Kost v. Baldwin et al
Filing
23
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry).Signed by Honorable Malachy E Mannion on 9/29/17. (bs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DOROTHY S. KOST,
:
Plaintiff
:
:
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-2008
(JUDGE MANNION)
WILLIAM BALDWIN and
SCHUYLKILL COUNTY BAR
ASSOCIATION,
:
Defendants
:
:
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the court are a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint
brought on behalf of defendant Baldwin, (Doc. 9), and a motion to dismiss the
plaintiff’s complaint brought on behalf of defendant Schuylkill County Bar
Association, (“SCBA”), (Doc. 10). Upon review of the defendants’ motions and
the materials related thereto, defendant Baldwin’s motion will be granted in
part and denied in part as discussed herein, and defendant SCBA’s motion
will be granted.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
By way of relevant background, on October 3, 2016, the plaintiff filed the
instant civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, in which she alleges
that defendant Baldwin, the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas
of Schuylkill County, and defendant SCBA, a non-profit 501(c)(3) association,
acted together in terminating her from her part-time employment as the
Executive Director of the SCBA, in violation of her constitutional right to
intimate association under the First Amendment, and in violation of her
constitutional right to quit employment under the 13th Amendment.
Defendant Baldwin and defendant SCBA filed motions to dismiss the
plaintiff’s complaint on November 7, 2016, (Doc. 9, Doc. 10). Briefs in support
of these motions were filed on November 21, 2016. (Doc. 17, Doc. 15
respectively). On December 5, 2016, the plaintiff filed a combined brief in
opposition to the defendants’ motions. (Doc. 19). Reply briefs were filed by
defendant Baldwin and defendant SCBA on December 15, 2016. (Doc. 21,
Doc. 22).
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
The defendants’ motions to dismiss are brought pursuant to the
provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). This rule provides for the dismissal of a
complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no
claim has been stated, Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir.
2005), and dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting all of the facts alleged
in the complaint as true, the plaintiff has failed to plead “enough facts to state
2
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (abrogating “no set of facts”
language found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The facts
alleged must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. This requirement “calls for
enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of” necessary elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Id.
Furthermore, in order to satisfy federal pleading requirements, the plaintiff
must “provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief,” which “requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231
(3d Cir. 2008) (brackets and quotations marks omitted) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the
complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. See Sands v.
McCormick, 502 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider
“undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attaches as an exhibit
to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached]
documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d
1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged
3
in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not
physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the
court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to
dismiss. See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250,
1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
Generally, the court should grant leave to amend a complaint before
dismissing it as merely deficient. See, e.g., Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote
Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007); Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213
F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000). “Dismissal without leave to amend is justified
only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility.” Alston v.
Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).
III.
DISCUSSION
In Count One of her complaint, the plaintiff alleges that she had worked
concurrently for two employers.1 She worked 35 hours per week for Schuylkill
County as a law librarian assigned to the judiciary for approximately 39 years.
1
The allegations taken from the plaintiff’s complaint are accepted as true
for purposes of the instant motions to dismiss.
4
Her last day of employment with the County was February 24, 2015. The
plaintiff alleges that she left her position with Schuylkill County after her
husband had fallen ill and, as a consequence, they encountered financial
difficulties. This resulted in their home being placed in foreclosure
proceedings. She alleges that she retired in order to take a lump sum option
which was sufficient to prevent foreclosure on their home.
The plaintiff also worked for defendant SCBA in a part-time capacity as
Executive Director for approximately 17 years. She alleges that she intended
to stay in that position once she retired from the County. However, the plaintiff
alleges that she was terminated from that position on March 4, 2015.
According to the plaintiff, this termination was at the insistence of defendant
Baldwin.
Upon notifying defendant Baldwin that she was retiring, the plaintiff’s
complaint provides that he “took great offense and umbrage at the prospect,
and admonished her for leaving her employment with him in order to save her
house.” The plaintiff explained that she wanted to continue working for the
defendant SCBA and noted that, at one time, if you were a law librarian, you
were also employed by the bar association. However, according to the
plaintiff, defendant Baldwin told her that the positions with the County and the
defendant SCBA were separate, there was no requirement that she hold both
5
jobs, and that he would not interfere with her continued employment with the
defendant SCBA.
