Pledger v. C.B.M. Food Vendors et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 16 Motion to Dismiss; granting 21 Motion for Summary Judgment. 1. Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint, (Doc. 16), is GRANTED. 2. Defendants motion for summary judgment (Doc. 21) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants Lackawanna County Prison, Captain Shanley and Officer Esposito and against Plaintiff on all claims. 3. Plaintiffs motion for court ordered mediation and appointment of counsel (Docs. 30, 3 1) are DISMISSED as moot. 4. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case. 5. Any appeal taken from this order will be deemed frivolous, without probable cause, and not taken in good faith. Signed by Honorable William J. Nealon on 3/29/2018 (bg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JEREMEL PLEDGER,
Plaintiff
v.
C.B.M. FOOD VENDORS, et al.,
Defendants
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:CV-16-1702
(Judge Nealon)
MEMORANDUM
I. Background
On August 15, 2016, Plaintiff, Jeremel Pledger, an inmate at the State
Correctional Institution Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, filed this pro se civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. He complains of incidents which occurred at
his prior place of confinement, the Lackawanna County Prison. Named as
Defendants are the Lackawanna County Prison and the following Lackawanna
County Prison employees: Captain Shanley and Officer Michael Esposito. (Doc. 1,
complaint). Plaintiff also names C.B.M. Food Vendors and Benjamin O’Leary, an
employee of C.B.M. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that he was “hired to work in the kitchen without being
medically cleared” and “was made to work 7 days a week with no days off from 6
am to 6 pm, sometimes later until 9 pm.” (Doc. 1). He states that he “worked for
87 days from March 6th until May 31st.” Id. He claims that “on January 29th the
doctor of Lackawanna County Prison deemed [him] no work no recreation.” Id.
Finally, Plaintiff states that “on May 24th [he] strained his back while working” and
“C.B.M. workers Kevin Mones, Ben O’Leary and Kitchen Officer told [Plaintiff]
that if he reported his injury he would be fired because he was not suppose to be
working.” Id. Plaintiff was then transferred to SCI-Graterford, where he claims he
“received an increase in medication on 7/9/16 after leaving the Lackawanna
County Prison.” Id.
On August 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant action in which he seeks
compensatory and punitive damages for “lack of medical attention, increase of
depression, violation of inmate workers rights” and “for mental anguish in
delaying [him] from proper health care” Id. Plaintiff also seeks to recover for
“negligence of grievance procedures.” Id.
On May 1, 2017, Defendants C.B.M. Food Vendors and Benjamin O’Leary
filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, and supporting brief, arguing, inter
alia, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction due to Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. (Docs. 16, 17). On June 21, 2017, the remaining
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by a statement of
material facts, exhibits and supporting brief. (Docs. 21-3). Although Plaintiff filed
2
a brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff has failed to oppose the
motion for summary judgment. As such, the motion is treated as unopposed. For
the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss and
motion for summary judgment.
II.
Motion to Dismiss
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Under Rule 12(b)(6), we must
“accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of
the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515
F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). While a complaint need only contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and detailed factual allegations
are not required, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a
complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[L]abels and conclusions” are not enough, Twombly, 550 U.S. at
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555, and a court “is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Id. (quoted case omitted). Thus, “a judicial conspiracy claim
must include at least a discernible factual basis to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal.” Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184
(3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
In resolving the motion to dismiss, we thus “conduct a two-part analysis.”
Fowler, supra, 578 F.3d at 210. First, we separate the factual elements from the
legal elements and disregard the legal conclusions. Id. at 210-11. Second, we
“determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that
the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief”. Id. at 211 (quoted case omitted).
