in a brief opposing a dispositive motion.
See Pennsylvania ex rel. Zimmerman v. Pepsico, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d
Cir.1988) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107
(7th Cir.1984)); cf. Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 202 (3d Cir.2007)
(“[W]e do not consider after-the-fact allegations in determining the sufficiency
of [a] complaint under Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6)”). In light of this, the complaint
fails with regard to alleging deliberate indifference on the part of the
Township. However, the plaintiff will be given the opportunity to amend the
complaint to sufficiently allege deliberate indifference by the Township.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint
(Doc. 8) will be granted as to the Township only, without prejudice, to allow
the plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
Date: July 31, 2017
O:\Mannion\shared\MEMORANDA - DJ\CIVIL MEMORANDA\2016 MEMORANDA\16-1513-01.wpd
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?