After her meeting with defendant Baldwin, the plaintiff alleges that she
received an email indicating that her email account was being shut down and
her security access card was being inactivated. Later, she received an email
from the Court Administrator forbidding her to do bar association work in the
law library, despite the fact that the defendant SCBA had been working out
of the law library for approximately 17 years. The plaintiff was given until
March 4, 2015 to separate law library and bar association paperwork.
The plaintiff alleges that she had discussed her mortgage foreclosure
with the bar association president, as well as other bar association board
members, and that they all assured that it would not be a problem as far as
her employment. Despite this assurance, after a regularly scheduled board
meeting on March 4, 2015, the plaintiff was asked to leave so that the board
could go into an executive session. Thereafter, the plaintiff was called back
into the room where she was informed by the board president that she was
being terminated as of that day. The plaintiff alleges that she was
subsequently informed by the bar association’s assistant director “that the bar
association leadership did what they could to keep her employed, but
Defendant, Baldwin, said she could not stay.” The plaintiff then learned that
6
the current and past presidents of the bar association talked to the County
Commissioners and with defendant Baldwin in an attempt to keep the plaintiff
employed, but that defendant Baldwin was “adamant” that the plaintiff was to
be terminated. The plaintiff alleges that defendant Baldwin used the power of
his office to get an independent third party to terminate her employment, even
though it was outside of his authority to do so. She further alleges that the
actions of defendant Baldwin in pressuring the defendant SCBA to terminate
her employment were arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and designed
to retaliate against her for exercising her right to marital privacy and right to
associate with her spouse, as well as her right to quit her position as a law
librarian.
After causing her termination, the plaintiff alleges that defendant
Baldwin then attempted to cause her further financial damage by trying to
deny her unemployment compensation. The plaintiff alleges that, at the
insistence of defendant Baldwin, the defendant SCBA attempted to contest
the plaintiff’s right to unemployment compensation. Moreover, according to
the plaintiff, defendant Baldwin appeared at her unemployment compensation
hearing and attempted to inject himself in to that proceeding, which only
involved the plaintiff and defendant SCBA. The plaintiff alleges, on July 15,
2015, the unemployment compensation referee determined that her
7
termination was not due to willful misconduct on her part and granted her
benefits.
In Count Two of her complaint against both defendants, the plaintiff
alleges that, although defendant SCBA was a voluntary association of
lawyers, it ultimately entered into an agreement with defendant Baldwin to
terminate her employment. By entering into such an agreement, the plaintiff
alleges that defendant SCBA “put on the mantle of government authority
making it a state actor.”
In Count Three of her complaint, the plaintiff alleges tortious
interference with an employment contract against defendant Baldwin. Here,
the plaintiff alleges that, at all relevant times, defendant Baldwin acted outside
of the scope and protection as a member of the judiciary and acted solely in
his private capacity. The plaintiff alleges that defendant Baldwin interfered
with her job as Executive Director of the SCBA by having her terminated.
Specifically, using Section 765 of the Restatement Second of Torts as a
guide, the plaintiff alleges:
1.
2.
3.
4.
There was a longstanding employment contract between
Plaintiff and Defendant, Bar.
Plaintiff and Defendant, Bar, intended to maintain that
employment.
Defendant, Baldwin, was not involved in that employment
relationship, and was not a decision-maker.
Defendant, Baldwin, purposefully contacted Plaintiff’s
employer for the purpose of securing her termination.
8
5.
6.
7.
Defendant, Baldwin, intended to hurt Plaintiff, solely
because she quit her job as law librarian under his
jurisdiction.
The Plaintiff had the constitutional right to quit working for
the County of Schuylkill and only work for the Defendant,
Bar, and her reasons were valid.
There is a close proximity [eight days] between Plaintiff’s
voluntary departure from her job with Schuylkill County and
the involuntary loss of job with Defendant, Bar.
In the final count of her complaint against the defendant SCBA, the
plaintiff alleges a “prima facie tort”. To this extent, the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant SCBA terminated her employment without excuse or justification
and only to “curry favor with a trial judge”. Given this, the plaintiff alleges that
the defendant SCBA is liable under the Restatement Second of Torts, Section
46, for intentional infliction of emotional distress, (“IIED”).