In addition, because Plaintiff complains about “prison conditions,” the
screening provisions of 42 U.S.C. §1997e apply, as do the screening provisions of
28 U.S.C. §1915(e), given that he was granted in forma pauperis status to pursue
this suit. The court’s obligation to dismiss a complaint under the PLRA screening
provisions for complaints that fail to state a claim is not excused even after
defendants have filed a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
1122, 1126 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2000). Hence, if there is a ground for dismissal which
was not relied upon by a defendant in a motion to dismiss, the court may
nonetheless sua sponte rest its dismissal upon such ground pursuant to the
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screening provisions of the PLRA. See Lopez; Dare v. U.S., Civil No. 06-115E,
2007 WL 1811198, at *4 (W.D. Pa. June 21, 2007), aff’d, 264 Fed App’x. 183 (3d
Cir. 2008).
Exhaustion
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that inmates exhaust the
administrative remedies that are available to them prior to bringing suit in federal
court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Specifically, the PLRA provides that “[n]o action
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1979 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. § 1983) or any other federal law,
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available have been exhausted.” Id.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that “[t]here is
no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA.” Ross v. Blake, –––
U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1856, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016), quoting Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006), accord Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007).
“And that mandatory language means a court may not excuse a failure to exhaust,
even to take [ ] [special] circumstances into account.” Ross at 1856.
Because the PLRA is a statutory exhaustion provision, “Congress sets the
rules—and courts have a role in creating exceptions only if Congress wants them
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to. For that reason mandatory exhaustion statutes like the PLRA establish
mandatory exhaustion regimes, foreclosing judicial discretion.” Id. at 1857.
Accordingly, exhaustion is required regardless of the availability of the requested
relief, and regardless of the nature of the underlying claim, whether it arises from
excessive force, or a violation of the constitution. Id., citing, Booth v. Churner,
532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002); Woodford,
548 U.S. at 91.
Additionally, exhaustion must be “proper,” which “demands compliance
with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford, at 90.
This serves to protect “administrative agency authority” over the matter, giving an
agency “an opportunity to correct its own mistakes ... before it is haled into federal
court,” and “discourages ‘disregard of [the agency’s] procedures.” Id. at 89,
quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992).
The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ administrative remedies for
inmate grievances are provided for in Department of Corrections Administrative
Directive 804. See www.cor.state.pa.us, DOC Policies, DC-ADM 804, Inmate
Grievance System Policy (“DC-ADM 804"). This policy establishes the
Consolidated Inmate Grievance Review System, through which inmates can seek
to resolve issues relating to their incarceration. Id. The first step in the inmate
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grievance process is initial review. Id. Grievances must be submitted for initial
review within 15 working days after the event upon which the grievance is based.
Id. After initial review, the inmate may appeal to the superintendent of their
institution. Id. Upon completion of the initial review and the appeal from the
initial review, an inmate may seek final review. Id.
Defendants C.B.M. Food Vendors and Benjamin O’Leary have properly
raised the matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies made available to
inmates confined within the Lackawanna County Prison. Defendants argue that
Plaintiff’s own complaint reveals that Plaintiff “filed grievances at Lackawanna
County Prison got no response” and that he “filed a grievance to PA DOC
grievance department on 8-4-16.” (Doc. 1 at 2). However, while it is apparent that
Plaintiff started the grievance process at both the Lackawanna County Prison and
the State Correctional Institution he was subsequently transferred to, he failed to
finish the grievance process. To the extent that Plaintiff submitted a grievance to
the appropriate official and did not receive a response, the procedure contemplates
several tiers of review and the grievance review system is not exhausted when an
inmate files a grievance and then takes no other action through established
channels when a grievance is not resolved to his satisfaction.
Plaintiff’s next step would have been to appeal any decision, or lack of one,
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to the next level of review. It is clear from the face of Plaintiff’s complaint that he
failed to properly exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff does not refute this.
Thus, the failure to pursue the appropriate administrative process with respect to
his claims precludes the litigation of such claims.
In Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir. 2004), our Court of Appeals
held that congressional policy objectives were best served by interpreting the
statutory “exhaustion requirement to include a procedural default component.”
