Juice v. Barrasse et al
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 14 Order Terminating Case, Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/16/17. (jam)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
STEPHEN JUICE,
Plaintiff
v.
JUDGE MICHAEL BARRASSE,
et al.,
Defendants
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CIVIL NO. 3:CV-16-1913
(Judge Caputo)
MEMORANDUM
I.
Introduction
Presently before the Court is Mr. Juice’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s May
5, 2017 Order dismissing his consolidated action for failure to state a claim for which relief
could be granted.1 (ECF No. 14.) In his Complaint Mr. Juice, a state inmate, named the
Honorable Michael Barrasse, the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County and the
Secretary and Board of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (the Board) as
defendants in his action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He claims he was improperly
convicted and sentenced as a sexually violent predator under Megan’s Law, denied a copy of
his criminal transcript during his criminal appeals, and unable to secure a home plan even
though granted parole due to his classification as a sexually violent predator. (ECF No. 1,
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On May 5, 2017, the Court consolidated Juice v. Barrasse, Civ. No. 3:16-cv-2191 (M.D.
Pa.) with the present action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). See ECF No. 12.
Compl.) As relief he sought his immediate release, monetary damages and treatment for his
various medical problems.
For the reasons that follow, his motion for reconsideration will be granted in part and
denied in part.
II.
Standard of Review
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) provides that “[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment must be
filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). A motion for
reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is used “‘to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present
newly discovered evidence.’” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010)(quoting
Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)). A
party moving to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) faces a difficult burden. The
scope of a motion for reconsideration is extremely limited. Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397,
415 (3d Cir. 2011). The applicant for reconsideration must show “at least one of the following
grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or
(3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Schumann
v. Astrazeneca Pharm., L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 848 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Max’s Seafood Café,
176 F.3d at 677). A motion for reconsideration is not intended to give an unhappy litigant an
additional chance to rehash or reargue issues which have already been considered and
disposed of by the Court. See Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F. Supp. 2d 588, 606 (M.D.
Pa. 2002).
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III. Discussion
In his motion for reconsideration Mr. Juice argues that the Court could have treated [his
other action] as an amendment or supplement to the Complaint initially submitted” rather than
a separate action. (ECF No. 16, p. 1.) He claims that he “never intended to file more than one
Complaint” and that he cannot afford to pay two filing fees. (Id.) The Court notes that while
each Complaint was dated the same day and was accompanied by an application for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis and authorization form to allow for the periodic deductions from
his account to pay the filing fee, they were received by the Clerk of Courts on separate dates.
As such they were given separate docket numbers, but eventually consolidated. To date Mr.
Juice has not tendered any funds towards the filing fee in either matter. While it is not the
practice of this Court to forgive or refund disappointed plaintiff’s their filing fees, in this instance
given Mr. Juice’s statement that he never intended on filing two separate actions, the identical
mailing dates of both Complaints, the Court will vacate paragraph 4 of our May 5, 2017, order
which granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in Juice v. Barrasse, Civ. No. 3:16cv-2191 (M.D. Pa.). See ECF No. 12. However, Mr. Juice will still be required to pay the full
filing fee in Juice v. Judge Barrasse, Civ. No. 3:16-cv-1913 (M.D. Pa.).
The remainder of Mr. Juice’s claims stem form the Court’s finding that his action was
more appropriately filed as one for habeas relief. See ECF No. 13. Mr. Juice argues that the
Court improperly construed his action as seeking habeas relief and that the cases the Court
relied upon are either unconstitutional or inapplicable to his situation. Yet he does not explain
how his request for release on bail or probation are viable remedies available to him via a civil
rights action. Likewise, aside from taking issue with the Court’s finding that his claims of
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ineffective assistance of counsel and sentencing challenges should be addressed by the
Court, he does not identify any clear error of law or fact by the Court in its finding that these
matters may only be addressed in a properly filed habeas petition rather than a civil rights
matter. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 505, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1841, 36 L.Ed.2d 439
(1973); see also Pittman v. Pennsylvania General Assembly, 642 F. App’x 87, 89 (3d Cir.
2016). The same is true with respect to his claim that although he “has provided the Board
with reasonable and satisfactory ‘Home Plans’” they have not been approved. Moreover, to
the extent Mr. Juice argues that the Board has granted him parole but not yet approved his
Home Plan, he fails to assert a viable due process or equal protection claim. It is axiomatic
that “there is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally
released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal
& Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979). Likewise, both
the federal and Pennsylvania state courts have held that parole is not a constitutionally
protected liberty interest under Pennsylvania law. Burkett v. Love, 89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir.
1996); Weaver v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 688 A.2d 766, 770 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1997).
Except for the issue of the duplicative filing fee, none of the reasons given by Mr. Juice
warrant reconsideration by the Court. As such, and for the reasons previously given by the
Court, the pending motion for reconsideration will be granted in part and denied in part.
An appropriate order follows.
/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. RICHARD CAPUTO
United States District Judge
Date: June 16, 2017
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