A.
Defendant Baldwin’s Motion to Dismiss
In his motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, defendant Baldwin
initially argues that, in his official capacity, all claims against him are barred
by the Eleventh Amendment and he is not a person under §1983. With
respect to this argument, it does not appear that the plaintiff is suing
defendant Baldwin in his official capacity. In fact, the plaintiff alleges in her
complaint that “at no time herein was the Defendant, Baldwin, acting in his
official capacity as a State Judge, but rather he used and abused his official
9
position to act on his own personal idiosyncrasies.” The plaintiff further
alleges that defendant Baldwin “was acting outside the scope and protection
as a member of this judiciary as the term is used at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §8501, and
acting solely in his private capacity as an individual.” Because there is no
indication that the plaintiff is bringing the instant action against defendant
Baldwin in his official capacity, this portion of defendant Baldwin’s motion will
be denied.2
Defendant Baldwin also argues that he is entitled to sovereign immunity
in his official and individual capacity. Once again, the plaintiff does not appear
to be bringing the instant action against defendant Baldwin in his official
capacity. As to the individual capacity claims, sovereign immunity bars liability
for intentional acts committed within the scope of employment. La Frankie v.
Miklich, 618 A.2d 1145 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1992). Defendant Baldwin argues that,
as president judge, he is the executive and administrative head of the court
and oversees the running of the courthouse and managing of all activities
within the judicial district, including that which occurs within the law library at
the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas. He argues that the allegations
2
To the extent that the plaintiff is suing defendant Baldwin in his
individual capacity, Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar suit against
state officials in their individual capacities. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 165-68 (1985); Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 26 (3d Cir. 1981).
10
against him relate to the scope of his authority as president judge. However,
the plaintiff specifically alleges in her complaint that defendant Baldwin was
acting outside of the scope of his authority. To this extent, she alleges that her
positions with the County as a law librarian and with the SCBA as executive
director were separate and distinct, as were her employers for those
positions. The plaintiff alleges that defendant Baldwin acknowledged this and
indicated that he had nothing to do with the SCBA. Despite this, the plaintiff
alleges that defendant Baldwin interfered with her employment with defendant
SCBA by improperly using his position to convince defendant SCBA to
terminate her employment. Accordingly, defendant Baldwin’s motion will be
denied on this basis as well.
Defendant Baldwin next argues that the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state
a claim under the First, Fourteenth or Thirteenth Amendments upon which
relief can be granted. To the extent that the plaintiff alleges an intimate
association retaliation claim under either the First or Fourteenth Amendment3,
3
The Supreme Court’s decisions do not clearly indicate whether the right
to marital or intimate association is rooted in the First Amendment, the
Fourteenth Amendment, or both. The Court’s discussion of the right to
intimate association in Roberts is supported mainly by citations to cases
rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
608, 617-18 (1984) (citations omitted). Notwithstanding, Supreme Court cases
following Roberts suggest that the right to intimate association has roots in
the First Amendment as well. See Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Internat’l v. Rotary
(continued...)
11
defendant Baldwin provides that the plaintiff must establish that: (1) she
engaged in conduct or speech protected by the First Amendment; (2) the
government responded with retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of
ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights; and (3) the
protected activity caused the retaliation. Thomas v. Independence Township,
463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006). Defendant Baldwin argues that the plaintiff
does not meet any of these elements.
There is no doubt that the plaintiff enjoys the right to intimate
association in relation to her marriage which she claims she was exercising
at all relevant times. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, supra. It is alleged that the
3
(...continued)
Club of Durante, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987); City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490
U.S. 19, 25 (1989); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 698 n. 26
(2000)
There appears to be a circuit split on the issue with the majority of
circuits, including the Third Circuit, finding a right to intimate association
protected under the First Amendment, as well as an intimate association or
privacy right protected under the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process clause. See generally Nancy Catherine Marcus, The Freedom of
Intimate Association in the Twenty First Century, 16 GEO. MASON U. CIV.