The court further ruled that procedural default under § 1997e(a) is governed by the
applicable prison grievance system, provided that the “prison grievance system’s
procedural requirements [are] not imposed in a way that offends the Federal
Constitution or the federal policy embodied in § 1997e(a).” Id. at 231, 232. Thus,
Pledger has sustained a procedural default.
Spruill cited with approval the Seventh Circuit decision in Pozo v.
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). Spruill, 372 F.3d at 231. In
Pozo, the Seventh Circuit ruled that “to exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file
complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative
rules require.” Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1025 (emphasis added). Plaintiff offers no
evidence to justify his failure to appeal to final review. Thus, Pledger is now
foreclosed from litigating his claims in this Court.
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In Spruill, the Third Circuit found that a procedural default component to the
exhaustion requirement served the following congressional objectives: “(1) to
return control of the inmate grievance process to prison administrators; (2) to
encourage development of administrative record, and perhaps settlements, within
the inmate grievance process; and (3) to reduce the burden on the federal courts by
erecting barriers to frivolous prisoner lawsuits.” 372 F.3d at 230. In Pusey v.
Belanger, No. Civ. 02-351, 2004 WL 2075472 at *2-3 (D. Del. Sept. 14, 2004), the
court applied Spruill to dismiss an inmate’s action for failure to timely pursue an
administrative remedy over the inmate’s objection that he did not believe the
administrative remedy program operating in Delaware covered his grievance. In
Berry v. Kerik, 366 F.3d 85, 86-88 (2d Cir. 2004), the court affirmed the dismissal
of an inmate’s action with prejudice where the inmate had failed to offer
appropriate justification for the failure to timely pursue administrative grievances.
In Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 2004), the court
embraced the holding in Pozo, stating that “[a] prison procedure that is
procedurally barred and thus is unavailable to a prisoner is not thereby considered
exhausted.” These precedents support this Court’s decision to grant the motion to
dismiss filed on behalf of C.B.M. Food Vendors and Benjamin O’Leary.
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III. Summary Judgment
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) “[t]he court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
“[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material
fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
A disputed fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would
affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992).
An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257;
Brenner v. Local 514, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,
927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).
When determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the court
must view the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consolidated Rail
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Corporation, 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Electric
Company, 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). In order to avoid summary judgment,
however, parties may not rely on unsubstantiated allegations. Parties seeking to
establish that a fact is or is not genuinely disputed must support such an assertion
by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record,” by showing that an adverse
party’s factual assertion lacks support from cited materials, or demonstrating that a
factual assertion is unsupportable by admissible evidence. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1);
see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (requiring evidentiary support for factual assertions
made in response to summary judgment). The party opposing the motion “must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Parties must produce evidence to show the existence of every element essential to
its case that they bear the burden of proving at trial, for “a complete failure of
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily
renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U .S. at 323; see Harter v. G.A.F.
Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir.1992). Failure to properly support or contest an
assertion of fact may result in the fact being considered undisputed for the purpose
of the motion, although a court may also give parties an opportunity to properly
provide support or opposition. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
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A.
Statement of Facts1
On January 24, 2016, Plaintiff, Jeremel Pledger, was admitted to the
Lackawanna County Prison as an inmate. (Doc. 21-1 at 2). At the time of his
admission, Plaintiff gave a history of having suffered a stroke just five (5) days
previous. Id. As a result of Plaintiff’s medical history, he was restricted to no
work and no recreation at the Lackawanna County Prison. (Doc. 21-2 at 2).
On or about January 25, 2016, the Lackawanna County Prison obtained
the medical records from St. Clare Hospital, Dover, New Jersey, where Plaintiff
was treated during his previous hospitalization. (Doc. 21-3 at 2-4). Said records
indicated that the Plaintiff suffered from Bell’s Palsy, rather than from a stroke. Id.
Nevertheless, out an abundance of caution, Plaintiff continued to be restricted to no
work and no recreation.
1
Middle District of Pennsylvania Local Rules of Court provide that in addition
to filing a brief in response to the moving party’s brief in support, “[t]he papers
opposing a motion for summary judgment shall included a separate, short and concise
statement of material facts responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the
statement [of material facts filed by the moving party] ..., as to which it is contended
that there exists a genuine issue to be tried.” See M.D. Pa. LR 56. 1. The rule further
states that the statement of material facts required to be served by the moving party
will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be
served by the opposing party. See id. Because Plaintiff has failed to file a separate
statement of material facts controverting the statement filed by Defendants, all
material facts set forth in Defendants’ statement (Doc. 23) will be deemed admitted.
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On January 30, 2016, Plaintiff received a medical examination from the
medical staff at the Prison. (Doc. 21-7 at 2). The examination showed no positive
findings and Plaintiff’s only request was for eye drops. Id.
On February 28, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a request that he be cleared to
work in the kitchen alleging that he was fully capable of doing so. (Doc. 21-4 at
2). Plaintiff was advised that after he was “cleared by all others required, we will
evaluate you.” Id.
On February 28, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a second request that he be
cleared to work in the kitchen. (Doc. 21-5 at 2).
On March 3, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a third request to be cleared for work
in the kitchen. (Doc. 21-6 at 2). That request was approved on March 10, 2016.
Id. Inmates working in the kitchen are required to work a maximum of forty (40)
hours per week. (Doc. 26 at 2). Any additional hours worked are done so at the
request of the inmate. Id.
On May 11, 2016, Plaintiff was seen by the medical department, stating “he
had his friend cut a mole off his back earlier today with county issued nail
clippers” and it was bleeding and warm and tender to the touch. (Doc. 21-7 at 2).
Plaintiff was treated with Betadine and Minocycline and advised to return for a
follow up on three days. Id.
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On May 26, 2016, Plaintiff was issued a Misconduct Report for taking
unauthorized food from the kitchen or staff dining; failure to perform work duties;
malingering and disobeying a direct order. (Doc. 21-8 at 2). The misconduct
states as follows:
While on duty as the Kitchen Officer, I was informed by CBM
employee Kevin Mones that he caught inmate kitchen worker Pledger
stealing food from the kitchen dry storage. Inmate Pledger has been
verbally warned by myself & CBM employees multiple times about
stealing food which he continues to ignore. Today inmate Pledger
was late for work. Today, and on multiple occasions, Pledger has
been verbally warned about his failure to carry out & complete work
assignments in the kitchen. Kevin Mones has stated to me that inmate
Pledger continually fails to do the work which he assigns him, & that
he catches him taking food regularly without asking. All kitchen
workers have received direct orders from myself not to take food,
including inmate Pledger. End of report.
Id.
On May 31, 2016, Plaintiff appeared for his Misconduct Hearing. (Doc. 219). Plaintiff states that he never stole anything and that he “asked if he could have
BBQ sauce and was told no and left”. Id. He claims that he was late for work
because he was “helping Counselor Gavin.” Id. Plaintiff was found guilty and was
terminated from his kitchen position. Id.
B.
Discussion
A plaintiff, in order to state a viable § 1983 claim, must plead two essential
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elements: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting
under color of state law, and (2) that said conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995); Shaw by
Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1141-42 (3d Cir. 1990).
A §1983 action brought against a “State and its Board of Corrections is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment unless [the State] has consented to the filing of
such a suit.” Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); see also Thompson v.
Burke, 556 F.2d 231, 232 (3d Cir.1977) (parole Board could not be sued because it
is not a person within the meaning of § 1983). A prison or correctional facility is
also not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. See Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d
991, 992 (3d Cir.1973); Philogene v. Adams County Prison, Civ. No. 97-0043, slip
op. at p. 4 (M.D.Pa. Jan. 30, 1997) (Rambo, C.J.); Sponsler v. Berks County
Prison, Civ. A. 95-1136, 1995 WL 92370, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Feb.28, 1995).