RTS. L.J. 269, 287 & n. 95 (2006) (noting the split). Cases in Middle District
of Pennsylvania provide that it is the First Amendment which protects the
freedom of intimate association. See e.g., Mills v. City of Harrisburg, 589
F.Supp.2d 544, 554 n. 9 (M.D.Pa. 2008) (rejecting First Amendment right of
intimate association claim by plaintiff charged with patronizing a prostitute);
Schultz v. Wilson, 2007 WL 4276696 at *9 (M.D.Pa. Dec. 4, 2007) (First
Amendment association claim fails under either expressive or intimate
association theory).
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plaintiff was fired from her position with the defendant SCBA, allegedly at the
behest of defendant Baldwin after exercising this right, which would be an
action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his
First Amendment rights. However, completely missing from the plaintiff’s
retaliation claim is any sufficient causal connection. To this extent, the plaintiff
does not provide any factual support for her claim that defendant Baldwin took
the actions he allegedly did because the plaintiff had exercised her right to
marital or intimate association. The plaintiff instead alleges in her complaint
that “[f]or reasons known only to him . . . [defendant Baldwin] . . . decided to
punish Plaintiff for quitting her job as law librarian.” She goes on to allege that
defendant Baldwin contacted the defendant SCBA to secure her termination
and intended to hurt her “solely because she quit her job as law librarian
under his jurisdiction.” Such factual allegations do not sufficiently allege that
the plaintiff’s marital or intimate association had anything to do with defendant
Baldwin’s alleged actions.
Moreover, there is some guidance for the notion that, in making an
intimate association claim, the plaintiff must establish that the challenged
action “directly and substantially interfered with” the intimate relationship. See
Freebery v. Coons, 589 F.Supp.2d 409, 421 (D.Del. 2008) (quoting Lyng v.
Int’l Union, et al., 485 U.S. 360, 365 (1988)), aff’d, 355 Fed.Appx. 645 (3d Cir.
13
2009). The plaintiff has made no such allegations in this case.
Since the plaintiff has failed to allege a sufficient causal connection
between the exercise of her constitutional right to intimate association and her
termination from employment at the SCBA, and has failed to allege that the
challenged action had any direct or substantial interference on her
relationship, defendant Baldwin’s motion to dismiss will be granted and the
plaintiff’s complaint dismissed, with prejudice, on this basis.
To the extent that the plaintiff attempts to allege a Thirteenth
Amendment claim, the Thirteenth Amendment states:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.
U.S. Const. Amendment XIII. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, the
Thirteenth Amendment was adopted with the “general intent to prohibit
conditions ‘akin to African slavery . . .’” United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S.
931 (1988) (quoting Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332-333 (1916)).
Defendant Baldwin argues that there are no specific allegations showing
that the plaintiff was required to continue working either by force or threat of
force, or was otherwise forced to perform “involuntary servitude”. See United
14
States v. Kozminski, supra.; Steirer v. Bethlehem Area School Dist., 987 F.2d
989 (3d Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds, Troster v. Pa. State Dep’t
Corr., 65 F.3d 1086, 1090 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d
1002 (3d Cir. 1993). While the plaintiff alleges that defendant Baldwin
counseled her that retiring and using her pension for her mortgage was “a big
mistake”, he argues that she does not allege that he otherwise threatened her
with any type of injury or harm. In her opposing brief, the plaintiff does not
substantively respond to this argument and, instead, simply provides a
number of blanket case citations. It is not for the court to make the plaintiff’s
case for her or otherwise decipher the applicability of the cases cited to by the
plaintiff. The plaintiff has made no substantive argument in opposition to
defendant Baldwin’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s Thirteenth Amendment
claim. As such, defendant Baldwin’s motion to dismiss will be granted on this
basis and the plaintiff’s complaint dismissed with prejudice.
Defendant Baldwin also argues that the plaintiff has failed to state a
claim for tortious interference with an employment contract. Defendant
Baldwin points out that, under Pennsylvania law, in order to state a claim for
tortious interference with an employment contract, a plaintiff must show:
(1) the existence of a contractual relationship, or prospective
contractual relationship, between the complainant and a third
party; (2) purposeful action by the defendant, specifically intended
to harm the existing relationship, or to prevent a prospective
15
relationship from occurring; (3) the absence of privilege or
justification on the part of the defendant; and (4) actual legal
damage. Pelagatti v. Cohen, 370 Pa.Super. 422, 536 A.2d 1337,
1343 (1987).