Pursuant to the above standards, the Lackawanna County Prison is not a
proper Defendant and will be dismissed.
Moreover, each named defendant must be shown, via the complaint’s
allegations, to have been personally involved in the events underlying a claim. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (“[A] plaintiff must plead that each
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Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.”). As the Court stated in Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir.1998):
A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in
the alleged wrongs.... [P]ersonal involvement can be shown through
allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and
acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and
acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity.
(Citations omitted).
See also Beattie v. Dept. of Corrections SCI–Mahanoy, 2009 WL 533051, *3 (“a
prerequisite for a viable civil rights claim is that a Defendant directed, or knew of
and acquiesced in, the deprivation of a Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”), citing
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.1988)).
In the context of medical care, while the relevant inquiry is whether
defendants were: (1) deliberately indifferent (the subjective element) to (2)
plaintiff’s serious medical needs (the objective element), Monmouth County
Correctional Institution Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987), the
plaintiff must meet the requirements of the inquiry.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to indicate how any of the moving Defendants were
involved in a deprivation, or violation, of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
The undisputed record reveals that Plaintiff was not a stroke victim and that
there was nothing in his records which would prevent him from working in the
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kitchen. Nothing demonstrates this more clearly than the fact that he wrote and
submitted three (3) separate requests that he be allowed to work in the kitchen. On
March 10, 2016, the Prison physician relented and allowed Plaintiff to work in the
kitchen. Once he was allowed to work in the kitchen, his work proceeded from
March to May, 2016, without any complaint of physical pain or being overworked.
On May 26, 2016, he was charged with stealing food, neglecting his duties, and
being chronically late. Being found guilty of these actions resulted in Plaintiff
being terminated from his kitchen duties.
From January 24, 2016, the date of Plaintiff’s entry into the Lackawanna
County Prison to May 26, 2016, the date of Plaintiff’s termination, there are only
two recorded medical visits; one requesting eye drops and the second for treatment
of a mole on Plaintiff’s back. Both times, Plaintiff’s concerns were addressed and
treated. There is no indication in the medical record of a back injury on May 24,
2016. To the extent that Plaintiff states that he was “told that if he reported his
injury he would be fired because he was not supposed to be working,” Plaintiff’s
argument is completely lacking in merit, as the record demonstrates that he as
cleared to work in the kitchen on March 10, 2016. There is absolutely no indication
in the record that any of the moving Defendants were deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s medical needs, and more importantly, to what serious medical need they
17
were indifferent. Accordingly, the remaining Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment will be granted.
VI.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the motion to dismiss, filed on behalf of
Defendants C.B.M. Vendors and Benjamin O’Leary will (Doc. 16) will be granted.
The motion for summary judgment, filed on behalf of Defendants Lackawanna
County Prison, Officer Esposito and Captain Shanley (Doc. 21) will be granted. A
separate Order will be issued.
Dated: March 29, 2018
/s/ William J. Nealon
United States District Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JEREMEL PLEDGER,
Plaintiff
v.
C.B.M. FOOD VENDORS, et al.,
Defendants
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:CV-16-1702
(Judge Nealon)
ORDER
AND NOW, THIS 29th DAY OF MARCH, 2018, for the reasons set forth
in the Memorandum of this date, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint,
(Doc. 16), is GRANTED.
2.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 21) is
GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter
judgment in favor of Defendants Lackawanna County
Prison, Captain Shanley and Officer Esposito and against
Plaintiff on all claims.
3.
Plaintiff’s motion for court ordered mediation and
appointment of counsel (Docs. 30, 31) are DISMISSED
as moot.
4.
The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
5.
Any appeal taken from this order will be deemed
frivolous, without probable cause, and not taken in good
faith.
/s/ William J. Nealon
United States District Judge
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