Reed v. Chambersburg Area Sch. Dist., 951 F.Supp.2d 706, 728 (M.D.Pa.
2013. In Pennsylvania, at will employment is presumed unless there is a
specific contract to the contrary. Nix v. Temple University, 596 A.2d 1132,
1135 (Pa.Super. 1991). “Evidence that the employer offered “a permanent
job,” “life-long employment,” or work on a “long term project” is insufficient, as
are claims that are too vague to demonstrate a specific employment term.
See Murray v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 782 F.2d 432, 435 (3d Cir. 1986)
(citations omitted). Here, while the plaintiff generally alleges that “[t]here was
a longstanding employment contract between Plaintiff and Defendant, Bar”,
defendant Baldwin argues that the plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient
allegations defining any such contract in order to overcome the at-will
presumption. In her opposing brief, the plaintiff, again, does not substantively
respond to this argument and, instead, simply provides a string of case
citations. For the reasons discussed relating to the plaintiff’s Thirteenth
Amendment claim, defendant Baldwin’s motion to dismiss the tortious
interference claim will be granted on this basis and the plaintiff’s complaint will
be dismissed with prejudice.
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B.
Defendant SCBA’s Motion to Dismiss
In its motion to dismiss, defendant SCBA argues that Count Two of the
plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because the plaintiff has not pled
sufficient facts to state a claim against it for denying her a federal
constitutional or statutory right in terminating her at will employment. The
plaintiff alleges in Count Two that because the defendant SCBA essentially
conspired with defendant Baldwin, a state actor, defendant SCBA assumed
that state actor status. Since the court has dismissed the underlying
substantive claim, any such claim based upon agreement or conspiracy must
also fail. See Dykes v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 68 F.3d 1564, 1570
(3d Cir. 1995) (conspiracy claim need not be reached where underlying
substantive claim is dismissed). As such, defendant SCBA’s motion to
dismiss will be granted in this respect.
Defendant SCBA also argues that the plaintiff has failed to state
sufficient facts for a prima facie tort or IIED based upon the termination of her
employment. To state a cognizable IIED claim, a plaintiff must plead that the
defendant’s conduct (1) was intentional or reckless; (2) was extreme and
outrageous; (3) actually caused the distress; and (4) caused distress that was
severe. Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1998);
Wisniewski v. Johns-Mansville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 85 (3d Cir. 1987); Mulgrew
17
v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 868 F. Supp. 98, 103 (E.D. Pa. 1994). To meet this
high threshold, the plaintiff must allege conduct that is “so outrageous in
character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible grounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized
society.” Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 754 (Pa. 1998); see also Mulgrew,
868 F. Supp. at 103 (explaining that the conduct must be “so extreme in
nature as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency such that it would be
regarded as utterly intolerable to civilized society”). Conduct arising in the
employment context will rarely rise to the level of outrageousness necessary
to support an IIED claim. Hampton v. Tokai Fin. Servs., Inc., 1999 WL 83934,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1999); see also Cox, 861 F.2d at 395 (“[I]t must be
recognized that it is extremely rare to find conduct in the employment context
that will rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to provide a basis for
recovery for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.”). In addition
to requiring that a plaintiff establish that the conduct complained of was
outrageous, “the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has required that the plaintiff
present competent medical evidence to support the claim.” Britt v. Chestnut
Hill Coll., 632 A.2d 557, 561 (Pa. Super. 1993).
In this case, even assuming the plaintiff’s allegations are true and that
defendant SCBA agreed with defendant Baldwin to terminate the plaintiff’s
18
employment in order to appease defendant Baldwin and win his favor, this
does not rise to the level of outrageous behavior so as to meet the
requirements of a claim for IIED. As such, defendant SCBA’s motion to
dismiss will be granted in this respect and Count Four of the plaintiff’s
complaint will be dismissed.
IV.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, an appropriate order shall issue.
s/Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
Date: September 29, 2017
O:\Mannion\shared\MEMORANDA - DJ\CIVIL MEMORANDA\2016 MEMORANDA\16-2008-01.wpd
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